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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation investigates the normative construction of a politics of language and 
community in north-west Wales (United Kingdom).  It is based on ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted primarily between January 2007 and April 2008, with central participant-observation 
settings in primary-level state schools and in the teaching-spaces and hallways of a university.  
Its primary finding is an account of the gap between the national visibility and the cultural 
(in)visibility communities of speakers of the indigenous language of Wales (Cymraeg, or 
“Welsh”).  With one exception, no public discourse has yet emerged in Wales that provides an 
explicit framework or vocabulary for describing the cultural community that is anchored in 
Cymraeg.  One has to live those meanings even to know about them.  The range of social 
categories for living those meanings tends to be constructed in ordinary conversations as some 
form of nationalism, whether political, cultural, or language nationalism.  Further, the negatively 
valenced category of nationalism current in English-speaking Britain is in tension with the 
positively valenced category of nationalism current among many who move within Cymraeg-
speaking communities.  Thus, the very politics of identity are themselves political since the line 
between what is political and what is not, is itself subject to controversy.  The result is what I call 
the “submergence” of Cymraeg-oriented cultural communities: People who would say Cymraeg 
is an essential part of their personality and communities mark out cultural space for their sense of 
continuity (to the past, to others) in ways that do not require or enable them to make any 
substantive cultural claims. 
 Within these settings of a modalized Welsh culture—always only partially expressed— 
indigeneity and ethnic difference are symbolized by the emblematic and lived importance of 
Cymraeg, while the significance of Cymraeg tends to be implicitly conveyed by means of overt 
references to “Welshness”.  This cultural submergence of the resources for Cymraeg-centered 
identity seems motivated and sustained by the fact that it produces a haven from holiday-goers 
and English patriots who do not value Welsh cultural features as highly as do those who take 
pride in the Cymraeg-centered cultural community.  In light of these features of local life, I 
suggest several terms of art—including “language demesne” and “language corridor”—because 
they are more fitting of local politics than is the idea of a (global) language community.  
 This dissertation also contributes a theoretical basis for examining the pragmatics of 
language communities, which requires differentiating phenomenal-level semiotic analyses from 
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investigations of the dynamics of cultural discourse.  The “obvious” empirical situation in 
Wales—as analyzed using a Peircean-phenomenological semiotics—runs contrary to the 
relatively opaque and counter-empirical cultural dynamics in Wales.  As a result, this account of 
the tensions between semiotic descriptions and cultural dynamics signals a wrinkle in received 
theories of metapragmatics.  Conventionally, metapragmatics makes sense of the text–discourse 
relation, but not the relations between discourse and consciousness because theories of 
metapragmatics apply only to the former.  Unless the relationship of text-and-discourse  to 
consciousness is explicated at the epistemological level of analysis, ethnographic descriptions of 
locales within language communities—particularly those rife with language politics—can take 
on the appearance of an ontology of human kinds.  Given this condition, any broad account of 
the cultural dynamics of language and community must take an analytic position regarding the 
relationship between the surface-level of semiotics and the historical and cultural processes of 
community constitution. 
 My approach engages directly with the neglected conflict between the strategy of 
primordialist essentialism and that of constructivism.  The analytic strategy and theoretical 
perspective of this dissertation avoids the scholarly tendency to treat certain local conceptions as 
misconstruals of sociocultural life.  Instead, they are treated as locally valid and proper 
constitutings of divisible community.  Academics would be no less inclined to reject analogous 
conceptual entailments in their cultural worlds despite their commitment to the view that 
sociocultural realities are constructed.  The position adopted here underwrites an account that 
denaturalizes without denaturing the essentializing claims (e.g., of language activists) in north-
west Wales. 
 In engaging with current analytic strategies in linguistic anthropology, my “inferentialist” 
and pragmatistic strategy frames the politicizing of language and community in north-west 
Wales using an alternative to linguistic indexes or icons, which are grounded in an empirical 
sense of necessity.  The framework adopted here envisions an empirical field organized not only 
by necessary principles of Welsh belonging that are practiced or not, but by tensions among 
many different “modal” types of constraints—normative principles that are inferable from 
community-specific ways of enacting belonging to a particular sociocultural imaginary that owes 
its coherence to language affinity.  Consequently, this dissertation treats languages themselves as 
inhabitable and provides a theoretical justification for doing so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
◄ LANGUAGE FOR WALES ► 
 
Eu ner a volant Their God they shall adore 
Eu hiaith a gadwant Their language they shall keep 
Eu tir a gollant Their land they shall lose 
Ond gwyllt Walia. Except wild Wales.1 
 
 
FINDING ONESELF IN NORTH-WEST WALES 
National versus Cultural Visibility 
 This dissertation investigates the sociocultural conditions of how people express—and 
live—their sense of cultural belonging in the north-west part of the principality of Wales, in the 
United Kingdom (hereafter “UK”).  Because this topic concerns normative forms of 
consciousness and action, and because the relevant sociocultural conditions are dominated by 
issues of language and community, I call this “the pragmatics of language community”.  People 
throughout Wales accept, at least tacitly, that there are special resources of Welsh identity to be 
found in the indigenous complex of practices and cultural heritage.  Many of the participants in 
certain cultural traditions of Wales derive their identity in great part from a cultural complex that 
is bound, through everyday banal practices, to the indigenous language (language code and 
associated forms of thinking and feeling).  Those who do participate in that community largely 
by orientation to the indigenous language know in their heart of hearts that this community 
represents their national identity.  Those who do not participate in it feel (we might say, in their 
                                                 
1  In Wild Wales, published in 1862, travel writer Gorge Borrow quoted several verses in an epigraph.  Borrow 
explicitly linked his book’s title to these verses by his use of that epigraph, where he identified these verses as part 
of “The Destiny of Britons”.  In the fifth chapter of Wild Wales, Borrow also gave his own free translation of these 
verses (presented above).  The actual song/poem is “Yr Awdl Fraith [Awdl of Varieties]” (an awdl is a highly 
respected lyrical form in Welsh literary traditions, sometimes glossed as an ode).  It is typically attributed to the 
early medieval poet/bard, Taliesin; however, William F. Skene attributed it to the later, Tenth-Century figure of 
Jonas Athraw o Fynyw on p. 75 of volume XII (1866) of Archaeologia Cambrensis, Third Series, Number XLV. 
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“head of heads”) that a focus on the source of identity in the daily practice within that 
community would, if taken as directly representative of an empirical Welsh identity, 
misrepresent and overdetermine perceptions of Welsh identity. 
 Wales presents particular challenges to the study of the sociocultural conditions of these 
ways of expressing and living a sense of Welsh cultural belonging.  One of these is that people 
who do not seem to differ greatly from the English ethnic majority in the UK make claims to be 
fundamentally different from the English.  Thus, while the expressions of identity in Wales 
involve powerful and deep claims, the context of comparison seems superficial.  Second, to 
researchers from the US, Wales appears entirely familiar and not especially different from life in 
the US.  This makes it difficult to identify what might be particularly Welsh features of life in 
Wales.  In the particular institution of schooling in Wales, on which my dissertation research 
focused, teachers in Wales seem to follow more or less the same pedagogical and administrative 
principles teachers follow in California or Illinois (or Israel, see Golden 2006, whose 
descriptions resonate strongly with my experiences in Wales).  The lack of noticeable cultural 
differences is accentuated by the formality of schooling.  That formality makes schooling a 
special area of ethnography in anthropology that stands in contrast to the prototypical kinds of 
ethnographic investigation, where social interaction is less structured and events are much more 
open-ended, unfolding into novel arenas of social action. 
 These two ethnographic challenges are entwined in a more significant fact: most Welsh 
claims of difference are not well articulated.  They tend to revolve around tokens of nationality, 
such as national symbols (e.g., flags, anthems, and costumes), sports, and the traditional religious 
conflict between England and Wales, which is mild compared to other political-religious 
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conflicts in the region.  The Welsh national tokens do not make for great contrast to the 
comparable symbols and traditional religion of England. 
 A large minority in Wales, however, center their claims of difference in a language that 
they treat almost as a part of the natural world—as unchanging and as old as the rocks and 
mountains that form the landscapes of Wales.  If one does not join such a language world, it is 
difficult to appreciate the substantiality of such an essential part of identity.  Notably, in this 
connection, in my many conversations with cultural anthropologists and with linguistic 
anthropologists, many of the former found it hard to see how language identity in Wales could 
take on such sociopolitical significance.  Linguistic anthropologists, however, recognized the 
phenomena in Wales as a general and familiar concept.  Neither perspective left to Wales any 
claim to uniqueness, which is not surprising or alarming, but neither position lends itself to 
appreciation of particularity in Wales.  This dissertation is concerned with the social reality of 
cultural and national belonging not as a trait shared by many cultural communities, but in the 
particularistic qualities of the claim to special, particular resources of identity.  A cornerstone of 
such a social reality is the particularity of belonging “here in Wales”. 
 Renato Rosaldo (1988, 1989) made an important observation when he famously 
excoriated the selective, unofficial use of the term, “culture”, by traditional anthropologists. The 
unofficial use of “culture” plots the variability of difference solely among communities of people 
who are not direct descendants of the western European legacy.  This observation is particularly 
remarkable when it is set alongside Rosaldo’s note that these communities of non-European 
People of Culture do not include those Others who lack the “elaborate rituals, material culture” 
and complex subsistence practices of traditional ethnographic interest (Rosaldo 1988:80).  In the 
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latter case, these people’s cultural features seem so irrelevant as to be invisible to the 
ethnographic gaze.2  
 Rosaldo’s critique of a traditional concept of culture points to the problem of visible 
culture, an artifact of anthropological analysis that results from ethnographers’ invisible 
commitments.  In some parts of the world, having culture according to the perspective Rosaldo 
critiqued can be dangerous.  It can also be dangerous to be so anthropologically insignificant as 
to appear to lack it since these subalterns are exploited by those who do have it, as well as by 
powerful groups with imperial aspirations.  In the national setting of Wales, and other cultural 
settings offer parallel cases for study—it might not be dangerous to be identified as a person of 
Welsh culture.  It is, however, disadvantageous to be so identified in Wales.  While many boldly 
display the Welsh national flag, few who identify with Welsh cultural traditions want to stand 
out or be put on display in association with the substantive features of “their” different culture 
(for reasons ranging from self-confident modesty to repressed shame). 
 National visibility differs from cultural visibility, then.  Local people in north-west Wales 
who have an affinity for “indigenous” Wales do not value cultural visibility, especially.  
However, they do value an ongoing past—having something to carry on, traditions, including an 
“old, old language”.  It is difficult to perform that particular script—to be Welsh by means of the 
substantive features of “their” different culture—let alone to make it explicit, in the absence of a 
common, widely intelligible language about things like culture and difference, which are lacking 
among laypersons and even, as Rosaldo observed, among academics. 
                                                 
2  My reading of what Rosaldo (1988) called “anthropology’s informal filing system” is that it is a somewhat 
enlightened version of Lewis Henry Morgan’s (non-evolutionary) tripartite scheme of savages, barbarians, and 
civilized people.  The civilized people, only recently becoming ethnographic subjects themselves, require no 
introduction: They are “us” (i.e., occupiers of the rhetorical subject-position from which any producer of 
authoritative knowledge speaks and from which most consumers of authoritative knowledge read).  The analogous 
barbarians are the subjects (“cultures”) of interest to traditional anthropology, while the analogous savages are the 
anthropological subalterns. 
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 During my fieldwork, I constantly reminded myself that even the notion of cultural 
difference is particular to the history and cultural resources of the people making such claims.  
By the end of this dissertation, I will have described a number of ways of imagining social 
realities of cultural and national belonging not as a trait shared by many cultural communities, 
but in the particularistic qualities of the claim to special, particular resources of identity.  Of 
course, the imagination of differences among the Welsh relative to the prototypic ethnic group in 
Britain (i.e., the English) has had a long history—being imagined from a variety of perspectives.  
The English perspective has tended to accentuate the “wildness” of Wales.  This is where I begin 
my introduction to Wales. 
 
Wild Wales3 
 Wales encompasses around eight thousand square miles in area, is home to about three 
million people, and is largely rural and mountainous.  Wales’ capital, Cardiff, lies in the south-east 
of the nation, much as does the capital of England and the United Kingdom: London.  English-
language media have long projected an image of the north-west as a wild and untamed territory.  This 
idea of Wales as wild and untamed, more generally, emerged due to the different cultural 
expectations of English persons who travelled from major cities in England to the rural north-west of 
Wales.  This is largely due to the alienation that monolingual English-speaking people have felt in 
encountering others who carry out the activities of their lives in another “medium”.  Urbanization of 
the south-east of Wales brought with it a linguistic Anglicization that the rural areas of Wales have 
resisted.  The need to ferry Irish members of parliament to Britain in the early Twentieth Century 
instigated the building of roads all across the north of Wales from Holyhead to Chester.  Were it not 
                                                 
3  George Borrow gave a modern form to the idea of Wales as a remote place in his famous travel-journalistic 
account of his walking tour of “Wild Wales”, first published in 1862.  In the epigraph, Borrow capitalized both ‘W’s 
of “Wild Wales”. 
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Chester 
YNYS MON 
for that official demand for access, the north-west part of Wales might have remained “wild” for 
much longer. 
 North Wales offers many tourist resorts and has attracted many persons living in England 
who desire either a holiday home or a retirement location far from the busy cities of England.  This 
attraction is aided by the fact that English persons perceive Wales as distant temporally, as well as 
spatially from those cities.  I have heard the so-called “incomers” from England say that parts of 
north Wales seemed to them to be fifteen or even thirty years back in time, compared to places like  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.1: Fieldwork area and major roads in Wales.  The cross-hatched region in the north-west is the area my research 
covered.  The map gives a sense of the scope of traffic arteries; the winding A470 that runs north to south varies between a 
one- to three-lane road, the A5 in the north is a two-lane freeway for most of its length, while the M4 in the south 
resembles a landing strip with parallel lane markers and median barriers. 
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Liverpool, Manchester, and Birmingham.  English informants mentioned a number of features of 
contemporary life in north-west Wales that evoked for them days of yore.  These included the rural 
expanses and paucity of urban development, the large number of sheep and pastures, gas stations that 
close for the night, the low level of crime, an allegedly slower paced lifestyle, a sense of close-knit 
community, and nostalgic steam railway lines. 
 The uneven presence of the new and the old in north Wales—the pastiche of previous eras 
and the current modern era—enables the perception of Wales as somehow less than modern.  In 
other areas of Britain, the new and the old of modern industry are mixed together, so that by 
highlighting the new (e.g., new designs in architecture) and silently and selectively dismissing the old 
(e.g., manufacturing sites and their residential communities), people construct a coherent sense of 
modernity.  While north-west Wales is known for farming, the terrain of north-west Wales is so 
mountainous that sheepherding is the most common form of agriculture.  At least half of the region 
falls within national park boundaries.  Tokens of high modernity are rare; there are no skyscrapers, 
for example.  The impression one receives is that of a rural form of life and even well-inhabited areas 
look like scenes of countryside, many of which are postcard perfect.  As a result, the unevenness of 
the new and old in north-west Wales tends to emphasize the old. 
 As originally envisioned, my dissertation research was to be about this blending of the 
new and the old in Welsh people’s imagining of history; in particular, of teachers’ teaching of 
national identity to their students in public schools through a re-appropriation of the stage for  
telling such histories.  During an eight-week preliminary research trip in 2002, I investigated the  
range of Welsh heritage-and-history instruction practices used by teachers at public schools in 
a county in north-west Wales: Gwynedd (pronounced /gwÍ.nɛð /  ; the double-d at the end is  
pronounced the same way as the voiced /th/ in “bother”.).  I examined how teachers had 
 9
chosen to respond to the devolution of educational policy (beginning in 1988)—the delegation of 
powers of the central government to regional administrations—and any concomitant changes in 
the cultural and educational climate.  I anticipated finding that teachers’ creative capacities and 
personal desires would lead to a widespread practice in the county of teaching a particularly 
Welsh content for the subject of history.  My conclusions, however, were largely negative.  In 
order for me to express the alternative that emerged, some framework of Welsh history is useful. 
 
The Historical Geography of Wales 
 It is telling that the ethnic label, “Welsh”, is derived from an Anglo-Saxon proper noun 
(Wælisc, from Wealh) meaning something like “the foreigners”, and today is the common self-
identifying term for people of Wales.  “Welsh”, in the European context, is comparable, then, to 
“Indian” in the US and Canadian contexts, but it has not been subject to reappropriation as the 
latter term has although it has a fairly non-political connotation.  Of course, there is a native term 
for being “Welsh”; more than one, in fact.  These include the plural form, “Cymry”; the 
masculine term for a Welsh person, “Cymro”; and the feminine, singular form, “Cymraes”.  
Similarly, the indigenous language is “Cymraeg”, a nominative form that, being singular, 
neglects regional variation. 
 In Cymraeg, one can also differentiate between Welshness [cymreictod], the name of the 
nation, “Cymru,” and the people of Wales, the “Cymry”.  There is no convenient way in English 
to distinguish people whose family members have lived in Wales for generations and yet who do 
not or cannot speak the Cymraeg.  Typically, such distinctions lie in background information and 
cultural knowledge.  However, such expressions as “Cymro glan” [pure Welshman] and 
“Cymry-Cymraeg” [Cymraeg-speaking Welsh people] have an overtly ideological flavor that 
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indicates who the “real” Welsh are; and who are, by contrast, members of “Cymru-diGymraeg” 
[non-Cymraeg-speaking Wales].  In north-west Wales, the latter are often referred to as “Sais” 
[English], from “Sax(on)”, and they speak Saesneg [English]. 
 Cymraeg belongs to the Brythonic group of the Celtic family of languages, which have 
the distinctive feature of initial consonantal mutations.4  Thus, the nominative-class lexical form 
CYMRAEG is expressed as “Gymraeg” when the preposition “yn” is added to it: “yn Gymraeg”.  
There are three systems of mutations, affecting in total, nine consonants of the twenty-eight 
letters of the Cymraeg alphabet.  Cymraeg is frequently associated with indigenous Wales in 
opposition to the immediate, culturally salient contrast of England and Englishness.  Although, in 
English-language contexts, Cymraeg is typically called “Welsh” or “the Welsh language”, I do 
not follow this practice for reasons that I elaborate below—which is to take a unique political 
stand of my own. 
 In legal terms, Wales is a principality of the sovereign world-state known as the UK.  
This classification marks a set of contrasts between Wales and the historical kingdom of 
England.  There is no historiographic position outside presentism to justify the distinction 
between principality and kingdom.  Nonetheless, during the Tudor Era, England became a world 
power that had established a history of relative stability and continuity, of which Wales was a 
backwoods territory (as seen from England).  Wales did not and, one could argue, still has not 
established such an internal stability and continuity within the UK state.  One kind of contrast 
between England and Wales, then, is the lesser military, economic, and population potential of 
Wales relative to England.  Another kind of historical contrast is the indigenous Welsh social 
imaginary that privileges kinship relations, rather than a state.  This importance of kinship is 
                                                 
4  The fact that there are eight digraphs (ch, dd, ff, ng, ll, ph, rh, and th) causes orthographical conflicts in 
predominantly English contexts; thus, I capitalize both elements of each digraph in this dissertation when any 
digraph appears in the initial position—which happens to be an unusual practice. 
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illustrated in Wales’ indigenous legal traditions (codified in the Tenth Century) by the fact that 
the persons who are offended by a crime are the victim’s kin, rather than the local chief or ruler; 
and compensation is due to the former, not the latter. 
 The designation of “principality” is also a legacy of indigenous attempts to unify Wales 
under a ruler [tywysog].  The English politically equivalent term, “prince”, was shrewdly 
appropriated by the Norman-English King, Edward I.  When England finally conquered Wales in 
the early 1280s, Edward invested his son as Prince of Wales, which marked the turning point in 
conquest from invasion to administration.  Previously, princes of Wales came from the 
aristocracy in Wales, to which a significant amount of cultural labor was devoted in the form of 
genealogy and praise poetry.  Edward II had no place in that aristocracy.  Nonetheless, 
particularly because the title came to signify the heir apparent to the throne of England, it was a 
symbol of the kingdom’s dominance over the principality. 
 In physical terms, Wales is often called a double peninsula, bounded on three sides by ocean 
(composed of the Irish Sea, Saint George’s Canal, and the Bristol Canal).  At the risk of reifying 
certain geographic constructs, Wales has long been connected by way of the conduit of ocean travel 
to the other “Celtic” countries: Ireland, Scotland, Cornwall, and the Isle of Man (The last two have 
far less significance in the current state context, but are significant in the terms of the contact eras of 
Anglo-Saxon, Viking, or Norman invasions prior to the Thirteenth Century, when Wales was 
conquered.).  As a set of “nations” recognized in collective imagination, the core territory of today’s 
UK consists of England and the so-called Celtic fringe: Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. 
 The formation of the UK in 1707 was the culmination of centuries of historical movement 
(at least, in retrospect) toward consolidating the contiguous territories of Wales, England, and 
Scotland.  That history did not go away with the Act of Union of 1707, but constitutes part of the 
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UK’s unwritten traditions that make up its political constitution, as well as its intra-state tensions.  
At least since the 1700s, Wales has dealt with ethnic tension mainly via expressive culture—
despite some minimal paramilitary organization and bombing events—and through a mode that 
might be connected to resources offered by Tenth-Century, codified Welsh law, involving the 
burning of property owned by English residents and government agencies.  One of the products 
of this history is the Welsh emphasis on toleration of English persons in such state institutions as 
schools, while opposing England’s cultural and linguistic hegemony in these same institutions. 
 The histories of Wales and England have been entwined closely at least since the Twelfth 
Century and seldom have been free of mutual tensions.  Wales’ distinctiveness relative to England, 
then, is a complex affair.  When in Wales, it often does seem as if the world beyond one’s village or 
county consists only of England and the rest of Wales—partitioned and sequestered away from the 
rest of the world and even from Scotland and Northern Ireland.  In ordinary conversations in many 
parts of Wales, the England and Wales relationship is the paramount one—and only seldom an 
antagonistic one.  Welsh persons I encountered during my fieldwork in north Wales said they travel 
to England much more frequently than they do to Scotland or Northern Ireland (and even more than 
to the opposite end of Wales.  It is only at roads going through part of England, when traveling from 
or to the north of Wales, to or from the south, that roads are straight, are more than two lanes wide, 
and consistently post high speed limits. 
 Besides England, the two constituent parts (to use the legal, constitutional phrase) of the UK 
that are most similar to Wales are Scotland and Northern Ireland.  They feature in the Welsh 
imagination of the UK as discrete entities in relation to Wales most often in sports events, such as 
rugby competitions.  While this experience-near aspect of everyday encounters with the internal and 
external borders of Wales is important in everyday cultural life, experience-far encounters of nations 
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tend to be conceived in terms of political and athletic distinctiveness.  However, because “nation” 
and “country” are used differently in Great Britain than they are used in the United States, it is worth 
briefly describing the political economic aspects of the different nations of the UK to grasp how these 
differ from both world states (like Canada) and federal states (like Illinois). 
 In addition to national claims to cultural distinctiveness (an issue I do not find pertinent 
here), Scotland is distinguished at the national level by its already having had strong political and 
economic institutions, which it maintained, when its sovereignty was replaced by that of the UK 
(as the “Kingdom of Great Britain”) at the significantly late date of 1707.  These institutions 
helped Scotland to take full advantage of the Industrial Revolution (Davies 1989).  Having 
developed these institutions at the center of the developing capitalist system in Britain, Scotland 
is widely thought to have produced a native elite (like England) that was well-positioned to enter 
the late-modern era, despite Scotland’s loss of autonomy. 
 Northern Ireland was joined to the (thereafter: United) Kingdom of Great Britain in 1801, 
and remained part of the UK after the Republic of Ireland gained independence in 1922.  Yet, 
like Wales, it was part of an indigenous territory that was conquered well before the rise of 
modern agricultural capitalism.  This Irish territory had been conquered by Normans, then 
expanded and made into an English kingdom by Henry VIII.  Scholars tend to characterize 
Northern Ireland as being different from other parts of the UK, generally in two ways.  One 
difference is Northern Ireland’s political division along religious lines—as connected to 
idealized conceptions of democracy from the Protestant perspective, and social forms of 
community and communication from the Catholic perspective (Kelleher 2003).  Northern Ireland 
also stands out for the widespread use of retributive violence, as well as political actions, in the 
attempt to achieve a generally acceptable level of autonomy from the UK. 
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ABERGWAITH 
The Area of My Fieldwork 
 There is no question that history plays a major role in conceptions of national identity for 
people in Wales.  Indeed, Appendix A elaborates on the interactions of historical narratives and 
the social imaginary related to a sense of community tied to Cymraeg.  Nonetheless, when I 
began the fourteen-months of dissertation fieldwork between January 2007 and April 2008, I had 
already gathered enough data (fieldnotes, transcripts of recorded interviews with history 
teachers, government discussion papers, etc.) to allow me to see that questions about history 
instruction were not the central questions I should have been asking.  Because I was concerned 
with the teaching of identity at state schools and because history instruction was not the primary 
locus for the teaching of national identity, this was probably the wrong region of questions for 
me to be asking.  I only recognized this fully, and arrived at the “right” region of questions, after 
beginning the writing up of this dissertation.  For me to convey how anyone could fail to 
recognize what are the right questions after preliminary fieldtrips requires that I provide my 
readers with a deeper appreciation of both the surface and the depths of cultural issues in north-
west Wales.  The message does not hinge as much on pedagogical practice as on the broader 
perception of the politics of language and cultural citizenship.  The perspective I adopt in 
presenting these cultural surfaces and depths, itself draws on some of those depths in moving 
gradually from the cultural “surface” to the “deeper” sociocultural realities that I investigate in 
this dissertation.  My first cultural surface is the local cultural history and geography of the 
region in which I carried out my fieldwork. 
 I had arrived in Wales on my fieldtrip devoted to principal dissertation research on 
January 1, 2007.  In preliminary trips to north-west Wales in January and July 2005, I had 
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established an arrangement with the headteacher of a junior school (ages 3-11).  This school was 
to be the anchor for my research.  When arriving in Wales in January 2007, I understood (albeit 
inaccurately) that the arrangement still held.  My more recent communication with him in late 2006 
suggested that it did.  Accordingly, I found housing in that school district (“catchment area”)  
in the northwest corner of Wales. 
 This district lay within a small part of one of the unitary authorities of Wales, which is  
called Gwynedd [gw Í .nɛð] county.  Gwynedd is populated by about 120,000 residents and 
encompasses nearly 1,000 square miles.  To adopt the local or official reference frames in the  
context of this and adjacent counties could ultimately suggest to the informed reader which 
catchment area/school district it is in which this project was sited.  To avoid identification of 
actual schools that were the sites of research in the service of maintaining privacy and 
confidentiality, I therefore drew arbitrary boundary lines around this area of north-west Wales 
(see Fig. 0.1 above).  The area of north-west Wales in which my research was centered, cohered 
together according to present and historical occupational mobility, and could be studied 
adequately within a six to twelve month period. 
 This area forms a salient territory for my project because the area is, and has been since 
1870, a confluence of labor-productive forces, apart from whatever linguistic, aesthetic-cultural, 
political, or social-affinitive factors overlap across and within the area. This fact has shaped 
settlement patterns over the last century and a half, with implications for north Wales’ recent 
history of religion, in particular, and its social history more generally.  Between 1870 and 1950, 
laborers travelled for work toward the eastern edges of the area.  During that time, this area was 
the industrial center for the north-west of Wales, being comprised of several quarry sites that 
produced the largest quantities of slate of any place in the world, an important commodity prior 
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to the introduction of plastics.  Because of the pattern of human movement that resulted from the 
relationship between where people lived and where they worked, I came to call the part of north-west 
Wales in which my research was anchored, “Abergwaith” (meaning literally, “mouth of a river 
[aber], characterized by work [gwaith]”).5 
 The laborers in Abergwaith were largely Non-Conformist and this fact shaped the 
establishment of a large number of chapels.  Non-Conformism was a bloc of Protestant 
denominations opposed to the institution of a state religion in Great Britain.  Within Wales 
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Non-Conformism was the primary 
platform from which concepts and discourses about a national community of Wales were 
projected.  The religious sites of Non-Conformism were chapels, whereas the established (i.e., 
state) religion was practiced, were achieved in churches.  The terms of “church” and “chapel” 
took on symbolic meanings about personhood, community, and social values. These terms, in 
turn, came to hold separate relations to the British state (“church”) and the Welsh folk 
(“chapel”). The opposition of these terms, and the ways of life and cultural affiliation they imply, 
                                                 
5  While this is a fictive and novel designation, there is a large number of ways, in Cymraeg, of making reference to 
land and of classifying land according to different uses.  As with English, there are many options for saying that you 
have in mind some part of space on land. One may speak of a district (ardal) or a place (lle), each of which might be 
historically linked to English words.  That is, the /pl/ combination might have been “transphonated” as the lateral 
fricative, /ll/, in “lle”, while “ardal” resembles “area” in certain phonal qualities.  In particular, the consonant and 
vowel of the first syllable of “ardal” and “area”, along with the second-syllable vowel of both words, are the same; 
while the final consonantal value of “ardal” (an alveolar lateral approximant /l/) is very close to that of “area” 
(implied as an intrusive rhotic consonant in some British English pronunciations of “area”, as an alveolar 
approximant /ɹ/ ). 
     In addition, there are Celtic-derived words for a settlement (tref) and a village (pentref, a head settlement).  One 
may also speak of the territory of a people (gwlad), the land or ground itself (tir), a region amenable to settlement 
(bro), a neighborhood (cymdogaeth), a habitat or familiar place (cynefin). But beyond this, place names contain a 
large number of affixes that indicate the adjectival root or stem refers to a place. For example, the house attached to 
the cottage in which I started my principal dissertation research is called Gwynfa, where “gwyn” means “blessed” or 
“white”, and “-fa” means “place”. 
     Further, there are many local ways of dividing the land within contemporary unitary authorities (more or less, 
counties) and within the more particular area I am calling Abergwaith.  These include early medieval groupings of 
settlements (“cantref”—literally, a hundred settlements), a cwmwd (sub-divisions of the cantrefi), abolished but not 
obsolete “civil parishes” defined by ecclesiastic territories established by the Church of England, subdivisions of 
national administrative units (i.e., borough, urban, and rural districts) established in 1894, and land units officially 
called “communities” as established by law in 1972. 
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was a highly charged ensemble.  The building of chapels where Non-Conformists began to 
concentrate in Abergwaith as elsewhere in Wales in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in 
material culture terms, meant the establishment of sites for the networked-construction of 
national identity, in ideational and social terms. 
 After World War Two, a reversal in the direction of movement from residence to labor 
center occurred.  The cities of Bangor and Gwynedd’s county seat of Caernarfon generated the 
capacity to support economically greater numbers of urban dwellers, alongside other, rural, 
economic activities.  After 1950, people whose family had settled in the eastern edges of the area 
travelled for work westerly into the north-west and south-west of the Abergwaith area.  Today, 
professionals and others who work in the university town of Bangor or Caernarfon reside in the rural 
villages that lie on either side of the Menai Straits—separating Gwynedd and the island, Ynys Môn.  
The quarries are no longer worked and no longer supply most of the world’s supply of slate, as they 
did in the early-Twentieth Century. 
 
Keeping Warm and Busy in Abergwaith 
 During my fieldwork, I and my wife lived in one of the many villages that formed in relation 
to the slate quarrying industry of north-west Wales.  Many new homes have been built in the area in 
the last fifty years, including “council housing,” which is publicly subsidized and easily identified by 
the exteriors and the attached rows of flats.  Housing in the area would have been prohibitively 
expensive for us, where even state housing, for which we were not eligible, was more than twice the 
University housing rental costs in Urbana, Illinois.  My wife and I were lucky to find seasonal rental 
accommodation at less than welfare prices.  For the bulk of our stay in Gwynedd, we lived alongside 
a home-owning family that had renovated a set of three, semi-attached quarrymen lodgings, with the 
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characteristic, three-foot wide walls of late Nineteenth-Century construction tradition.  This was 
offered at a leasing rate we could afford because, as our next landlord suggested to us, the owners 
were likely not reporting taxes on our rent. 
 The renovated structure, of some 500 square feet, comprised one and one-half quarrymen 
“cottages”.  Our living room and kitchen once formed a single shelter during the week for several 
quarrymen.  The bedroom and bathroom formed the remaining half of an adjoining cottage.  A 
farmhouse with an extension and a second story was built onto the other one and one-half cottage.  
Renovated cottages across north-west Wales and beyond offer some sense of nostalgic quaintness to 
tourists, but the use of such laborers’ cottages in the “self-catered” and “bed and breakfast” markets 
is less an issue of packaging than it is that these are the most common residential structures.  It is 
clear, from the farmhouse I lived in, that most people try to modernize such structures to whatever 
extent feasible. 
 New energy regulations require owners to make some changes to improve energy efficiency.  
Our own cottage, however, was furnished with a solid fuel burner and the property owners supplied 
coal for burning. 
 Before my principal dissertation research, I had stayed longer than ten days in Wales only 
during the warmer, summer months.  Coming from the United States, the use of coal and its olfactory 
effects stood out as a prominent and distinctive feature of Wales although the scent of coal is just as 
likely to be found on cold days in Liverpool, Birmingham, and London.  I found the sooty, almost 
tangy odor of coal smoke in the winter to be one of my most visceral experiences of north-west 
Wales.  It is a part of post-Victorian-era life that cannot be reproduced in readings of, say, Dickens.  
It has to be experienced.  One smells the coal fumes everywhere when walking along the rows of 
houses in the villages of north-west Wales that sprang up as residential areas for laborers in slate 
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quarrying (or the related shipping industry)—especially in Gwynedd county.  A few of the former 
slate quarrying villages in Gwynedd, such as LLanberis and Betws-y-Coed, are now supported by the 
tourism industry.  Even today, coal is necessary to heat many of the homes in these villages.  This is 
not so much evidence for a choice made between heating fuels, as it is due to the fact that the costs of 
overhauling houses to update them to central air or even radiated heating would be too costly a trade-
off (or simply prohibitive) for most people, even for many professionals within Wales. 
 During my fieldwork in Abergwaith, I would shovel the pieces of coal into a bucket from a 
pile in the coal shed and bring it into our cottage, knocking the goose droppings off of my shoes at 
the threshold.  My wife would return soon after dusk from an archaeological dig near the coast where 
she spent weekdays in the cold, gale force winds that came off the sea, while I worked to gain entry 
to schools for my research.  As it got dark, I (or she) would spend three-quarters of an hour lighting 
the coal fire in our stove—even longer if I had not planned ahead and procured paraffin blocks to 
expedite the deep burning of the coal.  The paraffin “firelighter” blocks, which served a purpose 
similar to lighter fluid for barbecues in the US, were indispensible.  Like the coal smoke, the paraffin 
invaded one’s senses, but with a smell resembling turpentine, which remains on the hands after 
washing.  Both of these evoked the persistent, tangible, but elusive quality of Welsh identity that I 
was studying. 
 In the early months of dissertation research, building the coal fire in evenings was more 
than a metaphor for identity.  Along with preparing and cooking dinner, these evening tasks fell 
to me if for no other reason than to balance my partner’s contribution in subsidizing my research 
by her earning of wages in British currency—much more valuable than US currency, in which 
my grants were issued.  However, it was also true that I was not able, on those evening, to write 
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up research notes from observations in schools because I had not yet gained access to 
classrooms. 
 After arriving in Wales in January 2007, I came to understand over weeks and then months 
of attempts to arrange school visits that the agreement I had with my anchoring junior school and 
its headteacher no longer held.  He gave me access to classrooms only in partial, non-contiguous 
days and I eventually saw a pattern.  The access he gave me was to events in which he was the 
primary organizer—school assemblies, field trips—and yet even these were few and far between.  
As it turned out, the teachers I hoped to learn from and in whose classes I wanted to gather data, 
were highly protective against the intrusion of observers—giving grudging admittance to school 
inspectors every few years and the occasional teacher in training.  This background fact and the 
limited time in Wales I could obtain had already led to my usual methods of seeking access, 
which were rather unusual for the social context of educational institutions in Wales. 
 During my early research, I did not courteously follow norms in the initial stages of 
school ethnography, such as telephoning in order to schedule interviews.  I found telephone and 
scheduling usually met with less success that appearing “on the doorstep”.  Upon eventually 
receiving permission to visit schools, I stayed for a longer period of observation than the usual 
one, two, or (rare except for student teachers) three days.  Once “inside” schools, I did try to 
maintain the implied restrictions as well as I could (e.g., not demanding hours of teachers’ time 
beyond their regular hours of work), which limited the scope of my research, perhaps, but 
seemed to me to be necessary in establishing and maintaining the grounds of mutual respect 
between teachers and researcher.  On the other hand, if I had not visited schools in-person—and, 
in one case, if I had not “hounded” a headteacher who had previously given me approval for a 
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year-long visit, but would not be held to that agreement—I would never have gained access to 
schools. 
 In the latter case, it might be that the headteacher promised something that he thought at 
some level he might not have to deliver on and, eventually, was not as eager to act as broker with 
his teachers on the request.  By contrast, I did not press the point with another headteacher at a 
different school who had pledged support, but then withdrew; in the latter case, there were 
concrete, internal political circumstances that she could and would not articulate to an outsider, 
but which were not locked away from village gossip.  When I did gain that access, my project 
shifted from history instruction to language identity.  The following section explains why. 
 
WHITHER HISTORY? 
Where is History Now? 
 For those, like me, who seek-out histories told “from below” and for Welsh persons 
trying to establish a modernity continuous with the past, the indigenous language and history of 
Wales have a tendency to bond to the self, much like the smell of free-floating coal smoke or of 
paraffin fumes, to which one is exposed in the tedious and lonely ritual of building a coal fire.  
The politicized significance of language and perspectives on history, as well as other 
demonstrative markers of identity, while contested by Welsh residents, travel as if by air.  
Perhaps it is the factor of autobiographical time itself by which these, otherwise accidental, 
features of cultural life become a part of personal and social identity. 
 Like the coal smoke describmentioned above, I found it crucially and ethnographically 
important to take in those scents, fragrant or sour by turn, to allow them to influence my 
participation in, and perhaps my analysis of, life in regions of Wales where identity is politicized.  
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Yet, in the analytic aspects of ethnography, too, the interests that dispose scholars to one stance 
or another are equally volatile; not to say (though they are occasionally), explosive. 
  Most scholars in professional history see things differently from activists who deal with 
the practical realties and legacies of historical processes like colonization.  The former come to 
see the political conditions of earlier periods as somewhat foreign to present-day political 
institutions and our current notions of statehood.  Samuel (1998: 3-4) illustrated this observation 
by historians’ locating the initial moment of the modern British state in ever more recent times—
once said to occur in 1485 (end of the War of the Roses) or 1536 (first Acts of Union), later 
proposed as taking place in the 1590s by another author, and then discovered to have originated 
in the 1740s by a more recent writer.  Historians’ notions of the past become more opaque upon 
further study (Lowenthal 1996: xi).  By contrast, activists (along with other kinds of heritage-
seekers) “clarif[y] pasts so as to infuse them with present purposes” and, through this process, 
they “domesticate” the past (Lowenthal 1996:xi), making it familiar by adopting it as “theirs”.  
Extending Lowenthal’s metaphor of domestication, I suggest that the domesticated past is 
“cultivated” when people treat the past as part of the heritage of their group, as a resource that 
can be used to enrichen present nation-centered projects.  Accordingly, many Welsh activists feel 
and experience that Wales has been a nation at least since a codified set of laws was enacted and 
enforced throughout a unified, Tenth-Century Welsh principality. 
 By representing this dichotomy as a real division, I am also identifying a problem that has 
been recognized from an international Western academic vantage in various areas of scholarship.  
As an intellectual problem in linguistic anthropology, this issue has to do with the shaping of a 
particular form of historicity by the emblematic use of language to stand for the nation (see 
Silverstein 1998a).  This means that language represents the nation; where “represents” can mean 
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three different things (at least)—rhetorically, to be substitutable in discourse for nation; 
cognitively, to invoke the nation in perception; and ontologically, to be the tangible shape of the 
nation. 
 
A Lesson about History Teaching 
 Over the last fifty years in the UK, devolution has demonstrated the willingness of state 
officials to allow the constituent parts of the UK to develop regional policies.  First occurring in 
Ireland, with the relatively abrupt and total independence of the Republic of Ireland in 1922, 
devolution was later seen in minute shifts in public opinion along the “Celtic fringe” in the 
1970s, in the divestment of local policy (e.g., education and agriculture) in the 1980s, and by 
constitutional changes in the 1990s that brought into being political assemblies in Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. 
 Since public education is widely recognized as an institution susceptible to national identity 
projects, and as a site of cultural reproduction within Wales, I decided early to center my research on 
issues surrounding Welsh identity and to focus on history instruction in schools in Wales.  This 
decision was informed by the fact that the 1988 provision of autonomy to education policy-makers in 
Wales by the UK political state resulted in much discussion on how to make Welsh education more 
“Welsh” (Phillips 2004).  The 1999 revision of the Welsh national curriculum, released in January 
2000, included (as did revisions released previously) some products of that discussion.6  The national 
curriculum of 2000 required that a “Welsh dimension” (cwricwlwm cymreig) be included in the 
education provided to pupils in Welsh state schools.  This was an independent part of the curriculum 
                                                 
6  Throughout all of my preliminary and principal dissertation research, with the last fieldtrip ending in March 2008, the 
curriculum released in 2000 remained the official curricular program for instruction in state schools in Wales. 
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that cut across traditional curricular subjects like Mathematics and Science, operating in conjunction 
with them as a “cross-curricular requirement”. 
 The mandate to bring a focus on Welsh identity to multiple school subjects could have led to 
the presence of patriotic versions of British history, focusing on Wales, in classrooms.  While I 
intended to investigate such presences in the field, I was ultimately forced to conclude that either they 
were absent from classrooms or that teachers modified their teaching in my presence.  More critical 
reflection led me to realize that the impulse to use historical accounts to enable expression of group 
cohesion among Welsh children could not be the only factor in curriculum implementation.  
Interaction of the Welsh dimension and the history curriculum could (per hypothesis) mobilize 
resources in other school subjects for a patriotic pedagogy.  However, a conjunction of a new 
opportunity and old motives do not amount to the emergence of the means to do so.  Teachers have 
their own pedagogical strategies and routines, including meeting children’s requests for certain 
topical material.  Discourses and opinions in the larger community also impinge on how teachers 
meet curriculum demands (see Maas 2005). 
 Prior to gaining long-term access to classrooms of schools in north-west Wales, I 
believed that history teaching in Wales might exhibit styles of managing the contested history of 
Wales’ national character.  Historical accounts have the potential to enable expression of group 
cohesion among Welsh persons as in other nations.  Indeed, Welsh nationalists throughout the 
Twentieth Century expressed a felt need for a distinctly “Welsh” recounting of national history.  
Before beginning my preliminary research and based partly on experiences during a non-academic 
trip to Wales in 1995, I believed that I would discover history instruction being used intentionally to 
stage some range of Welsh national identities. 
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 Thus, I imagined that the revolutionary Fourteenth-Century figure of Owain Glyndŵr would 
take a central role in Welsh schooling.7  Glyndŵr used political instability in England to stage a claim 
to independence for Wales in 1400, leading to a failed alliance with two other leaders in Britain, 
whose victory would have led to a three-part division of Britain.  During Glyndŵr’s short revolution, 
Wales was united, a national political assembly was created, and the idea of several other national 
institutions conceived (e.g., a national university on the model of late-medieval European universities 
like those in Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge).  He poses a contrast to a figure like Henry VII (arriving 
on the historical stage fifty years later).  Equally Welsh, Henry VII is credited in some accounts of 
history with the founding of the modern British state.  Teachers and students of English, Irish, or 
Scottish ethnicity are unlikely to have any affinity with the distinctly Welsh hero, Glyndŵr, but 
would recognize Henry VII as a British figure. 
 Shared understandings about Glyndŵr form the potential for a project of constructing a 
distinctly Welsh history in a setting that resembles the modern world and, thus, stakes a claim for the 
legitimacy of a distinct Welsh nation (not to say, “state”).  Such projects have been promoted now 
and again in Wales over the Twentieth Century, particularly by nationalists associated with various 
political parties.  However, I came to realize through my dissertation research fieldwork that the 
idea of a focus on the conflict-oriented figure of Owain Glyndŵr, or the figures of Welsh princes 
in the Middle Ages who fought against English rulers, was unlikely because many perceive it as 
casting Welsh and English relations in an antagonist light—something unsuitable for state 
schooling—even in a devolutionary context (see Maas 2005).  
                                                 
7  I mention this cultural reference because such cultural references and their mutual relations are an intrinsic part of 
understanding the (folk-historiographic features of the) cultural milieu I am describing in more general terms.  The 
/w/ in Cymraeg is pronounced as a vowel with a value between an American-English long-‘o’ and an ‘ooh’-sound, 
while the second-syllable ‘y’ is pronounced as an ‘uh’-sound.  If marked by a circumflex to signify a “long” vowel, 
as in “dŵr ” [water], it is an ‘ooh’ sound. 
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 Furthermore, an educational focus on history and geography preceded the cross-curricular 
requirement of the Welsh Curriculum, and this produced patterns of practice that continued after the 
Welsh dimension was introduced as a curricular requirement.  When the Welsh dimension was made 
part of the official curriculum, teachers continued the geographic focus on local history in Wales, 
thereby meeting demands of both the history segment of the national curriculum and the Welsh 
dimension.  Many opportunities for patriotic history lessons are present in north-west Wales because 
it is the stomping-grounds of the most famous of Welsh princes.  Teachers could even focus on the 
larger area of north Wales, where Henry VII came from (and where current Prince William is said to 
live), or they might broaden their gaze to include the effects of Henry’s Tudor-era reign on different 
parts of Wales.  However, of the Tudors, the one I found that most teachers focus on is Henry VIII 
(son of Henry VII).  Why was this; because he also had Welsh forebears?  No.  According to the 
teachers, it was because the details of the fates of Henry VIII’s wives is a popular topic among 
children in primary school. 
 Despite a thread of nation-centered advocacy, beginning in the 1920s and lasting at least 
until the 1970s, in which nationalists suggested that Welsh persons needed to develop a 
consciousness of Welsh national history as separate from England’s—history teaching in schools 
in the north-west of Wales remained largely devoid of any programmatic effort to distinguish 
Welsh narratives from English narratives in the service of patriotism.  This is as much the case at 
the policy-making level as at the level of implementation in schools, as confirmed by library-
research and field research in schools in north-west Wales. 
 A previous researcher from outside Wales concluded from his research that a language-
based identity, but not national identity (in his opinion), was being deliberately fostered through 
the use of Cymraeg as a medium of instruction in schools (Khleif 1980).  It was only during a 
 27
post-fieldwork re-reading of Bud Khleif that it became clear to me that I could have recognized 
the centrality of language from this simple observation.  All other concerns (e.g., with history 
instruction as a stage for national identity) fade into the white space on which the text of that fact 
is printed.  Despite the available “evidence”, I did not initially realize how central language was 
to questions of identity and everyday cultural practices in Wales, particularly in the north-west. 
 In a quest to cultivate a Welsh modernity that is rooted in an indigenous past, language 
has become central to cultural identity and heritage issues over the last 30 years, even more so 
than the project of disseminating a national history.  Since language identity, but not national 
identity, was being enabled through the use of Cymraeg as a medium of instruction in schools, I 
chose not to focus, in the larger dissertation project, on historical imagination.  This is also due to 
the fact that the entanglement of history, nation, language, and cultural identity would make for 
confusing ethnography.  Rather, I chose to focus on the primary issue of the cultural process by 
which language operates as a central, but problematic indicator of identity. 
 People in north-west Wales often express this importance in terms of the Cymraeg-schools 
movement, which sought to establish schools that would use Cymraeg as the primary language of 
instruction.  Such expression involves the deployment of landmarks in that history.  Some of this 
account of history, and all of its flavor, appears in a document on the website for the National 
Assembly of Wales (see NAW 2009).  Thus, in 1939, the first school to teach solely through the 
medium of Cymraeg, a primary school, was established in Aberystwyth (mid-Wales).  In 1953, 
Ysgol Garnedd, a primary school in Bangor (north-west Wales), was designated as a Cymraeg-
medium school.  In 1956, Ysgol Glan Clwyd was opened in Rhyl (coastal north Wales).  Ysgol 
Glan Clwyd was the first secondary school where the pupils were taught through the medium of 
Cymraeg, with others to follow in the 1960s.  “By 1950 a total of seven designated bilingual 
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primary schools operated.  By 1960 the number had increased fourfold to twenty eight” (Jones 
1993: 564). 
 While doing principal dissertation research, I wondered why I did not hear more about 
the local effects in Gwynedd of this Cymraeg schools movement during my preliminary 
research.  The primary school, Ysgol Garnedd, was not celebrated as a local example (though 
Ysgol Glan Clwyd, in another county, was celebrated because it was a “first” type of event: first 
among secondary schools).  I wondered why this narrative did not emplot Gwynedd in its 
progressive tale of relative success.  Teachers in Gwynedd would refer to this history rather 
vaguely as if it occurred all over Wales, including Gwynedd.  The reason is that most of the 
schools in villages in and around Caernarfon and surrounding Bangor (whose university attracts 
more English monolinguals) would have already been using Cymraeg as the primary language of 
instruction.  This is because Gwynedd was situated in that part of north Wales with a high 
proportion of Cymraeg speakers and a climate of “resistance” to English (equivalent, on 
occasion, to a tacit preference for Cymraeg).  That fact did not prevent, and actually explains a 
county-wide response to the “encroachment” of English: The Gwynedd County Council 
Language Policy of 1975 stated the aim of making “every child in the county thoroughly 
bilingual”, meaning bilingual in literacy as well as orality (Baker 1985:55).  “When English 
speaking newcomers entered these schools or elected to attend designated Welsh schools in the 
more anglicized areas, an intensive course in Welsh was to be given so that they adjusted 
linguistically as soon as possible” (Baker 1985:56). 
 The problem might have arisen more keenly with respect to secondary school teachers, 
for whom expertise with their subject-matter at a college-educated level would be a requirement; 
indeed, Cymraeg has been used at very few universities as a language of academic dialogue, 
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which has changed slightly in recent decades.  Even today, Bangor University (formerly 
University of Wales, Bangor), is the only place of higher learning in which one can take all 
courses in a sociology program in Cymraeg. 
 According to several history teachers in Gwynedd, in the 1960s, county education 
authorities aggressively recruited secondary school history teachers who could speak Cymraeg 
fluently.  Since history has a natural place among laypersons of Welsh society, the county 
probably recruited even more aggressively for secondary school teachers in math and sciences.  
“In 1991, 19 out of its 23 secondary schools provided teaching through the medium of Welsh in 
five or more subjects, compared with 12 schools in Dyfed and only 4 in Powys.  Maths [as this 
subject is called in British English] and Science in Welsh, available only in Gwynedd in 1985, 
are now more widely available” (Giles Jones 1994:53). 
 Observations like Khleif’s (1980) can, and should, lead one to challenge what I had assumed 
in my original question regarding whether/how the school subject of history is made to serve the 
interests of identity construction and the teaching of a Welsh heritage.  Such a question, if asked so 
baldly, should be challenged because it cannot be answered in north-west Wales (and probably other 
parts of Wales) without first tackling the essentially diachronic (and, therefore, contingently dynamic 
and historiographic) issue of language politics.  Indeed, that is a corollary to the main thesis of this 
dissertation.  Consequently, during my fourteen-month dissertation fieldwork, I moved away 
from a primary focus on history instruction.  I also moved away from a focus on curricular 
concerns and to a broader, more holistic concern with how language is used in schooling settings and 
how attitudes toward language identity are expressed in such settings. 
 One way I believed I might address the more holistic concern was to seek diversity by 
examining what is excluded from a duality-prominent image of Wales—a nation that is English-
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speaking and Cymraeg-speaking.  The tension in the numerous dualities—Cymraeg and English, 
historic past and the present, and others—suggested to me the operation of a deeply interesting 
set of social, linguistic, and political processes.  There are, of course, traditional minorities in 
Wales, which make up even smaller proportions of the population in north-west Wales.  The 
existential problems they face in trying to inhabit the complex cultural milieu of north-west 
Wales would make the political challenges of the “Welsh natives” relatively trivial.  
Nevertheless, the historical statistics for Cymraeg speakers suggests something like 
“endangerment”.  Those who feel they belong to a community of Cymraeg speakers frequently 
express their felt-sense of a diffuse oppression by the English language community.  These 
factors compelled me to look for complexities in belongingness and entitlement against the 
background of what is, only superficially, a dichotomy—one that manifests in ordinary discourse 
about a “bilingual” nation divided under some contexts between Cymraeg-speaking nationalists 
and the greater majority. 
 
SUMMARY 
 This dissertation is divided into four parts.  The first, introductory part provides a 
statement of the ethnographic setting, the theoretical concerns and nature of the research, and the 
analytic framework for bringing the latter to bear on the former.  A large part of this research 
involved shaping and articulating a relationship between discourses about identity and analysis.  
The second part of this dissertation situates identity within the national setting of Wales and the 
local setting of north-west Wales.  Chapter Two addresses the lack of fit between scholarly 
conceptions of belonging to a national community and the motivations and ideas about belonging 
within Wales.  Chapter Three provides an analysis of an interview with two teachers about their 
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views on teaching Welsh history at school.  The interview revealed a potentially explicit 
discourse about Welshness that is submerged in an implicit stream of talk discourse about 
language.  Cultural references that the speakers make, signal the submerged topic of language 
identity.  Once decoded, these cultural references reveal relations between the appropriate style 
of talking about what can be recognized as potentially controversial topics (given the fact that 
they were encoded in the first place) and the lived practice of the existential and practical 
features that those potentially controversial topics are about.  Discussion of this interview forms 
the basis for my notion that there are political goals that are served by the marking of particular 
activities, practices, and themes as political or not. 
 Part III of the dissertation provides a more conventional description of the discursive 
context of the cultural milieu, the phenomenal expressions of identity.  The main objective of 
this part of the dissertation is to examine critically the prototypical positions regarding the 
official languages of Wales and national identity, positions that figure in public discourse in 
terms of “nationalism”.  Chapter Four details how the persistence of the category of political 
nationalism serves to ground the less acceptable form of nationalism, even while culture- and 
language-based forms are constituted in communicative settings as blurring into the political end 
of the spectrum.  After surveying the broken discursive terrain at the edges of political 
nationalism, I discuss the rhetorical work that certain categories for identity (e.g., being English 
or being Welsh) do.  Given three major foci for taking up issues of identity—the conflict-laden 
past, the future of a liberal democratic Welsh modernity, and the separateness of languages and 
their distinct kinds of identity—the rhetorical work of identity categories produces a Welsh logic 
of heritage.  The importance of this logic of heritage is that it makes impractical the adoption of 
all three foci at salient public sites like schools. 
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 Chapter Five continues with detailed exposition of the organization of the two other 
rubrics of nationalism: cultural and language nationalism.  Chapter Six takes a substantivist 
approach to the social imaginaries in north-west Wales.  I document the tropes that apply to the 
cultural importance of Cymraeg, particularly in light of “post-modern” concerns with 
decolonization.  Chapter Seven presents the results of a diagnostic method I used to locate some 
core attitudes in the substantive ethnolinguistic consciousness associated with nationalism.  The 
results indicate that the attitudes of self-described nationalists outside of schools are relatively 
narrow.  The problem such diagnosis presents is that, while such narrowness is assumed by the 
discourse of and about nationalism, it is clearly at odds with the range of the social uses of 
nationalism described in the foregoing. 
 Part IV of this dissertation moves beyond the ideology of subject-positions related to 
national identity and focuses on the dynamics of such positioning practices.  Chapter Eight 
interrogates the ways the entrenched positions on Welsh identity are constructed in Welsh 
Studies in Wales.  Chapter Nine offers reflections and a more thoroughgoing analysis of the 
surface positions and discursive contexts in which nationalism and national identity converge.  
Finally, the concluding chapter brings together my discussions of the shifting line between what 
is political, and what is not.  It reveals a moving-picture of the ongoing processes of constitution 
of a cultural community centered in Cymraeg use, which I describe as the pragmatics of 
language community.  Together, the various settings for “waging” such pragmatics, the various 
linguistic and discursive stances people deploy in asserting associated ideologies (and systematic 
organization of this variety), and how people maintain positions within the surface-level 
discourse of and about nationalism inform an account that can denaturalize without denaturing 
(speaking pejoratively about) the essentialist beliefs of Cymraeg language activists. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
◄ A PLACE IN A DISCOURSE ► 
 
The terms discourse and practice have what we might call a ‘felicitous ambiguity’: both can refer 
to either what people are doing on a particular occasion, or what people habitually do given a 
certain sort of occasion.  That is, both can refer either to action, or to convention.  The ambiguity 
is felicitous here because it helps underline the social nature of discourse and practice, by 
suggesting that the individual instance always implies social conventions—any discourse or 
practice implies conventional types of discourse or practice.  The ambiguity also suggests social 
preconditions for action on the part of individual persons: the individual is able to act only in so 
far as there are social conventions to act within.  (Norman Fairclough, Language and Power 
(1989:28)) 
 
 
THE GOG’ TRÊN 
 In the initial months of this research, while laboring to gain moderate access to schools, I 
learned that the phenomena of relevance to cultural identities available at schools were largely 
produced outside school sites.  While I do not shoulder the burden of evidence for this claim, it is 
abundantly clear that the production of national identities that relate to the two official national 
languages of Wales is a broad phenomenon.  The following extended description serves as an 
illustration of how the topography of cultural difference appears in the context of language. 
 The route I have most often taken into Wales is the railroad.  The North Coast Rail Line 
is one of the fastest ways from England, across the border region, into those parts of Wales 
where Cymraeg is used in significant proportions.  For most of its course, this rail line runs next 
to the A55 freeway, which lacks regular station stops, as well as other constraints on freedom of 
when or where to move (see Figure 0.1 in the previous chapter and Figure 1.1 below for many of 
the towns mentioned in what follows).  The railroad runs from the border-towns of Chester, 
Crewe, and Mold—on the English side of the border—all the way to the Welsh university and 
cathedral city of Bangor, and on further to Caergybi (Holyhead) on the northwestern island of 
Môn (Ynys Môn), where there is access by ferry to several points in Ireland. 
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 The idea of a linear track with particular stopping points and stages of travel makes the 
rail-line concept analogous to the felt linguistic realities of the region of north Wales.  During the 
time of my research, the station stops in Wales between Crewe and Bangor, moving east to west, 
were: Flint, Prestatyn, Rhyl, Abergele, Bae Colwyn/Colwyn Bay, LLandudno Junction, Conwy, 
Penmaenmawr, and LLanfairfechan.  This linear progression through the countryside offers some 
initial impressions for the outsider.  When the train stops at Prestatyn, welcome signs and the like 
are printed with the English version on top, and the Cymraeg version below.  When the train 
stops at Abergele, however, not only is the Cymraeg text on the top of signs—thus, “araf” and 
“ffordd allan” are printed more prominently than “slow” and “way out” [exit]—but one also 
begins to see a broader presence of Cymraeg texts, including Cymraeg graffiti.  I never did see 
the rare and particularly vulgar, “twll tin pob Sais ” [All English are assholes] until I was closer 
to Caernarfon or Pwllheli, however. 
 The stop at Colwyn Bay signals the arrival into Cymraeg “heartlands” more starkly, if 
superficially, in that the Cymraeg name for the location (Bae Colwyn) is both syntactically 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: A map of north-west mainland Wales.  The mountainous region of Snowdonia or Eryri marked in dark grey. 
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(noun initial) and morphologically different from the English name (Colwyn Bay).1  While 
“Cyffordd LLandudno” [LLandudno Junction] is less accessible to monolinguals than “Bae 
Colwyn”, English remains prevalent along the coast even this far west.  while Cymraeg is much 
more prevalent moving south up the Conwy Valley (the leftmost finger of dark grey in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1.2a and 1.2b: Two maps of Wales (ONS 2001a) based on 2001 census data that show the percentages of 
people born in Wales who can speak Cymraeg.  Figure 1.2a distinguishes (with the darkest grey) areas where ninety 
percent or more of the people born in Wales speak Cymraeg.  Figure 1.2b uses the darkest grey on that figure to 
mark areas where eighty percent or more can speak Cymraeg.  The next darkest shading on Figure 1.2a is the range 
of 90-50%, and 80-50% for Figure 1.2b.  Notice that these ranges almost coincide with the next darkest ranges—50-
20% for Figure 1.2a, and 50-30% for Figure 1.2b. 
     While the upper-end ranges are noteworthy, to provide any context at all for these data requires knowledge of the 
absolute number of people in their sample (N=868), and for the ranges to the degree the census report allows.  There 
were 61 people in the 97.3-90% range, 65 people in the 90-80% range, 117 people in the 80-50% range, 71 people in 
the 50-30% range, and 68 people in the 30-20% range.  By contrast to these comparable sub-samples, there were 
486 people in the 20-6.8% range; over 50% of their total sample!  Interestingly, the census officials found no areas 
in which less than 6.8% of those born there could speak Cymraeg. 
                                                 
1  There is also a distinctly Cymraeg name for Y Rhyl [the Rhyl], which marks out the geographic site of a salt 
marsh (though this etymology is a matter of debate).  However, the welcome sign in Rhyl (like the official signage 
for some similar cases) does not recognize the definite object in the Cymraeg welcome message.  It states “Croeso i 
Rhyl ”, rather than “Croeso i’r Rhyl ”, where the definite object is marked by an apostrophe-‘r’ form following the 
vowel. 
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Figure 1.2a), as well as west of LLandudno Junction.  By the time one reaches the station at 
Bangor, if one steps out onto the platform or walks the streets, one is more likely to hear 
Cymraeg than English. 
 During my fieldwork travels across north Wales, I had the distinct sense that, as one goes 
farther west along the Gog Trên, it becomes more ordinary for most people inhabiting any given 
village to accentuate the use of Cymraeg as a component of an identity that connects them to 
others and that forms a source and sense of national belonging.  The literal train route of the 
North Wales Coast Line might be called “the gogledd trên” [northern train].  This suggests 
“Gog’ Trên”, for short; however, I came to use this nickname not for the literal train route with 
its multiple stations in areas whose denizens find more or less affinity toward Cymraeg, but for 
something else.  I use “the Gog’ Trên” to refer to graduated changes in the way language is 
perceived, which corresponds to the series of gradations of linguistic competence in Cymraeg as 
one moves west across north Wales from the English border. 
 My train metaphor about language identity is based loosely on the idea of a dialectal 
chain, which refers to a series of gradations of dialectal variation in a language.  However, there 
is an analytic analog in cultural anthropology as well.  Ong’s (1999) concept of graduated 
sovereignty refers to areas of gradually diminishing state control over economies that give rise to 
flexible performances of personal identities.  These flexible performances trade on sets of 
opportunities, benefits, entitlement, and exclusion.  Similarly, the coastal part of north Wales 
exhibits graduated language prevalence.  Thus, various material-ideological concerns give rise to 
zones of gradually diminishing prevalence of one language regime relative to another in society 
in general.  On the north coast of Wales, it is not economic privatization that produces the 
relevant gradations—as in graduated sovereignty; rather, material-ideological concerns produce 
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gradations in language prevalence and competence.  These include inter-village mobility, a 
leisure class, holiday economies, and inter-lingual migration.  When coupled with other factors, 
including institutional arrangements and other cultural regimes, the result of graduated language 
dominance is a chain of gradually differing senses of identity, which correspond in some way to 
the graduated prevalence of one language relative to the other. 
 Regional history is also part of my construct of the Gog’ Trên.  The last three-quarters of 
the Twentieth Century saw changes in the way the land along the north of Wales was divided.  
The creation of an intermediate jurisdiction made it convenient for the Cymraeg-prevalent parts 
of the county of Gwynedd, and the English-prevalent portions of north Wales to the east of 
Gwynedd to have different language policies for schools.  The changing jurisdictional  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The different divisions of counties and boroughs of Wales. The 1974-1996 arrangement of counties (8) is 
shown on the left.  The post-1996 unitary authorities (22) are shown on the right. 
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boundaries in north Wales is significant because of the cultural importance of schools in Wales.2  
Importantly, I focused on a school in this “border” region—now called “Conwy”, not 
“Gwynedd”—that had the unusual feature of employing many teachers whose first-language was 
Cymraeg.  Thus, they were in the position of having an affinity for the Cymraeg language world, 
but were not able to make much as much use of Cymraeg in their classrooms as teachers at 
schools now within the new boundaries of Gwynedd.  Some knowledge of the changing 
boundaries will clarify why this feature of the school and its teachers was valuable. 
 Between 1974 and 1996, the north-west of Wales was composed of the county of Clwyd 
and old Gwynedd, which spanned from east of LLandudno to south of Dolgellau, and included 
Ynys Môn.  The eastern edge of Gwynedd during this period was defined by the north-south 
flowing river, Conwy, and not linguistic boundaries.  These new boundaries reestablished the 
relatively ancient boundaries of Gwynedd, which existed when it was ruled by dynasties of 
native princes.  In 1996, a change in county boundaries created a pocket across the old borders of 
the then-county of Clwyd and the present-day county of Gwynedd (see Fig. 1.3).  In 1996, the 
western half of Clwyd and an eastern portion of the old county of Gwynedd were merged to 
create the county of Conwy, which encircles the river Conwy, the corresponding north-south 
roadways, the broad river valley that stretches to the east, as well as the eastern slopes of the 
Eryri mountain range (Snowdonia).  The boundaries of the new local government jurisdictions 
were not shaped to the boundaries implied by informal or rigorous language use-sampling.  
However, the differential responses of these local authorities are likely to influence future 
developments in language gradation. 
                                                 
2   A movement to broaden instruction in Cymraeg to areas with high English language concentrations resulted in the 
establishing of the first secondary school, Ysgol Glan Clwyd, which opened in Rhyl in 1956.  Rhyl, formerly at the 
East-West midpoint of the old county of Clwyd, of Clwyd—lies at the pivot point in language prevalence along the 
Gog’ Trên. 
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 The change in the way north Wales has been divided is significant from the standpoint of 
language and schools because schooling administration is tied to counties.  Most primary schools 
in Gwynedd make primary use of Cymraeg (based on a sample of primary schools visited during 
a survey in 2002).  By 1975, Gwynedd had already initiated a bilingual policy for schools that 
required use of Cymraeg in schooling, which remains in effect today.  The prevalence of 
Cymraeg has been in decline all over Wales and the likelihood of such a decline in Gwynedd 
seemed to be the motivation for this policy. 
 By the time of my preliminary research trips, what became the county of Conwy had 
become an inverted microcosm of Wales.  That is, English was the prevailing language in its 
urban northern parts, while the more rural southern parts of the county contained high 
proportions of Cymraeg speakers—the north-south relation here is inverted relative to Wales as a 
whole.  Even before the boundary changes, a much higher percentage of students in current-day 
Conwy were monolingual in English.  When they were part of the old county of Gwynedd, 
primary schools along the northern part of current-day Conwy would have addressed Gwynedd’s 
bilingual policy mandate differently.  After 1996, schools in communities in those parts of 
Conwy where English was more prevalent than Cymraeg no longer had to conform to 
Gwynedd’s language policy.  Thus, first the county boundaries, then the language policies 
mandated by county jurisdictions, came to mirror the series of gradations of linguistic 
competence in Cymraeg and identity that I call the Gog’ Trên. 
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SITUATING MY RESEARCH 
The Schools-Centered Research 
 My research design originally required one school in north Wales (Gwynedd county) and 
another in south Wales.  The important differences that this geographic arrangement was 
intended to express, concern the kind and amount of Cymraeg use in instruction, the 
concentration of Cymraeg in the local community, and local estimates of the strength of 
nationalism in the area.  In my planned site in Gwynedd, the relative values of three features 
were high, while many areas of south Wales would contain schools with minimal use of 
Cymraeg in instruction, low concentrations of Cymraeg use in the local community, and low 
estimates of perceived nationalism.  It turned out to be possible to accomplish the goal of 
different geographic arrangements by coordinating permission for research at a school site in 
north Wales that contrasted in these features with the focal Cymraeg-prevalent school of the 
study.  Thus, the contrast site was in Conwy county, in a village that has relatively few Cymraeg 
speakers.3 
 The first school for which I gained entry was a few miles from where I was living.  
Demographically, it had roughly 200 pupils from ages of around three to eleven, and a teaching 
staff of ten teachers, including the headteacher, whose main teaching role occurred during school 
assemblies.  Cymraeg was the main language in the homes of 93% of the pupils at this school, 
according to the school inspection report for this school (the bibliographic information for which 
would identify this school).  Less than 20% of the pupils took free meals, to use the standard 
economic indicator in Welsh education. 
                                                 
3   The following descriptions use pseudonyms and slight misinformation where true statements are likely to yield to 
identification of the schools or persons researched, and where such misinformation has no significant effect on the 
details of the ethnographic account. 
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 Unfortunately, my access to classrooms at this school was occasional, at best.  Despite 
the agreement I had worked out with the headteacher there during a short, preliminary trip in 
December 2005, I was only able to arrange one visit every few weeks, in addition to occasional 
fieldtrips.  I suspect that the teachers at the school did not share the headteacher’s enthusiasm for 
the long-term, intensive presence of a foreign researcher.  I called this school, “Ysgol Gynradd 
Brynpiws” [“Brynpiws Junior School”], the abbreviation of which (“YGB”) could also have the 
significance of “Cymraeg School B”.  I gained better and more regular access to another school 
at which Cymraeg was the prevailing language of instruction, and which became my anchor for 
my initial focus on history instruction—my “Cymraeg School A”.  Since I had trouble gaining 
consistent access to Ysgol Gynradd Brynpiws, the school I thought would be my anchor, Ysgol 
Brynpiws became Cymraeg School B. 
 Classroom observations at YGB amounted to about fifteen hours in September 2007, 
fifteen hours in November 2007, and several hours in February and March 2008.  While the 
headteacher was very generous about allowing me to attend fieldtrips in July and September, 
which he tended to lead, these served more of the broad purposes of research.  Since they 
involved lots of walking in outdoor environments, these events did not allow me the opportunity 
to record interactional talk.  I sought out other schools because I was not having success in 
gaining continuous access to classrooms at YGB. 
 In late summer of 2007, YGB was attending a field trip to an overnight outdoor center in 
a part of Wales near Y Bala (Meirionydd, Gwynedd county), to which the headteacher at YGB 
had invited me.  On that fieldtrip, I met the assistant head teacher from another school, which I 
designated “Ysgol Gerrig yn yr Afon” (meaning, “Rock in the River School”).  YGA is only a 
few miles from YGB and shares many of the same demographic features.  My main interest was 
 42
still in history instruction and I scheduled a series of one- to two-hour visits to YGA during 
history lessons in the month of October.  Although my initial access to both YGA and YGB was 
slight, these cracks allowed for gradual increases in access.  Initial visits to YGA amounted to 
slightly over twenty observation hours in history and related lessons during the month of 
October, but I returned periodically in November 2007, and in February and March of 2008. 
 In seeking a school that would allow more continuous access and offer cross-linguistic 
comparison to the Cymraeg-medium schools, I had the fortune of meeting the headteacher of 
Ysgol Glain y Sir (“YGS”).  The headteacher was very willing to allow me access—to the point 
that teachers were complaining among themselves near the end of my research stay (as I learned 
during the very last days of observing).  YGS is located in the village of Croes Efydd, in the 
county borough of Conwy, in the middle of north Wales.  It lies about thirty miles east of the 
other two schools (i.e., YGA and YGB).  At this primarily English-medium school, I was able to 
spend about two hundred hours observing activities in classrooms and other areas of the school 
in October 2007, part of November, and then virtually all of late January, February and March of 
2008. 
 Croes Efydd has a population of around 4,000, while YGS has just under 200 pupils from 
ages of around three to eleven. According to the 2001 census, less than thirty percent of the 
people in the area of Croes Efydd are Cymraeg speakers and more than sixty percent have 
virtually no knowledge at all of Cymraeg.  The latter figure is higher than the national average 
and made YGS a perfect comparison with the two Cymraeg-prevalent schools. 
 Ysgol Glain y Sir has had an unusually high retention rate for teachers, given that the 
occupational group is fairly mobile.  This is notable because it means that teachers there during 
my fieldwork had remained there since before the change in county boundaries, with the various 
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implications these changes had on the language practices of instruction.  After 1996, teachers in 
the part of the new county Conwy that formerly had been the eastern edge of the old Gwynedd 
county gained greater flexibility in their performances of national identity.  That is, the 
demographics of their students (and the corresponding prevalence of one language over another 
in the community) did not change, but the policy regime did.  As the assistant head teacher at 
YGS described: 
 
So we were in the old Gwynedd.  And Gwynedd had a policy of—you had to 
teach Welsh as a first language.  Well, it was impossible to do it in this area [east 
of the current Gwynedd border].  It was impossible to teach [in] Welsh, even 
though they pushed you to do it.  So all the teachers also had to be Welsh speakers 
in Gwynedd.  You had to have Welsh as a first language.  ‘Cause we’ve been 
lucky ‘cause a lot of us have been here for such a long time and we’ve still got all 
the teachers as first-language.  I’m sure if you went to some schools just a little- a 
few miles down the road, you’d see a lot of the teachers have Welsh as a second 
language. (March 6, 2008) 
 
Thus, while the use of English or Cymraeg is partly dependent on the prevalent language of the 
larger community, the teachers themselves possessed a native competence in the cultural and 
grammatical features of Cymraeg.4  
 The life choices that teachers at YGS have made has also impacted the language 
character of the school.  They have been relatively sedentary in their willingness to remain at the 
school for long segments of their careers.  As a result, nearly all of the teachers at YGS were 
first-language Cymraeg speakers.  Nonetheless, fewer than ten pupils and maybe only one pupil 
                                                 
4  Notice also the geographic reference to a few miles down the road, which is an abstract reference to the proportion 
of Cymraeg speakers in the area and the resulting competence of the teaching staff at area schools.  It is not clear 
whether she meant a distance that would indicate a marked change in the proportion of Cymraeg speakers in the 
community in general, or whether the distance signifies that YGS is alone in the area among minimally bilingual 
schools for the number of teachers who are first-language Cymraeg speakers.  There is one bilingual primary/junior 
school in the area that far exceeds the amount of Cymraeg that the county requires be used in classrooms, but the 
teacher’s comparison could not have included that school because the school’s criteria for competence would select 
for first-language Cymraeg speakers in terms of pupils and teaching staff; thus ruling that school out of the teacher’s 
comparison. 
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would be able to carry a conversation in Cymraeg.  Apart from lessons on the school subject of 
Cymraeg, sStudents at YGS heard Cymraeg only among and between teachers, occasionally as 
commands to sit or to be quiet, and in hymns they sang at daily assemblies. 
 This does not (though to some people it would, while others would object to the idea that 
it should) mean that teaching Welshness and Welsh history there is less important.  According to 
a different teacher, a teacher of the younger pupils, teaching Welshness and Welsh history: 
 
. . . is very important in an area like this, which is not totally Welsh, the children 
to understand what it is to be Welsh, really.  But I would say, in this area, the 
children do feel that they are Welsh.  You have to go a few miles [east] down the 
road. . . and that changes quite considerably.  You know, there’s a kind of 
invisible border there.  And I think you’d be struggling really to present that 
identity of Welshness. (March 6, 2008) 
 
Notice that her reference, using the very same words as the assistant head teacher—“a few miles 
down the road”—is implicitly directed to the east, along the Gog’ Trên toward the English 
border, because she is specifically concerned with a diminished expression of Welshness. 
 It might surprise my reader that these references to “Welsh” are all indicators of language 
identity are indirect references to Cymraeg.  The invisible border the second teacher referred to is 
one of the stops, or transitions between grades along the Gog’ Trên of graduated language 
prevalence.  By making apparent references to Welsh culture (actually, ambiguous references to 
“Welsh”; i.e., Cymraeg) and making a geographic reference, it is immediately apparent to those 
with the appropriate background regarding gradual language prevalence that she is, in fact, 
making an implicit reference to the contrast between Cymraeg and English-language.  It is as if 
she were saying that the Cymraeg-oriented “identity of Welshness” could not easily be presented 
“a few miles down the road” because it was more difficult to find Cymraeg speakers there. 
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Overview of Fieldwork 
The Scenarios of Welsh Life Sub-Study:   It was not until July 2007 that I had finally obtained 
permissions for regular school visits and entered the classroom of YGB.  The delay caused me to 
reconsider my objectives continually from January until July.  Between January and May 2007, I 
engaged in background ethnographic research on national identity in society at large in north-
west Wales and surveyed students at a regional teaching college.  I attended teacher-training 
class meetings at the regional teaching college, and seminars and meetings of the various 
university “Welsh Studies”-related academic programs.5 
 Between May and September 2007, I devoted much of my attention to a project that used 
structured interviewing techniques on the topic of attitudes about language and national identity.  
The sub-study was inspired by a research project (see Trosset and Caulkins 2001, 2002) on 
shared national culture.  That study was developed on the foundations of ethnographic research 
into Welsh personhood by the US-trained and US-resident anthropologist, Carole Trosset, 
published as Welshness Performed (1993) (I summarize her findings in Chapter Two and discuss 
them more in Chapters Eight and Nine.).  Trosset suggested that understanding of society and 
identity in Wales could be furthered by conceptualizing more or less discrete categories of 
personhood.  The subsequent work by Carol Trosset and Doug Caulkins employed textual 
snapshots of everyday life from Trosset’s field experiences.  Use of these descriptions, or 
scenarios, provided a method by which respondents could respond to identical elicitation 
materials that were also fairly rich representations of cultural life, as contextualized by 
respondents’ own understandings and personal histories.  However, Trosset and Caulkins (2001, 
                                                 
5  Note that this image of a cohesive interdisciplinary area in academic institutions in Wales is a rhetorical device of 
fiction, which enables me to protect the privacy and confidentiality of individuals.  At the same time, the fiction 
does reflect something factual about some range of scholarly interactions across campus and disciplinary 
boundaries. 
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2002) almost completely avoided any of the controversial politics of language because they 
pursued a representation of shared Welsh culture.  By contrast, the scenarios-based sub-study I 
undertook, involved generating scenario items related to three areas of Welsh life: language and 
governance, as well as the more banal, but significant cultural issues Trosset 1993 identified 
(e.g., egalitarianism).  A report of my sub-study is found in Chapter Seven.  It presents a 
rigorous—but what I came to see as a flawed—conceptualization of identity phenomena in 
Wales. 
 In July, I recruited a focus group to evaluate a set of a large number of candidate scenario 
items.  I weighed their comments (especially novel issues raised in this focus group session) 
against the ethnographic considerations that led me to generate them, the commentary on the 
initial study of this kind (Trosset and Caulkins 2001, 2002), and my previous field-testing of 
some of the items.  That process led me to reduce the set of candidate scenario items to about 
thirty key scenarios on language and governance, in addition to fifteen scenarios on cultural 
identity.  In August, I pilot tested the selected items at a national culture festival, which allowed 
me to eliminate several more items.  I then conducted interviews with about ten nationalists in 
September using a set of thirty-two items on culture, language, and governance.  In addition, I 
asked approximately ten teachers at each of two schools in north-west Wales to respond to the 
thirty-two scenario items used with the self-described nationalists, plus nine additional cultural 
items to avoid a nationalistic cast to my research interests. 
 
School Ethnography?:   By September 2007, I finally arranged extended access to school 
locations at two Cymraeg-prevalent schools and one English-prevalent bilingual school.  I 
carried out interviews and observations at each of the three schools—attending classroom 
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lessons, school assemblies, rehearsals for extra-curricular competitions and school productions, 
and field trips.  I completed this research in March 2008. 
 Because of my problems with access to schools, I have some reservations about calling 
my research “school ethnography”.  It is true that, during the fourteen months of preliminary 
dissertation research in north-west Wales, I studied bilingual schooling environments in which 
either English or Cymraeg prevailed.  I focused on three schools that are similar in that each 
school had between 150 and 250 pupils from ages of around three to eleven.  I visited these 
schools during a variety of pedagogical moments, including classroom lessons, school 
assemblies, rehearsals for extra-curricular competitions and school productions, and school trips 
to regional sites of cultural importance.  Nevertheless, this dissertation is probably best described 
as being about the discourses that impinge on those sites of schooling.  In particular, one of its 
goals is to clarify our conceptions to better understand those discourses as they appear in the 
context of empirical field research.  
 Within the context of the critiques of theory and ethnographic practice in anthropology of 
the last thirty years, the issues I address on the basis of my experiences at schools in north-west 
Wales are not revolutionary, nor do they overturn fundamental conventions of ethnography.  
That would be inappropriate in a Ph.D. thesis.  Whatever novelty this dissertation possesses is 
limited to making explicit the impact on methods (not to be read as “ethics of ethnography” as 
sometimes happens) made by the accompanying critique of theory.  This involved explicating the 
concrete meanings of what are often termed “the effects of power”—as they relate to the politics 
of language in north-west Wales.  It might not be obvious why this is such an important task for 
ethnography of this region, unless one has spent time there among the academics of highland 
Wales. 
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 Any original ethnography will be decoded by Welsh academics according to the cultural 
logic prescribed by orientations to Welsh identity as found in Welsh Studies in Wales.  This 
should sound familiar to graduate students in anthropology at US universities and their mentors.  
Post-Vietnam-era ethnographers worried that the work of anthropologists could be mined by the 
military intelligence community purely in the “national” interest, aided by the open structure of 
traditional ethnographers’ reports.  That lesson is recounted annually in anthropology seminars.  
My related point is both different and similar: Ethnography of Wales will be read in the light of 
entrenched positions on Welsh identity unless deliberate steps are taken to prevent that from 
happening.  Unlike the challenge presented by the threat of having one’s ethnographic work co-
opted by state institutional regimes and used in alarming ways, my challenge was to uncover, by 
ethnographic means (of course), how previous ethnographic work was so thoroughly channeled 
into established positions.  These positions are so entrenched that I constantly worried that no 
effort on my part would be sufficient.  Regardless of the success of such pre-emptive measures, 
the fact that there is such a cultural logic in the Welsh academy points to circumstances—
underlying cultural currents—that warrant attention. 
 In the process of making explicit, and offering an account of, the politics of language and 
community that impinge on schools, my reflection on my fieldwork experiences led me to a 
theoretical basis that my perception of analysis of those experiences seemed to demand.  Since I 
convey my experiences in the terms of that explicit methodological presentation, this account is 
also able to reveal unnoticed analytic problems contained in the cultural milieux of Wales.  
These problems are ones with which I wrestled while conducting the research itself.  The process 
of writing this dissertation, then, has enabled those problems to be formulated and (partially) 
addressed in the empirical sections of this dissertation. 
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 The following section, by describing a moment in a particular classroom, provides some 
substance for adopting an analytic language for the pragmatics of language community (i.e., the 
normative forms of consciousness and action related to how people in north-west Wales express 
and live their sense(s) of cultural belonging).  This analytic substance is not simply given as a 
result of experiencing life in Wales, nor is it given in the anthropological literature; no more do 
our senses simply receive some objective existence outside the body.  The substance of 
perceptual content must be made, whether this substance is the perceptions of sensory experience 
or perceptions of cultural interpretation. 
 
BUILDING BLOCS 
The Problem of Recognizing Recognizability 
 It was an autumn day, the second of October 2007, and I sat in the fourth row of a 
classroom at YGB.  This class combined third- and fourth-grade pupils.  The classroom, like 
most other classrooms I had seen for third- or fourth- graders was colorful and its walls were 
papered in pedagogical materials.  Of particular interest to me at the time was the chronological 
sequence of historical landmarks and personages printed on placards that seemed de riguer, 
though the content of the sequence varied with each classroom.  This timeline stretched across 
the back and side wall.  From the 1500s to the middle of the 1850s, this classroom highlighted 
“Sir Walter Raleigh”, “Elizabeth I”, “Guto Ffowcs” [Guy Fawkes], “Rheilffordd Stockford” 
[Stockford Railway], “Rheoliad Plant yn y Ffatri” [1833 Factory Act], “Queen Fictoria”, 
“sefyliad post brenhinol” [establishment of the Royal Mail’s service, free-of-charge for receipt of 
mail]. 
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 On the ceiling, there was a compass, as in the fourth-/fifth-grader’s classroom.  In the 
back-left corner, if sitting in a chair oriented toward the front of the room, there were three 
computers with one of the monitors displaying on a screen saver the nearby, local Conquest-Era 
castle in the nearby town of Caernarfon.  That castle, a site of bloody conflict that was once a 
key part of a series of fortifications used to subdue the local Welsh people and to end the 
autonomy of dynastic Welsh princes, was now a tourist attraction and key part of a series of 
exchange points in the Welsh service economy.  It was also a part of the landscape of local 
history and offered resources for teachers to use. 
 In the front of the classroom, next to the teacher’s desk near the left corner, there was a 
digital whiteboard with the Welsh flag on the desktop screen.  A nearby dry-erase board had 
writing on it: “September 28th” (interesting because it was in English and used the US-American 
date-format), and “atalnodi” [pronunciation].  Windows on the right hand side-wall looked onto 
the outside play area where I could see children playing.  The boys’ shirts, in particular, 
represented association football [soccer] teams (mainly Liverpool, with some wearing shirts for 
Manchester United and Wales).  In the classroom, all pupils wore school uniforms. 
 For the period immediately after lunch, the teacher was beginning a history lesson about 
the Celts and it was my first day in her classroom.  Before providing a recap of the previous 
history lesson on Friday, she introduced me to the class.  This event would be largely 
unremarkable except for the interesting way in which the children tried to classify me as a new 
part of their classroom environment. 
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Mrs. P:  Cyn i ni gychwyn, fella fel ‘dachi di sylwi, ella, 
 Before we begin, you may have noticed, perhaps, 
 
 mae ‘gynna ni ymwelydd yn y dosbarth heddiw. Mister? 
 we have a visitor in the classroom today. Mister? 
 
Steve:  Maas. 
 
Mrs. P: Maas? 
 
Steve: Iawn [Right]. 
 
Mrs. P:  . . . wedi dod i weld chi. Wel, sut ydach chi? 
 . . . [He has come to see you.  Well, how are you? 
 
Tom: Is he Saesneg, Miss? 
 Is he English, Miss? [inaudible sounds from other children] 
 
Mrs. P: Manyrs, Tom! 
 Manners, Tom! 
 
Child 2: Saesneg- 
 English - 
 
Child 3: Cymraeg ydi o? 
 Is he Welsh? 
 
 Small clues reveal that this is an entry-point into a rich setting for identity practices and 
politics.  One of the most important clues is that Tom’s suggestion that I am English, rather than 
Welsh, provoked a strong reaction from Mrs. P, who rebuked him for his brazen rudeness.  I 
return to this entry-point in a later chapter, as it warrants additional interpretation.  My purpose 
here is the broader one of introduction.  My choice of translation, however, demands that I pause 
to note that the translation of “Saesneg” as “English” is, at once, culturally true, but linguistically 
inaccurate.  Like its complement (“Cymraeg”), “Saesneg” refers to a language.  “Saesneg” refers 
to the group of language varieties we call “English” and its complement refers to the language  
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indigenous to Wales.6  While sitting in the classroom, however, I understood exactly what the 
child had in mind, and it had less to do with the language someone (me, in this case) tends to 
speak than it did with a type of total persona: a cultural identity.  In the later chapter in which I 
return to this classroom moment (Chapter Four), I interpret broadly how particular capacities for 
using a specific language could be imagined in such a way as to play this role in the talk of a ten-
year old boy and his classmates. 
 The greatest challenge I feel this dissertation faces is in revealing the forms that 
recognizability takes—both in this cultural setting, and more generally.  This is a great challenge 
because, by “recognizability”, I mean a second-order kind of recognition: the recognition of 
recognition, and the conditions of such recognition.  The vignette above, independent of 
commentary, does not necessarily draw attention to the way language comes to mark cultural 
identity.  The vignette can only show—not say—that (and perhaps how) language marks 
identity.  This is because commentary is needed to point out how language acts as a kind of 
marker of, and how people in Wales associate it with, cultural identities in a way that a language 
comes to seem essential to identity.  Yet, even when commentary provides such interpretation, it 
cannot say who recognizes what about what other people recognize; it can only show something 
open to further interpretation.  Given the main problem of this dissertation, an important point 
follows from that anthropological truth about ethnography: Even if the essential role(s) that the 
two official languages of Wales play in cultural identities is clear, it would not necessarily be 
clear that (or how) the significance of such sociolinguistically marking would be political, or that 
                                                 
6 Although, in English-language contexts, Cymraeg is typically called “Welsh” or “the Welsh language”, I do not 
follow this practice—which is to take a unique political stand of my own.  I use the term, “Cymraeg”, as if it had not 
English translation and I think this is the best anthropological position, but not the most ethnographically accurate 
position.  Some Welsh people do, and perhaps most would, find it aesthetically unsettling to encounter my routine 
use of “Cymraeg” (rather than “Welsh”) in English-language contexts.  Also, one principal analytic task this 
dissertation undertakes, is to explicate the role of language in the social organization of north-west Wales.  Apart 
from reproducing a convenient, if “lazy” convention, it would be contrary to my analytic objectives and, therefore, 
rhetorically and communicatively counterproductive to denote the Cymraeg language code by the term, “Welsh”. 
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it would be as politically significant as knowing the world-state (e.g., Germany) to which one 
belongs. 
 It might seem implausible or bizarre that language, especially those aligned with 
indigeneity rather than a sovereign state, would incite reactions related to such political 
allegiances (cf. Handler 1988).  However, in making sense of how people identify themselves as 
Welsh in conversations in Wales, NATIONALISM is the typical key people in Wales use to make 
sense of positioning one’s own and others’ identities in such conversations.  Moreover, as this 
dissertation explores, what it means to be nationalistic is differently valued in Wales depending 
on the local organization of the social, communicative, and political setting and one’s affinities 
within that setting. 
 People in Wales commonly think of identity practices relevant to this dissertation—
practices cued by or that evoke the dominant culture or nation of Wales—as being generally 
unconstrained.  Yet, these same social actors can also easily identify a regime that heavily 
constrains identity practices.7  These social actors can identify such a regime even if the only 
available framework to describe that regime does little more than identify a thematic space they 
can designate with the vague trope-label of NATIONALISM.  To give a more neutral name to the 
discursive context for which NATIONALISM is the key orienting trope, I refer to it by the common, 
if rather bald, term of “national identity”.  The discourse context of national identity in Wales is 
organized by a normative regime, and it is this regime that is the subject of this dissertation. 
 Typically, in cultural anthropology, the internal organization of any cultural phenomenon 
like nationalism is explored in light of concepts of varying constraint, which I refer to as 
normative regimes.  Among others, these include Foucault’s (1978) techniques of the self, 
                                                 
7  For comparison, in simple terms, one might think of the ideology of freedom maintained by members of both 
parties of the constraining and regulative two-party political system in the United States. 
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Gramsci’s (1971) cultural hegemony, Williams’ (1961) structures of feeling, and Bourdieu’s 
(1977) habitus.  In contrast to these representations of normativity, as more or less abstract 
schemes, normative regimes can be concretely recognized when they appear as the frame for 
descriptions of cultural practices.  The latter can be seen in anthropologists’ innovations on the 
preceding, more philosophical/socal-theoretic frameworks.  To take two representative examples, 
Ortner (1984:148) presented the maxim that “society and history. . . are governed by 
organizational and evaluative schemes. . . within institutional, symbolic, and material forms”; 
and Wolf (1990:586-7) articulated an elaborate notion of social structure and power largely 
outside of the hands of agents.  Yet, in moving beyond the social-theoretic frameworks, 
normativity itself is seldom examined in the anthropological cases.  Few examine the cultural 
production of the particular forms of normativity themselves, which regiment or organize 
relatively more substantive areas of practice.  This question about the cultural production of 
normativity in Wales, then, is what raises the issue of the recognizability of recognition.  It is 
only by communicating something about the recognizability of recognition that normativity 
becomes open to empirical investigation.  However, I do feel that many aspects about the 
recognizability of recognition are not themselves easily rendered into rich ethnographic 
description and occasionally have to be grasped more abstractly. 
 
A Stance on Normativity 
 Although I began my dissertation research anchored in my interests in the social uses of 
Wales’ indigenous past in the present, I quickly saw NATIONALISM as the broad set of phenomena 
my research needed to address before I could grapple with the problem of cultural identity in the 
past or present.  NATIONALISM is not the primary key to understanding everyday practices in 
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Wales.  That is because everyday practices admit an infinite number of perspectival frames, and 
there might not be any single “primary” key to everyday practices.  However, the rubric of 
NATIONALISM is the first key an outsider investigator is likely to recognize in observing broad 
social and cultural identities in Wales—emerging even out of the mouths of youths like Tom.  In 
this sense, the subject-matter of NATIONALISM can be called a discourse because it maintains 
coherence across gaps of time and settings even while this sort of “theme” admits different kinds 
of expressions, evaluations, and more and less prevalent orientations toward it that operate 
situationally on talk and other action.  Nationalism was so recognizable to me and, undoubtedly, 
is recognizable to residents of Wales in this sense of being a thematic cultural feature of life in 
Wales.  That is, it is recognizable for its recognizability, without which it could not perform a 
thematic function. 
 Anthropologists tend to focus on the cultural description of such identity practice, but I 
am most interested in how these different modes of expression, representation, and 
belongingness emerge, rather than in what they are.  I privilege the questions: How are such 
meanings organized?  How are such acts and processes organized?  I examine these how-
processes by making a philosophical assumption: Whatever might be the metaphysics of cultural 
processes—most centrally, the process of constructing social reality—there subsists a normative 
regime that organizes the discourse context for national identity.  This philosophical assumption 
about a normative regime is added to the article of faith that this regime warrants description.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, this dissertation describes a number of varying and 
sometimes conflicting, meaningful forms of local normative regimes, which I refer to (in the 
concluding chapter) as “cultural modalities”. 
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 If social actors deem identity practices to be generally unconstrained, but also recognize a 
regimenting system of normative values, the marking out of cultural space for one’s sense of 
cultural or national continuity suggests we can describe two different, but interrelated layers.  In 
Wales, as in other places, the line between the constraining regime and ordinary identity practice 
is blurred.  Also, the regimenting norms are naturalized and seldom in focus.  Through 
ethnographic research, however, it is possible to identify analytically two distinct, if interrelated, 
domains of cultural life that conform to this abstract description.  This dissertation investigates 
this analytic space of the claim for which these two planes of ethnographic description—the 
space of generally unconstrained identity practices and a regimenting system of normative 
values—are local realities. 
 I maintain that, even if such an investigation focuses on rather abstract levels of culture 
and society, such a project of substantiation warrants the designation of “ethnography”.  I 
propose, for this dissertation, placing the primary focus on the internal organization of normative 
regimes in Wales, rather than using these regimes as descriptive frames for something else or 
focusing solely on the local, cultural description of normative structures.  To do so in an 
intelligible way, however, requires a theory-bound, methodological frame for—or, at the least, a 
statement of—the stance I take towards normativity as subject-matter, which I make here at the 
outset.  My rationale for focusing on such an abstract, even hypothetical, level, however, must 
have a frame.  I find the supporting frame in an analogy to language. 
 As many have observed in the study of language use, the normative regime in language 
production is not best seen as a set of laws that structure behavior (e.g., as in Chomsky’s 
language acquisition device).  Yet, there are many suggestions and no general consensus as to 
how best to describe—or, better perhaps, to provide a theoretical explanation of—the arbitrary 
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normative regime of language expression.  My own preference is the figure of a game, since 
games can be organized variably in more or less constrained ways.  The implication I draw is not 
that, by analogy, there is a game at the level of sociocultural life and a rulebook that explains it.  
Rather, to put it simply: There are two levels at which games are taking place.8 
 In the Euro-American study of language, scholars make a division between description 
and action (as constructed by the conflicting interests of analytic philosophers like Bertrand 
Russell versus sociolinguists like William Labov), and also between structure and practice (as 
constructed by the conflicting interests of the camps of de Saussure and Chomsky versus 
anthropologists like Dell Hymes and William Hanks).  In either analysis, the latter term—
action/practice—has tended to be privileged in anthropological discussions.  While I do not 
reject that emphasis, I would privilege the contrast between two levels in the image of language 
given by Louis Hjelmslev, which seems most relevant to national and cultural identity.  This is 
the contrast between the instruments of expression and meaningful forms. 
 The meanings that social actors more or less consciously associate with language use—
whether words, lilting prosody, incomprehensible jargon, descriptions, insulting remarks—all 
depend on a dimension that is itself stratified into a number of basic, underlying forms: 
phonemes (e.g., /z/ ), syllables (DOGS), and other expressive unit-types (such as foot and tone 
group).  The latter dimension, in contrast to meanings, is the set of resources by which people 
express language as manifest meaningful forms.  Stratification at the underlying level of 
instruments of expression, as well as at the level of the more accessible (interpretable) meanings, 
leads to complexity in the building blocks of expression and, ultimately, suggests an abstract 
description of language use.  This dissertation is primarily concerned with the analogue to this 
                                                 
8  One of these is at the visible level of meaningful forms, while the other is at the hidden level outside of general 
awareness (as a cryptotype, to use Whorf’s (1945) term). 
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means of expression in language use and identity: the means of expression of that sort of identity 
practice which is keyed to nationalism and national identity.  As with language (e.g., 
grammatical principles), the basic building blocks of such identity practice are not always (and 
almost never are) in social actors’ consciousnesses. 
 Certain combinations of sounds might be arbitrary, but their normative use in producing 
meanings creates the “reality” of right or wrong combinations.  Such motivation at the level of 
meaning, despite an arbitrariness at the level of expression, subsists for everyday practices in 
relation to national identity, analogous to the phonetics of language practice and the structured 
motivations of word-meanings.  Similarly, one can find segments of Welsh society that do not all 
agree about their cultural affinities in relation to the nation, but there is a common perception in 
Wales that differences between the Welsh and the English go deeper than the forms (e.g., the use 
of a common ethnic or national name for the Welsh).  These differences are part of the social 
reality of cultural and national belonging. 
 
The Surface Effects of Normativity: Cultural Submergence 
 To recall my earlier statement, my stance on normativity might suggest that there is a 
game at the level of sociocultural life and a rulebook or grammar that explains it.  However, I 
would reiterate that this is not the case.  There are simply two levels at which games are taking 
place.  This trope of games is useful because it highlights the active use of meanings by social 
actors in the face of rule-like norms—norms that themselves can become subject to active use, 
and thence removed or modified in interaction.  I think of the pertinent normative regime in 
Wales as the game inside the game that everyone typically knows about.  When rendered with 
more ethnographic details, this normative regime can be seen to resemble a game that is part of 
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social life.  We discover the norm-generating game by seeing its effects: the playing of a game 
everyone knows about, which depends on the norm-generating game. 
 The game everyone knows about is characterized by something very like what, on a 
smaller scale and in the rubric of kinship, traditional anthropology might have called a system of 
“moieties”.  That is, people in Wales can recognize (and orient themselves accordingly to) two 
fundamentally different kinds of (national) identification and expression.  Some attempts (e.g., 
Owen 1960) have been made to reveal such bipolarities in Wales by means of the local concept 
of a “buchedd ”, but this has been directed at the contrast between two sorts of lifestyle within 
community locales in Wales: a traditional Welsh sort of lifestyle centered on chapel community 
and a less respectable lifestyle dichotomy centered on the pub (See Chapter Five for more on this 
concept.).  Community locales are not the same as the larger Welsh, national community. 
 The two kinds of national identity with which I am concerned differ in how people of 
each orientation conceive of Welsh modernity/-ies in relation to an indigenous complex of 
practices and cultural heritage in the present.  Those who do not participate in the community 
associated with the indigenous language code—and the associated “consciousness” of 
belonging—do not insinuate that the idea of an identity lurking in “native” Wales is a mere 
figment of the imagination.  Instead, they express an academic or cultural-democratic concern 
with representation.  They will suggest that such a narrow scope would force other lifeways out 
of whatever image of Wales is co-imagined.  Across Wales, it is clear that this latter group is 
dominant, but at smaller geographic scales (business meetings and villages) the reverse might be 
true.  Consequently, I should mention some aspects of this national situation that highlights the 
“politics” at play in this cultural field. 
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 “Political” is frequently used for contexts in which there are people who belong to 
recognizable blocs and who, from such positions, vie for resources.  By “political”, I am 
extending the meaning to include blocs that might not be recognizable to people outside the 
cultural milieux of Wales.  Within Wales, everyone would recognize the bloc of so-called 
nationalists, in contrast to those who try to deemphasize indigeneity and nationalism.  One 
consequence of this dilemma of identity is that those who do not belong to either of these blocs 
are caught between living their lives in one of two shapes or forms of Welshness, and the 
normalizing political context that seems to determine (and thus, people actually respond to) what 
are appropriate ways of being Welsh in light of this polarized, or binomial Welshness.  A second 
consequence is that members of the subordinate bloc, participants in the complex of Cymraeg 
language and cultural practices, live the legacy of a conquered nation.  In asserting the 
legitimacy of their sense of national identity, they contribute to and confront reactions mobilized 
by the larger majority which does not actively seek Welsh identity in the primordial past of 
indigeneity. 
 Those who do not participate in a community organized around the indigenous language 
either ignore, or reject any focus on, the substantive aspect of that complex of language and 
cultural practices because they think such a focus would be reductivistic.  Members of the 
participant bloc feel they are unable to express that substantive core to those who do not 
participate in it and who do not position themselves within it.  People who would say they belong 
to this community mark out cultural space for their sense of continuity in such a way that does 
not require or enable them to make any substantive cultural claims.  I call this condition of 
cultural production in the north-west corner of Wales—intended or otherwise—the submergence 
of culture.  It is the central phenomenon on which I focus in this dissertation. 
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 This situation of cultural submergence is common to practically any locale that traditional 
anthropologists established as their research sites, as well as to the consciousness in which 
national affinity was the product of more or less deliberate processes of state-building.  These 
ongoing dynamics of expression, representation, and belongingness in Wales are like any 
culturally salient identity practice in which social actors believe such identity practice is 
generally unconstrained, but (on reflection) can also easily identify a “regime” or set of attitudes 
that heavily constrains identity practices.  While certainly not unique, the type of phenomenon I 
focus on involves features of social organization in Wales—features that are imagined and 
enacted in the rubric of “the nation”.  The thematic dimension of “the nation” makes these 
features particularly and peculiarly political.  In addition to raising the micro-political issue of 
“who decides”, the nation is political at a macro level. 
 The fact that certain practices do not require or enable participants in both Welsh 
indigeneity and modernity to make any substantive cultural claims is the product of a national 
political context.  Therefore, it differs from many of the kinds of identity practice alongside it in 
Wales (e.g., gender or race), as well as being different from its correlates in other territorial units 
(e.g., Quebec).  That is, it shapes the imagining and construction of social institutions in explicit 
state-oriented dimensions local to Wales, as well as implicit dimensions that can also invoke 
controversy on occasion.  Unlike identity practices keyed to the rubric of, say, sex and gender, 
national identity practices are political not only in terms of how individuals are positioned within 
a social category, but also in terms of who has a recognizable right to membership within 
something that has long been associated with a recognizable geographical territory. 
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VOLATILE COMMITMENTS: VISIBLE DIFFERENCE, INVISIBLE CULTURE 
“Deeper” Social Reality 
 This dissertation is an account of the ongoing cultural dialectic in identity politics of 
language and community between the two major positions of language-cultural identity in 
Wales.  (To recall: Those who do participate in a cultural complex that is bound, through 
everyday banal practices, to the indigenous language know in their heart of hearts that this 
community represents their national identity.  Those who do not participate in it feel that a focus 
on the source of identity in the daily practice within that community would, if taken as directly 
representative of an empirical Welsh identity, misrepresent and overdetermine perceptions of 
Welsh identity.)  In particular, I draw attention to the cultural construction, within the confines of 
that dialectic, of a thin line between “politics”—or practices of identity that some perceive as 
controversial—and ordinary and taken-for-granted culture.  The dialectic provides the structure 
of motives for imagining that there is such a line between politics and culture, however 
(in)flexible.  At the same time, the tendency to organize cultural performances differentially in 
relation to the ground on either side of that shifting line (re)produces the dialectic. 
 Since that thin line is itself the aspect of cultural life that is most instrumental to the 
(re)production of the cultural dialectic, there is a (non-vicious) circularity in my account.  Yet, I 
have not intended for my readers to lend my construct of this cultural dialectic the status of an 
empirical fact; rather, the construct captures numerous phenomena that reveal an absence in 
Wales.  That is, the cultural dialectic—lacking any known resolution or synthesis in Wales 
multiplicitous sociocultural life—acts as a barrier to identifying those resources for Welsh 
identity that are (putatively) to be found in the indigenous complex of practices and cultural 
heritage.  In other words, an account of those resources for Welsh identity that are (putatively) to 
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be found in the Cymraeg language-cultural complex age is barred by the fact that a substantive 
content for Welshness is not recognizable or visible.  Because Welshness is politicized in the 
way(s) this dissertation describes, there is a part of Welsh culture that is submerged. 
 To focus on the submergence of indigeneity in Wales, one must first confront the cultural 
fact that the idea of nationalism is the most salient category in the context of national identity.  
My use of “nationalism”, here, is not a reference to any set of activities and attitudes of actual 
people.  This term, in my use of it, denotes the idea of such activities and attitudes and, more 
importantly, the role of this idea of such activities and attitude in creating the evaluative 
framework in which discussions of national identity take place.  However, the complementary 
nature of nationalism and cultural submergence of indigeneity should not be equated with local 
conceptions of a mutual contrast between English and Welsh, or of a duality between those who 
would lionize or minimize the resources of indigenous language and culture. 
 While I do not disregard the seeming dichotomy—of two ways of relating the Welsh 
modernity to an indigenous complex of practices and cultural heritage in the present—it is not 
my focus for two reasons.  First, it conceals more significant processes, as already noted.  
Secondly, it appears by means of labels and categories for other people, more so than in what 
ethnographers would find in actual practices of social actors.  I consider a focus on these (or any 
parallel) two positions to be a preoccupation with a dimension that is, at best, the mere surface of 
culture—a preoccupation that misleadingly lends a static quality to a deeper process of cultural 
dialectics.  Such a focus on visible designs “on the surface” allows one to miss the processes that 
are part of the warp and weave of social life.  Yet, it cannot be denied, a dichotomy with two 
“sides”, often glossed as Welsh nationalist and Anglocentric cosmopolitan, is an ever present 
“reality” of life in Wales.  
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 In this context, the ever-present frame of nationalism has supported an obsession with 
subject-positions on the “surface” of cultural life, which typically appear in the contrast between 
nationalists and, for want of a better word, cosmopolitans.  This gives the impression that use of 
these positions serves much as does a life preserver for those who cannot swim.  If one rejects 
that polarized superficial “reality”, as a whole, then one can better understand a “deeper” reality 
of the cultural dynamics of sociocultural contexts related to national identity.  The submergence 
of one “subordinate” set of social networks and lifestyles cannot be explained, or even described, 
by giving attention solely to attitudes that are so informed, as a totality, by the topics of 
nationalism.  To answer the questions of whether and how one identity of one cultural 
community is submerged, requires description of discourses organized by a dialectical set of 
perspectives on the history/historicity, cultural heritage, and languages of Wales. 
 I try to clear away these habits of thinking through analyses of the contexts in which a 
way of thinking about national identity, common to both orientations, moves people to privilege 
one or the other fundamental orientations to Welsh identity.  While it is part of the cultural 
topography, I reject the underlying, popular, polarizing assumptions—according to which every 
person chooses between two ways of relating the Welsh modernity to an indigenous complex of 
practices and cultural heritage in the present.  Labels like “small-minded nationalist” and 
“English colonialist”, “cosmopolitan” and “Cymro glan [literally, pure Welshperson]”, are 
obviously part of the discourse about national identity.  Nevertheless, the salience of the 
discourse on and about nationalism is constituted by “deeper” cultural processes than the 
positions and labels on the “surface”.  The same is true, by implication, of the submergence of 
indigeneity in Wales. 
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Communities of Debate 
 The impression of a nation divided between those who do and those who do not 
participate in the community associated with the indigenous language code ubiquitous; as much 
so as the discourse of and about nationalism.  Published research has not made clear what 
conditions, or shapes, this internal boundary of what I call a “community-of-debate”. To have an 
identity of either of the two major orientations requires people to commit, in practice, to 
particular types and meanings of interactions and particular ways in which everyday life is 
organized.  These are what I call “endorsements” that people make in everyday life.  This 
dissertation should not be perceived, and was not intended, as an attempt at a systematic 
investigation of the acts and ways in which people commit to particular types and meanings of 
interactions and particular ways in which everyday life is organized.  In such an investigation, a 
focus on endorsements would replace a focus on surface positions.  That investigation of a 
positive question about the submerged part—rather than the critical question I do address—
would require an ethnographic investigation that can begin only at that point at which this 
dissertation ends. 
 In navigating the boundary between these two orienting attitudes, people of both 
positions in Wales endorse an axiomatic inference.  To focus for a moment on it, I put this 
“dominant implication” in block formatting: 
 
To accept that the indigenous language of Wales and related traditions supply 
special resources for identity is to be committed to the view that the indigenous 
language and related traditions have a special claim on identity for all Welsh 
people. 
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In this dissertation, I argue that this dominant implication is what focuses people on the 
discursive/ideological surface positions to the detriment of recognition of, and communication 
about, the special resources for Welsh identity themselves, which the indigenous language might 
offer. 
 Once again, there is an unavoidable circularity, and the operation of the dominant 
implication of Welsh ideology returns us to a point I introduced above, that point of the cultural 
construction of a thin line between “politics”—or practices of identity that some perceive as 
controversial—and what is taken for granted by people, regardless of their affinity toward either 
cultural orientation, as ordinary features of life in Wales.  The dialectic of the two cultural 
orientations provides the structure of motives for imagining that there is such a line between 
politics and culture, while the tendency to organize cultural performances differentially in 
relation to the ground on either side of that shifting line (re)produces the dialectic itself.  As a 
result of the inherent sociopolitical problems tied to the discourse of national identity and 
nationalism in Wales, and in the absence of a coherent image of a consensual national identity, 
no public discourse has emerged that provides an explicit form of discourse or vocabulary for 
self-description of indigeneity in Wales. 
 Again, this dissertation does not provide historiographic and ethnographic evidence for 
this condition—of the absence of a public discourse that provides an explicit form of discourse 
or vocabulary for self-description of indigeneity in Wales.  Rather, I treat this more or less stable 
dialectical “state”—in the relation between two cultural orientations—as the presenting condition 
of life in Wales.  It is one that provides the structure for further investigation.  This dissertation, 
then, is not an investigation of the condition itself, but of the available resources for a potential—
but not currently developed—explicit form of discourse, tantamount to a rich lexicon for self-
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description.  The scarcity of these resources, it turns out, is also symptomatic of the focal 
historical and cultural dialectic, insofar as the resources fall under a regime of cultural 
management, within which the world is divided up between what is controversial and “political”, 
versus what is banally “cultural”.  The next chapter addresses the internal relations between 
normal (academic) views within cultural and linguistic anthropology, and also normative (lay 
and academic) views on the two official languages of Wales.  In doing so, the next chapter 
begins to describe the line between POLITICS and CULTURE, so-recognized in Wales. 
 68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
 
 
 
 
IDENTITY AND POLITICAL PRAGMATICS 
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CHAPTER TWO 
◄ ZONES OF LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, AND SELF ► 
 
     For any speaker if it, a given language is at once either more or less his own or more or less 
someone else’s, and either more or less cosmopolitan or more or less parochial—a borrowing or a 
heritage; a passport or a citadel.  The question of whether, when, and for what purposes to use it is 
thus also the question of how far a people should form itself by the bent of its genius and how far 
by the demands of its times. 
    The tendency to approach the “language issue” from the linguistic standpoint, homemade or 
scientific, has somewhat obscured this fact. (Clifford Geertz, “After the Revolution” (1973:241)) 
 
 
THE NORTH WALES PUB TALE 
 By taking a different look at the Gog’ Trên, one from the other side of the border, many 
of the cultural tensions in this broad context come into sharper view.  From that vantage, the 
“culture” of north Wales is made visible in terms of how some English people describe people in 
north Wales; that is, as xenophobic.  I illustrate this vantage by means of a narrative genre I call 
“the North Wales Pub Tale”. 
 For people who visit north Wales, the A55 across coastal north Wales from Flint, through 
LLandudno and Bangor, is probably the normal means of entering the region from England.  The 
implications of using this route are several, most important of which is that the A55 allows a 
motorist to have no contact with local people.  If travelling by personal car, one can admire the 
natural beauty of north Wales’ ocean views and mountain vistas without having any personal 
encounters to indicate how differently nationhood is experienced in the local places to either side 
of one’s vehicle.  The insularity of a car, of course, is not the only means by which visitors can 
block influences on the imagination of life in Wales.  In fact, there is one famous short narrative 
that conveys the “strangeness” or remoteness of Wales without requiring more than superficial 
contact with “the natives”. 
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 The “North Wales Pub Tale” has a remarkable social life at the imaginary border between 
Wales and England (and other regions in the world that are associated strongly with the English-
language).  I was told the North Wales Pub Tale on a number of occasions.  A kind English lady 
told me the tale while bringing me back from a train station to her bed-and-breakfast in 
Manchester.  A man in a Liverpool pub told me the tale at some point in conjunction with a 
tirade that the Welsh had stolen all the English mountains.  An English stranger on a train 
platform at Manchester Piccadilly station even offered a theory about it after telling it to me, 
which I recount below.  A headteacher from north Wales told me the tale in quotations (i.e., as 
indirect recorded speech) and referred to it as a myth concocted by English people who know 
little or nothing of Cymraeg-speaking Wales. 
 When it was recounted by English persons, these speakers always told me the tale in the 
realist mode (i.e., as something that actually happened, the truth of which is beyond reproach) 
and from a third-person perspective—as an experience of their brother, friend, or other 
intimate—never in the first-person perspective.  I also heard it many times in the critical mode 
told by Cymraeg speakers who found the tale greatly annoying and indicative of what they saw 
as cultural-linguistic imperialism.  I have even been told the tale by an ethnographer who worked 
among laborers in Ireland and Northern Ireland while we were both in the US.  I call him “Peter 
Tell”.  Surprisingly, Tell recounted the North Wales Pub Tale in the realist mode and from the 
first-person perspective; therefore, it is worthwhile to recount it as he told it to me. 
 Peter Tell had been driving in north Wales in the mid-1980s—a period which he 
characterized in terms of the Welsh arsonists who burned English vacation residences at that 
time.  During the 1980s, he informed me, there was a large number of such cases of arson by 
Welsh activists (but that number has been greatly exaggerated, having become an urban myth of 
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its own, of which only a relatively few instances can be documented).  Tell’s car broke down and 
so he walked to a pub to make a phone call to request roadside assistance.  Upon entering the 
pub, Tell noticed that everyone had switched from using English to speaking Cymraeg as soon as 
Tell stepped inside the pub.  This is the gist of the North Wales Pub Tale: Those who can speak 
the Welsh language will do so only—or can be depended upon to “switch to Cymraeg”—when 
an English person stumbles upon them “at home” among themselves, where they will have been 
speaking English. 
 In the abstract, the tale evokes for me Hollywood scenes of the Old West in North 
America in which the antagonist or protagonist walks into a saloon.  In those scenes, every 
occupant in the saloon stops talking and turns to look at the figure in the doorway.  There might 
even be a visual framing of the bartender frozen in place while drying a glass or pouring a drink.  
My own, many attempts to determine the languages being used in pubs before I entered them 
were consistently foiled by insulated windows and door fittings, as well as the common, rural 
Welsh building construction, which employs two- to three-foot wide walls.  It is almost never 
possible to hide within earshot, but out of sight once one enters a “public house”.  Since I knew 
also from experience on many buses that it is extremely common to hear Cymraeg and English 
casually spoken in public spaces, and code-switching too, I found the tale to be a virtually pure 
case of fabrication as an emblem of English persons’ feelings of alienation in north Wales.  I 
believe my everyday experiences with social life in north Wales immunized me and 
differentiated me from those who told the tale in the realist mode. 
 Before I heard Peter Tell’s version, I had never encountered a realist, first-person version 
of the tale and was faced with either accepting the truth of the myth, which violated my first-
hand impressions of Welsh society, or questioning Tell’s credibility.  The choice was more 
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vexing because of Tell’s professional identity: Not only were accurate observations of cultural 
scenes the essence of his trade, but he was very familiar with clashes between the British-centric 
vantage and viewpoints less aligned to the UK state.  My best guess is that, while standing on the 
threshold, he could not tell the difference between English spoken with a thick Venedotian 
accent (a dialect of north-west Wales) and use of Cymraeg.  He likely heard the tale at some 
point before or after the event and used it as a schema in making sense of, or later recollecting 
that moment during which he stood looking in at the pub scene. 
 I seldom pushed those who propagated what I considered a yarn.  If met with my 
somewhat concealed skepticism, some persons recounting the narrative as a fact would produce a 
“triangulation” of several confirming, third-person perspectives.  Occasionally, encountering 
realist perspectives, I have asked if the teller thought the tale was actually true, which always met 
with an affirmative response.  When I asked for additional confirming details, I did so gently up 
until the point that I would be expressing my disbelief in the person recounting the narrative 
(almost always a stranger) and suggesting they were telling falsehoods. 
 In July 2003, after arriving at the airport in Manchester, in one of those situations where 
going the wrong way puts one in the right direction, I wound up at a station one stop on the other 
side from Wales.  While I was standing on the train platform in Manchester Piccadilly, I struck 
up a conversation with a local man who was curious about my travels to Wales.  As if we had 
reached item Number Three on some public hospitality program for travelers, he told me the 
North Wales Pub Tale.  I confess I might have said (with ulterior ethnographic intent) that I was 
looking forward to going to a pub when I reached north Wales. 
 Feigning ignorance all the way through my interlocutor’s tale of his relative’s 
experiences in a north Wales pub, I asked the stranger about the significance of the tale.  He 
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thought it represented xenophobia among people of north Wales.  According to him, the Welsh 
only use Cymraeg to offend the English or keep them at a distance.  I told him of my experiences 
that people in north Wales will do the opposite.  That is, they switch from Cymraeg to English if 
there is someone in a group whose first language is not Cymraeg.  I asked him how these two 
representations could both be true.  In the north Wales pub tale, pub regulars are thought to 
switch to Cymraeg from English.  “Why wouldn’t they start out in Welsh to begin with?”, I 
asked.  “Why would they be speaking English in the first place?”.  He replied matter of factly: 
“Well, it’s easier for them, isn’t it?  Welsh is a very difficult language”. 
 It is possible that some people believe they hear that language in which they feel the most 
comfortable, until they learn otherwise.  This would explain why so many English monolingual 
persons believe the occupants of north Wales pubs are speaking English before and then switch 
to Cymraeg upon learning a foreigner stands in the pub doorway.  I find it doubly interesting in 
that, in contradiction to what I just wrote, when I heard anyone speaking just outside of my 
hearing range in north-west Wales, I often believed—assumed, that is—I could hear Cymraeg 
phonemes.  On some of those occasions, I learned that it was a south Asian language and neither 
English nor Cymraeg. 
 Interestingly, linguistic anthropologists tend to find my doubts about the veridicality of 
the North Wales Pub Tale compelling, while a few cultural anthropologists find my skepticism 
amusing and perhaps indicative of a sympathy for Welsh national causes.  Linguistic 
anthropologists are aware that all sorts of claims are made about language by those uninitiated 
with linguistic issues and those unfamiliar with particular cases of multilingualism.  Typically, 
cultural anthropologists interpret the case of the North Wales Pub Tale in the keys of cultural 
logics, Foucauldian discourse, and mythopraxis.  Linguistic anthropologists interpret the case in 
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the keys of language ideologies and (meta)pragmatic functions.  The rationale for the divide 
between linguistic and cultural anthropologists in how they receive my accounts of the tale might 
be explained in terms of the greater salience the tale possesses for linguistic anthropologists: The 
explanation the man in Manchester Picadilly gave is taken up as a theme in Laurie Bauer and 
Peter Trudgill’s introductory text, Language Myths.  The response of the man on the Manchester 
Piccadilly train platform is Myth #7: “Some languages are harder than others”. 
 One cultural anthropologist with a personal background in Europe and first-hand 
experience in Wales pointed out to me how common it is in Europe for people to use more than 
one language.  He went on to express his confusion at the political salience of language issues in 
Wales and at the obstinacy of Welsh language activists.  While academics’ sentiments are not the 
primary focus of this dissertation, they are indicative of the paltry imaginational resources 
available to us for either making sense of something (i.e., interpreting) or analyzing (i.e., 
rendering into a matter amenable to cultural comparison), and my goal has been to do both. 
 These differences suggest something else, as well, about the mode of experience 
involved.  Ethnographers who see little method in the minor politics of language use in Wales, 
like the English people who recounted the North Wales Pub Tale, never stay for long in Wales.  
This condition enables the sentiments of ethnographers and other social actors of this persuasion 
to privilege the British imagined community in a political or ethnic dimension—not because this 
is a reflection of their own language politics, but because they have no schema for understanding 
language politics regarding this corner of the world, nor any role for participating therein.  
Where Wales is concerned, the mandate to evaluate the significance of “the hold life has” (to use 
Malinowski’s ([1922]1961) turn of phrase) does not extend to recognition of the hold language 
has.  Further, when ethnographers make such comments, the hold life has on these ethnographers 
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in relation to their own familiar language-scapes and to the dominant–subordinate system of 
languages in modern states goes unexamined. 
 By contrast, ethnographers who are preoccupied with language dwell for long periods of 
time within local politics of language, as do language activists.  These linguistic anthropologists 
are aware, and at least implicitly critical, of the naturalization of modern “world” languages like 
British English, French, and Spanish.  Nevertheless, their ethnographic lives inhabit the reality of 
social tensions that are not merely abstract relations between different language categories like 
Cymraeg and English, but are constructed through language choices and constituted by language 
identities. 
 When I left my home university for principal dissertation field research, I embraced the 
implication that language is often (always?) a central cultural concern in ethnography.  However, 
I do not think I would have begun to question certain conventional assumptions about language 
without first trying to understand the activities (as opposed to categories or representations) of 
language politics in situ.  It is a problem of description that led me to recognize a problem with 
theory.  There is a large difference between recognizing the importance of language in a place 
where the politics of language become quite heated, and the bigger step of obtaining answers 
about the cultural and political significance of language practices in such a locale. 
 What I did not realize until I was home again is that virtually all things of significant 
cultural interest that I encountered in the field were predicated on some conception or another of 
a community; a community of language, but it was the relations of community that were of key 
importance.  Language, in the sense of the language practices that linguistic anthropologists 
study, was the visible presence of that community, but the sense of cohesion that language lent to 
social interactions and perceptions of society—which enabled people to sense fissures, fractures, 
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and a moral code to resist, tolerate, or endorse—was the cohesion of putative communities, not 
the cohesion of language as conventionally understood.  While I had moved from concerns with 
history instruction to concerns with language practices, it was yet another major step to the 
realization that, if I constructed my research problem in terms of language practices, this would 
misrepresent the sociocultural realities.  My research problem was more properly centered in 
issues regarding the role of languages-as-symbols in the social constitution of the macro-form of 
domestic and voluntary association: communities.  The politics of language and identity in 
Wales, then, is the politics over the recognition and production of communities. 
 The consequences of the politics of language and community make it difficult to produce 
a coherent image of a consensual national identity: None, apparently, would deny the compelling 
force of the discourse of nationalism (Thus, nationalism phenomena, for lay adherents and many 
scholars alike, bear a startling resemblance to phenomena of religious practices.).  As a result, 
nationalism stands in for such a coherent image.  I am concerned as much with this false promise 
of coherence that nationalism has, as with understanding its social uses.  The region of the world 
in which this ongoing difficulty with coherence emerges, has long served as a site of struggles 
over identity.  Today, some of those struggling with the idea of a Welsh identity are called or call 
themselves “nationalists” although their goals might have nothing to do with the state.  That is, 
nationalism is figured in the public imagination as being about the country of Wales; as a 
preoccupation that might have as salient features the indigenous Welsh language, traditional 
Welsh practices, or historical relations between England and Wales; and typically includes a 
concern that Welsh culture or language is threatened. 
 The outcome of the discursive settings in north-west Wales (and beyond) is that any 
attempt to identify and put on display those special resources of the Cymraeg language-cultural 
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complex or to construct a national identity on its basis is branded, in the mainstream frame of 
perception, as an expression of a negatively valenced Welsh nationalism.  This outcome 
perpetuates the conditions of language politics by motivating: 1) native speakers’ reticence to 
identify and put on display the special resources of Welsh identity to be found in the complex of 
Cymraeg language and culture, and 2) challenges to any articulation of national identity that 
highlights the complex of Cymraeg language and culture in the construction of the proprieties of 
belonging. 
 The phenomenon of the North Wales Pub Tale is an elaborate example of the way that 
difference is highly visible, while the principles of cultural engagement that organize such 
visibility are not merely difficult or impossible to see, but are located necessarily offstage in the 
production of difference.  Thus, no empirical evidence can convince those who propagate the 
realist versions of the North Wales Pub Tale that it did not happen.  The first-person realist 
version told by Peter Tell shows how persistent such a perspectival frame is.  That trained 
ethnographer had worked in settings in northern Ireland that were (admittedly) largely 
monolingual, but nonetheless highly volatile in terms of a prominent cultural divide.  Yet, he 
believed that everyone in a pub in north Wales switched from using English to speaking 
Cymraeg as soon as he stepped inside the pub.  Even for that experienced ethnographer, the 
borders of familiarity and difference were constructed by his very presence.  This persistently 
counter-empirical condition would seem to have no cure, but I suggest that making the 
underlying norms of consciousness and action central is one way to find empirical traction that is 
not purely fictional. 
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THEORETICAL CONDITIONS 
Pragmatic Functionality 
 It should be no surprise that I have been unable to avoid the fact that race, ethnicity, 
nationalism, and language practices often intersect in questions about language identity.  Wales 
is not an exception.  The general fact of intersection is evident in the scholarly consideration of 
language vis á vis imagined communities—of both ethnopolitical and the language kinds 
community (by, for example, Kulick 1986, Silverstein 1998a, Bauman and Briggs 1990).  The 
underlying analytic principles have come to be known under the rubrics of iconization and 
indexicality.  “Indexicality” has a narrow and a broad meaning.  The narrow meaning is 
synonymous with deictics, the prototypical example of which are pronouns.  The broad meaning 
of indexicality sets aside the standard semantical interpretations of morphosyntactic units in 
favor of a myriad of kinds of linguistic functionality.  It is in its broad significance that 
Silverstein’s (1976) concept of indexicality has achieved its widely recognized explicative 
power. 
 Silverstein’s image of functionality (1976) is key to understanding this use of 
indexicality.  His image of functionality resulted in a replacement of the role that semantics has 
traditionally played in as an apparently context-free, conventional, cognitive framework for 
interpreting recurrent form-tokens—within models of language entertained in linguistic 
anthropology.  The first type of functionality to replace traditional semantics—best represented 
in Malinowski’s (1923, 1935) notion that words have a pragmatic effect—was a 
“metapragmatic” capacity in language users for “computing/representing intents to perform 
effective, socially understood action with speech” (Silverstein 1987:28).  This kind of expressive 
functionality—what Silverstein called “PRAGMATIC FUNCTION2”—has its emblematic form in 
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Silverstein’s (1976, 2003) idea that there are non-referential categories of “pointings”—
including acts of pointing to symbols of situational context (e.g., presence of mother-in-law), 
symbols of gender, symbols of linguistic community, symbols of epistemic or affective attitude. 
 The best strategy to approaching Silverstein’s model of language use is to start with the 
pivotal phenomenon that stands in contrast to Silverstein’s conception of traditional linguistics.  
That phenomenon is the directness that certain signs have to its communicative situation.  This 
turns out to be Silverstein’s central discovery: There are ways of signifying meaning that involve 
neither context-independent, abstract description (what Silverstein has called semanticity), nor an 
appeal to the words, categories, and arrangements in terms of which traditional linguists 
analyzed them.  The difficulty in formulating this principle comes from the entrenched nature of 
the received terms, the ordinary lack of awareness among speakers of the roles that performative 
markers in communication play, and the lack of any convenient terms that serve in contrast. 
 According to Silverstein, linguists have traditionally constructed proposition-like 
expressions according to what he called the traditional “metalanguage of constituency”, 
characterized by: 
 
“a description of formal arrangements of units, in the familiar metalanguage of 
constituency (hierarchical linear combinations of structural units), and with a 
description of the referential-and-predicational potential of such constituencies, in 
the familiar metalanguage of their logical or denotational [sic] sense (based on 
implication, synonymy, antonymy, taxonomy, and similar relationships of 
propositional form). (Silverstein 1987a:19) 
 
Silverstein attacked this traditional view of how linguistic forms operate functionally in terms of 
two related concepts, semanticity and reference, but gave non-traditional interpretations to them. 
For Silverstein, the first is a linguistic habit of abstraction—a detachment from, and lack of 
direct contact with, communicative events and their contextual variables.  “Reference”, in 
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Silverstein’s usage, stands for that quality of traditional linguistics in virtue of which meanings 
are said to be attached to “hierarchical linear combinations of structural units”, in the 
grammarians’ metalanguage of constituency.1 2 
 Ultimately, it is impossible to isolate semanticity and referentiality in Silverstein’s usage 
because they arise as an attempt to analyze a tradition of semantico-referential metasemantics.  
Silverstein noted that traditional linguists had identified indexical expressions that had general 
functions that were stable event-to-event, but whose uses were only intelligible in terms of the 
context they were used—which he dubbed “hybrid” signs (non-semantic, but referential, in his 
use of these terms).  Consequently, it appears as if Silverstein’s concepts of semanticity and 
referentiality are somehow independent of each other.  However, the symbiosis of these two 
concepts is so strong in Silverstein’s model that he wrote that the “abstract reference or 
description as a property of speech, can be called SEMANTICITY” (1995[1976]:190).3  What is 
                                                 
1  In using “reference” to indicate the semantic representational functionality of description more generally, 
Silverstein was apparently influenced by Jakobson’s ([1960]1990) sense of “referent”—which is better captured by 
the psychological term of intentionality (i.e., aboutness—not to be confused with “doing something on purpose”; see 
Brentano [1889]1995; Husserl [1900/1]2001), since Jakobson’s usage also draws, in part, on the Saussurean 
signified aspect of signs, for which there may or may not be an existing object that the signifier is about.  Jakobson 
([1960]1990) elaborated “a set (Einstellung) toward the referent” as “an orientation toward the CONTEXT” and as 
“the so-called REFERENTIAL, ‘denotational,’ ‘cognitive’ function”.  Here, the use of “cognitive” (itself in quotation 
marks) alludes to Brentano’s notion of intentionality, and the use of “denotational” (also in quotation marks) links 
Jakobson’s use of “referent” to that category used by de Saussure’s and Benveniste’s commentators. 
2  In focusing on linguists’ use of reference and predication, Silverstein neglected the deep, philosophical problems 
that gave rise to two, such distinct concepts.  I would go so far as to say that the failure of philosophy to reconcile 
the two functions of reference/extensionalism and predication/intensionalism was so momentous that it brought an 
end to philosophy of language as a productive field.  It is this failure that drives much of the debates in philosophy 
of mind, which absorbed the bulk of the problems of philosophy of language (see Burge 1992).  In this connection, 
Silverstein connected reference and predication together and marked their reconstruction with a single, conjunctive 
lexical item because the former provides the (idea of a) putative connection between lexical expressions and things 
in the world that those lexical expressions purportedly denote, while the latter provides the (idea of an) immutable, 
abstract mentalistic domain of meaning.  It is only by separating reference from predication that one begins to see 
how traditional philosophy of language understood representation to work.  Since linguistic anthropology as a field 
of practice has not differentiated the concept of representation from semanticity and reference(-and-predication), it 
simply is not clear how indexicality is supposed to work in terms of beliefs, significances, and things. 
3  Silverstein (1985a, 1987a) came to call the functionality of reference-and-predication by the short-hand term, 
“denotation”, since he located such operation on “the denotational plane”.  Denotation, for Silverstein, is a focus on 
the value of grammatical constituents as representing, or standing-for things in the world (i.e., linguistic 
“referentiality) and a detachment from, and lack of direct contact with, communicative events and their contextual 
variables (i.e., Silverstein’s “semanticity”). 
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needed is a third basic concept of traditional grammarians: the idea that grammatical constituents 
have the capacity to stand for something—traditionally, this is called “representation” and is the 
concept at the center of Peircean semiotics.4  The concept of representation overlaps both targets 
of Silverstein’s criticism.5 
 Nevertheless, it is the directness of features of talk to the ongoing communicative context 
and the sense that certain signs point in a way that could not be given a dictionary definition that 
inspires Silverstein’s novel use of the term, “index”.6  “Pure index” is Silverstein’s term for 
“features of speech” that “signal some particular value of one or more contextual variables” 
“independent[ly] of any referential speech event that may be occurring” (Silverstein 
1995[1976]:201).  Of such an “index”, Silverstein gave the example of a suffix “–s” on the 
inflected verb “of every non-quotative utterance spoken by a [culturally-recognized] female 
individual”, to mark the gender of this kind of speaker in Muskogean languages 
(1995[1976]:202).  Rather than “contribut[ing] to the referential speech event” by signaling 
                                                 
4  The challenge of distinguishing among the three categories is made considerable by a Saussurean deflation of 
classical reference into Silverstein’s concept of “denotation”.  Silverstein’s concept of “denotation” conflates 
traditional semantic values—moving from the objectivist platform, on which reference was traditionally posited, to a 
mentalistic framework of ideas.  In addition, his use of the term, “index”, as traditionally used for deictic signs that 
involve traditional reference—for signs that relate directly to things in the field of discourse—does not make for 
clarity.  The epistemological context is decidedly unclear since Silverstein uses “index” primarily to demonstrate 
that features of context are interactionally/pragmatically involved in talk (i.e., its pure form, in Silverstein’s 
parlance), rather than to mark out intellectual space for taking about a connection or causality between signs and 
objects (i.e., as indexes operate in Peirce’s parlance).  In the linguistic strain of semiotics, signs perform actions 
(index), while in Peircean semiotics, intelligences perform actions (representation). 
5  N.B.: Since linguistic anthropology as a field of practice has not differentiated the concept of representation from 
semanticity and reference(-and-predication), it simply is not clear how indexicality is supposed to work in terms of 
beliefs, significances, and things (i.e., consciousness).  It is only by separating reference from predication that one 
begins to see the way in which traditional philosophers of language understood representation.  In particular, by 
focusing on linguists’ use of reference and predication, Silverstein neglected the deep, philosophical problems that 
gave rise to these two distinct concepts.  I would go so far in emphasizing such a difference as to say that the failure 
of Twentieth-Century philosophy to reconcile the two functional ranges of reference/extensionalism and 
predication/intensionalism was so momentous that it brought an end to philosophy of language as a productive field.  
It is that failure that drives much of the debates in philosophy of mind, which inherited the bulk of the problems of 
philosophy of language (see Burge 1992). 
6  For Peirce, an index was equivalent to the prototypical concept of a genuine clue as is typically imagined in the 
detective genre of popular fiction.  I would argue that Silverstein’s (1976, 1979; cf. Burks 1954 and Jakobson 1957) 
use of “indexicality” borrows as much from de Saussure as from Peirce’s discussions of indexical sign-relations, and 
largely ignores Peirce’s architectonic of logic-privileging semiotics. 
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abstract semantic values—by way of either structural grammatical categories (e.g., the 
semantico-syntactic category of COUNTABLE) or lexical significance—pure indexes “signal the 
structure of the speech context” (Silverstein 1995[1976]:201).  Silverstein added the construct of 
PURE INDEX to the constructs of 1) semantic categories of REFERENCE (e.g., in Silverstein’s sense 
of “reference”) and 2) categories of language use that directly link to contextual features, but 
nonetheless have stable meanings; that is HYBRID INDEXES, which are prototypically represented 
by deictics.  This addition rounded off the picture Silverstein envisioned of semiotics as bearing 
on language use.7 
 In his “Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function” (1993), Silverstein began 
exposition of this revolutionary perspective in linguistics by first defining semantic categories of 
reference.  These have “denotative” features, in the two senses of this word; that is, “denotative” 
as in his usage of representational description (i.e., a kind of meaning that privileges semantics 
over context and interaction) and as in the more narrow usage of philosophical tradition of non-
designative reference (i.e., referential projections of language that do not name, but merely make 
reference to things).  He then distinguished pure indexes from hybrid indexes: 
 
                                                 
7  The equivocation regarding sign-object and sign-significance in this picture of semiotics makes it difficult to see 
what the essential difference would be between a non-semantic “index” and a referential (hybrid) “index”.  
Generally speaking, Silverstein did not give examples of semantic “indexes”, but instead of non-referential 
“indexes” (i.e., “pure indexes”).  This is because almost all examples of genuinely non-referential indexes involve a 
direct connection to context, and hence are also non-semantic (in Silverstein’s senses of “semantic” and 
“referential”).  Conversely, there are cases of “indexical” signs that are non-semantic, referential “indexes”, but no 
obvious cases of semantic, non-referential “indexes”. 
     Thus, it seems clear that Silverstein’s example of a so-called non-referential (or pure) “index”, the Muskogean 
suffix “-s”, is a non-semantic sign (again, in Silverstein’s sense of “semantic”), rather than a non-“referential” sign, 
as he called it.  As a “pure index” in immediate connection to a communicative event, the Muskogean suffix “-s” 
does not describe anything by way of lexical features that lack a direct connection to the present communicative 
event.  It is not a lexical expression that stands descriptively for something in the general way that “this morning’s 
rosy dawn” does.  It bears directly on the communicative situation it is a part of, and this places it in direct contrast 
to signs that instantiate Silverstein’s concept of semanticity. That is, it is a covert marker of meaning.  Hence, it does 
describe, in some sense of describe, the speaker as a Muskogean female and, for that reason, it can be taken as 
analogous to a traditional, grammatical constituent that operates in terms of Silverstein’s concept of reference-and-
predication. 
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We should thus distinguish between INHERENTLY METAPRAGMATIC 
semanticoreferential forms, lexicon and structural elements, the denotational values 
of which qua constituents of any grammatical expressions in which they occur 
characterize pragmatic facts of one sort or another, and denotational explicitness in 
the metapragmatic-pragmatic functional relationship germane to some interactional-
textual segment. The former type of signs, e.g., DEICTICS (indexical-denotationals) 
such as English I, you, here (: there), this (: that), now (: then) and their equivalents in 
all languages, etc., denote [signify]by virtue of coding a characterization computible 
in terms of pragmatic facts about contextualized use of a token of the form, which 
facts they presuppose/entail in particular ways on each use. They can thus always 
contribute to denotational text in a particular way. In any particular interactional text, 
however, they may not figure among the latter, denotationally explicit machinery in 
the instance (the nonregimenting role of deixis in many rituals comes immediately to 
mind). (Silverstein 1993:39-40) 
 
 If one avoids equivocation regarding the sign-object and sign-significance (à la de 
Saussure), one can see that Silverstein was concerned with three sign-variables.  One of these 
includes features of talk that have immediate relations to communicative events through a link to 
a particular value of one or another contextual relation (or not).  Where a feature of talk is not 
immediately related to a communicative event in this way, it is easier to assimilate it to 
semanticity, but to do so would be to ignore the pragmatic “component that is motivated only at 
the level of speech acts” (Silverstein 1995[1976]:218).  Even forms of communication that seem 
to be wholly inert and indifferent to context has a “socially constituted ‘task[s]’ which speech 
behavior accomplishes or ‘performs’ ” (Silverstein 1995[1976]:213). 
 A second sign-variable includes formal markers of significance.  This might be a lexeme 
such as GOAT or THAT, or it might be a gesture that literally points to something in the 
spatiotemporal context.  Thirdly, there are functional instances of expression significance in 
some shape or another.  Traditional grammarians believed any grammatical constituent acted as a 
marker of expression significance in the shape of semantico-referential content—indeed, this was 
their prototypical emblem of meaning (i.e., REFERENTIAL FUNCTION1).  Silverstein has suggested that  
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pragmatic indexes act as functional markers of significance that signal pragmatic effects—his 
prototypical emblem of meaning (i.e., PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALITY1).8 
 Iconicity is a kissing cousin of indexicality.  Iconization is the process by which people 
link categories under which a social group falls (or images of that social group) to categories 
under which a language or stylistic practice falls (or images of that language/stylistic practice).  
Persons naturalize a perceived relationship between a language practice and a grouping of people 
and, thus, iconization is important for identifying the mechanisms people use to differentiate  
groups of people.  As Gal (2005:26) put it: 
 
 
“One key aspect of ideologies of differentiation is that they pick out qualities 
supposedly shared by the social image (in this case, aspects of the categories of 
persons, themes, spaces, and moral attributes) and the linguistic image (in this 
case, aspects of style and interaction) and bind them together in a linkage that 
appears from the perspective of the ideology to be inherent and particularly apt”. 
 
                                                 
8  Silverstein (1979, 1985a, 1987) differentiated three kinds of meaning-functionality (and implied a fourth): 1) 
REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONALITY2, 2) PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALITY1, and 3) PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALITY2.  One way of 
understanding Silverstein’s subscript notation is in the following way: FUNCTION1 is [act or instance] and FUNCTION2 
is [convention or general principle].  The first of these kinds of expressive functionality (i.e., REFERENTIAL 
FUNCTIONALITY2) is, roughly, the semantico-referential linguistic conception of assertion, as the generalized 
capacity of expressions to describe and represent states-of-affairs.  PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALITY1 is the capacity of 
talk to have purposive, consciously-intended social effects on the occasion of particular acts.  As defined in the body 
text above, PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALITY2 is the capacity of talk to put the values of contextual variables of 
communicative situations (in addition to whatever descriptive content is part of the utterance) into communicative 
play.  Thus, a passive voice construction can operate (syntactically and pragmatically) to tie clauses together 
cohesively, as well as serve (social-pragmatically) to indicate deference and, therefore, politeness (Silverstein 1987); 
and, possibly to indicate, according to cultural models of femininity, social categories like gender (Ochs 1992). 
     As for the implied fourth category, REFERENTIAL FUNCTION1, Silverstein (1987a:25) wrote: 
   [I]f referring and predicating are USES of language in specific contexts, that can thus be 
appropriate/correct/effective or not, then viewed from this second perspective [of PRAGMATIC 
FUNCTION1] the first functionalism [REFERENTIAL FUNCTION2] performs an analysis of grammatical 
structure of sentences that can now be seen as abstractions from maximally 
appropriate/correct/effective referring-and-predicating.  In other words, the first approach is an 
idealization of how lexical expressions PROPOSITIONALLY or REFERENTIALLY FUNCTION2 in 
grammatical patterns that underlie how certain utterances can pragmatically function1 in achieving 
effective referring-and-predicating results.  There is, in other words, a particular PRAGMATIC 
FUNCTION1 we can dub PROPOSITIONAL or REFERENTIAL FUNCTION1, forming the backdrop for the 
REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONAL2 analysis of language. 
   Once referring-and-predicating is (correctly) seen as the socially-effective action for which 
language is uniquely essential—i.e., no other totally language-independent code has this 
functional capacity—then referring-and-predicating becomes one of the “FUNCTIONS1” to be 
considered and explained in this second functionalism.  But note that understanding this 
[REFERENTIAL] FUNCTION1 is logically prior to explaining the [REFERENTIAL] “FUNCTION2” of 
lexical expressions in an idealized account of abstracted correct referring-and-predicating. 
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 If this sort of “naturalizing” of constructed features and relations were not typically 
outside the awareness of the social actors of concern, the features and relations would not appear 
natural.  Given the limits of awareness, most observing researchers neglect to notice that such 
naturalizing is itself an inference—that the linking between tacit categories of social group and 
of language/stylistic practice is inferred to be a metaphysical necessity.9 
 
The Projectivist Stance and Inferentialist Pragmatics 
 I would argue that even where researchers of language use have absorbed the lessons of 
Prague School theorists such as Jakobson and Mukařovský regarding the many functions of 
language, a certain semantic-representational residue remains.  Professional practice has implied 
or stated that utterances constitute a textual category of existence.  The result is the deeply held 
conviction that a text is the proximate cause that projects meanings.  This view implies that 
either texts project the meanings of descriptions of reality, which are descriptions insofar as they 
passively project meaning, or reality is seen to be projected in the form of ideas that texts 
express.10  In this view—the projectivist stance—texts bear a naturally-occurring and 
immediately-expressed projective relation to meanings, which suggests that the existence of such 
“texts” is privileged relative to that of acts, practices, agents, beliefs, and other non-linguistic  
  
                                                 
9  Just because an inference is a process that we can describe as movement from one state of understanding to 
another does not mean that anyone is aware of the inferences they make; certainly not all of the inferences and 
probably only a fraction of them. 
10  The rendering of utterance into morpheme-by-morpheme transcripts and into “conversational” transcripts gives 
the “basic” textual level of utterances: The “what is said” from the speaker’s and recipient’s point of view in the 
model of a “message”.  In cases of descriptive-analytic reports (e.g., ethnographies of communication), the audience 
to the report was not present to the communicative act; thus, there is a methodological use of, and instrumentalist 
need for, text.  It should be clear that I am not making the claim that, in linguistic anthropology, non-referential 
functions are “ ‘riding on’ descriptive propositions” as was the case in “the point of view of the traditional 
semantico-referential linguistics” (Silverstein 1995[1976]:191).  However, I am concerned with a specific kind of 
meaning-functionality that is a special kind of “standing for something else” in which the sign itself carries some 
meaningful content—whether only on particular occasions of interpretation or in a more general way (as with 
conventional sign-meaning relations). 
 86
things.  The position that signs stand for something else in virtue of the fact that the sign has 
some meaningful content has led to the (re)production of habits of thinking in which meanings, 
beliefs, and things blur into each other.  It is this professional view on the (sociocultural) reality 
of texts, every bit similar in this respect to the common-sense descriptivism that it rejects, that 
makes it possible to see such texts as interpretable in opposition to a non-textual (sociocultural) 
reality.11  While I do not dispute that the implications of sign tokens are socially constructed, 
these implications are not somehow “out there” to be grasped: People infer some interpretation 
from the sign tokens, thereby producing effects and possibilities that come to operate in some 
interaction among participants. 
 A comprehensive presentation of semiotics requires consideration of the possibility that 
some instances of meaningful “content” have nothing to “contain” them (just as it is possible that 
there are causally efficient things that never become a sign for anything to anyone).  The 
consequence of not admitting those possibilities is that meanings, beliefs, and things blur into 
each other.  The seeming necessity of meaningfulness, in a general or particular sense, is difficult 
to resist given an appreciation for the cohesiveness of pure textual (and/or intertextual) 
components in “participation” (e.g., use of pronominals, or categorical nominalizations, that 
“refer” back to previous mentionings, in language, of a person, place, event, or thing).  
Consequently, those whose jobs require that they analyze textual matter tend to equivocate  
  
                                                 
11  The projectivist model itself might be said to hold the power of its own mode of duration (keeping in mind 
Whorf’s (1956:148ff.) comments about Hopi habitual cultural behavior).  The relation of ideas and language as a 
representation of the world in words has one of its best formulations in the Western tradition in the statements of 
Locke.  He is often attributed with the turn to language in philosophy, in which the tools of communication are 
subjected to analysis.  He argued that “the use of Words . . . stand[s] as outward Marks of our internal ideas and 
those ideas [are] taken from particular things” (Book II, Chapter XI, §9).  Through these marks, the ideas within 
individual minds “might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men’s minds might be conveyed to another” 
(Book III, Chapter I, §2).  In Locke’s view, the primary projection is of ideas, rather than particular things or facts, 
although some of one’s ideas stand for things in the world.  As Ott (2008:294) characterized Locke’s view: “words 
are signs in the sense of indicators or signals of mental contents and acts”. 
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regarding 1) the efficient role things play in producing the presentation of a sign token; and 2) 
the significance a sign obtains for an intelligent being who interprets a particular sign token.12  
Description of meanings in terms of projective-meaningful functions has the result that agents 
are subsumed under constructed and re-animated discourses. 
 The challenge in addressing the projectivist stance amounts to—as Webb Keane 
expressed, while discussing a related observation—“drawing attention to the dynamic 
interconnections among different modes of signification at play within a particular historical and 
social formation” (Keane 2003:410) while managing not to “reduc[e] [the historicity and social 
power of material things] either to being only vehicles of meaning, on the one hand, or ultimate 
determinants, on the other” (2003:411).  I would argue that to avoid conflating (1) and (2) above, 
requires going even beyond modes of signification, in one’s focus, to the possibility of 
signification, at all.  Interestingly enough, given Peirce’s nominal presence in linguistic 
anthropology, the neglected alternative is to theorize discourses in light of their supporting role 
of producing and reproducing culture through inferential networks of meaning—also known as 
philosophical, or “American” pragmatism.13  Keane’s resolution draws on Peirce, but does so in 
light of current applications of Peircean semiotics.  Use of the concepts of iconicity and 
indexicality tend to downplay the role of both active and implicit inferences in communication 
and in other social action.14 
                                                 
12  Traditionally (i.e., in philosophy), projective-meaningful functions that form a family with Silverstein’s 
indexicality and Gal and Irvine’s iconicity have been articulated in terms of meaningful functions that are about or 
intend some mentalistic role (intension), or refer to an existing class or particular (extension). 
13  One might argue that philosophical pragmatism lacks relevance to contemporary anthropological theories and 
critiques of culture, but one can say the same thing about Peircean semiotics that now infuses many areas of 
linguistic anthropology. 
14  Inference is an indispensable part of semiotics in the Peircean tradition, from which Silverstein’s and Irvine and 
Gal’s terminology is derived.  Conventional formulations of iconization, in particular, do not take a stance on the 
“inferential” nature of the relation between groups and communicative practices, but draw on the language of 
constructivism instead. 
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 The problem for theoretical discussions that draw on Peircean semiotic concepts (e.g., 
indexical signs) is that Peircean semiotics is intrinsically a set of tools for analyzing 
philosophical problems from his particular perspective (i.e., pragmatism).  This is not to say 
Peircean semiotics cannot be used extrinsically, but the tension in the problematic space is what 
makes up the substance of Peircean semiotics.  Most extrinsic applications neglect that substance 
of Peircean pragmatism (which Peirce later renamed, “pragmaticism” because others had applied 
his concepts in ways not aligned with his intentions).  Given that Peirce developed the semiotic 
concepts for making sense of the family of phenomena of which Silversteinian entailments are 
members, while addressing problems in inference and meaning, the neglect of Peirce’s 
pragmatistic concepts (e.g., Thirdness) in favor of a basic categorization of sign-relations marks 
a particularly lamentable lost opportunity—but not an unrecoverable one. 
 The pragmatic intent expressed by attention to networks of inferences and meanings is 
clear in linguistic anthropology generally (see, e.g., Silverstein 2004), but theorization in terms 
of Peirce’s specific concepts often does not deliver such a pragmatistic result.  Applications of 
these concepts in linguistic anthropology do not reject, and sometimes even seem to suggest that 
the basic (but more general) sociality of communicative situations emerges only after an 
utterance has been identified by recipients as a particular type of sign15.  The wider contexts in 
which any participant interacts, from the agent’s perspective, involves networks of inferences 
and meanings that are made by means of inferences.16  Consequently, one of the less empirically 
                                                 
15  A frequent type of instance of this is most harmless, being analogous to evolutionary biologists’ talk about a non-
directed, almost random process that occurs in actively phrased terms like “selection”, where “nature” is “doing” the 
“selecting”.  The difference between linguistic anthropology and evolutionary biology, of course, is that there is a 
recognized agent in the linguistic and semiotic cases.  Alongside such modes of talking are instances that belie these 
modes, such as Silverstein’s discussion of “pragmatic calibration of the metapragmatic sign-event” (1993:40)—even 
if it is not clear whether it is a who or a what that is doing the calibration. 
16  Bearing in mind an example of indices given by Peirce, involving the mark left by a bullet, while modifying the 
gun lobby’s mantra: Signs don’t make indexes; people do. 
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grounded, but still integral arguments of this dissertation is for recognition of the fact that 
inference is an important part of cultural processes.17 
 Rather than privilege signs, I take the much more (fundamentally?) Peircean approach of 
examining the space of inferences.  That analytic “space” corresponds to whatever precedes any 
agent’s recognition of particular signs in communicative interaction, but still give pride of place 
to the agent.  Where de Saussure can be said to equivocate regarding objects and meanings (for 
want of better philosophical terms), Peirce was driven by a scientific realist perspective to give a 
place to “real” things in the world (beyond texts under analysis).18  Recalling my distinction 
above—between 1) the efficient role things play in producing the presentation of a sign token, 
and 2) the significance a sign obtains for an intelligent being who interprets a particular sign 
token—it is critical to differentiate between (1) and (2) if one is to address the problem of 
counter-empirical, underlying norms of consciousness and action. 
 Unlike Peirce, however, I take a sociocultural approach according to which this space of 
inferences is constructed in conditions that are essentially social and cultural, and by means that 
                                                 
17  Recognition of the role of inference allows us—not the least of its virtues—to avoid treating “natives” as given 
themselves (as pegs that fill a slot, to make a trans-metaphoric reference to Trouillot’s (1991) notion of the “savage 
slot” of academia).  It does not, nor should it, prevent us from describing “natives” own cultural claims of 
givenness—that is, as if their vision of the world lends a kind of necessity to their beliefs.  The givenness of such 
claims are somewhat independent of power relations inasmuch as the cosmological claims of the “natives” of Chevy 
Chase, Maryland can seem as natural to themselves as those of the “natives” of Prince George’s county seem to the 
latter.  Indeed, description of strategic or historically particular essentialisms is frequently important to 
understanding life “on the ground”.  A focus on inference allows researchers to analytically suspend commitment to 
those beliefs while preserving their cultural implications. 
18  While he firmly believed in an objective reality beyond thought, he also believed that such an objective reality 
and thought were connected in a way that made it possible for human intelligence to discover truths about the 
objectual world.  Thus, his writings between 1885 and 1908 indicate that Peirce believed thought and reality to be 
continuous such that some element is common to both in varying degrees (Peirce 1974, CP 6.476-7, 1908).  The 
central notion of thought, here, is that of symbolic representations with a content that is about or intends toward 
something else, where this capacity for being about something—whether it be something as “real” as the index 
fingers on our hands, or some image of a fictional palace on the moon—is called “intentionality”.  Thus, Peirce took 
the capacity we have for such intentional representations to be a result of the constitution of the physical universe 
having a nature interrelated with thought (CP 5.93-5.106, 1903).  If we leave his forbidding system of thought in the 
background, we can see that the basic unit of semiotics, “the sign”, which represents the capacity of human-like 
intelligence to participate in representational relations that Peirce believed, encompassed the objectively real 
universe. 
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are essentially social and cultural.  In moving from Peircean semiotics to anthropology, it is 
useful to draw on a social theorist in the background of much of my thinking, as well as of Gal’s 
and Irvine’s writings.  As an exemplar of post-structuralism, Bourdieu emphasized the more-
than-dynamic (i.e., more than one-to-one relational) movement that is characteristic of open-
ended sociocultural “games”.19  Bourdieu’s practice theory addresses what might be seen as 
ontological issues, but transposes them to the key of epistemological inquiry, involving terms of 
cognition (e.g., recognition and practical knowledge).  Thus, social actors engaged in such games 
possess “tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game as practical mastery of its rules” 
(Bourdieu 1992:117). 
 Sociocultural games tend to exhibit systematicity even though performances can vary 
greatly in the way they are produced.20  Taken collectively, these games may depend as much on 
somewhat static, overt ideology or on fluid perspectives and purpose-oriented orientations to 
sociocultural interaction.  Therefore, these games imply tacit interests and cognitive 
commitments.21  This serious-minded “ludic” perspective fuels my attempt to formulate a 
methodological framework that is assumed or implicit in the linguistic anthropology, but never 
                                                 
19  Note that this use of “game” and “ludic” should be distinguished from Schiller’s use of “das Spiel” (in Über die 
ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen), and from Huizinga’s (1949) concept of “ludic”, as well as those following 
him, such as Bateson (1972), Turner (1978, 1982), and Schechner (1988).  Nonetheless, my view is much more 
aligned to the Bateson/Turner tradition, which sees value in “the ludic”, than to schools of thought that oppose ludic 
to material.  Thus, my usage is entirely separate from Teresa Ebert’s (1991a, 1991b) use of it for certain kinds of 
postmodernism and for ludic feminism, which privilege “linguistic play” over material social factors in its analyses 
of the politics of difference.  
20  For example, consider that US-American attorneys and judges do not mechanically follow statutes and case law 
precedent, but use laws and precedent as if they have roles in complex legal games that can be played with more or 
less creativity, typically in more adversarial contexts, but sometimes in nearly cooperative contexts. 
21  The flexibility involved in this concept of games is not limited to the fuzzy boundaries of classification or to a 
capacity for flexibly capturing complexities.  Instead, the trope of GAMES encompasses the sense that people have 
stakes, and that there are a variety of stakes.  At a very basic level, any definition of a game implies a by-definition 
kind of stakes.  Juggling is an example of a highly dynamic game and, consequently, one could not be said to have a 
stake in the game if one tried to demonstrate one’s ability to juggle by putting only a single object into motion.  By 
“stakes”, I mean something more than requisite knowledge of the nature of, and that excludes a willingness to mock, 
the game.  Besides being measured by commitment, stakes of the game can be expressed in terms of performance: 
an activity is still recognizable as juggling whether one is throwing puffy plastic balls or battle-axes, but use of the 
latter in the performance entails its own stakes, which are different from use of the former.  Stakes can also be 
identified in the social context of games. 
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expressed in perfect clarity—perhaps out of fear of the specter of positivism or objectivism.  
Since I give priority to the essential sociality of communicative situations over communicative 
texts, this risk is necessary (and particularly evident in Chapter Seven). 
 Another risk lies in the unwieldy string of themes that arises due to my goal of addressing 
a space of inferences constructed in essentially social and cultural conditions and by essentially 
social and cultural means.  The mapping relations that are addressed in a focus on iconization 
allow a much simpler exposition.  The space of inferences involved here allows me to describe 
the internal relations between normal (academic) views within cultural and linguistic 
anthropology, and also normative (lay and academic) views on the two official languages of 
Wales.  However, in addressing the theoretical concerns that relate to the network of inferences 
and meanings, the development of this (lengthy) chapter obtains a kind of organic chaos.  The 
glue holding the whole together remains, nevertheless, scholarship related to imagining “the 
nation” as a community. 
 
The Places of Nations 
 In the broader literature outside linguistic anthropology, scholars have often presupposed 
some particular position in this scholarly, analytic space that shapes their focus.  Academics 
aligned with powerful world-states like the US, the UK, and France have tended to take state to 
be prior to nation (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).  They are, therefore, critical of the nation-
privileging perspectives of nation-oriented activists who stress ethnicity and a broadly imagined 
fictive “kinship” among compatriots (cf. Cohen 1974 and Weber 1968).  The result is an 
externally viewed constellation of concepts, such as invented national traditions (Hobsbawn and 
Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1990), invented nations (Gellner 1983), and imagined communities 
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(Anderson 1991).  From a perspective in which state is assumed to be conceptually prior to 
nation, the Welsh nation emerged only during the last 150 years through Welsh persons’ 
recognition of, and opposition to, the hegemony of the English state.  That nation, on this view, 
only became remarkable in the latter-half of the Twentieth Century. 
 As with the clinging scent of paraffin, the choices a researcher makes stays with her.  For 
example, to refer to the practice of speaking the language indigenous to Wales as speaking in 
“Welsh” (instead of using “yn Gymraeg” or “in Cymraeg”) is far more significant in its effects 
on thinking than might be apparent.  In particular, the label “Welsh” blurs a great many 
distinctions (of language and ethnic groupings—as well as racial, gender, and class groupings 
that I do not address).  Such blurring can be the purpose of a given use of “Welsh” and, at other 
times, shapes the thinking of the person using it. 
 The selective, if conventional use of terminological distinctions related to the indigenous 
language of Wales speaks to historically settled conventions and a legacy of ethnic or cultural 
dominance by English institutions and polities.  In a train of thought one might call Romantic (as 
a genre mode), selective use of this terminology could symbolize, by its binomial quality, the 
potential for a well of culture fed by Cymraeg streams, which stands in counterpoint to English-
language cultural production.  In this dissertation, I treat this well of culture as real—“the 
Cymraeg language-culture complex”. 
 By “language-culture complex”, I mean the obverse of Agar’s (1994) modification of 
Friedrich’s (1989:306-7) “linguaculture” into “languaculture”.  Agar has used this phrase to 
gesture to something about language over and above “vocabulary and syntax and sentence drills 
and dialogues about buying a ticket for the train” (1994).  He pointed to a phenomenological 
cultural space that is made visible through analysis of lexemes and representation-centric (i.e., 
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semantical) aspects of language.  However, I mean the network of sociocultural practices that 
constitute and reproduce such a cultural space, beyond the not insignificant aesthetics of 
belonging. 
 Similarly, Basso’s notion “place-making” opens up a sociocultural space by focusing on 
practices and activities within such “place-worlds”.  Any set of recognizable landmarks and any 
network of people can evoke “entire worlds of meaning”, “a posited state of affairs, a particular 
universe of objects and events” and people (Basso 1996:5).  Place-making is “a way of 
constructing social traditions and, in the process, personal and social identities” (Basso 1996:7).  
As Basso (1996:7) elaborated: “[W]hat people make of their places is closely connected to what 
they make of themselves as members of society and inhabitants of the earth, and while to the two 
activities may be separable in principle, they are deeply joined in practice”.22 
 Basso’s concept is a general one that accommodates many different analytic foci.  I use 
the “language-” prefix, in connection with “culture complex”, in order to indicate that the system 
of sociocultural practices is organized in terms of the empirical problematic space of a language.  
I use “language-” in this way whether the so-called language is thought to achieve cohesion by 
means of a grammatical code or due to the impression that there is a community whose members 
communicate in some way that they or others describe as communicating with the so-called 
language. 
 Members of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex, as with members of any putative 
community, can be thought of in terms of a set of hypothetical “sensations, concepts, images, 
ideas, attitudes” (Burke 1969:21) and believe that every other member shares roughly the same 
interests and motives. The presumed-to-be common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, 
                                                 
22  The underlying contrast between Basso’s place-worlds, oriented in terms of concrete settings, and my language-
cultural complexes, oriented in terms of status differences created by social relations and sociality, amounts to a 
contrast between PLACE and SPACE. 
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attitudes, including, become manifest via practices in circulation within and between 
communities of people.  These practices “owe their convincingness much more to trivial 
repetition and dull daily reinforcements than to exceptional rhetorical skill” (Burke 1969:26)—
and through this repetition and reinforcement, a set of contextualized ideational “objects”, along 
with the notions and practices of belonging, become the tools of place-making.23  I now turn to a 
different set of issues: how the discourse of and about nationalism shapes ordinary Welsh 
persons’ place-worlds, and how such shaping of place-worlds can disrupt the work of even the 
most careful of ethnographers. 
 
Welshness Performed and Welshness Politicized 
 In the early stages of research, I became aware, from mostly second-hand parental 
complaints, about the image of teachers who were glossed locally as “nationalist”.  These 
parents’ children would come home from school with stories about a teacher who, for example, 
narrated an historical event framed by the elements of English dominance and the valiant 
resistance of the Welsh to the same.  In fact, only once did I ever come across a moment that 
resembled the one some parents fear. 
 An assistant head teacher presented and elicited details from his students about the 
circumstances surrounding Battle of Bosworth, which led to the end of a series of Fifteenth-
Century civil wars in Britain (“the War of the Roses”).  In that lesson, the assistant head teacher 
presented the defender, Richard III, in terms borrowed from Shakespeare and emplotted him as 
                                                 
23  In unpacking a domain defined by what are problems for this ethnographer to puzzle over, I uphold a contrast 
between the analytic notion of ideologies and that of styles of place-making because a focus on ideology (need not, 
but) tends to separate world-views from moral dimensions of action (which are not separable within Basso’s 
perspective on place-making).  Rather than suggest that researchers must select a critical frame that represents a 
choice between ideologies and styles of place-making, I aim to find a common ground that takes the best from each.  
I do not see myself as a pioneer here; see, for example, Becker 1979; Geertz 1957; Irvine 1992; Kockelman 2010; 
Lutz 1988; Ochs 1984, 1996; and Schoaps 2002. 
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the antagonist and loser.24  The reason is not to be explained merely by Tudor or Elizabethan 
values and narratives, but because of the personage who figured as the protagonist and victor.  
The battle that led to the end of the War of the Roses (and some historians have said the 
beginning of the British state) also led to the reign of Henry VII, whose Tudur forebears were 
rooted in Penmynydd in north-west Wales.25 
 In certain parents’ minds, something clearly does happen on occasion at their children’s 
schools, and the confluence of concern and happening is of ethnographic significance.  What I 
find most important—methodologically, at the least—about such reports by those parents has to 
do with the frame that allows interpretation of such a communicative event at school as a token 
of nationalism: that is, the means of production of this frame is largely outside of schools.  In 
fact, that frame cannot even manifest at schools without the potential of causing a rupture in 
everyday practices, making schools a problematic site for that frame, as these parents’ 
frustrations suggest.  Since the discussion of the different ideological commitments that inform 
different senses of citizenship and community membership is deemed political (Chapters Four 
and Five elaborate this point), one is not likely to encounter occasions that support any sort of 
thesis on nationalism in schools. 
                                                 
24  The English Bard described Richard III, in the play of that name, as a hunchbacked, scheming misogynist, tyrant, 
and murderer of a brother and of child-princes.  He is said to “clothe his naked villainy with odd old ends stol'n forth 
of holy writ, and seem a saint, when most [he] play[s] the devil” (I, iii 336-338).  
25  Moreover, although Henry VII, known as Harri Tudur [T Í .dǝr / “Tidder”)] according to the typical Welsh 
orthography, was to take the apical position in the Kingdom of England (and Wales), his geneaological connections 
linked him to the Welsh domain of British kingdoms: to the Lord Protector and the Chief Councillor to the only two 
Welsh rulers to be styled “the Great”.  These two so-styled rulers were the Ninth-Century leader, Rhodri ap Cynan 
(Rhodri the Great), whose Lord Protector was Marchudd ap Cynan, and Twelfth-Century leader, LLywelyn ap 
Iorwerth (LLywelyn the Great), whose Chief Councillor was Ednyfed Fychan (Davies 1993; Lloyd [1911]2004; 
Thomas [1872]2000).  Rhodri was considered great probably because he united for the first time most of the area 
recognized by the English at the time as Wales under his leadership for thirty-odd years, while LLywelyn was styled 
“the Great” probably because he united all of recognized Wales again after it had fragmented in the mid-Eleventh 
Century, and then held it together for nearly forty years.  The two figures are part of a Welsh dynasty (the house of 
Aberffraw) based in north-west Wales that nearly succeeded in constructing a stable polity—a project that decisively 
ended in 1282 with the failure of princes of this dynasty to halt the Norman English conquest of Wales.  “[O]f the 
main line of Aberffraw, Rhodri’s branch was the only one to survive the tribulations of 1282-3” (Davies 1993:164). 
 96
 Consequently, while my originally conceived dissertation research was designed to study 
schooling contexts, I gradually came to focus on a constellation of phenomena that is most 
salient outside schools.  This constellation obtains unity by the coupling of an ongoing, practical 
struggle for identity to processes related to the invention of Wales.  While local people use the 
label, “nationalism”, for certain stances regarding Welsh cultural heritage or Cymraeg (or for 
both), the set of phenomena of interest actually straddles nationalism on one side and national 
identity on the other.  In the Welsh context of a broad and official public, it is generally 
controversial to be a nationalist, but everyone is expected to have national identity.  It is just not 
all that clear what national identity amounts to or whether people could have different shades of 
a singular national identity, or different national identities while remaining “Welsh”. 
 The overlap between the rubrics of NATIONALISM and NATIONAL IDENTITY is easily 
overlooked.  This is because the salience of nationalism creates a kind of epistemic glare (to 
invert Taussig’s (1987) trope of epistemic murk) that blurs anyone’s image of particular kinds of 
national identity.  Moreover, the politics of language identity further act to subvert any analysis 
of local forms of identity.  As transparent and banal as the shield metaphor and the trope of 
defense are, and as apparently valuable they might be to reveal the depths of local meaning about 
communities of Cymraeg speakers, these figures form but one culturally symbolic indicator with 
social and emotional dimensions.  The deeper cultural reality to which they point involves social 
division according to the two official languages of Wales. 
 When I set out to Wales in 2007, it never occurred to me to write an ethnography about 
the organization of identity discourses among the community of Cymraeg speakers, as that 
community manifests in north-west Wales.  This is partly because there was already an excellent 
monograph on this setting of the Cymraeg-anchored imagined community: Carol Trosset’s 
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(1993) Welshness Performed: Welsh Concepts of Person and Society (I describe the conclusions 
of Trosset’s monograph briefly here, but I give more attention to it later in this dissertation.).  I 
doubt I or few others could have provided a richer, more informative description, written for 
“outsiders”, of the Cymraeg language cultural complex as it appears in north-west Wales.  
Nonetheless, that work thoroughly left its mark on my anthropological consciousness, as did 
similar work in the sociology and geography of Wales.  In each of these cases, part of what left 
its mark is the missed opportunity to interrogate language politics.  Tacitly, I pushed the politics 
of language and community into the background.  As a result, initially, they became barriers to 
understanding, rather than objects for explication. 
 Trosset’s (1993) presentation of the ethnolinguistic ideological constellation she 
experienced in northern Wales centered on descriptions of several component ideologies.  The 
most visible feature of Welshness in north-west Wales (but would not be as visible a feature in, 
say, Cardiff or Swansea) is that of the use of Cymraeg as an emblem of nation.  An inability to 
speak Cymraeg or a choice not to speak it (Trosset 1993:50) is cause for others to position one as 
English.  However, Trosset did not count this feature as its own component among the seven 
components to which she attributes determinate (if somewhat fuzzy) boundaries by numbering 
them.  Rather, this feature plays the minor role of informing her readers of the substantive 
content of the component that she designated “degrees of Welshness”. 
 The concept of relative degrees of Welshness is the idea that there is a diametricality to 
being Welsh in the British state-context (in mathematical terms, the proximity of any particular 
position to the terminal of either being Welsh or being English is a ratio of the two); for, while 
one can be both Welsh and English, the sort of belonging that pertains to being English or being 
Welsh is, in the abstract, does not overlap.  It is a highly problematic concept since there are 
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positive and negative values associated with being primarily Welsh or primarily English.  Also, 
there is a great deal of variation over what could count as being more Welsh or more English.  
Despite the controversy and variation, the clearest possible exception to such variability is that 
the concept of degrees of Welshness seems to relate largely to issues of language. 
 Language in Wales—when the context opposes Cymraeg and English to each other, 
which is virtually all of the time for a very large percentage of people there—has a binomial 
character in which people feel that one or the other language provides the core of their sense of 
self.  Thus, one might take, as a principal ideology among the components of Welsh personhood, 
the assertion of a past and present domination by the English, where being English is symbolized 
by the inability to speak Cymraeg (Trosset 1993:50).  However, Trosset did not count such 
assertions among her seven components.  This ideological feature is submerged in the first 
component she discussed, degrees of Welshness, and the relations there are not fully explored.  
The omission of the politics of Cymraeg as a component ideology is an important lacuna. 
 Another major important component of Trosset’s image of Welshness is an ideology of 
egalitarianism (1993:164).  The ideology of egalitarianism involves a sensibility of “strong 
disapproval of those seeking status” (Trosset 1993:164) attached to a seemingly contrary 
“respect for high status, education, official credentials, and prestigious jobs” (1993:164).  In 
addition, the prevalent constellation of ideologies that Trosset described includes a tendency 
toward self sacrifice and martyrdom (1993:125-127) in which Welshness is seen as a burden 
(1993:127-128), and individuals, and even groups, are perceived as powerless in the face of 
systemic conditions (1993:121-125).  This locally dominant ideology of Welsh identity also 
involves an interest in contributing to the current existence of certain “community” practices 
which are seen as essentially Welsh (Trosset 1993:53).  Trosset’s ideology of personhood also 
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involves a number of component ideologies related to a distaste for contamination of groups 
identified as attaining a “purity” (Trosset’s term) of Welsh membership (1993:59-61), sectarian 
organization of affiliation, and the imaginary absence of hierarchy. 
 I regard Trosset’s as the best treatment of sociocultural life in Wales available, 
particularly of north-west Wales.  It provides an impression of what it is like to inhabit north-
west Wales when one was not born into a family that is part of Cymraeg-speaking social 
networks.  In fact, Trosset achieved success at gaining access to Cymraeg-oriented social 
contexts, where I found such access to be possible only by marrying into such a family (which I 
did not do) or by committing to long-term residence in Britain (which was economically 
unsustainable for me).  If I were to fault her, it would be for not subjecting language and 
Cymraeg-oriented social activities to greater analysis. 
 What my summary leaves out is that Trosset’s components of a Welsh ideology of 
personhood is based on those who participate traditional activities and those who react against 
the commitment of these participants to those component ideologies.  My informed guess is that 
she did not provide an account of the important connection between the prevalent Welsh 
ideology of personhood (which she did describe) has to the emphasis many place on Cymraeg in 
their own notions of identity because any mention of the generally salient traditional practices 
Trosset focused on already has the tendency to evoke Cymraeg as a naturalizing component of 
identity.  Even while trying to avoid the impression that she thought Cymraeg was representative 
of all Wales—through no less than an outright denial of this (Trosset 1993:37)—her readers 
could not be disabused of the notion.  Charlotte Davies, another anthropologist, claimed that 
“Trosset’s view of Welshness as emanating from what is even a relatively small segment of 
Welsh-speaking society, let alone Welsh society as a whole, is ultimately unconvincing” 
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(1998:151).  The only choice for this language-cultural context would seem to be to make it the 
topic itself.  Such a decision in research design would seem to be in local demand. 
 While attending a concert in Caernarfon, the subject of Trosset’s monograph came up in 
a conversation with an acquaintance.  Originally from the US, but having settled in Wales, this 
scholar was currently working within the “humanities sector” of Welsh Studies in Wales.  
Although this scholar was not involved in such empirical praxis in her/his scholarship, s/he had 
been involved in language activism in Wales.  S/he commented that Trosset’s monograph 
seemed only to touch the surface, covering only the more obvious parts of Welsh culture and 
society.  The force of the criticism was that Trosset (1993) neglected to address the undercurrents 
of language politics in Wales. 
 As we shall see, Trosset’s focus on ideologies prevalent among those who participate 
traditional activities—and not a focus on Cymraeg—is and was doomed to misunderstanding by 
a stubborn sociolinguistic fact: “Welsh” has the extensional (i.e., referential) scope of anything 
that can be subsumed under the concept of Wales.  “Welsh” operates as a semiotic mélange of 
geographic, linguistic, ethnic, and civic identifiers—as does “English”.  Hence, although there is 
a history of ethnic conflict and tensions, social actors in Wales can move the struggle between 
two culturally recognized kinds of languages, with their own historical continuity—to the 
foreground without explicitly mentioning the conflict between two putative kinds of people.  The 
latter is part of what the humanities scholar was referring to as underneath the surface.  Further, 
“Welsh” makes no distinction between the imagined community of Wales and each of the 
following three groupings: 1) the Cymraeg-anchored community, 2) those who participate in 
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Cymraeg-dominant “community” activities, or 3) those who feel that participation in the 
Cymraeg language-cultural complex is an essential part of their own social being.26 
 By blurring across lines of division, the common use of “Welsh” is, in fact, an important 
way in which Welsh persons manage intercultural dialogue without foregrounding centuries of 
conflict, and thereby offering offense to ethnic others.  By the same token, where language 
choice evokes a politics of belonging, the ethnic label, “Welsh”, can be used in a way that does 
not immediately distinguish the normal-political territory from a linguistic domain (e.g., “Welsh 
ethos”).  The result is not only that of confusion on some occasions, and an enabling of a kind of 
communicative unity across domains of ethnicity, language, and civic identity, but also a 
concealment of the object of discourse. 
 The politicization of issues surrounding language and national identity contributes to an 
inability by Welsh publics to develop a generally intelligible set of stances, beliefs, and 
categories for making explicit the substantive claims intrinsic to the indigenous language-cultural 
complex.  This might seem to be an empirical claim, but I do not treat it as the focus of my 
investigation.  Rather, I see it as a general condition—what I called “the submergence of culture” 
in Chapter One.  It is similar to many contexts around the world, but with specific formations in 
Wales.  In this dissertation, I focus on the particular effects of cultural submergence.  To indicate 
the direction I intend to take these strands of thought in the relevant areas of the literature on 
imagined communities, I extend this lengthy chapter in order to relate some of the practical 
effects I have in mind to the theoretical language developed in anthropology. 
                                                 
26  Unlike in English, people communicating in Cymraeg can easily distinguish Cymraeg (the language) from a large 
variety of properties or things grouped by their association with Wales [cymreig].  In ordinary speech occasions, 
however, pronunciations of these two ideally-phonemically distinct words are not always aurally distinguishable 
(even for native speakers), which creates an interpretive demand for contextual features, just as in English-language 
situations.  Even if this were not so, I suspect that the centrality of the root form of cymr- in the relevant linguistic 
locations serves to create an image of unity across domains of ethnicity, language, and civic identity, even though 
additional forms are available in Cymraeg that do not have analogs in English. 
 102
CYMRAEG LANGUAGE ZONES 
The Shield Trope 
 In the summer of 2007, I attended a field trip to an overnight outdoor center in a part of 
Wales near Y Bala (Meirionydd, Gwynedd county).  On that daytrip, I met the assistant head 
teacher whom I call Mrs. Lloyd from a school I call “Ysgol Gerrig yn yr Afon”, or “YGA” 
(pseudonyms).  Eventually, I arranged a schedule of visits to YGA, but those discussions had not 
yet occurred.  In front of us, pupils scaled a training climbing wall, which resembled the keep of 
some of the atypical, rectangular native-built castles around north Wales.  The paved area where 
we stood led up to the housing units and administrative buildings and, in the other direction, 
down to the dock of the lake, LLyn Tegid.  On the other side of this narrow strip of pavement, 
opposite the climbing wall, there was a gentle slope of verdant grass.  Looking on, as site 
instructors assisted children, Mrs. Lloyd explained to me what it meant to know and use 
Cymraeg as a first-language. 
 She began by recounting her own personal story, in English, which we had been using (I 
address this impolitic, but then-necessary practice in Chapter Three.).  The following is a 
reconstructed monologue on the basis of the notes I took, the details of which I furiously filled in 
immediately after the conversation. 
 
 “We lived in South Wales about twenty-five years ago and we were 
surrounded by English language.  Welsh language schools were very important 
then.  Even more popular now, but at the time Welsh language schools were 
popular because they were an alternative to the English comprehensives, which 
were thought to be a poor education.  Parents who wanted to give their child a 
better education would send their children to the Welsh school—even if they 
weren’t as passionate about the language as the culture. 
 “But we found our own community an artificial community.  If we saw 
each other on the street ordinarily, we wouldn’t do things, but because we had the 
language we’d organize activities.  We even had our own club, with a bar.  You 
could have a pint and chat with each other in Welsh.  One night, my husband and 
 103
I went out for the evening and had our child at a child-minder and when he came 
home he stuck his foot out like that. 
 
 
She demonstrated, extending one foot in front of me, and continued. 
 
 
“He said, ‘Tie my shoe, Daddy’ [in English, not Cymraeg] and my husband said, 
‘We’re moving’, and we started planning that night. 
 “We decided we would try it individually and whoever got a job first 
would move and the other would follow and stay at home. When our friends 
visited and we knew they would—we had a place in north Wales and they would 
drive up and stay for a weekend.  And we would go to the park because we all had 
toddlers and they were amazed.  They would look out over the park—a grassy 
area like this with children playing and, hearing the children, they would say 
[using a tone of great surprise]: ‘They’re speaking Welsh!’”. 
 
 In this autobiographical account, language appears as an inhabitable zone or, at the least, 
an essential element of some inhabitable zone.  For her and her husband, the overwhelming 
presence of English did not motivate their move until they believed that it was becoming a 
salient and visible factor in their child’s personality.  Cymraeg, in her autobiographical account, 
while they were surrounded by an English-language environment prior to the move to 
Abergwaith, figured as one of the components of a complex medium.  When their child began 
using English, it was as if the nitrogen content of the ambient air suddenly rose from seventy-
five or eighty percent, up to ninety percent: the environment suddenly became unbearable, the air 
toxic.   
 In the context of her autobigraphical narrative, once she had moved to a Cymraeg-rich 
environment and occupied a community that could sustain a Cymraeg-based identity, Cymraeg 
took on another quality: It figured as a protective force, but only in the context of the recent 
present.  At that point in her account, the notion of shield took the form of a cultural identity, an 
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imagined community counterpart to an intrinsic aspect of personal identity that emerges from 
belonging to a local language community: 
 
It’s who you are.  It protects you.  It’s also because we’ve been oppressed and we 
don’t want to be engulfed by this wave of Englishness and American culture.  
People who move in and participate in village activities and learn the language, 
they understand.  It’s your feelings.  It’s a part of you.  It’s also a shield. 
 
This image in which Cymraeg is cognized as protecting a segment of society is a prevalent, if not 
a commonly expressed, one.  This particular example is notable because of its implied 
description of the cultural topography that situates language in its protective mode and the 
pronominal variety that operates as resources for meaning in that description. 
 In her short statement about the protective potential of Cymraeg, Mrs. Lloyd captured 
nearly the entire range of positions from a certain perspective in this field of discourse about 
language worlds.  The way she moved across different person-deictic classes, from “it” to “you”, 
to “we” (to “this wave”), to “they”, to the reflexive “you”, and back to “it” again, is like a 
musical progression that resolves in the anchoring harmonic foundation of the musical key.  Put 
differently, it is a linguistic expression of discursive motifs that links to aspects of the social 
landscape just as some musical scores have leitmotifs for the protagonist and the villain.  In 
doing so, this short stream of talk amounts to an identity game of its own, and many of her 
compatriots, who would sympathize with her reasons for moving to north-west Wales, know that 
game intimately. 
 Using the third-person pronoun, “it”, Mrs. Lloyd began by referring to the language as a 
marker of identity (“It’s who you are”), but also as an emblematic part of self that can operate in 
an agentive sense (“It protects you”).  Her simultaneous use of the English-language, second-
person objective pronoun, “you”, can take a singular or plural form.  The origin of reference—
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given that the context was focused on her experience—was herself.  This singular form of 
expression clearly was not sufficient for her purposes.  After all, her experience of Cymraeg was 
not individual.  One might even argue that her use of the second-person objective pronoun (“. . . 
who you are”, “. . . protects you”), even if construed as singular in number, represented the 
unmarked human membership in her reflexive community, the Cymraeg language community.  
Hence, she moved from using “you” to using the first-person collective pronoun, “we”, 
representing those who respond appropriately to being in Wales by using “the language”; that is, 
the Cymraeg community.  She then characterized the culture of outsiders—all English, 
American, Australian and similar “external” culture-kinds grouped together—as a “wave” 
threatening “to engulf” the community. 
 An interesting shift in this short stretch of talk is the move Mrs. Lloyd made away from a 
simple image of her experience in terms of an internal sense of identity and an external non-
identity—the internal we, as contrasted with the implied they, who are not part of the language 
community.  She seems to have recognized, as she represented that image, that the internal 
community (the “we”) is not homogeneous.  Some members of this community start out from a 
place outside that language community, while others start out from a place that is “outside” in a 
merely geographically sense (as in her case).  Hence, she then introduced the “they” of those 
who make the transition to becoming a member of the Cymraeg community by learning the 
language and participating in village life.  Since her experience of language is one in which 
language is not individualistic, but ties people together into a community, she moved back again 
to the third-person and her predication of the language with properties of protection and of 
shielding the “we” from the “wave”. 
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Defensive Translation and Parallel Zones 
 The emblematic use of Cymraeg in the figurative role of defense of a national geist 
(whether embodied in a person, as in the above, or not) appears in many forms.  The shield 
metaphor shares similar motives with these other emblematic uses of Cymraeg as defense.  
Another way of cognizing language as defense concerns the set of various translation practices 
that reflect a modern Wales, in which both Cymraeg and English enjoy official status, but stand 
in different vernacular spaces.  When there is a task-orientation of bilingual presentation of the 
“same” content, this context helps to produce a regime of practice in which translators impose 
relatively strict equivalences.  Thus, the Gwynedd Hospital in Bangor translated “Breastfeeding 
policy” as “Polisi bwydo ar y fron” [transliterally: A feeding-on-the-breast policy].  Even the 
matching of National Patent Safety Agency’s “A clean hand is a hand you can trust” with 
“Rhowch eich ffydd mewn dwylo glân” [Put your faith in two clean hands] is a fairly equivalent 
pairing. 
 However, it is fairly common in other settings to find translations of phrases in which 
there are non-equivalent descriptive meanings—where translation appears as a deliberate act of 
transposition of different cultural contexts.  The result—itself a realization of the duality of 
identity in these cultural milieux—is one in which one can understand that the parallel 
translations are related to each other as translations without understanding the precise cultural 
meanings and background associations of each translation.  Some of the most readily available 
instances are slogans issued by quasi-state agencies. 
 Under the functionalist interpretation of translation, we might suppose the Welsh 
Language Board takes “Welsh! Give it a go” to be equivalent to “Cymraeg yn Gyntaf” [Cymraeg 
First; or, less transliterally: Cymraeg in the Beginning/Cymraeg at the Start].  The English-
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language phrase encourages risk-taking and trying new things, which carry no hint of 
commitment, while the Cymraeg phrase speaks to a normative sense of priority—a statement that 
might be unnecessary for those who can already read the Cymraeg slogan, as they are putting it 
first by reading it (i.e., by reading the Cymraeg slogan, the conveyed message is already 
represented in immediate consciousness by that practice).  The UK Baby Friendly Initiative’s 
impersonal thematic of “Breastfeeding’s world of benefits” was translated as—“LLaeth mam: 
llond gwlad o fanteision” [Mother’s milk: countryful of benefits].  The Cymraeg phrase makes 
the kinship link between mother and child salient, and notionally connects that link between 
mother and child to the overflowing resources of a rich nation.  By contrast, some might read the 
English slogan in the register of UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), where “world of 
benefits” could be an allusion to the scientific analysis of health and nutrition. 
 The preceding are fairly banal instances of exceptions to the tacit doctrine of a bilingual 
translation-regime that purports to uphold parallelisms in meaning.  They are significant because 
they illustrate how such a tacit doctrine of parallelism in translation conceals the “deeper” 
networks of meanings by means of a functionalist scheme that takes what translation is simply to 
be what translation does.  Attention to variability can reveal cultural significance, which 
becomes more clear when one turns from state-issued slogans aimed at public welfare to 
domains closer to the heart of cultural feeling. 
 One example, which also serves the purpose of showing the use of language as an explicit 
symbolic instrument, is the title of a book about the history of Cymraeg-medium schools.  
Translated from the original Cymraeg, it bears the English title, Our Children's Language: the 
Welsh-medium Schools of Wales 1939-2000.  The original Cymraeg version is called Gorau Arf: 
Hanes Sefydlu Ysgolion Cymraeg 1939-2000.  When I asked a librarian how she would translate 
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“arf”, immediately after I found the book of that title on the library shelf, she said it meant 
“weapon” or something used in battle.  Incidentally, that is the first conventional translation, 
which can be found in many dictionaries.  However, the librarian immediately said that that was 
wrong and corrected herself after a minute of thinking about it, suggesting “defense” instead.  
The Cymraeg title, then can be translated as “Best Defense: A History of the Cymraeg Schools 
Movement 1939-2000”. 
 I am inclined to take the librarian’s situation of translation discomfort as a recursive 
moment, in one sense or another—as a defensive repositioning of cultural semantics.  On one 
hand, I could construe her “correction” as a reflection of her understanding that a weapon does 
violence, while a defense protects against violence.  As I have told some of my students when 
they have proposed paper topics, a language used as a weapon is different from a language used 
in defense.  On the other hand, the (meta)semantics of “arf” might be a reflection of the 
historical imagination of Wales as a conquered nation that long tried to defend itself.  In that 
imaginary, weapons were used defensively to protect the nation.  Either construal—self-
conscious cultural politeness or a demand for verisimilitude in meaning—entails a defensive 
repositioning of the cultural semantics of defense.  The previous section of this chapter should 
have suggested some ways language might operate defensively in the context of official 
language in Wales.  Interestingly, the main title of the book on the Cymraeg-medium schools 
movement, in its Cymraeg form, makes no mention of who is defended—“our children”; nor 
“their” language—as did the English-version. 
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 “Gorau arf ” is a fragment of a longer proverb—“Gorau arf, arf dysg”—that states that 
education is the best defense (or, literally: tool or weapon).27  Local people’s suggestions 
regarding the source of that quotation includes biblical proverb and the more easily confirmed 
motto of a secondary school in north-west Wales (the derivation of which is unknown).28 29  The 
symbolism of the phrase itself supplies the implied context of education and, therefore, children. 
 Moreover, since the phrase, an allusion to education as a resource, is in Cymraeg, the 
code of communication itself evokes the cultural context within which Cymraeg is presumed.  
This informs the kind of education to which the phrase refers, indicating a language-medium for 
education (i.e., in Cymraeg).  Consequently, the title in Cymraeg both expresses explicitly and 
itself exemplifies the way in which teaching children in Cymraeg serves to insulate the Cymraeg 
language complex from the influences of other language complexes; the language of English, 
being the obvious “threat”.  One can interpret such a social imaginary in its aspects that reflect an 
historical narrative, or one can interpret it in terms of the sense of place it produces.  The 
following section takes up the first alternative, but the rest of this chapter shows how these two 
kinds of interpretation are not mutually exclusive and even seem to implicate each other in the 
place-times of Wales. 
 
                                                 
27  Interestingly, on the publisher’s web page for the book, the book’s title is stated as the entire proverb (as if the 
four words made up the main title), despite the fact that only the first two words appear in the actual title; 
http://www.ylolfa.com/dangos.php?ISBN=0862436176, accessed February 24, 2012. 
28  Apparently, it is also the motto of the college, Colegio Camwy/Coleg Gamwy, in Gaiman, Chubut, Argentina; 
http://www.travelblog.org/Photos/827654, accessed February 24, 2012.  It is also the motto of Stanwell 
Comprehensive School in Penarth, Glaorgan, Wales; http://davidcornock.blogspot.com/2007/06/gorau-arf-arf-
dysg.html, accessed February 24, 2012. 
29  A history of the National Eisteddfod—contained in Barddoniaeth Fuddugol Eisteddfod Genedlaethol 
Caernarfon, 1877: yn nghyda Hanes cyflawn o'r Eisteddfod, yn cynwys yr areithiau [Winning Bards of the 
Caernarfon National Eisteddfod of 1877: along with a complete history of the Eisteddfod, in contents of the 
speeches], Caernarfon: Y Genedy Gymreig (1878)—mentioned finding the motto in a setting described therein: “O 
dan yr orielau gwelid yr arwyddeiriau canlynol [From under the gallery is visible the following mottos]: . . . ‘Goreu 
arf, arf dysg ’ ”. 
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A LESSON ABOUT LANGUAGE DEMESNES 
Language Communities and Language Demesnes 
 I have already related a lesson I learned about schooling contexts in north-west Wales, 
about history teaching (in the introductory chapter).  This dissertation is largely about a second 
lesson I learned in north-west Wales, which is two-fold.  First, the conceptualization of Welsh 
culture among those with an affinity for “indigenous” Wales is figured in terms of the indigenous 
language, Cymraeg, which declined dramatically during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
By the mid 1980s, only twenty percent of the population of Wales voiced confidence in their 
competence.  The figuring of Welsh culture in terms of Cymraeg articulates to a fear of loss.  If 
culture is taken to be identical to language (which is a coarse-grained representation of a 
diversity of experienced reality in this milieu), then the decline of the language signifies a loss of 
culture.  Secondly, when people make what are essentially references to Cymraeg-based 
language identity, from subject-positions within that identity-space, these references tend to be 
submerged in utterances that are, on the surface, about cultural practices. 
 It is worth noting that the submergence of Cymraeg language-culture is fundamentally 
both a diachronic process and a synchronic system (cf. Geertz’s (1962) distinction between the 
two, in this connection to national identity).  It is both historical process and cultural dialectic—
even if I could reasonably only address one or the other (and I chose to focus on the latter).  
Thus, the synchronic system is but the current moment in an ongoing history that is told from 
various perspectives, which, in the self-narrations of these perspectives, maintain a synchronic 
system.  Put differently, cultural activities of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex are 
practiced primarily because they are sustained by, and because participants act-as-if-they-believe 
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that these activities sustain, the reproductive social function of Cymraeg use.30  I leave this 
interpretation with the status of a hypothesis, not to be investigated in this dissertation, because 
the function of language and salient traditional practices associated with Cymraeg cannot be 
adequately examined until the ideological appearances are addressed. 
 To some extent, this cultural knowledge of the relevance and significance of language 
involves an almost universal taken-for-granted quality (common to the taken-for-granted quality 
of cultural practices practiced anywhere), where those with a language identity rooted in an 
affinity for the Cymraeg language-cultural complex could not imagine a world without Cymraeg.  
However, the fact that Cymraeg has been the target of repression and does not have a high status 
among world languages—as if balancing on its narrow, rocky, and gradually deteriorating ledge 
alongside the broad fields of England—is not the stuff of ordinary tacit cultural knowledge that 
is necessarily familiar to every ethnographer of any cultural setting.  The fact that the indigenous 
language has been the target of repression and does not have a high status among world 
languages is the motivation for a sort of political consciousness that, for some people in Wales, 
guides individuals’ participation in a politics of language and national identity, rather than being 
an inert part of the background of everyday life—whether tacit or expressed. 
 Since that political consciousness is driven as much by accounts of the past as of the 
present, this dissertation is really about something common to both the first and second lessons I 
learned.  That is, it is of primary importance that the conceptualization of Welsh culture is in 
terms of implicit references to Cymraeg and that the implicit references to Cymraeg are 
submerged in explicit references to culture—as Chapters Three and Nine discuss.  Yet, because 
                                                 
30  We can compare these activities to that of baptismal practices, which are sustained by, and serve to sustain, a 
Christianity cultural complex (This reference to Christian baptism is partly coincidental and partly motivated, given 
my discussion in Chapter Nine of the trope of “drowning” children in Welshness.).  In this imperfect analogy, 
Cymraeg is one type of language, with associated sociocultural spaces for its performances (kinds of practices); just 
as Christianity is one type of religion, with associated kinds of practices, such as baptisms. 
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the meanings and circulation of implicit references to Cymraeg require an historical 
consciousness of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex, history narratives and images do vital 
work in (re)producing Cymraeg-based language identities. 
 I eventually came to see that teachers choose many of the national figures selected for 
history instruction because the figures are part of the history of the Cymraeg language in 
particular.  My recognition that most lessons that did address a distinctly Welsh history were 
about figures in the history of Cymraeg finally met my conclusions based on the first lesson I 
had received: that there was no programmatic effort in history lessons to distinguish Welsh 
narratives from English narratives and to teach a pointed Welsh history in the service of 
patriotism.  The consequence was my sense that history as a topic, implicit or explicit, was 
secondary to the implicit or explicit topic of Cymraeg as the centerpiece of a language-cultural 
complex.  In discovering that that was much of the content of a question I had not asked (“Why 
is there no such programmatic effort in history lessons?”), I realized I had a basis—albeit, a 
fuzzy, underdetermined notion—for an answer. 
 The fact that instructional resources, like the curriculum and lesson materials relating to 
the school subject of history, are not mobilized to teach a patriotic version of Welsh heritage is of 
cultural significance.  Ultimately, it means that those people with an affinity for “indigenous” 
Wales rely on background knowledge about the history and practices of the Cymraeg language-
cultural complex that is only ever made explicit on those occasions when people express 
frustration with the status quo or a desire for change in Wales.  These occasions, in turn, become 
marked—as “political”, by people who share those views, and as “nationalistic” in a negative 
sense by those who do not share those views—precisely because that knowledge is unusually 
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being made explicit on these occasions and given a directedness that would ordinarily be merely 
implicit—and, therefore, neutral or, at least, indeterminately (un)directed. 
 After the realizations above, I came to see that they do not speak as much to language in 
the sense of communicative practices as they do to the idea of language communities as cohesive 
units.  Silverstein (1998a, 2003b) defined “language community” as a community of people 
whose membership consists in their treating the focal language (and only that language) as 
symptom and emblem of the community, regardless of dialectal variation.  The concept borrows 
on Anderson’s (1991) idea of an imagined community that is horizontal and generally not in 
interpersonal mutual contact.  Language community is an especially important concept when 
considered in conjunction with the folk models and folk theories about language use and 
language forms that linguistic anthropologists have come to call ideologies of language (see 
Schieffelin et al. 1998). 
 According to Woolard and Schieffelin, ideologies of language are “notions about how 
communication works as a social process, and to what purpose”, where these “envision and enact 
links of language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology”, 
“often underpin[ning] fundamental social institutions” (1994:55-56).  Contrasting the concept of 
language community with that of speech community, Silverstein stated that definition of the latter 
depends on patterns “of who, normatively, communicates in which ways to whom on what 
occasions”.  By contrast, language communities are made solidary by language ideologies (e.g., 
of purity of registers) “based on allegiance to norms of. . . code” (1998a:129). 
 The sort of language community with which the phenomena in north-west Wales were 
involved manifest as the more traditional notion of a more or less interpersonal (nevertheless, 
imagined) community that is an experiential and inhabitable locality or social network.  Such 
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loosely defined locality or network that is associated closely with a necessarily non-experiential 
and partially impersonal language-based imagined community might be called a language 
demesne—despite the feudal origins of the term.  That is, a language demesne is some “chunk” 
of a language community shaped by and constituted by those who lay claim to it in and through 
their frequent interactions within its indefinite and permeable boundaries.  Because the area of 
north-west Wales in which my research was centered, 1) cohered together according to present 
and historical occupational mobility, and 2) could be studied adequately within a six to twelve 
month period, Abergwaith formed what I call a language demesne. 
 While the term refers to something belonging to a landlord with vassals who was himself 
a vassal of other lords, it is noteworthy that a language demesne occupies a middle territory 
between different domains of language-based identity.  In the language demesne in which I 
carried out my research in northwest Wales, Cymraeg dominates and has its “vassals”.  Among 
those who belong to the Cymraeg language community living and intermingling there are those 
who feel subject to a local Cymraeg regime, people who feel imposed on by social obligations to 
participate in the Cymraeg community.  At the outer edge, that particular demesne is one among 
many demesnes within Wales that have in common the fact that Cymraeg has a minority status in 
Wales.  Even more dramatically, it is almost insignificant next to the power of the force that 
borders it; that is, the English-language language-empire of the UK, not to mention the UK’s 
diplomatic sibling and linguistic paternal-twin, the United States of America. 
 When I left my home university for principal dissertation field research, I embraced the 
implication that language is often (always?) a central cultural concern in ethnography.  However, 
I do not think I would have begun to question certain conventional assumptions about language 
without first trying to understand the activities (as opposed to categories or representations) of 
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language politics in situ.  It is a problem of description that led me to recognize a problem with 
theory.  There is a large difference between recognizing the importance of language in a place 
where the politics of language become quite heated, and the bigger step of obtaining answers 
about the cultural and political significance of language practices in such a locale. 
 What I did not realize until I was home again is that virtually all things of significant 
cultural interest that I encountered in the field were predicated on some conception or another of 
a community; a community of language, but it was the relations of community that were of key 
importance.  Language, in the sense of the language practices that linguistic anthropologists 
study, was the visible presence of that community, but the sense of cohesion that language lent to 
social interactions and perceptions of society—which enabled people to sense fissures, fractures, 
and a moral code to resist, tolerate, or endorse—was the cohesion of putative communities, not 
the cohesion of language as conventionally understood.  While I had moved from concerns with 
history instruction to concerns with language practices, it was yet another major step to the 
realization that, if I constructed my research problem in terms of language practices, this would 
misrepresent the sociocultural realities.  My research problem was more properly centered in 
issues regarding the role of languages-as-symbols in the social constitution of the macro-form of 
domestic and voluntary association: communities. 
 
A Scholarly, but Practical Dilemma 
 This dissertation is the result of trying to answer two questions that haunted me 
throughout my graduate student career, but which I laid aside in my later grant proposals for 
dissertation fieldwork.  I asked them in a form directed specifically at language and identity 
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issues while attending as a non-presenter at a Michicagoan conference in Chicago.31  The 
questions I posed seemed to lie in the not-distant background of nearly all of the papers 
presented that Saturday afternoon in May 2008.  With Jane Hill, Judith Irvine, John Lucy, Susan 
Philips, and Michael Silverstein (among others) looking on and participating in support of 
graduate students from the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago’s anthropology 
departments, I asked the following: 
 
First, how might we reconcile the deconstructionist mission in mainstream 
anthropology with the interests of indigenous language speakers, whose rights 
sometimes depend on their treating language codes as natural kinds? 
 
Secondly, why is it that this issue of reconciliation only gets raised (as a rule, it is 
seldom more than framed) near the end of journal articles, books, and conferences 
(e.g., Silverstein 1998a:421-423 and Silverstein 2003:546-554)? 
 
Had I asked those present to tell me the meaning of life, the universe, and everything, I would 
have received a more encouraging reply. 
 When my questions in Chicago were met with a thoughtful silence that seemed unlikely 
to produce a response, I continued: Of course, I know that we cannot answer my questions in the 
time we have, and they might even be unanswerable.  At that, a light shower of ambiguous 
laughter broke across the crowd.  In fact, there was no face-saving response the audience could 
make—and yet, I was convinced there was a genuine problem of broad significance here crying 
out to be addressed. 
                                                 
31  This is a conference at which graduate students of anthropology from (normally) the University of Chicago and 
the University of Michigan present papers in or around linguistic anthropology.  It alternates between the two host 
departments and receives enormous moral and intellectual support from both departments’ linguistic anthropology 
faculty.  In 2008, the theme was “Linguistic Worlds in Collision”.  My questions were partially inspired by several 
sessions I had attended the previous two days at the University of Illinois’ Decolonizations: Subaltern Studies and 
Indigenous Critical Theory symposium.  I returned to the Michicagoan conference in Chicago in 2010 to present 
some of the material in Chapter Seven and some of what follows on the theme of “Inhabitable Language”.  As far as 
I know, I am the first Michicagoan presenter who was not a student at either host department. 
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 Within the last forty years, it has become conventional for linguistic anthropologists to 
treat the relation between language and identity in a dialectic way, both in situations (e.g., 
Bauman and Briggs 1990) and in historical context (e.g., Silverstein 1985b).  This is a result of 
the struggles to contextualize the “texts” of linguistic analysis (see Goodwin and Duranti 1992).  
In that period of time, anthropological conceptualizations of these “texts” have moved away 
from a focus on morphosyntactic and semantic elements of utterances that constitute expressions 
with the propositional quality of descriptions and statements of fact (what Silverstein has called 
“denotational texts”).  They have moved toward a focus on particular, situational analyses of 
dialogic interaction that are not revealed solely in the meanings of “denotational texts”.  
Silverstein has called the latter analytic readings of cases of communicative interaction and 
dialogical meanings, “interactional texts”. 
 Linguistic anthropology has undergone such a revolution—perhaps, without fully 
acknowledging (certainly without privileging)—the intrinsic sociality of the social and semiotic 
situations in which texts, as models of meaning and interaction, arise.  In other words, the 
features of sociality that can be seen in interactional texts are revealed by means of a given 
evidentiary record.  The evidence happens to be a primarily linguistic object (“text”) with social 
pragmatic components.  This linguistic ontology of analytic textuality, in which utterances, as 
texts parsed into cohesive units by ordinary interpersonal interaction or by professional analysis, 
constitutes a category of existence that establishes the professional reality that texts analyzed or 
responded to in everyday sociality exist in a space of their own; obviously these texts and the 
space they occupy are understood to be in close contact, and co-constitute and are co-constituted 
by interpersonal action, assessment, and collaboration, but nonetheless necessarily distinct in 
imagination sufficient to make analysis possible.  As Caton (2004:647) put it, linguistic 
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anthropologists’ “method of analysis has been to start with the empirically concrete, interactive 
event and then work outward to ever wider contexts to develop our insights into the connections 
between language and culture”. 
 Yet, it is an inherently social situation that becomes the communicative situation that 
yields the empirically concrete, interactive event, which is amenable to analysis of inferences 
and interpretations.  To make the latter into “texts” of a more familiar analytic genre is to take a 
realist (i.e., non-constructivist) view of texts, or even a kind of reductivism.  That is, there would 
seem to be little recognition of an essential fact or, at least, the methodological problem entailed 
by the following fact: The tactile, visual, or auditory signal that will ultimately be decoded in 
some sense as a semiotic sign already has a social being (is already part of social reality) before 
it has a linguistic being.  Recognition of difference does not need to wait for decoding of a 
message, but can occur at the moment anyone interprets—as a possibly social act—anything 
another person is doing, such as speaking a “foreign” language.  Normativity that helps members 
of a language community to police borders, as with English-only campaigns, is expressed in a 
social assertibility that enters into interaction before, as well as during and after, signals are 
interpreted (decoded) as messages.  Within such an analytic strategy, there is no seam of 
functionality between the forms of talk and social assertibility. 
 This idea of the social envelopment of language can be contrasted with a different model 
that is sometimes accidentally applied in linguistic anthropology, and more actively in some 
cultural anthropological accounts.  According to the latter, conventional social deployment of 
language model, linguistic form structures social action or acts as a cue to shared cultural 
knowledge.  The methodological disability with respect to that essential fact neglects the 
existential conditions of identity as constructed in linguistic and social practices.  This is the 
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condition I was dimly aware of when I asked those two questions in Chicago.  It is the condition 
this dissertation tries to address by tacking back and forth between the sociocultural and the 
communicative aspects of language politics in Wales. 
 Given Rosaldo’s (1988, 1989) category of sub-altern communities of marginal 
importance in traditional anthropology, there are at least two ways of talking about the apparent 
absence of culture, both of which apply to indigeneity in Wales.  One is related to the lack of 
(traditionally ethnographic) prototypical elaborate rituals, material culture and complex 
subsistence practices, and therefore seem so irrelevant as to be invisible to the ethnographic gaze.  
Another, which is related to the first, is the lack of an explicit form of discourse or vocabulary 
for self-description of indigeneity in Wales.  This is a consequent of the subordinate status of and 
the incommensurate differences (in mass media, language, political, economic terms) between 
indigeneity in Wales and modern British regimes (see Gewertz and Errington 1991). 
 As I outlined above, the social relations and institutions of the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex and the worldview associated with Cymraeg, in public discourses, figure as a special 
interest (i.e., as political).  In turn, cultural labor devoted to moving those “special” aspects of 
Welshness out of that problematic space—making a point of treating them as if they are not 
problematic—is also deemed to be political and, occasionally, an expression of “Welsh racism” 
(because the issue of difference is made salient).  The consequence is not only a shaping of 
place-worlds that is influenced by the discourse of and about nationalism.  As demonstrated in 
the previous section, which focused on the shield trope and defensive translation, one can 
identify zones of identity that people inhabit—and the boundaries of which they reinforce by 
various communicative and rhetorical means. 
 120
CHAPTER THREE 
◄ CULTURE IN CODE ► 
 
If culture itself had been an elusive phenomenon, one may say that Geertz has pursued the most 
elusive part of it, the ethos [the affective and stylistic dimensions].  It may also be suggested that 
this, among other things, accounts for his continuing and broad-based appeal.  Perhaps the 
majority of students who go into anthropology, and almost certainly the majority of 
nonanthropologists who are fascinated by our field, are drawn to it because they have been struck 
at some point in their experience by the “otherness” of another culture, which we would call its 
ethos.  Geertz’s work provides one of the very few handles for grasping that otherness (Sherry 
Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties” (1984:129n3)) 
 
 
DECODING CULTURAL REFERENCES 
The Setting 
 During visits to about a dozen schools in Gwynedd county in July and August 2002, I 
conducted a routine interview with an assistant head teacher, Mrs. Hefina Williams and her close 
friend, Mrs. Hughes, also a teacher at the same school.1  The headteacher of the school was away 
in mid-Wales with the school’s tennis team during this visit to that school.  I interviewed him on 
a separate occasion (with less interesting results).  After finding my way to the main entrance, I 
followed a staff person into the building, who then went to find the deputy head teacher.  Mrs. 
Williams arrived and escorted me into the head teacher’s office.  Mrs. Williams explained to me 
that in a few moments, a stream of kids was going to come out of the classrooms and she would 
have to go away to arrange that her duties were covered.  She left and returned again with a cup 
of tea according to my specifications: with milk and a little sugar.  She left again for about 
fifteen minutes. 
 Along three of the walls of the headteacher’s office, there were shelf after shelf of binders 
filled with curriculum and assessment materials.  A small quilt wall-hanging depicting a pastoral 
                                                 
1  Interview D2#3R, 5 July 2002 
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scene with sheep decorated the fourth wall.  Several school athletic trophies were displayed on a 
table.  A security monitor with alternating views of the school was conspicuously located 
adjacent to the headteacher’s desk.  Sorting out my interview schedule and notes, before the 
interview with Mrs. Williams and Mrs. Hughes, I could hear children’s voices and the cry of 
seagulls far off through the open window on this summer afternoon.  I organized my thoughts 
and considered for yet another time how my series of questions performed in previous 
interviews. 
 When Mrs. Williams returned, our communication was conducted almost entirely in 
English.  The interviews I conducted English-language almost certainly would have been 
different if they had been conducted in Cymraeg, but this does not mean that they should have 
been conducted in Cymraeg (or in English, for that matter).  If they would have been “better” in 
such a case—if the “data” of these interviews would have been better—than this technical fact 
would act as a professional imperative to conduct them in Cymraeg (or English).  Of course, 
better data for one research purpose might be worse data for another purpose.  Apart from the 
basic methodological issues (see, for example, Briggs 1986), this very issue of interview 
language, in the context of my (and similar) research, is an issue of language politics, as well as 
management of interpersonal communication in a research context. 
 The recording of the interview, as a communicative event in English, is of lasting value—
beyond some unidimensional sense of quality, in the context of the interviewees’ participation.  
My reasoning for this claim is that the cultural knowledge I sought could neither precede nor be 
accomplished as a direct result of competence in the various registers and cultural areas I thought 
to be relevant.  That is, it was not purely interactional data I was after.  Such cultural knowledge 
was grown, not manufactured, albeit socially—in collaboration with others; and it is grown in 
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individual time-spans that allow management of knowledge through whichever language code is 
best available.  I responded by framing my understanding of my results in light of the limits 
imposed by the methods I used.  This retrospective view was not available to me during most of 
the time in which I conducted the principal dissertation research, of course. 
 When Mrs. Williams returned, she took up a patient and welcoming demeanor, given that 
she was facing a stranger who, she might have imagined, had no inkling of the depths of Welsh 
culture.  I can imagine her wondering how exactly I expected to learn about Welsh culture if I 
had not grown up there and, therefore, didn’t already know “it”.  Just as I began sipping the tea 
that Mrs. Williams prepared for me, she made a suggestion she probably thought would be 
helpful: “If you tell me what it is that you would like to know, perhaps I could then find a way to 
get the information to you”.  While, at the time, I could appreciate how common such a moment 
in ethnographic research was, I could not have imagined how impossible it would be to satisfy 
Mrs. Williams’ request, given that it was Welsh things that I wanted to know.  Even in 
retrospect, I do not necessarily think that my post-analysis familiarity with the culturally-
constructed, narratival expressive forms that Mrs. Williams would employ in the interview to 
follow could be equated with, or could have allowed me to articulate, “what [I] would like to 
know”.  Regardless of my bemusement with Mrs. Williams’ request at the time, my mode of 
analysis of this interview takes its cue from the cultural expectations of the two teachers. 
 Their cultural expectations, as is evident from my discussion of the interview that 
follows, include much that is taken to be part of a European legacy, by which I am alluding to 
the centrality of description.  In Wales, this often takes the form of a string of propositions about 
the past as a coherent subject, as did happen in that interview.  Narratives of an historical register 
are an important part of how Welsh people, with or without a primary affinity to Cymraeg, 
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convey what is Welsh about themselves.  Cultural references—such as to the Welsh hero, Owain 
Glyndŵr—and their mutual relations are an intrinsic part of understanding the (folk-
historiographic features of the) cultural milieu.  In this way, Welsh people and their heroes take 
on the role of protagonist in a story of collectivities. 
 The plane of expressive content—the description—is a recounting of what the 
protagonist did.  However, apart from explicit descriptions of the history of the Welsh, such 
narratives play at least an equally important, implicit symbolic role.  Appendix A provides some 
clues as to how the importance of language identity is bolstered by such a narrative.  My 
highlighting of the importance of language makes explicit what is mostly implicit in the kind of 
history of the Welsh that I encountered.  It is the implicit symbolism of teachers’ thinking that I 
was interested in when interviewing these teachers. 
 Of course I mentioned none of this.  Instead, I explained the project and gave Mrs. 
Williams the informed consent form so that she would have a clear idea of my objectives.  I 
explained to her my interest in the ways in which national identity figures in history teaching and 
suggested a format for the interview.  She wanted to know more about the subject population.  I 
explained that, since this was a preliminary research project, it wasn’t important that the teachers 
I spoke to be exclusively teachers of Years 2, 5, and 8 (US-American school grades 1, 4, and 7) 
as my principal dissertation research envisaged as participants. 
 Mrs. Williams mentioned a teacher who was related to the pioneer who had taken 
thousands of Welsh persons to Patagonia and who was very proud of her Welshness.  I later 
came to suspect that this was a good friend of Mrs. Williams, a good friend partly because they 
were so like-minded in their views of national identity.  Then, she made an interesting 
conversational move.  Mrs. Williams started to talk about how the “older” teachers, like herself 
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and Mrs. Hughes, were much more conscious of the difficulties Welsh teachers had faced in the 
past, such as the struggle to get Cymraeg services to be considered the norm.  The “younger” 
teachers now took for granted that which was won by her and her peers. 
 Mrs. Williams referred to this sort of talk as “getting on her soapbox”.  This phrase was a 
framing device that marked out discourse as inappropriately political for the ordinary school 
environment, much like PG-13 movie ratings mark out content deemed inappropriate for 
primary-school aged children.  I recognized the framing device on some level, but I had not yet 
moved to my focus on language politics.  As a result, I did not interpret it as a language politics 
soapbox, but only as a Welsh nationalist soapbox.  My interest in the role that regulation—of 
what is political and what is not—plays in meaning-construction was, at the time, still 
undeveloped.  Yet, even beyond my lack of readiness to focus on that theme, I was hesitant to 
focus on cultural struggles that occurred during a period of Welsh history that many Welsh 
teachers liken to the civil rights period in Twentieth-Century United States.  I wanted to know 
what teachers were doing now, in this decade, since education policy and practice were now in 
the hands of Welsh teachers and policy-makers.  The expressive forms that allow teachers like 
Mrs. Williams to say what Cymraeg means to them and why it is the history of Cymraeg that 
represents Welsh history to them—as I can now recognize—lie largely in such narratives of the 
recent past (1960s through the 1980s).  For teachers who lived through that period, it was a time 
of energy and expression of the cultural values that they locate in Cymraeg. 
 While conducting the preliminary fieldwork during which this interview took place, and 
even throughout much of my principal fieldwork, the complex relations among Cymraeg, history 
of the nation, English-language hegemony, civil rights, language ideologies, and history 
instruction evaded me.  I felt that I was skipping along the surface of a deep reservoir, but I 
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seemed to lack the cultural ballast necessary for anyone to plumb those depths (This is revealing, 
given that I began developing my cultural (albeit propositional) knowledge of Wales as a pre-
teen.).  To add to all of this, I had been saving questions about the patriotic sentiments of 
teachers until the ends of interviews.  Therefore, I was unwilling to make the most out of Mrs. 
Williams’ revelation, which came at the beginning of the interview.  Luckily, she returned to the 
theme later by using the soapbox image again. 
 To anticipate the subsequent details, those of the references to “cultural history” that Mrs. 
Williams and Mrs. Hughes made in this interview—which bear on Cymraeg, in particular, but 
only implicitly—were merely tacit references to the cultural thematics of nationalism and 
national identity (for the first half of the interview).  Much of what motivated the two teachers’ 
turns in their interview performance was implicit and, on the surface, this gave the interview a 
haphazard and rambling quality.  The interview was not so much topically organized as it was 
organized by the associations that cultural concepts, places, and historical figures had to other 
concepts, places, and figures.  One would already have to possess that network of cultural 
concepts, places, and historical figures to understand that the references were related to each 
other in terms of the cultural significance of Cymraeg.  On the surface, whatever explicit 
statements make use of these cultural references appear to be about the cultural significances of 
cultural landmarks.  I now proceed by presenting segments of that interview. 
 
First Half of the Interview 
 The first recorded segment begins by documenting their evaluation of English as their 
second language.  Clearly, their expression did not suffer from any lack of competence.  Rather, 
the general atmosphere is one in which performances in Cymraeg exhibit a more-or-less degree 
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of one’s embodiment of Cymraeg-based Welsh identity.  Thus, the teachers’ lower confidence in 
English is relative to expectations of performance in Cymraeg, within the context of Wales.  
While literary Cymraeg is the object of great scrutiny, everyday Cymraeg expectations revolve 
around local patterns, rather than formal competence.  People feel some discomfort speaking in 
English not because of a greater or lesser ability, but because they do not strive to meet high 
standards in English in the first place.  Further, the attitudes about English by many Cymraeg-
speakers in its oppositional relation to figures English as a foreign language.  Hence, there are no 
local patterns of performance that would be perceived as naturally local; hence, no local English 
pattern to adopt as one’s own.  Nonetheless, people who regard Cymraeg as their first language 
tend to be generally aware that their English competence is not equal to their Cymraeg 
competence. 
 
Hughes: ‘s my second language. 1 
Williams: It’s our second language, yes. 2 
Hughes: Yes. 3 
Williams: So- 4 
Hughes: Um, well, this term in our in year 3 and 4, our theme is um, sea, the sea 5 
life and the sea shore and in history we’re doing Tudor Times and we try 6 
to look at the Welsh aspect you know not- we do talk about things like 7 
you know who was the King and Queen of England at the time you 8 
know- 9 
Maas: Mm hm: 10 
Hughes: But that’s just by the way we really try to think of what pla- what sort of 11 
place it was in Wales at th~s- at the same time and what’s the most 12 
important thing.  There is the um, translation of the Bible13 
 
It is not surprising that Hughes began the discussion: She was the head of the history department 
and would be expected to lead because she held that role.  Such formalities do not tend to affect 
the interview that follows, however, and she allows her friend, Mrs. Williams to prevail at many 
points of the interview.  Her dominant role at this early stage might have set the pattern for the 
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rest of the interview, though I found the pattern to be fairly common, being intrinsic to the 
temporally-unfolding conversations with strangers about a professional practice.  This pattern 
involves the recall of items that are relevant to the discussion. 
 
The Theoretical List:   This short initial segment indicates the most obvious feature of this 
communicative event.  Given the explicit purposes for the interview—for these teachers to 
describe how they teach history—this event was arranged, in the teachers’ perspectives, for them 
to transmit information to me.  This means that it has the implicit structure of a list.  That is, it 
consists of a number of nominal forms (e.g., “the Bible”), many of which require explanation.  
The complete transcript can be found in Appendix B. 
 This initial segment also shows a transition from informal talk to addressing the explicit 
purposes of the interview.  As such, the theoretical list has not yet conformed to its organizing 
theme.  Lines 5-8 reveal Mrs. Hughes’ drawing on counter-examples to the intended theme (i.e., 
teaching about Welshness) as they presented me with a catalogue of related information, 
something they did throughout the interview.  Thus, telling students who was the King and 
Queen of England during the Tudor, on the surface, does not serve this purpose.  Human 
practices for those who live next to the sea also seem irrelevant, but it is not simply because it 
applies to local experiences of Welsh persons.  As Mrs. Hughes recognizes that the monarchs of 
England might not be apropos to life in Wales (“But that’s just by the way. . .”, line 11), she 
reconstructs the narrative—“we really try to think of what sort of place it was in Wales” in times 
marked by “English” chronology (“what sort of place it was in Wales at th~s- at the same time”, 
lines 11-12)—and orients herself to “what’s the most important thing” (lines 12-13).  This 
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provides the first entry on the theoretical list that corresponds to my vague purposes in 
interviewing these teachers: translation of the Bible into Cymraeg. 
 It is important to recognize that, whereas the start of Henry VII’s reign (and the end of 
the War of the Roses) is sometimes taken as the starting point of the modern British state, the 
translation of the Bible into Cymraeg in 1588 plays a similar role.  Clearly, there are earlier 
moments when events associable with that language took place and are recognized in the present 
as important events (e.g., the earliest known Cymraeg literary work).  Yet, all of the schools I 
visited made the translation of the Bible by William Morgan a paramount landmark, and starting 
terminus in the narrative they believed themselves accountable for telling.  The translation of the 
New Testament by William Salesbury in 1567 (twenty-one years earlier) did not receive such 
attention, and I did not hear it mentioned on any of the visits I made in 2002, or playing a 
prominent curricular role during my principal dissertation research.  Precedent in accounts of 
history, then, yielded to images in collective memory of a presentist perspective.  Note also that 
another significant event occurred the same year: the destruction of the Spanish Armada.  Some 
teachers give time to both, while some schools omit the Spanish Armada. 
 These details suggest a specific selective tradition, in conjunction with publication and 
circulation practices, which together have reproduced the significance of William Morgan and 
his translation.  Some partially explanatory accounts of that tradition bear on the significance of 
this moment in the history of Cymraeg, which amounts to giving much of the credit for the 
survival of Cymraeg to the Morgan Bible.  First, Morgan’s translation of the Old Testament was 
so popular (in reception and eventual consumption) that, as a landmark in writing, it became a 
standard for good written Cymraeg (Morgan 1988).  Secondly, it came to act as a common text 
that bridged dialectal variation as clerics encountered obstacles to religious communication with 
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respect to their own religious tracts they were distributing in north and south Wales (Morgan 
1988). 
 On the surface, then, the reference to translation of the central text of Christianity, which 
played a key role in sectarian Christian politics during the Sixteenth Century, as the Protestants 
wanted to eliminate the public role of the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church—vernacular 
translations of the Bible served that instrumentalist goal.  At a deeper level, the sectarian 
Christian politics had the consequence of spurring activity in and related to Wales for which 
Cymraeg was the focus (though religion was the more salient practical focus).  That segment of 
Welsh society that had an affinity toward Cymraeg (virtually all of the population of Wales in 
the Sixteenth Century, except some of the gentry) was suddenly encouraged by new resources of 
written Cymraeg and a model for writing Cymraeg in these Christian texts that, for the first time, 
were in their most familiar language.  In the process, that era of Cymraeg-centered activity 
produced the foundations for Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century cultural revival movements 
and Twentieth-Century “pilgrimages”. 
 
Maas: Mm hm: 9 
Hughes: But that’s just by the way we really try to think of what pla- what sort of 10 
place it was in Wales at th~s- at the same time and what’s the most 11 
important thing.  There is the um, translation of the Bible. 12 
M: Uh huh. 13 
H: Which happened in 1588, you know? 14 
M: Uh huh. 15 
H: By request of Elizabeth, who was Queen at the time, you know? 16 
M: Oh, so she actually requested that?  I didn’t- 17 
H: Yes, yes. 18 
M: …know that. 19 
H: Because she wanted to change, because before th- it was a Catholic 20 
country, wasn’t it, and then she wanted to change it really, um, to 21 
Protestant so she thought the best thing is to give the people of Wales the 22 
chance to read and learn about the Bible 23 
M: Hm. 24 
H: And of course there weren’t any schools. . . 25 
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M: Right. 26 
H: …so they- they didn’t have books either. So she started with the Bible, 27 
really, and that was translated fours hundred- in 1588  And then um each 28 
village was given or each town was given a bible in the chapel of the 29 
church, chained, because there was only one and they were so rare, you 30 
know. 31 
M: Right. 32 
H: So people then started having schools in chapels and in churches you 33 
know where they started to read. 34 
M: Huh. 35 
H: Um, so that’s quite interesting, you know th-. 36 
M: How do the students respond to. . . I guess by that time they know who 37 
L- Elizabeth is. 38 
H: Yeah’m. They also know about the Spanish Armada, as well, which 39 
happened in 1588, you know, y- uh- so we relate it with that, as well, you 40 
know, talk a little about what’s happened, you know, during that time. 41 
Em, and every four years we go: to where William Morgan was born, the 42 
chapel d- wooded—the translation—we go there on a pererindod- 43 
Will’ms: Right, it’s on a pilgrimage. 44 
H: “Pilgrimage”.  No, we walk there, which is nice you know through 45 
forestry and uh- 46 
W: Mmm. 47 
M: W- You walk from where to? 48 
H: We walk from em- the- the- village where he lived was near Penmachno, 49 
Betws... 50 
M: Uh huh- 51 
H: …-y-coed.  52 
M: …Okay.  Right. [castle built by a 53 
H: ...So, we eh walk from Dolwyddelan... Welsh prince, 54 
M: Uh huh. not by a Norman king] 55 
H: ...across you know and that... 56 
M: Mm. 57 
H: ...which is a nice walk, it’s not very long, it’s- 58 
M: It’s about te:n:: miles isn’t it? 59 
H: It’s two, three... 60 
M: …Or six- 61 
H: ... miles you know, but it’s... 62 
M: -Oh, okay. 63 
H: ...it’s, it’s countryside and you know, it’s- it gives them a feeling of what 64 
sort of age it’s very very narrow road, you know... 65 
M: Uh huh. 66 
W: Oh. 67 
H: ...um and then when you do arrive I don’t know if you’ve been there, but 68 
it’s a wonderful place. 69 
M: I walked from um:: Capel Curig... 70 
W: Mm:. 71 
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H: Yeah. 72 
M: ...to Betws-y-coed. 73 
H: Oh there we are. 74 
M: Which was more- 75 
H: But you’ve haven’t been to /y/ [the]2 Ty Mawr Wybernant where 76 
William Morgan lived? 77 
M: No: no. 78 
H: That’s very interesting.  It’s- 79 
W: Mm, it’s a lovely- it’s being... 80 
H: ’s museum there 81 
W: ...renovated. 82 
H: you know. Yes. 83 
W: Yes. 84 
H: And there’s a museum there you know, showing uh, you know... 85 
M: Hm. 86 
H: ...what’s sorts of, uh, and it’s a wonderful place for the children to go and 87 
see... 88 
W: Mmm. 89 
H: ...as well what sorts of houses they lived you know... 90 
M: Uh huh. 91 
H: ....because there’s no glass on the windows you know, shutters and, very, 92 
very old-fashioned. 93 
M: Mm. 94 
H: So that’s just you know what we do this term that is, you know.  We also 95 
look at, um, [school bell/alarm sounds] in history, I mean in the Year 4, 96 
we look at the Cel-, you know, at the Celtic Time... 97 
M: Mmhm: 98 
H: ...where we learn really from where we’ve come from as a nation you 99 
know or as a people. 100 
M: How far back do you start?  Is it Iron A- Age or...? 101 
H: No, we d-, um, when the Celts really came to places in Wales, you know.  102 
Um, we don’t really give a date. 103 
M: Uh huh. 104 
H: And also there, we talk about Dewi Sant, you know... 105 
M: Uh huh. 106 
H ...the patron saint of Wales... 107 
M: Yeah. 108 
H: ...Saints come into that category as well and that time you know. 109 
M: Uh huh. 110 
H: So you’re able to talk about Dewi S:ant David, but also about Deiniol. 111 
                                                 
2  Both teachers occasionally used the Cymraeg definite article, “y” [the], as a definite article in 
English-language streams of talk. 
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Mythological Presentism:   Interestingly, Christian religious topics dominate this segment even 
when the topic seems to have changed to the prehistoric time of the Celts (who, on some 
accounts, survived the Roman invasion, and on other accounts, are only distantly or virtually 
related to present-day Welsh persons).  The classical saints (400-600 A.D.) of Saint David and 
Saint Deiniol (as well as Saint Tudno, for whom LLandudno is named) emerge as the main 
topics.  Thousands of years are compressed, comprising a kind of mythology that enjoys the 
status of being referred for teachers’ consideration by professional archaeologists and historians.  
However, the teachers themselves can only relate to these figures and civilizations through their 
remnants that are left on the physical and cultural landscape.  The literal history of Britain, at 
primary schools, is extrinsic to the purposes of teaching about the locale and regions in Wales 
that appear significant from retrospective perspectives. 
 
Didacticism:   This second segment illustrates another feature of this communicative event, 
which these teachers shared with others.  They not only were willing to tell me what they taught, 
but they wanted to teach me, too.  Much of the time, I was aware of what Welsh persons were 
referring to when it was historical—to a fault, as it has made it difficult for me to see how 
communication should have appeared to a new ethnographer.  At other times, I was learning new 
things.  I was certainly new to the details of their fresh recollections of what makes up their 
syllabi and benefitted from their personal embellishments.  This was a great kindness, as they 
could have avoided the inconvenience of the interview and simply given me photocopies of the 
schools’ curriculum for various ages/grades. 
 The personal didacticism that characterized the teachers’ engagement with me, the 
foreigner, was common to many teachers I interviewed during preliminary and principal 
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fieldwork.  Early on in my series of fieldtrips, I did not conceal the fact that I knew many of the 
details they did not expect an outsider to know.  It made no difference: They went right on 
teaching me.  It must have seemed impossible that anyone outside Wales would know about its 
history.  However, simply for these educators to teach me what was on the theoretical list in even 
this personally engaged way cannot bring home the central point the theoretical list represents 
evocatively, connotatively. 
 The next segment (skipping lines 113-150) illustrates the practical use of fieldtrips to 
cover a wide variety of Welsh heritage, which stems from the primary teachers’ role of nurturing 
children.  These fieldtrip allow teachers to move beyond a catalogue of information about what it 
means to be Welsh and into the living environment and historical context that literal landmarks 
evoke—“what sorts of houses they lived you know” (line 91).  The teachers were more 
concerned with evoking a sense of place and time—see lines 102-104 above—than with dates 
and chronology (an approach that has pendular swings, coming and going in popularity)—see 
lines 200-201 in Appendix B).  This pedagogical impulse of theirs has an established, formal 
place in the traditions of curriculum development in Wales under the rubric of historical empathy 
(see lines 250-388 in Appendix B, for the informal theory on empathy that this approach 
represents).  
 
H: Yes, when we do- eh, when we do study the Celtic times, that’s in the 151 
Spring term, we take the children to Glanllyn.  I don’t know if you’ve 152 
heard about Glanllyn.  It’s a Welsh, em, it’s a camp 153 
W: League of… 154 
H: Welsh… 155 
W: …Youth 156 
H: League of Youth. 157 
W: On LLyn Tegid… 158 
M: Uh okay. 159 
W: …in Bala.  It’s between Bala and LLanuwchllyn. 160 
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H: Yeah.  So that gives us a chance to go to Celtica in Machnylleth and, eh, 161 
we looked at Celtic places around Bala as well, em. What else do we do?  162 
We do Victoria Time, but, em, what we do is we, you know, movement, 163 
people moving from Wales to Patagonia… 164 
W: Oh yeah. 165 
H: …and places… 166 
W: Uhh. 167 
H: …like that, you know. 168 
M: Uh huh. 169 
H: So it’s a chance for me to talk to them about Michael D. Jones and other 170 
people who did leave country, you know.171 
 
Multi-Tasking Fieldtrips and Identity:   Fieldtrips are difficult and time-costly to arrange.  
Teachers must make the most of these times outside of the classroom.  A single area, Y Bala, 
serves as the destination for several purposes.  This area of and around Y Bala is one of great 
cultural significance.  It is the heart of Christian literacy in Wales.  William Morgan came from 
the area.   When the teenager, Mary Jones, purportedly walked barefoot over twenty miles north-
east from LLanfihangel-y-Pennant to buy a bible from Charles, this prompted Thomas Charles to 
found the Bible Society, which is known for distributing bibles (line 624-662, Appendix B).  The 
man known for recruiting Welsh persons for settlement of Patagonia, Michael D. Jones, came 
from the village of Y Bala (line 170, above).  It is also considered “ground zero” in the 
construction of contemporary Welsh activism and resistance to English hegemony (i.e., so-called 
Welsh nationalism).  During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, several water reservoirs were constructed in 
Wales.  However, one in particular captured the cultural imagination: the flooding of Capel 
Celyn to the north of Y Bala to create the Tryweryn reservoir, which was made to supply water 
for Liverpool, England.  A play commemorating the process of removal of people and 
submerging the village was produced in 2007, while I was conducting my fieldwork.  In 
addition, the group that broke from the Women’s Institute when the latter established a policy of 
conducting business in English only was formed near Y Bala in Y Parc.  Finally, the original and 
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continuously maintained site for the youth organization, League of Youth (Yr Urdd Gobaith 
Cymru),3 is located near Y Bala: Glanllyn (lines 152-160).  It holds dormitories for overnight 
stays and outdoor activity facilities. 
 Lines 161 to 164 contain numerous and disparate references: the Celts (via Celtica, an 
interactive museum devoted to the Celts, but is now closed), Celtic places around Bala, Victoria 
Time, people moving from Wales to Patagonia.  The recollective process expressed in this last 
segment (lines 151-171) is fairly symbolic of how the teachers perform their role as nurturing 
children in their Welshness and manage multi-tasking fieldtrips.  Ostensibly, Mrs. Hughes 
mentioned Michael D. Jones because she had changed the topic to migrations and people who 
left Wales (lines 162-171).  That is only the surface part of what is going on at that point in the 
interview.  The fact that Michael D. Jones is from Y Bala—and this is a significant fact of local 
culture—is likely the stronger motivation for moving from the pedagogical unit of The Celts, 
which was the original topic, to that of Victoria Time.  The eclectic itinerary of any fieldtrip to 
the area is likely to center in a vague cohesion tying together the diverse set of activities.  Where 
some deeper meaning to this vague cohesion might be missing, they are connected in their 
representation of a kind of Wales. 
 The following segment continues this pattern of skipping from topic to topic by some 
implicit principle of conceptual cohesion.  The first principle in the following segment is the 
                                                 
3  In its creation, Yr Urdd Gobaith Cymru [The Welsh League of Hope/Youth] drew loosely on another Band of 
Hope, which was a temperance organization for working-class children founded in the mid-1800s.  Although Welsh 
culture has been oriented to the non-Conformist chapel tradition, but the latter was not explicitly directed toward 
alcohol abstinence.  The Urdd was founded in 1922 and was clearly devoted to Cymraeg as emblem of the nation.  
Clearly, it was the declining use of Cymraeg that was the primary cause for the Urdd’s founding.  Its founder, O. M. 
Edwards (see lines 665-667) was also the first Chief Inspector of Schools for Wales The symbol used the three 
colors of the Welsh flag, but used them to different symbolic purpose: green for Wales, red for humanity, and white 
for Jesus.  Apart from several hospitality sites for outdoor or civic activities, its biggest event is the Urdd Eisteddfod: 
a festival that culminates in May, but involves several competitions at the school district, sub-county area, and 
county levels before the final rounds of competition at the annual week-long event.  These events cover prose and 
poetry recitation, singing in a variety of forms (choral, duet, solo, with and without accompaniment), instrumental 
performance, drama, folk dancing, as well as sports like gymnastics, swimming, and rugby. 
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connection between wars and the Red Cross.  The local involvement of people in the Red Cross 
and family histories in relation to World War identifies another pedagogical approach, that of 
enabling pupils to recognize the existing personal connections to history.  This transitions to the 
historical topic of an aspect of the subject-matter of World War II, in which Wales figures as 
sanctuary for evacuees from the major cities of England during the period of German air raids.  
The implicit principle of cohesion guiding the next transition, however, is of particular interest. 
 
W: …because, we in Year Five and Six this term, we’ve been working about 203 
the- talking about- learning about the World War Two, period… 204 
M: Mm hmm. 205 
W: …but what’it is, it’s all how that affected… 206 
H: Yeah. 207 
W: …[area of north-west Wales] itself. 208 
M: Mm. 209 
W: And… 210 
H: And- 211 
W: …what life was like here, you know rather than what life was like 212 
throughout Britain, and the battles... 213 
M: Mm hmm. 214 
W: em, and we had someone from the Red Cross coming in to speak to me 215 
the other day and so we’ve learned about the history of the Red Cross 216 
and when it was founded, and things like that, em, but mainly ,again, as 217 
you say, local… 218 
H: Yeah 219 
M: Hm. 220 
W: …and get the children to find out… 221 
H: I think the main- 222 
W: …who’re related to them… 223 
H: Yeah. 224 
W: …who were in the war, what they were doing and they come up some- 225 
with some, you know, really interesting facts. 226 
H: Yes. 227 
W: …You know, one grandmother has written out three A4 sides about her 228 
memories of being evacuated to Wales… 229 
M: Wow- 230 
W: …and she’s moved back, of course, to live in- i- to- to London, eh, to, 231 
em, England, but what she didn’t realize at the time, after, she’d have a 232 
granddaughter living permanently in Wales… 233 
M: Hm. 234 
W: …and learning and- and being a bilingual child. 235 
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M: (Laughing) Huh huh. 236 
W: Like [Name]… 237 
H: Yes. 238 
W: …you know because her mother has learned Welsh after moving here… 239 
H: Yes. 240 
M: Uh huh. 241 
W: …and she (clapping once) she’s really to… be admired242 
 
 
The Mother Who Learned Cymraeg:   In lines 232-233, the topic of interest is the long-distance 
grandmother-granddaughter relationship.  The features that are most probably salient might seem 
to be the issue that the granddaughter lives permanently in Wales.  What is lying underneath the 
surface is the principle that, by learning Cymraeg, you can become a permanent inhabitant.  For 
a mother to have a bilingual child should mean, in relevant cases, that the child can use a 
language that the mother (and grandmother) can understand.  In that case, the distance between 
persons would only be geographic since there should be no linguistic barrier.  Beyond this, 
however, is the idea of cultural distance that is created by the granddaughter growing up (in) 
Cymraeg.  It is as if this fact makes the granddaughter into a wholly different being from the 
granddaughter: not only is the mother and daughter made a permanent (in some moral sense) 
inhabitant of Wales, coming to belong to Wales, but this fact marks a difference between the 
mother (and daughter) and the grandmother.  Consequently, the final transition to an explicit 
stance of admiration for the “learner” who has a daughter at the school (line 242) is a very 
interesting one. 
 
Implicit Elaborative Themes:   Even if one is present in contexts oriented to the Cymraeg 
language-cultural complex, the value of the theoretical list cannot be conveyed by “find[ing] a 
way to get the information to you”, as Mrs. Williams volunteered at the beginning of our 
meeting.  Of course, one might recognize the paramount importance of Cymraeg; after all, 
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explicit statements to that effect are quite common.  However, it is only in seeing that importance 
as an elaborative theme for the theoretical list that the items on the list can be instructional 
according to the way the teachers understand those items. 
 
W: But there- there’s quite a strong feeling here, em… 391 
H: Mm. 392 
W: …about learning about Kenni-… 393 
H: Mm. 394 
W: …eh, Penrhyn Castle… 395 
H: Yeah- 396 
W: …There’s a s- still a bitterness… 397 
H: Mm. 398 
W: …between the landlord and the people… 399 
H: Mm. 400 
W: …of Bethesda. 401 
H: Yeah- 402 
M: Hm. 403 
W: …because they… 404 
H: Still. 405 
W: …were locked out… 406 
M: Uh, wow 407 
W: …Was it?… 408 
H: Yes, uh huh. 409 
W: …How long, eh?  Nineteen-Ten- Nineteen Oh One. 410 
H: Yes.  I- I’m not sure-re how long it was… 411 
W: No. 412 
H: …but they were on strike, you know, for quite a long… 413 
W: Mm. 414 
H: …time 415 
W: and they suffered great hard… 416 
H: Yes. 417 
W: …ship- so the lord… 418 
H: and they still- 419 
W: …was in his… 420 
H: feel, you know- 421 
W: …castle and, you know ‘cause-  I remember one parent [Name]… 422 
H: (Repeats) [Name]- 423 
W: …the Welsh actor.  He came in to speak to- to the children about, em, 424 
life in the times, you know, as told by his grandfather and he has never 425 
set foot within the grounds of Penrhyn Castle… 426 
M: Hm. 427 
W: …and he will never set foot… 428 
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H: No, and he wo’ let… 429 
M: Hm. 430 
H: …his children even though- 431 
W: No. 432 
H: you- you know, his- that feeling… 433 
M: Hm. 434 
H: …to them… 435 
W: Mm. 436 
H: …as well… 437 
W: Yes- 438 
H: And… 439 
W: So, you know- 440 
H: …it’s still true where I live in [village name], which is, you know… 441 
M: Mm hmm- 442 
H: …a quarry village.  It’s… 443 
M: Right 444 
W: Ah. 445 
H: …the same there… 446 
W: Yes- 447 
H: …with the older people, you know… 448 
M: Hm.  So there’s- 449 
H: …They don’t talk about Castell Penrhyn, you know.  They don’t talk 450 
about it. 451 
M: Are there any, uh, descendants of the, uh, of… 452 
H: Of the- of the family? 453 
M: …Of the landlords, yeah? 454 
H: Well, yes, there are… 455 
W: Yes, but they don’t live in- the National Trust… 456 
H: Has taken the place- 457 
W: …has taken… 458 
H: over now, you know. 459 
W: …over the Castle now. 460 
M: Uh huh. 461 
W: But the Queen had, eh, eh, em, supper there recently… 462 
H: Yes- 463 
W: …didn’t she?… 464 
H: Two weeks ago- 465 
W: …on her travels… 466 
H: she was here, you know… 467 
M: Hm- 468 
W: …The Jubilee… 469 
H: That’s where she dined- 470 
W: …Yes. 471 
H: Dinner time- 472 
W: But they had the Welsh flag, eh… 473 
H: (Laughs) Yes.  It’s a- 474 
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W: They didn’t have the E-… 475 
H: The English 476 
W: …Th- No, they didn’t- 477 
H: Didn’t they? 478 
W: …have- ‘cause I was going to LLandudno after school… 479 
H: (Laughs) And y- 480 
W: And I noticed on the way home, they only had the Welsh… 481 
H: The Red. 482 
W: …flag… 483 
H: Dragon. 484 
W: …up on the tower while she was there and I thought, “Well that’s 485 
something”… 486 
M: (Laughs) 487 
H: Yes, yes. 488 
W: …You know. 489 
M: They took- 490 
W: …A good thing. 491 
M: …it down after she left?  492 
W: Oh yes.  Well, yes.  I think so. 493 
M: The Welsh flag? 494 
W: …Em… 495 
M: -Not the, eh 496 
W: …The Welsh flag.  No, there’s nothing now, ‘cause I was passing today.  497 
There wasn’t a flag… 498 
M: Huh. 499 
W: …there, em 500 
H: But things have changed a lot, you know…501 
 
 In the preceding segment, it seems obvious to me that there is a mix of 
seriousness (lines 391-461) and a bit of serious play about cultural politics (lines 462-
501).  The first sequence revolves around the teachers’ explication of the class-ethnic 
history of the mansion or faux castle, Penrhyn, near Bethesda.  A strike occurred during a 
time of labor issue tensions at the turn of the century, and over a hundred years later, 
some tension remains.  It is not clear from what they say who was pitted against whom, 
whether English, Welsh, proletariat, gentry, or what (I address these issues at the end of 
 141
Chapter Five.).  Whatever the identities of those on different sides, the teachers were 
informing me about the historic site. 
 This didactic moment takes a rather spontaneous turn into implicit knowledge and 
attitudes, which acts as a kind of intermission.  When Elizabeth II visited Penrhyn Castle 
during the protracted celebration of her fiftieth year as reigning Queen of the United 
Kingdom, the staff at Penrhyn flew only the Red Dragon flag of Wales.  The teacher’s 
response, as vocalized during the interview, is the prototype of object-directed thinking—
“Well that’s something”; here, knowing what she means by “something” is crucial.  
This—and the relational quality of this knowledge: it is shared by her friend—is even 
more important. 
 As far as implicit elaborative themes are concerned, this implicit, relational 
quality—the sharing of certain feelings about the world—is very different from the topics 
of their didactic moments and was not elaborated.  The significance, of course, is that—
on this important day of a visiting, sitting monarch—nobody insisted on making the flag 
of Wales take a subordinate place to the state’s Union flag.  I continue since the 
significance of this part of the interview is in the progression. 
H: But things have changed a lot, you know… 501 
M: Mm. 502 
H: …that Lady Douglas Pennant, who was last Lady.  She died about three 503 
years ago and she had a very, very sad death ‘cause she was in the same 504 
home as my mother-in-law, you know… 505 
M: Mm. 506 
H: …a’ it was… 507 
M: Mmhm: 508 
H: …so sad, you know.  She had all this money and yet… 509 
W: And there was no- 510 
H: …Oh… 511 
W: difference between her and the poor peo- 512 
H: ..Yes… 513 
W: you know. 514 
 142
H: …and- Oh yes, s’was- it was very… 515 
W: Mm. 516 
H: …very sad… 517 
M: Mm. 518 
W: Hm- 519 
H: …You know… 520 
W: Lot’s… 521 
H: Yes. 522 
W: …a- g- is- is done, em, by Le-, eh, education authorities, I think, in 523 
Wales by now… to make sure that history is brought to life… 524 
H: Yeah. 525 
W: …and the children, you know we’re talking about LLanstumdwy, em… 526 
H: Yeah. 527 
W: …Castell Penrhyn and, eh… 528 
H: There are places to take them here- 529 
W: …Yes… 530 
H: -aren’t they?- 531 
W: …lots… 532 
H: We’re lucky- 533 
W: lots…And the- e- even Caer-, em, Caernarfon Castle.  They will have, 534 
em, role-playing going on there… 535 
M: Uh huh- 536 
H: Yeah. 537 
W: …And children are invited… 538 
H: Yeah. 539 
W: …to go along, you know, for different occasions.. 540 
H: Yeah. 541 
W: …em… 542 
H: And- 543 
W: …So they ca~ do~ 544 
H: They’ve given the Welsh aspect, as well- 545 
W: ...That’s it… 546 
H: You know- 547 
W: …Yes. 548 
H: Even though it’s… 549 
M: Mm. 550 
H: …you know, Caernarfon is an English castle… 551 
W: Mm- 552 
H: …D’y’know’t I mean?  They’ve changed, you know, and they’re ready 553 
to say, “Well, what- what were the people who lived outside castle”? 554 
W: Yeah. 555 
H: …What sort of life they had?… 556 
M: Hm. 557 
H: …You know. They’re ready to- They’ve changed th’r’attitude really. 558 
M: Hm.559 
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 With me, in the absence of children, the teachers do take up partisan stances in relation to 
the historical subject-matter, as can be seen in the preceding two segments (lines 391-501, 501-
559).  Where there is a site they identify as “an English castle”, there are those inside the walls 
and those “outside castle” (line 554).  We can also see that, beyond this sort of stance-taking, 
there clearly is a salient relation between such subject-matter and feelings that persist today 
about historical events.  These feelings are reproduced, in part, because of the interweaving of 
personal connections across these borders of the social and historical topography.  They are also 
produced by animating the perspectives of others. 
 In this segment, there is a faceless “they” who have an attitude, and who change their 
attitude (lines 553, 558).  These historic sites that become part of the official landscape are 
recognized as having a certain perspective by virtue of the default Englishness of British 
officialdom—the Penrhyn estate, Caernarfon castle, but notably less so Lloyd George’s museum 
in LLanstumdwy.  In recent days, the teachers seem to be arguing, that officialdom has become a 
little more Welsh.  This opinion of the teachers is its own sort of stance.  It is in this tension 
among stances that we see the implicit politics emerge—still at the implicit level, which is the 
only level at which politics are acceptable at school. 
 
POLITICS OF POLITICS AT SCHOOL 
Getting on “The Soapbox” 
 Roughly half-way into the interview, the discursive figure of getting on a soapbox 
reappeared.  The assistant head teacher expressly marked the beginning of a shift to explicit 
statements about the cultural significance of Cymraeg—as opposed to cultural landmarks that do 
not explicitly refer to language—by saying: “I told him I’d go on my soapbox”.  She said this 
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with some excitement—louder volume, higher pitched tones—as if she were doing something 
that gave her a feeling of liberation, something she really was not supposed to be doing.  In our 
preliminary conversation before we were joined by Mrs. Hughes, which was the first mention of 
a soapbox, Mrs. Williams had told me about the struggle, in an English (language)-dominant 
society, of those teachers who feel the use of Cymraeg is an intrinsic part of their cultural 
identity.  She now continued in a more typical volume and pitch: “I was telling him how we 
more mature teachers, feel strongly about our country because we had to fight, because we didn’t 
have anything and we had our education through the medium of English”. 
 
W: …I told him I’d go on my soapbox.  I was telling him… 695 
H: (Laughs loudly) 696 
W: you know, how- how my children- how we s- older teachers, I was 697 
saying, or more mature teachers, feel strongly about… 698 
H: Mm. 699 
W: …our country… 700 
H: Yes, of course- 701 
W: …because we had to fight, because we didn’t have anything in-, you 702 
know… 703 
H: Yes. 704 
W: …and we had our- our education through the medium of English… 705 
H: Yes. 706 
W: …as children… 707 
H: Mm. 708 
M: Secondary… 709 
H: Yes! 710 
M: …and primary or…? 711 
W: Ehh… 712 
H: Yes!  More or less- 713 
M: …just secondary? 714 
H: -secondary as well.  I might be ~ - 715 
W: …Secondary more than the junior, I would say… 716 
H: Yeah.  Yeah- 717 
M: Uh huh- 718 
W: …Em, I think a few… 719 
H: I think I did the- I’s did scripture through the medium of- 720 
W: …That’s it… 721 
722 
 145
H: Welsh- 723 
W: …I did scripture in Welsh… 724 
H: and it’s part of my history725 
 
 The notion of lecturing or sermonizing that I associate with “getting on a soapbox” is 
strikingly at odds with Mrs. Williams’ performance in this interview.  I know now that “getting 
on a soapbox”, in this instance, meant that Cymraeg would occupy a place of central (and, 
therefore, “political”) importance.  Hence, it is particularly interesting that the teachers make a 
few false starts before verbalizing this fact.  They “feel strongly about [their] country” (line 698, 
700), but their country is not identical to their language.  They “had to fight” (line 702); what 
were they fighting for?  They “didn’t have anything in. . .” (line 702); what was missing?  They 
drop the subject of the discourse several times before: “we had our- our education through the 
medium of English” (line 705).  Tellingly, while English-language instruction dominated her 
general schooling experiences, some of Mrs. Williams’ religious recitation work was done in 
Cymraeg (line 723): she “did scripture through the medium of [Cymraeg]”.  The significance of 
this should be apparent form the historical importance of the translation of the Old Testament 
and other ways religious history converges on language history. 
 
Metapragmatic Marking:   It is important to recognize that this notion of getting on a “soapbox” 
to talk, where Cymraeg occupies a place of central importance, has nothing to do with a specific 
topic of conversation.  It is a Welsh performative genre whose significance lies in the regulation 
(or better: modulation) of cultural representations; a regulation that makes the genre salient in the 
first place.  There was nothing in the last few minutes, at this point in the interview, to indicate 
that Mrs. Williams was lecturing or preaching.  However, the two teachers had been using 
cultural references in an implicit, emblematic way. 
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 This act of marking that she was doing something in her ongoing participation and 
explaining what it was she was doing is known, more generally, as metapragmatic marking and 
discourse (Silverstein 1985a, 1993, 1997).  By saying that she was “getting on her soapbox”, she 
meant that she was presenting some of her relatively more political views about cultural identity.  
The views are relatively more political insofar as they can be located near the margin of 
culturally recognizable differences of opinion among Welsh people.  Even tacit, implicit 
references to potentially controversial stances on language-based cultural identity, then, can be 
construed as getting on a soapbox. 
 
Circumstances of Application:  What is especially fascinating about the marking of a 
controversial subject is that there is no clearly obvious sign that Mrs. Williams had stepped onto 
the soapbox in the first place.  Therefore, it is worth looking at what preceded her metapragmatic 
statement. 
 
W: So there’s lots, you know, the Urdd movement itself, an- f- the Child- (y) 667 
Children of the- Youth of Wales, we talk about O. M. Edwards- We 668 
teach th’m’bout- about O. M. Edwards, the founder, who again ‘s a 669 
statue… 670 
M: Uh huh 671 
W: …in LL-LLan-n-… 672 
H: LLanuwchllyn 673 
W: …LLanuwchlyn… 674 
H: Mm 675 
W: …em, cemetery and, em, we also teach th’m’bout, eh, modern day, eh, 676 
heroes, if you like… 677 
M: Uh huh- 678 
W: …Like Bryn Terfel, you know and… 679 
M: Uh huh- 680 
W: …Ryan Giggs and these that they-  We- we make sure they know that 681 
they are Welsh, even if some of them can’t speak the language… 682 
H: Yeah. 683 
W: Right. 684 
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H: Tom Jones… 685 
M:  (Laughs) 686 
H: …and Siôn Dafydd and [Olwen(?)] ‘n’t they?  I think it’s… 687 
W: Yes, they- 688 
H: …important, yes. 689 
W: ’re ours. 690 
H: Yes. 691 
W: …They are ours… 692 
H: Yes. 693 
M: (Laughs) 694 
W: …I told him I’d go on my soapbox.  I was telling him… 695 
 
 This last segment (lines 667-695) illustrates how language is salient even when it is 
absent.  For no apparent reason, in referring to the famous baritone Bryn Terfel and the soccer 
player Ryan Giggs, Mrs. Williams raised the issue of the ability to speak Cymraeg.  The 
sequence, of course, did move from the youth organization best known for championing 
Cymraeg use (Yr Urdd Gobaith Cymru), but resolved itself on the subject of modern day Welsh 
heroes—a subject which one might think would be indifferent to language ability.  Two 
instances were cited, Bryn Terfel, who probably learned Cymraeg before English, and resided in 
the region of my fieldwork, and Ryan Giggs.  Without warning, Mrs. Williams mentions the 
soccer star, Ryan Giggs, as a figure whom she uses to stand in for famous Welsh persons who 
cannot speak Cymraeg. 
 As possible reasons for Mrs’ Williams’ saying that she was getting on her soapbox, there 
are only a few more references the two teachers made: Tom Jones, Sion Dafydd, and Olwen.  
Although the famous singer, Tom Jones (who is often compared to Elvis) is more like Ryan 
Giggs than Bryn Terfel in the relevant context of symbols of (a lack of) Cymraeg competence.  
However, Siôn Dafydd is one of the key figures in modern resistance to English-language 
hegemony; unlike the others mentioned (apart from Olwen), Siôn Dafydd is a fictional character 
in a poem (cerdd) by Jac Glan-y-gors, Cerdd Dic Siôn Dafydd.  Moving to London for better 
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better opportunities, the main character, Dic Siôn Dafydd, claims he forgot how to speak 
Cymraeg and insists on speaking English to his Cymraeg-speaking mother.  This is the primary 
(perhaps only) signal of possible controversy in this segment.  In my interpretation, the best 
exaplanation is that the topic of famous representatives of Welshness already presupposes a 
discontinuity between those who represent Welshness through their use of Cymraeg, and those 
who do not. 
 
A Mother, a Grandfather, and an Archdruid:   Following Mrs. Williams’ metapragmatic marking, 
both teachers told—together, in narratival fragments, while finishing each others’ sentences—
two “stories” (lines 730-770).  These anecdotes were about the previously mentioned village of 
Y Bala, in the culturally sacred area of north Wales where Mrs. Williams lived as a child.  Mrs. 
Williams recalled that her mother told her that she did not realize until years after leaving school 
that some of the teachers in the village spoke Cymraeg.  Her mother did not learn they spoke 
Cymraeg until they used the language outside of school, on the streets of the village, in private 
conversation.  Mrs. Hughes told a story about her grandfather, an early member of the so-called 
nationalist party (Plaid Cymru) and teacher in Y Bala, who preferred not to mention that he was 
Welsh and, although a teacher, would not speak Cymraeg at school. 
 
 
W: …I did scripture in Welsh… 723 
H: and it’s part of my history- 724 
W: …Mm… 725 
H: …do you see? 726 
W: …Th- that’s… 727 
H: Yeah. 728 
W: …what I did… 729 
H: Anything else- 730 
W: …All the others and I remember my mother saying, when she was at 731 
school, she didn’t realize until years afterwards, em… 732 
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H: Some of the teachers- 733 
W: …Meeting people… 734 
H: Yea- 735 
W: …out on the streets-  Yeah: “That person speaks Welsh!”… 736 
H: ‘Cause she- 737 
M: Huh- 738 
H: you know- 739 
W: …because they’ve never spoken a word of Welsh… 740 
H: A school in Bala, [name of school] 741 
W: …in the school… 742 
H: Yeah 743 
W: …It’s- this is in Bala, where… 744 
H: Mm 745 
W: …I was brought up… 746 
M: Huh- 747 
W: …and my mother went to school, you know. 748 
M: Ohh- 749 
H: Well, my grandfather taught in Bala in… 750 
W: Yes- 751 
H: …a boy’s school there and- some people there, you know, they didn’t 752 
want to say that they were Welshmen, really, you know… 753 
M: Uh huh- 754 
H: …It was awful… 755 
W: Mmm- 756 
H: …And he was a member of Plaid Cymru, one of the earliest ones… 757 
W: Yeah 758 
H: …you know… 759 
W: one of the earliest members, yeah- 760 
H: …But yet he talked a mete of English… 761 
W: Mm. 762 
H: …you know in Bala… 763 
W: Huh 764 
H: ...’s very funny… 765 
W: Well, that’s- 766 
H: Yeah- 767 
W: …that’s how it was, isn’t it?  I’m sure… 768 
H: Yes, in the Thirties, yeah-769 
 
 
 Without preamble or explanation, the teachers moved on from the segment above to 
comment on the fact that a ceremonial official associated with the central cultural festival that 
emphasizes Cymraeg the Archdruid, was a grandfather of one of the children at their school. 
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 The eisteddfod tradition was once centered on events in the Middle Ages where the 
performers were professional bards.  Welsh lords would award bards who gave the best 
performances within usually strict poetic requirements.  The eisteddfod tradition, today, is 
strongly associated with the performances of children and the preservation of Cymraeg.  It is also 
associated with the National Eisteddfod—an annual, national cultural festival centered in 
musical, literary, dance, and dramatic competitions in Cymraeg—and an order of bards (Y 
Gorsedd).  The centuries-old project of romanticizing Wales and its history in terms of the 
music, myths, and literature of Welsh people persists in ceremonies of the modern-day druids 
and bards of the Gorsedd (Morgan 1983). 
 These ceremonies involve solemn, colorful rituals at which literati are inducted into the 
order of druids, winners of poetry competitions are "chaired" and "crowned," and quasi-religious 
services are carried out from within stone circles.  Their members include those who win the 
eisteddfodau events that are most highly regarded or who have made some well-recognized 
achievement (as author, poet, scientist, archbishop).  The Archdruid (Archdderwydd) is the 
presiding official of the Gorsedd and of its most important ceremonies, most of which take place 
during the long week of the annual National Eisteddfod. 
 
 
 
W: …Mister- Mister [Name], eh, [Full name]… 770 
H: Yeah, [Full name]- 771 
W: …Eh… 772 
H: would be the same, yes- 773 
W: …One of our old, eh… 774 
H: Ba- 775 
W: … Be’dy “Archdderwydd”? [What is “Archdderwydd”?] They’re the 776 
Eistedd- 777 
H: Archdruid 778 
W: …-fod- The Archdruids in the Eisteddfod…. 779 
M: Uh huh 780 
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W: …Have you heard… 781 
M: Yes. 782 
W: …of our Eisteddfod…? 783 
M: Yes, I went- 784 
W: …He’s a… 785 
M: in 1995- 786 
W: …grandfather… 787 
H: Here 788 
W: …He’s a grandfather here and- that’s why I was hoping that the ce- the 789 
chairing ceremony would be on… 790 
H: It would’ve been- 791 
M: Uh huh. 792 
W: …today… 793 
H: today, so you- 794 
W: …because we, you know because he- because being, em, a grandfather, 795 
he’s agreed to be… 796 
H: to be Archdruid- 797 
W: …you know, Archdruid for our ceremony, but it’ll be next Friday now.  798 
Emm, and that’s something else we do a lot of in the school is to make 799 
sure tha’ they know… 800 
H: Mm- 801 
W: …of our culture… 802 
M: Mm hm: 803 
W: …you know, the Eisteddfodau, the, eh, noson lawen, which are, em… 804 
H: Yes. 805 
W: …like evening concerts… 806 
M: Uh huh. 807 
W: …only formal, where they… 808 
H: Mm. 809 
W: …They started when they were held at- in farmhouses, around the fire, 810 
when people… 811 
M: Mmhm: 812 
W: …from neighboring farms came together in the winter to entertain… 813 
H: Mm. 814 
W: …you know, to pass /y/ [the] long hours 815 
H: That they know about the- 816 
W: …of  817 
H: tradition, really- 818 
W: …Mm. 819 
H: you know- 820 
M: Uh huh. 821 
H: What has happened and th- that things change, you know as- 822 
W: …Yes… 823 
H: history has changed- 824 
W: …And that they’ve got to carry on. 825 
H: Yes 826 
 152
M: Do they experience these things happening in the present, um? 827 
H: Oh yes. 828 
 
 Because of the symbolic role that the eisteddfod tradition plays in the Cymraeg language-
cultural complex of Wales (discussed at more length in Chapter Five), this reference to that 
tradition afforded the teachers with the opportunity to return to the official, overarching topic of 
the interview: how they teach Welshness in the classroom.  However, Mrs. Williams returned to 
this topic by re-framing the topic: “something else we do a lot of in the school is to make sure 
they know of our culture”.  This frames the issue of cultural instruction in terms of heritage-
based communities of belonging, rather than in terms of a procedure-driven response to a state-
mandated curriculum.  Besides the competition-oriented performances of the eisteddfod tradition, 
the only activity they mentioned was the noson lawen, which is a form of traditional evening 
entertainment characterized by humor and musical performances (and, as Mrs. Williams 
described (lines 810-815), were once held in farmhouses at evening time around a fire. 
 Unfortunately, I did not unravel the mystery of the scope of the “our” in line 798.  My 
understanding was that this was an inclusive referral to the general Welsh society, with the focus 
being on the Cymraeg language-cultural complex; “our ceremony”, then, would mean the 
ceremony of those of us who participate in the National Eisteddfod.  This might not have been 
the case, however.  Yet, I also need to explain the notion of the “chairing” ceremony.  The word, 
“eistedd-”, signifies a sitting in the sense of an audience.  More significantly, the bards who are 
deemed the best receive rather ornately carved chairs to mark the honor.  In high-profile 
competition contexts, such as the National Eisteddfod, and the Urdd Eisteddfod for youths, there 
is a chairing (yn cadeirio).  Much later, I considered the possibility that the school might have 
organized a reenactment of the chairing ceremony or held their own chairing ceremony, which 
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makes better sense of the idea that someone was invited, and that he “agreed to be. . . Archdruid 
for our ceremony”. 
 
Political versus Cultural Brainwashing 
 It would be easy to fail to notice why these various cultural traditions and stories, as 
conversational topics, would fall under the category of “getting on a soapbox”.  Luckily, an 
explanation emerges from the topical layer of the interview after I probed with questions that 
were purposefully oriented toward history instruction.  Because of my interest in how different 
perspectives on Welsh history enter the classroom, I asked the two teachers about the currency of 
these traditional cultural activities (lines 827-828 above).  I asked whether the children 
experience these activities in the present.  Mrs. Hughes’ answer was an immediate “Oh yes”.  
However, Mrs. Williams, hearing Mrs. Hughes’ too quick answer, reflected on the fact that over 
half of the students at their school come from non-Cymraeg backgrounds.  This prompted her 
immediate caveat, which seemed at first to be a non sequitur: “We are not supposed to brainwash 
children politically, but we can brainwash them culturally”. 
 
W: Cer- You know the- the- what we have to do, we- we have children here- 829 
To be honest, we have abou- ha- over half of them who are from non-830 
Welsh speaking backgrounds.  We are not supposed to brainwash 831 
children politically… 832 
H: (Laughs) 833 
W: …but we can brainwash them culturally… 834 
M: Uh huh. 835 
W: Hoping that- 836 
M: What would be difference between those two? 837 
H: (Laughs) 838 
W: …Well, that they will realize that there is a place for them and, eh- onus 839 
on them to carry on… 840 
H: Mm. 841 
W: …Em… 842 
H: -tradition- 843 
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W: …to- to carry on traditions and hopefully, em,… 844 
H: Hmm, love of country, you know- 845 
W: …Yes… 846 
M: Mm hmm 847 
H: Every- 848 
W: …‘T is… 849 
H: Everybody has- 850 
W: …Love of… 851 
H: it, I suppose- 852 
W: …country, love of /y/ [the] language… 853 
H: Yes, and how important it is- 854 
W: …Yeah… 855 
H: You know- 856 
M: So… 857 
H: If no one- 858 
M: …if it were politically, would- that’d be political parties… 859 
H: Well- 860 
M: …or-r would it be…? 861 
W: Oh yes… 862 
H: Well 863 
W: …we have the Welsh Nationalist Party… 864 
M: Right 865 
W: …yes, so we bo-, yes, we both vote for the Welsh… 866 
H: Yes 867 
W: …of the, you know 868 
H: yeah 869 
W: …but you… 870 
H: I don’t- 871 
W: …don’t talk about things… 872 
H: We don’t- 873 
W: …like that, for… 874 
H: bring that into school- 875 
W: …Oh no… 876 
H: No, no, 877 
W: …We don’t… 878 
H: No, 879 
W: …No… 880 
H: No. 881 
 
The Cues of Cymraeg and Eisteddfodau:   The segue, from a comment about students’ general 
commitment to the traditions and the idiom of “brainwashing”, became intelligible to me upon 
reflection on the distinction between political and cultural.  At the time these teachers formulated 
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it, it was new to me—as was the whole domain of brainwashing as a useful metaphor for 
instructional or nurturing roles of teachers.  Key to answering the question about how or why 
“brainwashing” (or anything like it) would arise at this point in the conversation is that Cymraeg 
was cued: “To be honest, we have abou- ha- over half of them who are from non-Welsh speaking 
backgrounds.  We are not supposed to brainwash children politically” (lines 830-831).  We had 
just been discussing traditional cultural activities, not Cymraeg.  Mrs. Williams had emphasized 
the importance of making sure “tha’ they know of our culture, you know: the Eisteddfodau, the, 
eh, noson lawen” (lines 799-804).  These traditional cultural activities are, of course, 
distinguishable from Cymraeg.  Hence, one mystery is exchanged by another: How and by whom 
was Cymraeg cued?  In fact, what had been cued was not the topic of Cymraeg, but the topic of 
language politics. 
 I was later able to see, in many other contexts, the distinction Mrs. Williams evoked.  At 
the time, my inquiries regarding how they distinguish between cultural and political pedagogy 
were ineffective.  However, they did elicit references to “tradition”, “love of country”, and an 
“onus on [children] to carry on traditions” (lines 839-853 above), all of which signify core 
motivations within the ethnolinguistic consciousness of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  
Eventually, I asked if “political” would suggest political parties, which they confirmed, adding 
that they “have the Welsh Nationalist Party” (Plaid Cymru, “Party of Wales”) and that they both 
voted in line with that party (line 864).  Evoking more embodied forms of conceptual experience, 
rather than to provide a more abstract definition of political brainwashing, Mrs. Williams 
immediately clarified, “but you don’t talk about things like that” at school, and Mrs. Hughes 
added, “We don’t bring that into school” (lines 870-881). 
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 The significance of this metapragmatic marking of ongoing talk as soapbox talk was that 
certain “political” views or perspectival orientations are outside the bounds of what is obviously 
appropriate when children are the audience.  For the teacher to “get on her soapbox” meant an 
opportunity to be forthright about her beliefs, but also to signal that this performative genre, 
under normal conditions of school operations, would be illicit behavior.  Given that the interview 
was occurring in one of the offices of a primary school and that it was topically oriented toward 
what the teachers do at the school, it retained some of this feeling of illicit behavior. 
 
The Grey Area of Sports:   My questions, asked to help me understand how they draw the line 
between cultural (unobjectionable) and political (objectionable) pedagogy, brought to light a 
grey area occupied by competitive (and well-financed) sports.  The World Cup (of association 
football, or soccer) was in high gear during my summer research in 2002, and England had made 
it through to the final match.  There is a cliché that many people in Wales will cheer the side that 
is playing against England even if Wales was never really expected to go far in the competition 
(as is often the case for association football, but not for rugby football).  The grey area between 
cultural and political pedagogy was illustrated by the willingness of the headteacher of the school 
to “cross” the implicit line in his visible support of Brazil against England in the final game. 
 
W: …But you have children like the- the- the World Cup last-… 882 
M: Uh huh. 883 
W: …last week.  The children were allowed to watch the games, you 884 
know… 885 
H: Yeah. 886 
W: …Up to a point, until the bell rang or lunch-time and, eh, the day bef- 887 
well, when- when England went out… 888 
M: Uh huh. 889 
W: …em, who- who beat them, ehh?… 890 
M: Brazil. 891 
H: Brazil! 892 
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W: …Brazil… 893 
H: Yes. 894 
W: …And we had the children in- in the theatre.  One or two children had 895 
asked to stay at home to watch because if/that they won… 896 
H: Yeah. 897 
W: …his mother was English… 898 
H: Yeah- 899 
W: …and, you know, and he was very, very upset when he got in… 900 
M: (Laughs) 901 
H: Tsk. 902 
W: …but I- I went from the theatre to my car- ‘ll I thought I might as well 903 
make use of the time, eh, at the- I heard a great roar: “Yeahhh”, you 904 
know… 905 
H: [Williams] will just will act it out (Laughs) 906 
M: (Laughing) 907 
W: …and… 908 
H: Really funny. 909 
M: (Still laughing) 910 
W: …Yes, I thought: “Oh, England has scored” and the children came 911 
running, he did: “Brazil beat them, Miss!”… 912 
M: (Laughs) 913 
H: Yes, they wanted to- you know- 914 
W: …You know, and- and it’s- noth- it was nothing, we didn’t… 915 
H: No. 916 
W: …I mean, we daren’t, you know… 917 
H: Mrs. ~, you wouldn’t- 918 
W: …you can’t… 919 
H: -would you?- 920 
W: …You’re not… 921 
H: You know. 922 
W: …You can say something, Oh [Headteacher] used to say, (In a deep, 923 
parodic voice) “Oh, I hope th- I hope- I hope the Brazilians beat them”, 924 
like that, but you know, em, no, we’re not allowed to really, but I- I 925 
think, lots of the children… 926 
H: (Laughing, presumably about the other’s performance) 927 
W: (Almost laughing too) They- they have got a strong W-… 928 
H: Yes 929 
W: …feeling of Welshness… 930 
H: Yeah 931 
W: …haven’t they? 932 
 
 
 The stance the headteacher took not only marks an affinity toward Brazil (momentary at 
best, despite the consistently good performances of that country’s team at the World Cup), but an 
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aversion to England.  The proscription against taking such a stance can be measured according to 
the metric of teachers’ own evaluatively keyed linguistic stances: “we didn’t”, “we daren’t”, you 
wouldn’t, would you?”, “you can’t”, “you’re not” (lines 915-921).  A recognizable line in 
behavior has been drawn (at least for the day-to-day teaching staff) and they are “not allowed to 
[cross it] really” (line 925).  Ultimately, the headteacher’s expression of sentiment that goes 
beyond Welsh national identity is ameliorated by the fact that he cannot really influence the 
converted: “Lots of the children. . . have got a strong W- feeling of Welshness, haven’t they?” 
(lines 926-932) 
 There is much that calls for further investigation in cases like this.  Many headteachers at 
primary schools in Gwynedd and Conwy are men, while only ten percent of the day-to-day 
teaching staff would be male.  Headteachers typically do not do the day-to-day teaching but tend 
to take up a more “moral” role, exemplified by their leading school assemblies.  That role itself 
creates a grey area in contrast to the more clear-cut rules that teachers, applying their training, do 
not have the authority to bend. 
 Following this fairly contained story, the teachers return to explaining why they would 
use the intensifier of “brainwashing” in reference to cultural pedagogy.  Importantly, while they 
do not see themselves doing anything that is objectionable, there is something about the motives 
for cultural pedagogy that justify the metaphor used for an objectionable influence on other 
people.  This something is composed of the feelings the teachers have for Cymraeg and related 
traditions, feelings that figure in their social consciousness. 
 
H: Well, it’s a matter of, you know, loving an old, old language, isn’t it… 933 
W: Mm. 934 
H: …and you want that to carry on, you know.  This is it, isn’t it?… 935 
W: Right. 936 
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H: …And it’s all part of ~~~ well… 937 
W: (Laughs self-consciously, presumably realizing the hilarity of her 938 
performance) 939 
H: …(Laughing a little) Eh doesn’t it. Y’know’t’ I mean?  It’s all… 940 
M: (Laughs) 941 
W: Yes, but we have… 942 
H: If we don’t do it… 943 
W: No, who will? 944 
H: Em, there’s not another school in [area name] will do it… 945 
W: No, ~ 946 
H: …feel like us ~… 947 
W: ‘cause this is the Welsh school of [area name], you see. 948 
M: Uh huh- 949 
H: …You know, you want it to… 950 
M: What d- Does that mean that… Welsh is a core… subject as- as opposed 951 
to a found-… 952 
W: Well, in Eng- 953 
M: …ational subject or…? 954 
H: Hm. 955 
W: …in Wales, there are four core subjects: English, Welsh, En- 956 
H: Maths- 957 
W: …eh, Maths, and Science.  Em, but lots of schools- Gwynedd, eh, 958 
County policy is that Wales- Welsh is the first language… 959 
H: Mmhm: 960 
W: …You know, they do the test of the Welsh first language, em, but you’ve 961 
got Anglicized areas in Gwynedd where I live and where Mrs. Hughes- 962 
where you live, very… 963 
H: Yes- 964 
W: …near to Bangor, but it’s… 965 
H: Yes. 966 
W: …it’s… 967 
H: Very- 968 
W: …very Welsh… 969 
H: Yes. 970 
W: …It’s-… 971 
H: Oh yes- 972 
W: …it’s very Welsh and I live the other side of Caernarfon, which is very 973 
Welsh, em, but here, and the schools where we are they are Welsh… 974 
H: Yes, yes. 975 
W: …schools, you know… 976 
H: Mmm. 977 
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Drowning Children 
 So as not to break the flow of this intensely interesting portion of the interview, I will 
make few comments about the highlighting of Cymraeg that happens in the last and the next 
segment.  It is worth calling attention to the fact that, in addition to cultural brainwashing, there 
is another dramatic metaphor these (and other) teachers apply to their practices.  It is not 
immediately obvious that it has to do with the language of Cymraeg because it is expressed in 
terms of (what would seem to be) a generic type of identity: Welshness. 
 
 
W: …You- you rarely have children who don’t speak Welsh… 978 
M: Hm. 979 
W: …coming to the school- er you have the maybe two or three and they, 980 
you know, they learn very quickly, because they’re drowned… 981 
H: Yeah. 982 
W: …in Welshness. 983 
M: Right, right. 984 
W: Whereas here, the parents-  This is a W- a specifically Welsh school, 985 
where you have another four or five junior schools in the city, em, where, 986 
okay, they do teach Welsh, but’s not’s- a- they- they don’t do the’s- the 987 
tests, do they? 988 
H: No, so they don’t work- 989 
W: Em, so really, they’re teaching more through the medium- of English, 990 
and learning the language, okay? 991 
H: Mm. 992 
W: …Whereas we- we start here by learning through the medium of 993 
Welsh… 994 
M: Ahh. 995 
H: Em. 996 
W: …but as they go up to school, em, what we aim for is to get them 997 
bilingual… 998 
H: Fifty percent. 999 
W: …by the time they’re eleven… 1000 
M: Right. 1001 
W: …and by the time they reach us, they do 50% of the work through 1002 
English and 50% through Welsh… 1003 
M: Hm. 1004 
H: Mm. 1005 
W: …and- but some people in th- in [the area] are under the misconception 1006 
that we only teach through the medium of Welsh… 1007 
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H: No, it’s not true really- 1008 
W: …You know… 1009 
H: Well, it- 1010 
W: …No… 1011 
H: T’isn’t true. 1012 
W: No, it’sn’t true. 1013 
H: No, but I think they dr- they’re really drowned in the Welshness at the 1014 
beginning… 1015 
W: Mm. 1016 
H: …you know, so that’s- eh, eh, you know, their Welsh is good when they 1017 
reach Year Six… 1018 
W: Mm. 1019 
H: …you know… 1020 
M: Uh huh. 1021 
H: …because they’ve been… 1022 
W: Mm. 1023 
M: They’ve been doing everything, or… 1024 
H: Mm. 1025 
M: …well,… 1026 
W: Yes. 1027 
H: Yes. 1028 
M: …at least half… 1029 
W: Yes. 1030 
M: …of… 1031 
H: Yes. 1032 
M: …everything. 1033 
W: Yes. 1034 
H: Yes, we do science, maths, everything through the medium of Welsh, but 1035 
also, you know, we bring it- the English in… 1036 
W: Yeah. 1037 
 
 The obvious and intriguing theme in this segment is the provocative concept of drowning 
(line 981 and line 1014), which is dramatic both in terms of the mortality of drowning and the 
idea that Welshness could be used to “drown” someone.  It is also remarkable in that it is so 
ambiguous.  Various Welsh teachers’ elaboration clearly revealed processes of immersion in 
Cymraeg contexts of communication as being central to its meaning.  Moreover, as at other times 
in this interview, the presenting symptoms have the shape of features of culture 
(“Welshness”/Cymreictod”) and not language (“Welsh”/”Cymraeg”).  Thus, Cymraeg can figure 
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as the theme of discourse even where the theme of communicative practices of a particular 
language code are never explicitly denoted.  Welshness, in such cases is what is used; where 
attempts to elicit this implicit denoting of Cymraeg also invoke a broader sense of Welshness 
than that which motivated the speaker.  In English conversations, this took the form of talking 
about a “Welsh ethos” or “drowning children in Welshness”, where in both cases Cymraeg plays 
the central part. 
 As the trope of DROWNING is the subject of a different chapter (Chapter Nine), I postpone 
discussion of it until that chapter.  For now, it suffices to note that it falls on the cultural side and 
not the political side of the pedagogy divide.  It constitutes a kind of cultural “brainwashing” 
because it clearly meant more than a cultural repertoire to these teachers and others with similar 
commitments to the Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  That is, it meant far more than the 
immersion of pupils in Cymraeg contexts and more even than the intended results of such 
immersion: Cymraeg competence.  From an analytic perspective, it signifies the culture that lies 
in the Cymraeg language code and the world the language code makes manifest. 
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PROBLEMS IN DIAGNOSIS 
 
 
164
CHAPTER FOUR 
◄ POLITICS AS USUAL ► 
 
 
Whatever else ideologies may be—projections of unacknowledged fears, disguises for ulterior motives, 
phatic expressions of group solidarity—they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality 
and matrices for the creation of collective conscience. (Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural 
System” (1973:220)) 
 
 This chapter addresses the discourses about nationalism issue of Welsh ethnic 
consciousness from the ideology-centric orientation that gives analyses of nationalism their sense 
of conceptual cohesion.  I discuss what commitments can be attributed to nationalism in the 
communities in which my schooling sites were situated.  I do not see the labor of this chapter as 
a project of so-called objective reporting.  In discussing nationalist commitments, it is important 
to acknowledge that public perception constructs a simplification of a variety of opinions to be 
found among nationalists.  I begin by highlighting the context that acts as ground when political 
issues—particularly nationalism—figure as a topic.  Given ordinary usage of the concept, 
politics, it is rare for lay persons to consider that what is or is not generally considered political is 
regulated by yet more politics. 
 
THE NATIONALISM META-DISCOURSE 
Highlighting the Politics of Politics in “Nationalism” Usage 
 It is often observed that global trends have not brought about the end of nationalism.  
These retrospective comments tend to possess a tone of puzzlement and to suggest a sense of 
humanity’s failure.  The implication—particularly, in Welsh and US academic contexts that 
resonate with the collective memory of world wars, hot and cold—is that nationalism is not a 
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benign way of looking at the world.  Yet, it is possible to imagine some forms of nationalism that 
are benign, even if they are deployed merely as a classificatory label for others. 
 Michael Ignatieff (1993) suggested that this possibility begins to be realized in what he 
called “civic nationalism”.  Civic nationalism “appeal[s] to people on the basis of a shared 
allegiance to [certain] constitutional principles” (Ignatieff 1999:143), such as equal protection 
before the law.  Ignatieff (1993) distinguished civic nationalism from ethnic nationalism: a 
nationalism that appeals to people on the basis of language, religion, or other naturalized bonds.  
Ingatieff thought civic nationalism was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a 
nationalism to be called benign; that is, for an ideology about national affiliation to be benign, 
that affiliation had to be based on constitutional guarantees, but other conditions would also need 
to be met.  A civic nationalism in which some people have fewer protected rights than others on 
the basis of skin tones, sex, or genealogy, for example, would not be benign. 
 The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, based on constitutional protections 
and issues of equality, does not map very well onto cultural contexts in north-west Wales, where 
the primary distinction is between political and cultural nationalism, with language nationalism 
overlapping the two.  Nationalism, then, has at least two sides to it in everyday contexts in 
Wales: Politically overt nationalism and a more or less benign cultural nationalism.  Movement 
from one to the other occurs on a graduated continuum of expression of one’s commitments, 
largely through deployment of symbols of various kinds. 
 Some commitments can be evoked by treating a harp, a mountain scene, a line of verse, a 
painting of a colliery, and postcards of the traditional Welsh feminine costume as Welsh and 
would be treated as benign and unobjectionable in virtually any context.  Others are generally 
considered unimpeachable emblems, but involve more variability in how they are received.  The 
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national anthem and the national flag are staunchly displayed on the principle that they instill and 
evoke pride of a positive sort, despite the associations these sorts of signs have with international 
division and conflict.  Party politics are completely off-limits in certain contexts (e.g., 
classrooms).  Because many sporting events (especially rugby and association football) mimic 
warfare in their physicality and antagonism, the performance of the national teams is considered 
a sometimes permissible, but borderline case of the political. 
 Teachers must toe the line on this sloping, sometimes shifting ground when teaching 
lessons and, yet, I met many teachers who considered themselves to be nationalists.  It was not 
always clear what they meant by this, but they “knew” what was acceptable in schooling settings 
and saw no contradiction between their nationalist commitments, of which many were very 
proud, and what they could or had to do at school.  While a small minority of parents might 
complain about the “deplorable” presence of nationalism in schools, they did not see these 
excesses of nationalism to be cases of malignant forms of nationalism comparable to racist 
ideologies.  Yet, the nebulous threat that some think nationalism presents, is a persistent and 
constant concern of many parents and nationalism that is frequently put on display in mass 
media, both by professional media personnel (i.e., broadcasters or writers) and by subscribers 
who seek to have their opinion published. 
 Of course, no one suspects that ordinary teachers have a malignant effect on children, 
even if the complaints seem to express some sense that authority is being abused.  Rather, the 
culturally significant issue I draw attention to is the sustaining of a normalizing screen that 
conceals “contradictions” in Welsh society.  Maintenance of this screen obliges members of the 
public sphere to perform or feel shocked disbelief when the full range of claims about 
community appears in state-official, semi-public spaces like schools.  Since some of the visions 
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of community that exist in Welsh society are incompatible with other visions, but invoke no 
reason to prohibit their circulation (as would overtly racist talk), the liberalist principle prevails.  
The result is a principled, if tacit, refusal to establish criteria for what is acceptable content for 
ideological commitments to the nation.  As a corollary, the sociopolitical conventions related to 
determining what is and what is not political are never examined to any significant degree in 
public spaces.  While my research was not directed at such macro-sociological cultural 
operations, I have sketched them because they are what give a broader significance to any 
discovery of local meanings of nationalism, belonging, and community membership. 
 The mainstream public discourse on nationalism is, in general, blind to what it means to 
possess a sense of belonging to local Cymraeg communities.  Hence, the nation-wide public 
discourse is largely numb to what is felt by those teachers who describe themselves as 
nationalists.  Indeed, many of the teachers I interacted with in north-west Wales would call 
themselves “nationalists”, but not in any pejorative sense.  I have a responsibility to avoid the 
impropriety of simple-mindedly assuming or, worse, suggesting that teachers teach nationalism 
in their classrooms.  Nevertheless, if the fact that (some) teachers see nationalism as a positive 
form of expression is silenced, then their sense of belonging and its meaning is silenced, too.  
From their perspective, such a silencing is malignant, as well as unpatriotic. 
 
Semiotic (Re)cognition of Nationalism 
 One of the problems with the specter of “nationalism” is that there is a plethora of 
features that become homogenized in the public imagination of nationalism.  In my own usage of 
the term, “nationalism”, I do not use the label to classify people according to their attitudes, 
except as part of a characterization of prevalent discourses about nationalism, or as a description 
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meant to be in alignment with such discourses.  I rely on individuals to describe themselves as 
nationalists and I try to qualify such identities in terms of membership in relevant activist 
organizations or political party. 
 If utterances exhibit discursive features that the principals of utterances identify as 
nationalistic, I would argue that these utterances are not themselves tokens of the discourse about 
nationalism except in virtue of those principals’ tacit, discursive understandings.  This has deep 
implications and it valuable to probe those depths at the risk of complicating things.  Such 
utterances can only be said to have discursive features that people identify as nationalistic in 
virtue of persons’ tacit, discursive understandings within which the unified image of nationalism 
has an “objective” appearance.  Therefore, the relevant discourse is itself a kind of context that 
gives meaning to utterances once they are identified as being nationalistic or being about 
nationalism.  Talk ascribed to the discourse of nationalism does not itself involve an 
endorsement of nationalist principles (or even of language communitarian principles, to use my 
less objectionable term).  However, it might imply participation in, or complicitness with, the 
discourse.  This is to engage in some way, directly or indirectly, with an ideological unity that is 
part of the field of social action related to identity in north-west Wales. 
 This leads me to treat nationalism as a discursive trope that people discuss and in which 
they participate, but might not want to be complicit with the discourse in all of its effects.  
Although just as awkward as the cumbersome phrase, “discourse of or about nationalism”, it 
would be better to locate that discourse in relation to its sociocultural setting of the “nationalism 
meta-discourse”.  The nationalism meta-discourse is a fluid and freely contextual discursive 
context that organizes communication on occasions regardless of whether the object of talk is or 
is not nationalistic in any conventionalized objective sense; whether or not the agent responsible 
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for animating the discursive token recognizes that token, or exhibits any features generally 
recognized, as nationalistic.  Allusions to nationalism—or rather, talk that registers in the cultural 
consciousness of Welsh persons as being nationalistic or being about nationalism—signal a 
cohesive field of action.  Such communication (implicitly or explicitly) enacts the discursive 
context in which such ascriptions or embodiments of nationalism are figured as being of or about 
nationalism.  This discursive context is the nationalism meta-discourse. 
 The nationalism meta-discourse operates largely out of the awareness of most people in 
Wales, including social researchers (see Silverstein 1985b).  What is in practical awareness are 
the surface positions that this and the next chapter describe, by way of a representation of the 
phenomenal level discourse of and about nationalism.  The research that produced the data for 
the present chapter involved a partial, tentative, and ongoing deconstruction of the cultural 
dialectic about language politics in Wales, as well as the tracking of the discourse of and about 
nationalism, and identification of the latter’s more “objectual” and salient features (i.e., the 
discourse of and about nationalism).  Because of its fluidity, the meta-discourse eludes attempts 
to demonstrate determinately that it is what it seems to be (what I say it is).  It is, essentially, a 
game within the game of nationalism and national identity.  As with much ethnographic 
interpretation, the compelling quality of such a representation comes from the coherence of the 
image represented, which in turn suggests an organization to the discourse.   
 
THE BLURRING OF PARTY-POLITICAL NATIONALISM 
INTO CULTURAL NATIONALISM 
 The label of “nationalist” is frequently used in a way that confounds different stakes and 
claims about a person’s national affinities and allegiances.  For purposes of systematic research, 
it is relatively useful to distinguish between political, cultural, and language nationalism, as a far 
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more precise terminology.  However, as this chapter shows, these varieties are not faithful to the 
fluid ways people in Wales use the concept.  Nonetheless, to gain a first-order sense of how the 
discourse about nationalism produces identity-positions in north-west Wales, I present a 
diagnostic description of varieties of nationalism that gradually reshapes the typology into a 
more faithful representation of the way nationalism figures in ordinary conversations. 
 During the period of my preliminary and principal dissertation fieldwork, the primary 
activist organizations that might be deemed nationalistic were Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg 
(“Cymraeg Language Society”) and Cymuned (“Community”), each of which is focused on 
language issues.  Plaid Cymru [Party of Wales] was the relevant political party.  Within lay or 
academic conversations in Wales, the traditional political variety of nationalism tends to be 
treated either as a more or less normal expression of support for the political party, Plaid Cymru, 
or as a deviant desire to rid Wales of England’s influence on Welsh political affairs.  The latter 
position, in prevailing views in Wales, conveys extremism.  Nonetheless, such a variety of 
political nationalism in the dominant popular imagination elicits an explicit and polarizing 
affirmation or rejection. 
 During my field research trips to Wales, expressions of political nationalism were fairly 
muted in public spaces.  Since 1998, devolution has produced a political assembly as a native 
faculty of Wales.  As devolution has been progressing in perceptible stages, political nationalism 
has become less visible.  To present oneself in relatively extreme ways (e.g., as a separatist) 
would suggest more than impatience with devolutionary developments—it would express 
something more like ethnic antagonism toward English people or the Anglocentric views that 
occasionally appear in the mass media and sound to some or all ears to be anti-Welsh.  In 2008, 
there were measured changes to policy-making procedures according to which the National 
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Assembly could make legislative decisions on any aspect of policy that formerly had been 
reserved to the UK Parliament.  Nevertheless, there have been and are obviously intermediate 
positions between separatism and conventional devolution, where these are muted or erased in 
various ways through the normalizing aspects of public discourse. 
 Today, this constellation of political nationalism might be considered the current 
governmental status quo in Wales insofar as power once held by the UK state has for decades 
been going through a process of decentralization.1  As such, it would be the contrast-class to 
British conservatism centered in specifically English traditions.  Of course, political nationalism 
has traditionally been associated with the idea of separating altogether from the UK.  This makes 
for considerable slippage in what frequently passes for a technical term. 
 Although lay critics say the National Assembly has accomplished little and has settled 
into a routine that reproduces the existing state of devolution, others see in it a vitality that 
represents the potential for developing national institutions that do not presently exist or are in 
early stages.  One sign of the latter viewpoint is the trend, beginning around 2002, to apply the 
convention in the British parliamentary context to refer to the administration in the hands of the 
UK Prime Minister, to the administration of the Wales’ First Minister, calling it a Welsh 
“government”.  The effect was to suggest a developing seat of power in Wales, even though the 
Welsh government enacts a fairly limited scope of policy.  It fulfills a nascent executive role in 
the governance of the Principality balanced by the National Assembly, which itself fulfills a 
nascent legislative role.  Neither has autonomous control of the respective branches of 
governance and all judicial and policing powers and functions remained with the Crown. 
                                                 
1  In recent developments, the Senedd voted to hold a referendum on the following question: “Do you want the 
assembly now to be able to make laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for?”  The results of the 
referendum of March 3, 2011 were: 517, 132 votes (63.49%) of “yes”, and 297,380 votes (36.51) of “no”.  
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/results/referendums/wales, accessed March 1, 2012. 
 
 
172
 A few years following this terminological development, after a new building was 
constructed to house the National Assembly, party leader Ieuen Wyn Jones coined it the 
“Senedd”.  This is the Welsh name for the parliament building in London and was the name of 
the Welsh parliament in the early 1400s, when Wales was formally independent of England for 
about a decade.  Such practices, while suggestive of a spirit of autonomy, are more consonant 
with a banal nationalism (Billig 1995) of the flag-waving variety.  It is here that party-political 
nationalism blurs into “cultural nationalism”. 
 Day’s (2002:245-246) summary of Denney’s (1991) presentation is particularly useful at 
displaying the problem of typologies. 
 
Using illustrations from a number of literary and political sources, Denney et al. 
[N.B.: there is only one author listed on the published article he discussed] 
deconstruct nationalist positions into a set of ideal types—that is, purified 
abstractions which are not necessarily to be found empirically in exactly that 
form. . .  One [of two central positions] consists of a sociolinguistic approach, 
which combines the defence of the Welsh language and associated culture with an 
attack on the capitalist economic order that is held to be undermining it.  This is 
held to be close to the views of the Welsh Language Society [Cymdeithas yr Iaith 
Gymraeg].  Finally, there is a position of cultural pluralism, advocated more 
recently by Plaid Cymru [Party of Wales], which works within the democratic 
process, through parliamentarian means, but aims to gain separate institutions for 
Wales, within a European context. 
 
Although Day (2002:246) noted that “Welsh nationalism is. . . a highly differentiated type of 
movement”, the bifurcated view of a political variety and a language-cultural variety of 
nationalism matches (indeed, probably informed) my experiences of discourses in Wales.  
However, the blurring of the analytic terms so they cannot track the differentiations of 
nationalism as a diverse movement—for example into cultural or language-based varieties—is 
analytically problematic.  This is not only because language and cultural are phenomenologically 
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and practically intertwined, even when either results in English-language/“English”-culture 
activities or Cymraeg/“Welsh”-culture activities. 
 In the Welsh context, the blurring of language and culture coincides with the joining, 
over the Twentieth Century, of the agendas of political party and broadly cultural objectives.  
This chapter wrestles with the problems that emerge from the convergence of this cultural milieu 
and the categorial rubrics.  I resolve the problem by arguing on the basis of local features in 
Wales that nationalism is not an analytic concept, but a phenomenal-discursive trope.  However, 
I dwell here for a moment on two interesting features of Day’s (2002) use of Denney 1991. 
 One of the contexts for the blurring of culture and language in (at least) scholarly 
discussions of nationalism arises, oddly, with respect to the ideal type of political nationalism on 
which Day (2002) commented in the block quotation a couple of pages above.  Thus, it is 
interesting that both Day (2002) and Denney (1991) described Plaid Cymru [Party of Wales] as 
cultural pluralist.  The attribution of cultural pluralism implies a move away from political 
nationalism as an ideal type—other than in the sense that Plaid Cymru is a political party.  Yet, 
being a political party does not make the Conservative Party a token of political nationalism.  
This is of interest because both authors portrayed Plaid Cymru’s political nationalism as more 
tolerant and less critical than their representative token of sociolinguistic nationalism: 
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg. 
 The background information that both authors might assume their readers possess is that 
Plaid Cymru was once widely recognized in English by the name “the Welsh Nationalist Party”  
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and has worked hard to remove the “stain” of nationalism.2  If Plaid Cymru had not had this 
history or been so recognized, it is unlikely that Denney (1991) could have justified using the 
image of such a culturally pluralist party as a token of political nationalism.  The historical 
process that this bloc in the Welsh political party system underwent, from an agenda of self-
government to cultural pluralism, does not sit easily within a general rubric of political 
nationalism.  The current blurring of political and broadly cultural nationalism continues today, 
as Plaid Cymru struggles with the image, sometimes vocalized, that this party has the goal of 
dividing Wales.  Indeed, after the creation of the National Assembly, when political 
independence from England seemed unnecessary and a new arena was opened for competition 
between different political parties in Wales, that perception of Plaid Cymru became a tool of 
political parties opposed to Plaid  (This is illustrated by a series of indirect exchanges that 
occurred in the newsprint- and internet-based news distributions of BBC News before the spring 
elections of 1999.  See Appendix C for a brief discussion of these exchanges.). 
 Interestingly, neither author explicitly noted that the phrase and English-language name 
for Plaid Cymru, “The Welsh Nationalist Party”, is related to the former name of Plaid Cymru: 
Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru.  The modifier, genedlaethol, should be translated as “national”, not  
                                                 
2  Although there was a Home Rule movement in the teens and twenties of the Twentieth Century, it was probably 
never so shocking in its brazenness as a speech Saunders Lewis made (in English) at the 1923 National Eisteddfod 
in Mold (quoted in Davies 2011): 
Our condition cannot be saved by a conference but by discipline and obedience. Do not 
seek a conference in which all the chatterboxes of Wales can deliver useless speeches, 
but next year form a battalion and a Welsh camp, and every Welshman who wishes to 
serve his country to come there to drill together for a fortnight and obey military orders 
so that they work together quietly and without argument, everyone prepared to obey and 
to be punished if he does not do so.  And do this for five years, without chatter. Drilling 
without weapons, and so openly and without breaking the law of any country, but by this 
preparing ourselves to accept laws and leadership by Welshmen.  If we had a hundred or 
fifty or only twenty in the first year to do so, this would be Wales’ most important 
movement since the days of Glyndŵr. I am perfectly serious. 
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“nationalist” [i.e., genedlaetholwr, which uses the person-individuating suffix, -wr (singular)/ 
-wyr (plural)].3  These two streams of translation and consciousness are relevant, but would seem 
to be reduced in significance by the fact that the association of “national” with “nationalist” in 
popular perceptions of the political party was due to the party’s original aim of self-government.  
The deletion of the term “national” might have been due to the negative connotations of 
nationalism and its association with fascism.  Moreover, Plaid Cymru is commonly referred to as 
“the Welsh Nationalist Party” in English-language contexts.4  During all stages of my fieldwork, 
I encountered Plaid Cymru so named in ordinary English-language conversations.  This pattern 
included people who described themselves as nationalists and were fervent about Cymraeg, as 
well as people who did not know Cymraeg. 
 The fact that there are two parallel streams of language translation and consciousness 
results in the fact that two authors with little competence in Cymraeg would fail to observe that 
“Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru” does not mean “Welsh Nationalist Party”.  However, the 
convergence of these two streams—in the commonplace idea that Plaid Cymru is the Welsh 
nationalist party—does not contradict such a social parallelism.  In fact, it is related and clarified 
by the second interesting feature of Day’s (2002) use of Denney 1991. 
                                                 
3  Plaid Cymru, established in 1925 eventually moved away (in the late 1990s, with the establishment of the 
National Assembly) from the politics of the “Home Rule” movement.  Indeed, one of the founding members of 
Plaid Cymru, Lewis Valentine, was a member of the Welsh Home Rulers Army, with which that movement was 
identified.  Plaid Cymru’s history involves the transition to the constitutional politics of later years of the devolution 
era that occupied most of the Twentieth Century, and a preoccupation of some of the party’s members with language 
issues (e.g., Saunders Lewis), as these became more widely recognized (because of people like Saunders Lewis). 
     The Home Rule movement began under the auspices of the Liberal Party, a context in which “self-government” 
was better left undefined.  Even at a time when the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was the Welsh 
nationalist, David Lloyd George (who was instrumental in the founding of the world-state of Ireland), it was 
controversial to talk about a Welsh state. 
4  One example is the title of this webpage about “Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru (The Welsh Nationalist Party)”, found 
on the website of the National Library of Wales [LLyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru), which is not typically referred to 
as the “Nationalist Library of Wales”: http://centenary.llgc.org.uk/en/XCM1917/events/1.html; accessed October 27, 
2012. 
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 The second feature is that Day used the English translation for a Cymraeg activist group 
(Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg), some of whose members engage in civil disobedience for the 
sake of language interests and for whom jail time is a badge of honor.  This contrasts with Day’s 
usage of the Cymraeg name (Plaid Cymru) for a political party that, because it is politically 
expedient to do so, takes pains to reach across to both official segments of the Welsh population 
and, thus, its spokespersons commonly use “Party of Wales”.  In this connection, language issues 
have had an equally long role in the history of nationalism in Wales. 
 Consider, for example, the use of “byddin” [army] by several activist groups.  In the 
context of his discussion of early Twentieth-Century activist groups, D. H. Davies (2011) noted, 
two “among the small patriotic movements that were emerging briefly and disappearing like 
fireflies as Welsh enthusiasts sought the way forward” in the 1920s were: 
 
St Dogmael’s Byddin Cymru (Army of Wales)—not a weapon in sight despite its 
name. . . [and] Byddin yr Iaith (The Language Army). . .  Despite its threatening 
title, there was nothing military about Byddin yr Iaith: members were to wear the 
movement’s badge, to speak Welsh as often as possible in places such as post 
offices and train stations, and to demand official status for the Welsh language. 
 
Even without taking these uses of “byddin” [army] literally, they do suggest, in conjunction with 
the modest objectives of Byddin yr Iaith, a particular social reading of activism of the time: It 
was deemed “militant” in the 1920s (and, thus, frowned upon) to demand that others use the 
indigenous language of Wales.  Alternatively, a highly cohesive sense of group identity like that 
of an “army” was necessary if one were going to maintain a position of making such demands of 
others.  The legacy of that Victorian-era climate remains today.  The idea of an army, much like 
the Salvation Army, provided a sense of solidarity and discipline in pursuing activist objectives.  
These included speaking Cymraeg in post offices and train stations—public places where people 
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might use English if they do not know the person with whom they come into contact.  However, 
a nationalist “army” is different from a charitable organization with Christian overtones (i.e., the 
Salvation Army). 
 It is past time to present a concrete example of how cultural pluralism within party-
political nationalism blurs into “cultural nationalism” or “language nationalism”—one that 
touches on schooling settings.  By turning to such an example and my explication of the 
example, we can begin to see how much more realistic are descriptions that cast the categories of 
POLITICAL and CULTURAL as overlapping, rather than as distinct and ideally concepts.  Further, it 
is only by considering language issues that we can see the way that POLITICAL and CULTURAL 
overlap, and also held in tension with each other. 
 
SYNECDOCHIC IDENTITY AT YSGOL GERRIG YN YR AFON (YGA) 
Is He Saesneg, Miss? 
 I return here to the autumn day, the second of October 2007, when I sat in the fourth row 
of a primary school classroom in Abergwaith.  I described this scene in the opening pages of this 
dissertation.  Now, I want to recount it not as I understood it at the time, but as I came to 
understand it. 
 The teacher was beginning a history lesson about the Celts and it was my first day in her 
classroom.  Before providing a recap of the previous history lesson on Friday, she introduced me 
to the class.  This event would be largely unremarkable except for the interesting way in which 
the children tried to classify me as a new part of their classroom environment. 
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Mrs. P:  Cyn i ni gychwyn, fella fel ‘dachi di sylwi, ella, 
 Before we begin, you may have noticed, perhaps, 
 
 mae ‘gynna ni ymwelydd yn y dosbarth heddiw. Mister? 
 we have a visitor in the classroom today. Mister? 
 
Steve:  Maas. 
 
Mrs. P: Maas? 
 
Steve: Iawn [Right]. 
 
Mrs. P:  . . . wedi dod i weld chi. Wel, sut ydach chi? 
 . . . [He] has come to see you.  Well, how are you? 
 
Tom: Is he Saesneg, Miss? 
 Is he English-language, Miss? [inaudible sounds from other children] 
 
Mrs. P: Manyrs, Tom! 
 Manners, Tom! 
 
Child 2: Saesneg- 
 English-language- 
 
Child 3: Cymraeg ydi o? 
 Is he Cymraeg? 
 
Mrs. P: d- Deallt Cymraeg. 
 He understands Cymraeg. 
 
 Mrs. P spoke in a very rapid style, which in some instances caused a problem even for 
native speakers of the region (from whom I sought assistance in interpreting some of her 
recorded talk).  Hence, I had more trouble with this teacher’s use of Cymraeg than any other 
teacher.  When I missed an opportunity to tell the students where I came from, which Mrs. P 
gave to me following the segment transcribed above, she summarized (in Cymraeg): “He is 
learning Cymraeg and comes from the US, from America, and he has been learning Cymraeg”.  
This was a diplomatic way of dealing with Tom’s question of classification, which clearly was a 
more impolitic question in the teacher’s perspective than in the perspectives of the children.  
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After this introduction, the lesson moved straightforwardly to a review of the ongoing series of 
lessons on the Celts. 
 At the time, this communicative segment seemed unremarkable to me, even with respect 
to the way the children tried to classify me.  By this point in my fieldwork, I was already 
immured to the seamless movement among discursive themes, from ethnicity to language to 
personal identity.  Being very uneasy with the politicization of language and struggling to find 
some kind of neutrality, I had no way of analyzing the simplifying “logic” that Tom applied: 
Was I “English-language or Cymraeg?”.  Its very simplicity seemed to thwart elaboration.  On 
this day in the classroom, I was also focused on how the Celts were going to be related in 
figurative terms to modern-day Welsh persons.  Therefore, at the time of this introduction, I took 
the children’s questions as being formulated in terms of a careless figure of speech.  I did not 
even notice the fact that I myself figured in a synecdoche, being included not as a member of a 
population of language speakers, but by having the language code itself predicated of me, much 
as one might say I am White.5  This is highly significant, but I did not notice the significance at 
the time. 
 Geertz (1973), almost aphoristically, pointed out the field of significance Tom evoked by 
figuring me as a language code: 
 
                                                 
5  In rhetoric, the concept of synecdoche is hardly a matter of established convention.  As part of a larger area of 
inquiry (no pun intended), conversations about the role of synecdoche give rise to competing definitions and 
schemes not only for the best known type of trope (i.e., metaphor), but also for other fairly widely-known types 
(e.g., metonymy and synecdoche); as well as those tropic types that are the common currency of classical and 
modern commentaries on rhetoric (allegory, hyperbole, onomatopoeia, epithet, antonomasia, periphrasis, and so on).  
Rather than establish a genealogical lineage or terminological convention amid this dizzying variety of opinions and 
definitions, I find it useful to focus on the semantic-rhetorical function of tropes; an approach proposed by Black 
(1962), and followed by Purcell (1990) and, most relevantly, Seto (1999). 
     Seto (1999) highlighted two functional types of tropes; constituted, on one hand, by referential transfer based on 
spatio-temporal contiguity—partonomy (a system of parts); and, on the other hand, conceptual transfer based on 
semantic inclusion—taxonomy (a system of kinds).  The former is “the relation between an entity and its parts, such 
as the relation between a table and its legs” (Seto 1999:93).  The latter is “the relation between a more 
comprehensive category and a less comprehensive one” (Seto 1999:93). 
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As a cultural system, an ideology that has developed beyond the stage of mere 
sloganeering consists of an intricate structure of interrelated meanings—interrelated 
in terms of the semantic mechanisms that formulate them—of which the two-level 
organization of an isolated metaphor is but a feeble representation (Geertz 1973: 
213n.). 
 
Ideology as a cultural system is both more significant than a unit of crude polemic and more 
meaningful than “false consciousness”.  In the English-speaking world (and beyond), the 
idolizing of objective truth leads to the occasionally expressed, but more frequently implied, 
statement that an ideology amounts to a distortion of the facts rather than a cultural system in 
Geertz’s sense.  Both ideology and rhetoric are concepts that can be deployed to belittle another 
position on that basis.  Both of these, in turn, are part of a number of concepts (e.g., discourse) 
that are units for analysis of phenomenal items that can be present in particular instances, but that 
can also be carried from communicative setting to communicative—available for instantiation—
without being instantiated in particular instances.  As such, they are also methodological lenses 
for analyses—of social consciousness (respecting ideology) and modes of identification 
(respecting rhetoric)—that transcend pejorative commentary.  Also, they are more powerful 
when used together. 
 
Out of the Mouths of Youths 
 Tom’s question, “Is he Saesneg, Miss? [Is he English-language, Miss?]”, was clearly on 
other children’s minds.  His and the other children’s use of synecdoche, in effect, meant the 
children believed that there was a language code-category into which one could most 
conveniently fit my vocal presentations, and that this code-category could stand for me, in terms 
of what I was, as a sociocultural being: my personhood.  On its own, this is a fairly mundane and 
even banal act.  At a basic level of decoding this figuration, the children’s questions reflected 
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their desire to know how to think about me in terms of a local schema of identity.  The most 
telling aspect of the event, however, is the teacher’s recognition that the local schema is value-
laden. 
 In this pedagogical context, Tom’s request that I be classified, allows us to notice that the 
values of the two-place schema (Saesneg and Cymraeg) are not neutral.  Mrs. P’s response to 
Tom’s question expressed an apparent need for diplomacy (“Manyrs, Tom!”).  As Bowie 
(1993:176-177) noted: “the terms ‘Welsh’ [and ‘Cymraeg’] and ‘English’ [and ‘Saesneg’] are 
used as ciphers for ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, and serve to distance incomers from locals and 
learners from first language [Cymraeg] speakers”.  When she rebuked Tom for his failure to 
demonstrate good manners, Mrs. P’s response starkly marked the charged value associated with 
speaking of someone as oriented (more) toward Cymraeg, and therefore an insider, or toward 
English, and therefore an outsider.6  To act in such a way that, simultaneously, welcomes 
someone and emphasizes the cultural exclusion (in some sense) of that person, is a violation of 
good manners (from Mrs. P’s perspective). 
 In general, the binomial nature of the alien/foreign and native category-set is applied 
contextually to either Cymraeg or English.  For obvious reasons, the value of native is evoked 
more often in relation to the indigenous language of Wales.  People in Abergwaith routinely 
apply the definite object, in English-language conversations, to the language-code of Cymraeg in 
order to avoid the confusion that can occur between Welsh ethnicity and “the” Welsh language.  
I have never heard English referred to as “the Welsh language”.  However, the privilege 
Cymraeg enjoys in being more “natural” within the geographic setting of Wales than English is 
                                                 
6  Later observations suggested that the teacher felt that Tom was an occasional concern in her management of class 
discipline.  Thus, when Tom asked a question that requested that I be classified, his role in doing so might have 
amplified the effect of his question.  Yet, it should also be noticed that Tom conscientiously code-switched to 
English (apart from the noun phrase, “Saesneg” [English-language]) in accordance with his guess that I was more 
accustomed to English than to Cymraeg. 
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limited to a privilege of simple, abstract taxonomic purpose.  The either/or tendency means that 
some choice has to be made and even the most “forward”-thinking of English persons are 
susceptible to historical precedent (even if not to Romantic compulsion), according to which 
Cymraeg is “the Welsh language”.  However, this is not much of an instrumental gain for the 
Welsh position (within a binomial scheme) in historical or current ethnic tensions. 
 This privilege, derived from mere expedience, is illustrated by the macro-contextual 
factors of linguistic usage.  If one combines multiple neighborhoods and villages together 
without making finer distinctions, then much of Wales is composed of areas in which English is 
the prevailing—and therefore, socially unmarked—language.  In such areas, English holds the 
position of being the tacitly native language (unless people are asked to reflect on the deeper 
history of the area), and Cymraeg is somewhat “alien”.  This macro-context amounts to 
reapplication of the original significance of the ethnic label, “Welsh” (as “foreign”). 
 This does not prevent, in many such areas, the idea of Cymraeg competence from 
carrying prestige: Many parents in English-prevalent areas desire that their children learn 
Cymraeg, despite the fact that the parents would likely be excluded from Cymraeg 
conversations.  Within so-called Welsh-language regions or areas of Wales (e.g., north-west 
Wales), Cymraeg is considered native, while English is “foreign”.  Thus, when Tom asked 
whether I was Cymraeg or Saesneg, Cymraeg was taken to be the “home team”.  To suggest that 
someone cannot be identified with Cymraeg is to classify them as an outsider.  This has the 
further significance that to be from the outside has a negative value and it is not good manners to 
cast a guest in negative terms. 
 I introduce the anecdote above at this point of the dissertation because it is symbolic and 
expressive of the sociocultural reality that I seek to explicate, and it occurred in a mundane way 
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very early in my contact with a new pedagogical context.  Its occurrence was so mundane that I 
almost failed to take notice of it.  Yet, the questions, “Is he Saesneg, Miss?” and “Cymraeg ydi 
o?” [Is he Cymraeg?] enact a broad vernacular politics of language.  In so doing, together, they 
stand—in a synecdochal relationship of representation—for the larger whole that this dissertation 
investigates.  This broad synecdoche speaks to a diffuse ideology, a “discursive formation” in 
Foucault’s (1984) terms, which is instantiated in the roles people play as they participate in the 
correlate field of social action.7  The most elegant formulation of the cultural synecdochal 
relationship of representation, which enacts a broad vernacular politics of language, appears in 
the form of what I call “the Welsh Logic of Heritage”.  However, “elegant” is not to say 
“simple”, as the following sections illustrates. 
 
Identity and the Welsh Logic of Heritage 
 This conflict is the mark of a particular logic of heritage that operates in Wales.  For those 
who ground Welsh national identity in a history and language prior to Anglo-Saxon settlement, the 
identity of Wales is based on a primordial version of the nation, as homogeneous, unified, and in 
conflict with early English settlers.  Importantly, the latter image of the nation is not compatible with 
present-day social, linguistic, and political arrangements.  Whether termed “liberal” or “neoliberal”, 
these arrangements require negotiated settlements and movement across frontiers between cultural 
spaces of difference that, nonetheless, have in common (as democratic political institutions) a 
presumption of a capacity to choose.  This capacity to choose is, in principle, constrained only by 
                                                 
7  I am indebted to Lugo’s (2008) insights, which expanded Terrence Turner’s understanding of synecdoche as a 
“fundamental, totalizing tropic relation” (Turner 1987:19).  Lugo (2008) demonstrated that synecdochal figures can 
function both rhetorically and also interdiscursively with ideological, ideational, and political import.  Thus, 
interdiscursive use of synecdoche encompasses different types of tropes (e.g., metaphor and metonymy) and 
multiple domains. 
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laws; in practice, other constraints might exist, but economics is the only sort of constraint that can 
operate as a valid rhetorical factor for all. 
 Given the location of Wales as a constituent part of the modern state of the United 
Kingdom, the geopolitical form of Welsh identity must explicitly address the conflict between 
the ethnic-conflict-laden past and negotiations in the present because its goals are located in a 
negotiated near-future where the historical conflict is more or less irrelevant.  Day-to-day, the 
imagination of a present-day Wales (tacitly) denies the image of a primordial past to some 
extent; conversely, the imagination of the primordial past denies (but more actively) some 
aspects of present-day Wales.  In the identity genre of ethnicity, the past of present-day Wales is 
not so much foreign or undomesticated (Lowenthal 1985, 1996), as it is an apparent self-
contradiction. 
 Language identity is the basis for much of the cultural action centered in language 
identity in Wales.  That kind of identity also entails the practical, and tacit or implicit resolution 
of paradoxes, the constant interplay of topical discourses and of agency—of discourses about 
language and Welshperson’s own presentations of self based tacitly on language choices.  Unlike 
political identity, however, the language-based form of identity need not deal with—can safely 
ignore (usually)—that paradox.  Because of the politicization of language in Wales, it is 
important to note a significant difference between the bounding of mutually excluding spaces by 
linguistic practice and that of the narrative bounding of mutually exclusive spaces tied to ethnic 
or racialist themes.  Despite the efficacy of language for imposing boundaries between 
exclusively conceived spaces, language operates in ways that are clearly different from ethnicity 
or race.  Identities based in the particular languages of Cymraeg or English are unequivocally 
embodied identities.  Nevertheless, unlike other kinds of identities, social actors can 
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pragmatically sever language identities’ associations with distinct ethnic identities (e.g., by 
changing the language code in use). 
 Given the logical independence of language-based identities and ethnic identities, Welsh 
history tellers can lose the thread of their own narrative when they find themselves caught in the 
middle of a struggle for national identity and the construction of national political institutions.  
Teachers who would want to foreground Welsh heritage in their lessons run up against this very 
conflict—as we began to see in the interview represented in the previous chapter (for more 
detailed discussion of this conflict, see Maas 2005).  In the process of reinforcing the broader 
ideology that language naturally excludes, by the activists’ maintenance of politicized language 
boundaries, language activists turn the idea of a national history into an insurmountable task.  It 
becomes insurmountable simply because it conflicts in obvious ways with the imaginary of the 
Wales of the present as a constituent part of a liberal democratic state. 
 One of the “choices” a large minority of Welsh people would like to make is to participate in 
a nation in which everyone knows and uses Cymraeg.  Since the genre of language identity in 
Wales (particularly by language activists) often “rides” on the more established genre of ethnic 
identity, the logic of heritage outlined above applies to language identities by extension.  The result is 
an instable relationship between: 1) Welsh ethnicity, which is primordial and most clearly visible in 
its antagonistic relationship with English ethnicity; 2) Welsh modernity—replete with its own liberal 
democratic political institutions, but united with England; and 3) the idea that languages like 
Cymraeg and English exclude one another. 
 Consequently, the production of a national present that is at odds with the narrative of a 
primordial past produces enormous and multiple challenges.  In primary schooling, teachers often 
motivate historical accounts by reference to current events, such as the opening of the Welsh 
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National Assembly (see Maas 2005).  The ideology of binomial language exclusion carried by 
language activists in Wales, then, seems to have two outcomes.  One outcome is that of 
interference between language promotion, on one hand, and efforts to teach non-language 
heritage, such as national history, on the other hand.  The other possible outcome is that of 
parallel streams, in which the Welsh past never joins with, or becomes increasingly distant from, 
the Welsh political modernity. 
 Considering the impression that I had of some parents and academics—that they believed 
many teachers in north-west Wales are nationalistic—there would be no reason to think that the 
teachers themselves would find inappropriate things like a narrative of resistance to English 
cultural and language hegemony.  Nevertheless, there is a set of principles operative at school, by 
which certain schemas in identity games are rendered invisible.  I take this to be the percolation 
of the politics of politics (as a concept in ordinary usage) into schools.  In the previous chapter, I 
discussed how an interview during my preliminary research could have already told me how the 
politics of politics function at school.  To see that requires decoding cultural references.  Once 
decoded, these cultural references, given the fact that they were encoded in the first place, reveal 
relations between the appropriate style of talking about potentially controversial topics and the 
lived practice of the existential and practical features that those potentially controversial topics 
are about. 
 
“THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION” 
 So much of even the explicit discourse about Welshness closes down quickly as it moves 
into implicit discourse about language, a phenomenon that might not be visible to those outside 
the Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  Hence, attempts to elicit the meanings of Welshness 
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result in doubly implicit references to some kind of language-based cultural identity.  That is, 
explicit references to culture mask an implicit reference to domains of identity in which Cymraeg 
is central, where even if one uncovers the implicit reference to language, the role and outcome of 
Cymraeg as central to identity remains implicit.  While one might find justification for claiming 
that such identity praxis conflates Cymraeg and Welshness, there is no justification for conflating 
the negative aspects of nationalism with a deep cultural affinity for the Cymraeg language-
cultural complex. 
 Beyond locale-based identities, the most salient aspect of such identity dynamics 
manifests in ordinary cultural situations in Wales in the shape of a discourse about nationalism—
a discourse that is largely concerned with the emblematic use of Cymraeg as the language of the 
Welsh nation.  While Cymraeg is generally implicit, the various significances of its use play an 
ever-present role in social and cultural identities.  One unfortunate outcome of that cultural 
understanding is that laypersons and scholars alike often make no distinction between 1) the 
claim that the Cymraeg language-cultural complex is an essential part of national identity and 2) 
the vague idea of nationalism.  The impulse to equate the two could also be understood as a 
conceptual linkage between the former claim and latter idea.  The semantic transfer from one to 
the other has “moved” from being locally conceived as a figurative one (in some mythological 
time of analytic purity) to being conceived as involving a single identity of essentialist claim and 
the idea of nationalism.  The impulse to subsume the claims of the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex under the rubric of Welsh nationalism does have one specific kernel of truth to it: Those 
who feel Cymraeg to be an intrinsic part of their personality and cultural identity often have 
Cymraeg implicitly in mind when Welshness is the explicit topic.  It is far from clear, however, 
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whether that kernel of truth is the result or the cause of the impulse to equate nationalism and the 
putative centrality of Cymraeg. 
 Although self-described nationalists animate expressions of nationalism, producing an 
embodied position fairly frequently, I should make clear that I am writing about nationalism as a 
cultural representation about others.  The cultural status of the message of which self-described 
nationalists are the principals is distinct and very different from those nationalistic messages that 
are ascribed to them (and others) by self-described non-nationalists.  Given the conventional 
discourses about nationalism in Wales, it might not be surprising that actually held attitudes 
about the Cymraeg language-cultural complex identity are more open to elaboration and 
engagement than public discourses about nationalism would lead one to expect. 
 The implied script of common social practices supposes that nationalists identify nation 
with a set of practices or a language code.  In turn, the disembodied subculture of nationalists is 
identified, in public discourse, with a narrow range of commitments about what practices or code 
should stand for the nation.  Ultimately, the violation of mores that such nationalism is supposed 
to commit, consists in the perceived narrowness of so-called nationalism.  Typically, in 
mainstream communicative practices, any apparent evidence for commitments in this narrow 
range is taken to imply a commitment to so-called nationalism. 
 The Manichean frame into which nationalism is made to figure in public discourse plays 
no small role in the discursive status of those forms of nationalism that popular discourse makes 
conventionally salient.  After all, if the good versus evil narrative of an imagined Welsh 
nationalism is something to be rejected, then the perspective from which one congratulates such 
rejection will in turn be the seat of the “enlightened” observer. 
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 Any influences permeating schools have the potential to be perceived by a parent, other 
teacher, or school inspector as inappropriate and out of place—a category that “nationalism in 
the classroom” occupies.  At the same time, Welsh people recognize expressions of national 
identity as a range of things.  Some expressions of national pride (e.g., regarding a military 
victory of the home nation) would be banal in world-states (if aligned with the dominant 
society), but are sometimes construed as excessively and problematically nationalistic in a Welsh 
context—particularly in schools.  On the surface, justification for the enlightened perspective 
comes from the liberalist prohibition against school teachers coercing a population’s consent to a 
given political state of affairs.  If one looks deeper, however, one can see a subtle struggle to 
determine what is political and what is not. 
 That any apparent evidence for certain commitments is taken to imply a commitment to 
“nationalism” is true of practices within, say, a coffeeshop in Upper Bangor in the north-west of 
Wales, as it is in international academic exchanges.  Consider one culturally enlightened review 
of my initial proposal for a National Science Foundation dissertation completion grant that I 
received in the summer of 2006 (quoted below).  While my methodology underwent a significant 
change, in part due to this reviewer’s comments, my original proposal described use of one 
analytic procedure that was at the center of the reviewer’s concern.  I originally proposed to 
“count” teachers’ references to Wales as a nation that they made in their lessons.  To count them, 
I intended to classify pedagogical acts as either Nation-Significant (NS) or Nation-Insignificant 
(NI) acts within larger sequences of acts, which would also be classified as NS or NI lesson 
events.  I could then compare these tabulations to teachers’ personal attitudes toward language 
and governance that I would elicit from them in separate structured interviews.  The NS acts and 
lesson events would be divided into those that seem to stem from curricular requirements and 
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those of a less official nature (such as those motivated by teachers’ interests).  I hypothesized 
that measures of “nationalism” would be higher in Cymraeg-prevalent pedagogical spaces. 
 In a text that exhibits many conventions of British typographical and lexical conventions, 
one NSF reviewer responded in a form that represented the publicly prominent, liberalist 
perspective.  At the same time, the reviewer’s comments reflect a professional appreciation for 
the vulnerability of the minority Cymraeg community: 
 
This proposal shows a serious lack of sensitivity to the current political situation 
in Wales, where the term ‘nationalism’ is politically very highly charged.  It is 
associated with party politics, with references to ‘narrow nationalism’ frequently 
being made by the Welsh Labour Party in attempts to discredit Plaid Cymru / The 
Party of Wales, who are currently the main opposition party in the National 
Assembly.  Under these circumstances, research that purports to show that 
‘nationalism’ among teachers is related to their performance in the classroom 
could be highly damaging to them personally and to their schools.  Furthermore, 
the attempt to show that this is more prevalent in Welsh-medium state schools 
could conceivably do a very great injustice to what has been a widely praised and 
successful movement to promote the survival of a minority language. 
 
I would concur with the reviewer’s general opinion about the volatility of ascriptions of 
nationalism, as would teachers who describe themselves as nationalists.  However, because s/he 
tacitly accepts (or does not challenge) the criticism of nationalism found in public discourse, this 
reviewer does not seem to be aware of something equally important: her/his stance requires that 
we take the unmarked form of “nationalism” to be a non-benign form of nationalism. 
 It might be less than wise for researchers to accept the unmarked significance, the 
malignancy, of nationalism without question.  Note that the NSF reviewer maintains a 
professional distance from the interests of the Cymraeg community, exhibiting an appropriate 
sensitivity to, but not positioning herself in sympathy with, that community’s vulnerability.  This 
stance implies that she endorses one sociocultural reality to the exclusion of others—the reality 
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in which nationalism is politically charged by definition.  Consequently, this stance of an expert 
professional (unintentionally) blocks the voices of those who take nationalism to be a positive 
form of expression. 
 This milieu makes research problematic for those who wish to address the issue of (less 
saliently political) substance, as well as the more salient instrumental claims about that 
substance.  Tacit acceptance of the conventional, liberal criticism of Welsh nationalism would 
prevent inquiry into the potentially diverse local meanings that are attributed to “nationalism” 
and the cultural implications of such an ideological constellation.  Further, the highly public 
discourse on nationalism in Wales generalizes the embodiment of personal commitments to a 
social imaginary that is associated with nationalism.  As a result, that discourse makes no 
distinction between a private sort of self and a quasi-public kind of self that is performed and 
made manifest at schooling settings.  Teachers in north-west Wales, in their practiced identities 
that are enacted in what are called state (or, in US terms, “public”) schools, are semi-
private/semi-public selves.  Particularly in primary schools, there is a large emphasis on the role 
of the teacher as an agent of nurturing.  While a great deal of teachers’ personalities come out in 
classrooms, it is an open question whether teachers, in their carefully constructed performances, 
feel it responsible or irresponsible to perform private selves.  Moreover, if private selves are 
performed, it is far from given which aspects of private selves and which kinds of commitments 
teachers would perform (not to mention whether any private aspects or commitments have a 
uniform interpretation). 
 The comments of the NSF reviewer did not assume that nationalist teachers’ expression 
of their own personal commitments in a classroom would express a malignant form of 
nationalism in the classroom.  However, that assumption—as purportedly dormant or active in 
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other people’s minds—does seem to ground her/his worry about conducting the proposed 
research in an imaginary “current political situation”.  What is missed here is that this kind of 
uptake of discourses about nationalism results in the silencing of teachers’ ideological 
commitments because they are “nationalistic”, and this response to nationalism discourages an 
interest in examining the substance and significance of those commitments.  Unfortunately, as I 
already noted, the reviewer is correct about the current political situation.  This does not mean 
that the proposed research should not have been done.  It means that the proposed research is 
already undercut by the controversial quality of politics in the classroom. 
 Nationalism is part of the cultural thematics of Wales, by which people organize their 
experience and prioritize what is to command their attention.  However, it is also a complex field 
of social action in which certain positions can, as the NSF reviewer simultaneously noted and 
demonstrated, create ruptures in the appearances of intersubjectivity.  People often believe they 
are jointly acting, or interacting civilly, but this mutual belief can be disrupted if it appears that 
what an interlocutor is doing can be framed as nationalistic, and if the beholder does not 
welcome “nationalistic” performances.  Either of these conditions can occur alone, but it is only 
for people who take nationalism to be unwelcome that a social assertion of nationalism has the 
effect of rupturing the appearance of joint action.  These conditions can present themselves 
equally as well to those who feel an affinity toward Wales, use Cymraeg in their daily life, and 
seem to bear all the other cultural markers of being a nationalist.  Reproduction of the impression 
that all so-called nationalisms are created evil has the effect of rupturing the appearance of 
intersubjectivity among Welsh patriots. 
 I suspect that it is the potential for the discourse about nationalism to disrupt appearances 
of intersubjectivity—to promote communication breakdown—that makes this topic so salient.  
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The discourse about nationalism is also a discourse about what is political and what is not, 
discussion of which can table indefinitely the description of ethic consciousness among 
participants in the Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  It is this range of subjectivity that 
makes ascriptions of nationalism to others into socially efficacious tools for positioning others, 
and therefore divisive, as well as problematic for those in the subordinate position. 
 This discourse and the field of identity of which it is a part are so prevalent that an 
anthropologist on my preliminary examination committee, who was from the US but had 
traveled by car in north Wales, told me: “You know, Steve, sometimes you write like a Welsh 
nationalist”.  It is possible there was some truth to that comment.  Likewise, some sections of this 
dissertation might be read (though incorrectly) as an apology for Welsh nationalism.  At the 
time, however, familiar with the use of the label in Wales as a tool for silencing others, I could 
think of no constructive response to that comment—but his statement has borne fruit.8 
 
                                                 
8  The head of the Department of History at a midwestern university, who researches British imperialism, asked me 
if I had said, “Thank you”, in response.  Yet, even this response would not repair the rupture in intersubjectivity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
◄ IDEOLOGY AND SURFACE POSITIONS► 
 
The supreme test of a book is that we should feel some unusual intelligence working behind the 
words. . . I have expressly written here not “intellect” but intelligence.  There is no intelligence 
without emotion. . . There may be emotion without intelligence, but that does not concern us. 
(Ezra Pound, in a review of T. S. Eliot’s Prufrock and Other Observations ([1917]1960:20, quoted 
in Williams 2002/3:23)) 
 
 
 This chapter continues the theme of Chapter Four by pursuing the “substance” and 
significance of commitments that are often labeled “nationalistic” in Wales.  It also continues the 
task of the previous chapter of evaluating the three ideal types of nationalism—political, cultural, 
and language—by taking up the latter two types.  It, further, examines the less ideal overlap 
between them and politically shaded ideologies of national identity. 
 
NON-“POLITICAL” VARIETIES AND FEATURES OF SO-CALLED NATIONALISM 
“Cultural Nationalism” and Ideologies of Personhood 
Non-Conformism:   Religion might be the most distinctive aspect of cultural nationalism simply 
because this part of the imagining of a traditional Welshness is not likely to be associated with 
language politics—despite the close tie between Non-Conformism and Cymraeg.  Traditional 
Welsh religious practices are marked by a resistance to what was the established (or State) 
religion in Wales until 1920: The Church of England.  This resistance, called “Non-
Conformism”, was not limited to Wales, but it is closely associated with the Welsh identity that 
is projected as the “traditional” one.  Non-Conformism was a reaction to the Church of 
England’s status as the official religion in Wales, which carried such implications as a Church 
Tax and the exclusion of other religions from various state opportunities and benefits.  The 
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dominant religious variety in Wales in the Nineteenth Century was more evangelistic than the 
mainstream Anglican Church and more related to Methodist, Calvinist, and Baptist 
Protestantism.  Similar to Cymraeg in Wales, the Non-Conformist tradition is in a minority in 
relation to the broader society of he United Kingdom while being dominant within some smaller 
local spheres. 
 The impetus for teaching in a Christian context, involving the Non-Conformist and the 
Anglican religious traditions, has played an historical role in schooling in Wales.  From the mid-
Seventeenth Century to the end of the Eighteenth Century, there were Puritan, Anglican, and 
Non-Conformist schools, involving circulating peripatetic Sunday schools.  Christian themes are 
still an implicit part of schooling, in terms of structure and content.  That is, biblical and 
Christian stories are common—especially during school assembly presentations—and are 
referred to at various parts of the year.  In recent decades, the symbolic appeal of religion as a 
feature of Welsh identity has lessened.  In north-west Wales, secular practices that are treated as 
“traditional” Welsh activities seem to occupy the symbolic position of representing cultural 
identity.  In fact, the constellation of practices and affect that is highlighted in use of the notion 
of cultural nationalism is usually indistinguishable from a love of one’s familiar environs, 
including “traditional” cultural practices that are strongly tied to the use of Cymraeg.  Most 
important among these is the eisteddfod tradition. 
 
The National Eisteddfod:  As mentioned in Chapter Three, an eisteddfod is a set of events 
centered in competitions of music, poetry, history essays, drama, among other forms.  The 
eisteddfod tradition is symbolized most prominently by the National Eisteddfod—or, more 
exactly, the Royal National Eisteddfod.   The National Eisteddfod falls squarely into this broader 
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tradition.  However, it is a different sort of thing that figures in mass media projections and that 
occurs as an event that is vaguely similar in some ways to a state fair.  This national festival has 
even inspired a similar Scottish event, called “the National Mòd” (Macdonald 1997:35). 
 The National Eisteddfod is an annual, national cultural festival centered in musical, 
literary, dance, and dramatic competitions in Cymraeg, and to the general exclusion of English 
language practices.  The origin of the National Eisteddfod is usually traced to an official festival 
of music and poetry competitions held by Rhys ap Gruffudd at his Aberteifi court in 1176.  The 
eisteddfod tradition was once centered on events in the Middle Ages where the performers were 
professional bards.  Welsh lords would award bards who gave the best performances within 
usually strict poetic requirements.  It was later “revived” in a more popular form when it was 
held, for the first time in the modern era, at Abergavenny in 1789 (Morgan 1983).1  The National 
Eisteddfod began in 1789—a tradition “invented” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983)—as a way to 
“revive” traditional Welsh culture related to the bardic traditions and to display that culture to the 
rest of Britain.  Consequently, it was not initially organized in a way that excluded English-
language events. 
 The National Eisteddfod is held in a different area of Wales in the first week of August, 
alternating between “north” and “south” Wales.  During the “week” of the festival—more 
exactly, it lasts nine days—a small, temporary city sits where there had been none a month 
before.  The center of that temporary settlement is composed of the main Maes [field] on which 
                                                 
1  This “Inventionist” narrative (in its instrumentalist mode) seems to imply, inaccurately, that there is a discrete 
event or period that marks the invention of tradition, as opposed to something more continuous (and therefore, more 
traditional).  The latter might involve false starts or minor events that are taken up in the eventual event or period 
that is deemed epochal of the modern invention stage.  Thus, the bardic establishment attempted to maintain a 
professional bardic tradition through the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, which gave rise to notable 
eisteddfodau that are intermediate to the “primordial” past and the modern “present”.  For example, eisteddfodau in 
1523 and 1567 are revivals of a different sort all their own, involving less invention, and involving less of a 
reception by a general public than the National Eisteddfod does.  While the 1789 National Eisteddfod event at 
Abergavenny might be seen as inventing a tradition that is frequently invoked by associating it with the Aberteifi 
eisteddfod in 1176, it is just as valid to represent it as the popularization of a bardic tradition that had discontinued. 
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the main events take place and venues are situated, including scores of booths for political 
parties, teachers’ unions, universities, book associations, book vendors, cultural societies, among 
others; and dozens of pavilions for competitions, performances, and exhibitions (e.g., art, 
science, and literature exhibits).  The Maes is surrounded by several camp sites, including a 
youth one, Maes B, which hosts various non-competitive entertainment events.  It is a socially 
and culturally vibrant event where people from all over Wales congregate.  This makes it an 
event to look forward to for most of the year—especially for those attendees who cannot manage 
to arrange to see each other at other times of the year. 
 In the contemporary era, the most distinctive feature of the National Eisteddfod might be 
that virtually all programmed events, and nearly all social interactions there take place in 
Cymraeg.  There is no prohibition in place for conversations, but it would be difficult not to 
recognize on some level that the Eisteddfod locale—the Maes, the camp sites, and the 
pavilions—is an island of social activities surrounded by a much larger and diffuse socially 
organized setting for English.  The Cymraeg ethos that prevails at the National Eisteddfod is 
present elsewhere and might even be the cause of Cymraeg-only norms in settings where 
Cymraeg use is promoted as a more-or-less self-consciously, more-or-less political practice—as 
a model for Welsh society.  The Cymraeg ethos associated with the National Eisteddfod is but 
one instance of the bleeding across of cultural and language types of nationalism. 
 
Eisteddfod Tradition:   The presence of the modern institution of the National Eisteddfod in the 
national imagination is indicative of the sprawling precision of the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex in Welsh society.  Where youths’ involvement in the National Eisteddfod is more of a 
leisurely vacation pursuit, the broader settings for eisteddfodau is a part of banal cultural life in 
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many parts of Wales, much like school activities.  Small-scale eisteddfodau are organized 
separately by villages, schools, a national youth organization, and the National Eisteddfod 
organization—where each of these is a different sort of milieu for events.  The image of 
eisteddfodau at schools, at the annual youth festival, and at the National Eisteddfod is so 
emblematic of the constellation of traditional Welsh cultural practices that the latter is often 
called simply “eisteddfod culture” in colloquial conversation. 
 In addition to village and national eisteddfod events, the eisteddfodau tradition includes a 
specific series of events organized around the performances of children and is arranged by a 
national organization (Yr Urdd Gobaith Cymru) with the participation of schools.  Thus, the 
eisteddfodau tradition, today, is strongly tied to the performances of children.  In particular, 
eisteddfodau are only emblematic for those with children or who have themselves participated in 
this part of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex. A series of competitions take place moving 
those judged best into another level of competition—from the school level, to the area [cylch] 
level, to the region/county [rhanbarth/sir] level.  The competitive process culminates in 
competitions at the national [cenedlaethol] level at an annual festival for children that mirrors the 
National Eisteddfod.  This tradition also emigrated as part of the Welsh diaspora: One can find 
medals, which were used as awards for eisteddfodau performances by school children, on display 
in museums in Welsh-American communities in the US, such as the Lillian E. Jones Museum, in 
Jackson Ohio.2 
                                                 
2  In school districts like those in Jackson City schools in Jackson County, Ohio, these medals were awards for the 
best performance in literary and musical contests.  While the performances in the original eisteddfodau in Welsh-
American communities sometimes took Cymraeg to be the language of performance, this was generally not 
sustainable in an assimilationist immigration context.  Eisteddfodau were being held in Jackson City schools as late 
as 1983. The program for that eisteddfod can be found at: 
http://ohio.llgc.org.uk/syllwr/arddangos_mets.php?xmlfile=DGR00025&lang=en&div=0, accessed January 20, 
2011. 
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 Today, the concept of the eisteddfod is often used as a trope, by which one can move 
seamlessly in a conversation from one type of eisteddfodau to another in order to capture 
something culturally generic about all of these events.  In terms of networks that people form, 
there is a lot of truth to Trosset’s (1993:37) observation that “the same people did everything”—
applicable to those who are active in eisteddfodau of various kinds (e.g., mothers who organize 
or participate in a community eisteddfod will actively support their children who win youth 
competitions held at the area and county levels).  In this way, different kinds of eisteddfodau can 
be thought of as part of one large cultural or language complex.  Moreover, as a super-trope, “the 
eisteddfod” is a figure that is deployed when people comment on cultural practices (from 
“inside” or “outside” the Cymraeg language complex), or when they enact symbols of specific 
Welsh values (typically, from “inside” the Cymraeg complex).  Ethnographically, these are very 
different functions, but the super-trope links them together in communicative practice, making it 
difficult in any particular context to distinguish which function is operative, while lending 
cohesion to the different functions under a general super-trope. 
 As much as it is emblematically rooted in an indigenous bardic tradition (mentioned 
above), the eisteddfod tradition also emerges from (and to some extent, is the invention of 
continuity of) life in Wales on the threshold of the Late Modern age.  Both the bardic tradition, 
and an idealized image of national folk are central to conceptions of a distinctive Welsh nation.  
In other words, the so-called eisteddfod culture, in the social imaginary, is bound to certain ideas 
about the national folk of Wales that acquire content in the values expressed by the eisteddfod 
tradition.  To describe how the cultural community of so-called eisteddfod culture interacts with 
the eisteddfod tradition, I first must show why the tradition itself figures in the imagination of 
Welsh society. 
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Segmented Society:  Welsh laypersons and scholars alike imagine traditional Welsh society as a 
two-class system, made of the bonedd, or gentry, and the gwerin, or common people (see Jones 
1992; cf. Williams 1985).  In contrast, post-feudal English society was marked by the division of 
labor and a corresponding stratification of society into farmers, working-class, merchants, 
industrial capitalists, nobles, and royalty.  The two-class schema of Welsh society is a point of 
distinction often used to indicate the distinctiveness of Wales relative to England in ordinary 
conversations—through indirect allusion by direct reference to the gwerin of Wales or through 
direct mention by those aware of the image in scholarly accounts of Wales’ social history.3  
Moreover, the gentry of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tended to take English culture to 
represent high civilization and were often portrayed by the Welsh “folk” as betraying the gwerin, 
particularly in labor disputes. 
 While the simple division of Welsh society into gentry and gwerin is easily overstated, 
this cultural representation also has currency in academic and lay discussions of Welsh identity.  
Therefore, it would be valuable to state briefly here “what everybody knows” in the Welsh 
academy about social strata and the eisteddfod tradition.  I took this to be “common” 
knowledge—and, therefore, was one of my unexamined ideology about Wales—while 
conducting preliminary fieldwork.  I encountered this idea of this simple class division before I 
entered anthropology—while in junior high school—in books on Welsh history at the library 
collections of the University of California campus in Riverside.  Academics in Wales are 
                                                 
3  In what amounts to an intervention in identity politics by means of “legitimate” scholarship, Gwyn A. Williams 
(1985) remarked on the possibility of inserting another class-category coordinate to the gwerin.  This category is the 
industrial working class in Wales, particularly in the south’s coal mining fields and iron/steel mills.  This division of 
the “low” (into industrial working class and gwerin) provides a perspective relevant to the historical development of 
political discourse and party politics in Wales, which came to influence the positions of cultural and language 
identity that academics, like the Marxian scholar Williams, and other professionals adopt in the current present. 
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familiar with the outlines of the narrative at the very least, and it percolates into common 
knowledge in Wales as a picture of traditional Welsh society. 
 Before and during the early part of the Tudor period (1485-1603), members of the 
professionalized bardic tradition, which focused on poetry and music production and circulation, 
depended on the gentry’s patronage.  Prior to and during the Tudor period, the gentry were 
“conscious of their obligations to a community structure and to the organic unity of a broader 
political entity which depended largely on dedicated leadership and protection” (Jones 1992:xx).  
After the reign of Henry VIII, the rise of nouveaux riches and economic conditions made it 
difficult for the gentry both to support local communities and to maintain their influence on 
nobility and royalty.  Consequently, there was a change in the practice of conscientious 
patronage of local Welsh communities.4 
 In the Seventeenth Century and the Eighteenth Century, the gentry of Wales began to 
look to England as an example of cultured civilization and sought ways to display their sense of 
distinction from the common people.5  These ways included distancing themselves from the 
Cymraeg-speaking, Calvinist folk of Wales by expanding their use of English and choosing the 
                                                 
4  According to Jones (1992: xxxvi): 
 
The growth and consolidation of the Tudor social and administrative settlement had forced upon 
the gentry new pressures and strains in addition to granting them and their successors the benefits 
of equal citizenship.  The tensions of financial inflation and continual demands in local and 
regional government, together with the pressing need to keep up appearances and create 
favourable impressions in places of power and influence had a serious impact upon those 
professional declaimers who sought to benefit by enjoying more lavish and sustained patronage. 
 
5  According to Jones (1992:xxxiii): 
 
One essential element in social development in the sixteenth century was the attraction of urban 
centres in England, especially London, for the younger sons of the gentry. Since they were 
deprived of a full property inheritance many of them either married local heiresses and set up 
cadet families or drifted over the border to England and sought their fortunes elsewhere as 
professional soldiers or in trade, commerce, the church or the law. The degree of absenteeism, 
even among heirs to established estates, also increased in the course of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, thus gradually depriving the Welsh countryside of cultural leadership 
[because the gentry failed to act as patrons of “the national cultural entity in Wales”]. 
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Church of England, as well as by building faux castles or “palaces” [plas tai] that survived to 
become part of the Twenty-First Century landscape.  The gentry of the Eighteenth Century and 
the Nineteenth Century tended to perceive English culture as emblematic of high civilization.  
The gentry and those they who shared their interests in English religious and political traditions, 
such as owners and head managers of quarries and mines, are often portrayed in the Welsh 
retrospective gaze as antagonists to the gwerin protagonist.  In this way, processes of identity 
construction along the English–Welsh cultural divide informed, as well as organized this stark 
division by economic class.  Thus, this “class” division became an ethnic one insofar as the 
gentry lacked authenticity as Welsh persons, from the populist perspective. 
 The gentry’s antithetical interests were particularly salient during labor disputes.  As a 
comment on the legacy of such social imaginaries, docents at Penrhyn Castle—a faux castle near 
Bethesda in north-west Wales that hosts public tours—tell visiting school children of tensions 
between quarry workers and those who worked in this manor palace (see Chapter Three, lines 
391-451).  The key story is that of conflict between slate-quarry workers who maintained the 
strike and those who returned to work six months into a strike that would last three years (see 
also Jones 1981:210–266).  Teachers in the area told me that these tensions live on today in the 
interactions between descendants—as “a bitterness between the landlord and the people of 
Bethesda”.  Apparently, families who live around the Penrhyn and Dinorwig slate quarries in 
north-west Wales pass on stories, from generation to generation, about the betrayal by those who 
sided with the gentry in the Nineteenth Century, against the Welsh gwerin.  As industrialism 
began to play a role in the shaping of national identity, the gentry faded from visibility (apart 
from the faux castles) and a middle class among the gwerin began to emerge. 
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 The non-gentry segment of Welsh society was likely never as monolithic as the stock 
image of the gwerin presents.  Nevertheless, this image has helped to sustain the connection of 
traditional Welsh culture to the eisteddfod tradition, which is important to expression of the 
meaning of the Cymraeg community.  As the anglicization of the gentry progressed, various 
quasi-scholars identified aspects of bardic and traditional Welsh culture that they believed to be 
an important part of folk life.  The eisteddfodau were one of these aspects. 
 
The “Dominant” Ideology of Welsh Personhood:   Trosset (1993), in her performative-based 
ethnography of national and local identity in Cymraeg-speaking Wales, wrote about a “dominant 
ideology of Welsh identity” that seems to be equivalent to the so-called “eisteddfod culture”.  
Indeed, another anthropologist faulted Trosset for “deal[ing] with only one segment of Welsh 
society, whose cultural expression and sense of Welshness are particularly closely linked with 
eisteddfodau” (Davies 1998:149).  Yet, as Trosset (1993) showed, people in north-west Wales 
buy into local ideology in complex ways, including those who do not think that any particular 
language should stand for “the” nation. 
 Certainly, it is plausible to treat participation in those features of cultural life in north-
west Wales that are combined in references to so-called eisteddfod culture as subscribing to the 
ideology of Welsh personhood that Trosset detailed.  Even so, Trosset clearly stated that it 
“could not be representative of even Cymraeg speakers in northwest Wales” (1993:37).  Yet, the 
normative aspects of these “traditional” features of cultural life in Wales carry such weight in 
evaluations of “authentic” Welsh identity that even if one does not participate, one must engage 
with the ideas encoded in the ideology.  It is “dominant”, then, in that “it is sufficiently 
widespread that it affects everyone’s thinking about society and their individual places in it” 
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(1993:17).  Therefore, according to Trosset, this ideological complex of a putatively distinctly-
Welsh kind of personhood is not dominant in the sense of being endorsed by most people.  
Rather, in Trosset’s view (and I agree), this ideological complex manifests dialogically in the 
form of salient and culturally recognized features in public and private discourses about Welsh 
identity.  At the same time, even among those who endorse its ideologies, its components 
manifest in activities that do not figure in the general popular imagination as “cultural traditions” 
of the Cymraeg language complex. 
 Trosset’s (1993) presentation of the ethnolinguistic ideological constellation of northern 
Wales encompassed several component ideologies.  Even if, according to Trosset (1993), 
Welshness could not be analyzed into its essence, Trosset was able to break down the ideological 
discourse about Welshness into several related components.  Performing emotional states, in 
political arenas as well as in contexts devoted to expressive culture, is considered vital among 
Welsh persons (1993:167-171) and I take this to be her best illustration of her concept of 
performance.  It forms part of a Goffman-esque strategy in Trosset’s monograph and does not 
speak so much to a distinctive Welshness as to the ideological discourse that is her topic.  In fact, 
it is the performing of socially appropriate expressions of one’s feelings and private life, rather 
than the unconstrained and unstructured show of emotions or the performance of music and 
poetry, that is more central to Trosset’s (1993) main argument.  Trosset considered performing of 
emotional states, in political arenas as well as in contexts devoted to expressive culture 
(1993:167-171), vital to the discourse of Welshness.  (From the egalitarian attitude and sense of 
self-sacrifice, one can see the resemblance between the “eisteddfod culture” and the Protestant 
Ethic idealized by Max Weber.) 
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 Most of Trosset’s descriptions relate to practiced (i.e., performed) components of that 
ideological discourse.  In a later study (Trosset and Caulkins 2001, 2002), the more complex 
discussion in Trosset 1993 was summarized in terms of five concepts of person and society that 
Trosset (1993; also Trosset and Caulkins 2001) argued were components of the locally dominant, 
hegemonic ideology.  These five analytic categories are Egalitarianism, Martyrdom, 
Performance, Emotionalism, and Nostalgia/Hiraeth (The last category was added because 
hiraeth is commonly cited (e.g. in National Geographic treatments of Wales) as an 
untranslatable concept significant to Welsh persons.). 
 Trosset conceived of the idea of egalitarianism as a marker of the distinctiveness of 
Welsh society (1993:164).  The importance of the latter might seem to be a less likely point of 
distinction in an inward-looking ideological discourse (compared to the egalitarianism of 
perspectives from outside Wales).  It is productive of a sense of distinctiveness partly because 
England is perceived as very stratified and class-conscious.  Thus, the ideology of egalitarianism 
involves a sensibility of “strong disapproval of those seeking status” (Trosset 1993:164).  The 
ideology of egalitarianism is attached to a seemingly contrary “respect for high status, education, 
official credentials, and prestigious jobs” (1993:164).  Yet, this respect for high status did not 
mean an idolization of the gentry.  Rather, it was influenced by the cultural values of traditional 
Welsh society as a Protestant society marked by great respect for expressive culture: music, 
debate of historical questions and Biblical scripture, and the production and critique of poetry.  
Thus, the high esteem for religious and educational positions reconciles the apparent tension 
between egalitarianism and respect for persons of high status (broadly viewed) who were in a 
position to put prestige on display.  One can be “called” to a position of service (religious or 
civic leadership, teaching, and increasingly translating), where certain positions are prestigious 
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because of their symbolic place in a society imagined to be egalitarian, without seeming to seek 
status. 
 The hegemonic ideology also includes a tendency toward self sacrifice and martyrdom 
(1993:125-127) in which Welshness is seen as a burden (1993:127-128), and individuals and 
even groups are perceived as powerless in the face of systemic conditions (1993:121-125). 
Another component of this locally dominant ideology of Welsh identity is an interest in 
contributing to the current existence of certain “community” practices which are seen as 
essentially Welsh (e.g., eisteddfodau) (Trosset 1993:53). 
 A final feature of this ideological discourse is a distaste for contamination of groups 
identified as attaining a “purity” (Trosset’s term) of Welsh membership (1993:59-61).  Trosset 
offered as an example of the duality of purity–contamination, the idea that the political party, 
Plaid Cymru [Party of Wales], is purely Welsh because, unlike the other parties (e.g., the Labour 
Party), it only operates in Wales and not in England.  This seemingly simple component is tied to 
other component ideologies, such as there being relative degrees of being Welsh and associated 
sources of prestige, sectarian organization of affiliation and the imaginary absence of hierarchy, 
the cultural center and inauthentic sources of status, and egalitarian personal bonds. 
 
The “Things” of Value in Welsh Cultural Identity 
 Some writers have denoted the features of the imagined eisteddfod cultural community, 
apart from the cohesive language bond created through use of Cymraeg, by the phrase: “y 
pethe”—literally, “the things”.  US-trained anthropologist Charlotte Aull Davies (1998:149-150) 
described these “things” in the following way: 
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     These ‘things’ are the types of performance and activity that traditionally are 
central to eisteddfodau—singing, both individual and choral, and especially cerdd 
dant [a musical form characterized by counterpoint]; recitation, again both 
individual and group; harp playing; and less prestigious, but still highly valued, 
various sorts of group dramatic activity, most typical being the can actol in which 
a short presentation involving both singing and acting depicts some set theme. 
There is often a high degree of family continuity among those whose lives are 
wrapped up in y pethe, with parents who have themselves competed successfully 
coaching their children.  Indeed the ‘eisteddfod mam’ who sits in the front row 
mouthing words and making facial expressions as her offspring perform on stage 
is one of the comic stereotypes of this collectivity. 
 
 One origin of the objectifying label that Davies used—“y pethe” [the things]—might be 
found in the title of an autobiography published in 1955 and written by Robert Lloyd (Lloyd 
n.d.).  Lloyd lived most of his life near Y Bala, which is a village in a part of north Wales that is 
a quasi-sacred area of cultural history.6  I originally thought the label, “y pethe”, would be more 
common in the south than in north-west Wales.  The use of the -e inflected, plural form is linked 
to south and west Wales, rather than to the primary dialect of the northern part of Wales, which  
uses the -au form for plurals. 
 I was unaware of Lloyd’s use of the phrase (and, thus, the connection to geographic north 
Wales) at the middle stages of my principal dissertation fieldwork stay in Wales.  Taking it to be 
a culturally significant concept, I asked student teachers from Gwynedd about it.  Few of those I 
asked about the term in north-west Wales recognized it, but once I cued them with some hints 
about so-called eisteddfod culture, they recognized it immediately, but could not identify the 
source of the phrase.  These student teachers, virtually all within the age-range of 20-28 years old 
and with family rooted in the Cymraeg language complex, believed the term, “y pethe”, to be a 
linguistic construction belonging to south or west Wales—as did I.  Because it employs the 
                                                 
6  While more properly considered part of the north of Wales, Y Bala lies along the boundary of the south and north 
Walian dialect regions (see Thomas 1973).  The boundary of these dialect regions could be a result of movements of 
people from different parts of Wales that were motivated by the cultural importance of the area. 
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inflected plural form, “-e”, my participants characterized the phrase as exotic to north Wales.  
This demonstrated, more than anything else, the student teachers’ lack of familiarity with the 
concept and term.7 
 Since the “things” of Welsh cultural (and language) identity are not universally 
recognized in Wales, it is worth noting that not everyone finds them relevant.  In a careful 
analysis of some of the activities that took place at the 1995 National Eisteddfod in Colwyn Bay, 
Davies (1998) took exception to Trosset’s (1993) depiction of Welsh identity—the ethnographer 
whose work I have privileged in the account above.  Davies thought this other anthropologist, 
Trosset had taken the constellation of “traditional” cultural practices referred to as “y pethe” to 
be, or to represent, the dominant segment of culture.  One might say that Davies believed Trosset 
(1993) to be turning “the things” of a specific variety of Welshness into “The Thing” of 
Welshness at large.  She (Davies 1998:150) criticized Trosset as follows: 
 
Her discussion of Welshness, in fact, appears to deal with only one segment of 
Welsh society, whose cultural expression and sense of Welshness are particularly 
closely linked with eisteddfodau; but there is less support for her view that this 
segment is hegemonic in defining Welshness in terms of their relationship to the 
Welsh language, eisteddfodau, cultural and (usually) political nationalism. 
     This particular segment of Welsh society is recognized among Welsh speakers 
as those who are active in and have a love for ‘y pethe’ (the things). 
 
 As noted above, when I asked student teachers with family connections rooted in the 
Cymraeg language-cultural complex about the term in north-west Wales, few recognized it.  
However, once cued appropriately, they demonstrated a general grasp of the concept.  In north-
                                                 
7  One problem of linguistic/cultural etymology is that the term, if of north Walian provenance, might be an 
intentionally unusual usage since the -au plural form is characteristic of formal Cymraeg (as well as the primary 
north Wales dialectal variety) and the author was emphasizing aspects of traditional, folk culture; evoked by the –e 
plural form, where this particular form-type (of the plural form)—as traditional, rather than formal—was selected 
from varieties of Cymraeg associated with south or west Wales.  The murkiness is increased when one considers that 
“formal” Cymraeg was constructed through the history of precisely those literary activities that form the core of y 
pethe of folk society.  Hence, the origin story must be left a mystery of the convolutions involved in the invention of 
tradition. 
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west Wales, where Trosset conducted the major part of her research, there would seem to be no 
special need to mark out such things as are denoted by “y pethe” because they are very common 
and subtly entwined in other everyday performances, such as seeing that children do their 
homework and get to after-school activities and back home again.  Practical experience in north-
west Wales suggests no reason to objectify y pethe as a matter of course.  Where y pethe is a 
marked category of Welshness, there would be a salient divide between the same activities 
organized at schools between parents “who are active in and have a love for y pethe” and parents 
who do not have such a love, but still have children who wish to participate. 
 As with any cultural practice, my point about the ordinariness of y pethe in north-west 
Wales can be overdrawn.  This category, after all, can take on a markedness that brings it in stark 
contrast with other “ordinary” practices in many different ways.  Even by hinting that choral 
singing is different from going to the butcher, without saying why, one can immediately bring 
into salience the traditional aspects of an objectified landscape of traditions and practices (e.g., 
many US-Americans often immediately mention Welsh male-voice choirs when I say that I 
study Wales).  From an outsider perspective, it might seem hardly the case that going to the 
butcher could be considered distinctly Welsh, especially if compared to the number of recordings 
of Welsh male-voice choirs.  Yet, it is precisely this compulsion toward distinctive Welshness 
that creates the landscape of surface positions with which this part of the dissertation is 
concerned.  Both going to the butcher and choral singing are equally “traditional” activities for 
Welsh villagers, but the evoking of a particular kind of cultural activity (i.e., expressive culture) 
brings the aesthete quality into sharper contrast, which might suggest something out of the 
ordinary—and, therefore, suggests the things that fit into the category of so-called eisteddfod 
culture. 
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 The claim that participation in so-called eisteddfod culture or y pethe is a kind of 
nationalism seemed to surface only when there was a sense of compulsion to participate, a sort of 
peer pressure said to be imposed, generally, by those with connections to people who have 
familial continuity in these traditions.  One professor in Welsh Studies at the University of Wales 
carefully formulated his own opinion as the following: “I don’t like the fantasy that it [the 
eisteddfod culture] is part of an inclusive popular culture, when it isn’t really and it isn’t 
something practiced across the whole of Wales.  It is something which is taught in schools  
and. . . it is very, very, very competitive and people are schooled to be competitive.”  The point 
he was making seems to be that Welsh culture as conceived in the paradigm of eisteddfod culture 
excludes some people—in fact, a majority—and this is inappropriate, in his view, for a 
“national” culture.  If that is a fair portrayal of so-called eisteddfod culture, it is remarkable since 
competitiveness would seem to be at odds with the egalitarian aspect of the ideology of Welsh 
personhood Trosset (1993) represented—as she noted herself in her conclusion (1993:164).  One 
explanation requires that one notice the competitiveness is restricted to the eisteddfod tradition—
even if this is a highly significant and prevalent component of the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex. 
 Welsh society and culture are, in general, relatively non-competitive and many people’s 
presentation of self is marked by self-deprecation.  Nonetheless, the codes of behavior that 
generate performance in eisteddfodau settings are governed by prescriptions about performance; 
and this is not surprising given that so-called eisteddfod culture emerged, in this idealization of 
Welsh society, from bardic traditions known for competitions using strict meters.  Further, an 
essential feature of eisteddfodau is that performances are adjudicated, often by a panel of several 
judges.  Trosset (1993:164-165) reconciled the competitiveness and egalitarianism by referring 
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to the fact that major competitions involve pseudonyms (so nobody knows who are among the 
unsuccessful) and to the general sentiment (or rationalizations) that those who do not win are 
victims of arbitrariness in adjudications.  Her observations of the sectarian nature of Welsh 
society also speak to the coincidence of competition and in-group egalitarianism.  Nevertheless, 
something of larger significance is at play here. 
 The eisteddfod stereotype, as emblematic of Welsh culture, holds a central truth beyond 
the spectacle of the National Eisteddfod that motivates its role as emblem.  The codes of 
behavior for eisteddfodau settings, governed by prescriptions about performance, include non-
linguistic codes.  However, language (i.e., Cymraeg) is one of the more salient code categories 
that is regulated in eisteddfod contexts according to particular standards.  The professor in Welsh 
Studies quoted above used the following phrases to characterize the qualities of Cymraeg 
performance of those with whom he felt uncomfortable speaking in Cymraeg: “very good”, 
“very formal”, “very correct”, and “very eloquent”.  This view is a common one among those 
learning Cymraeg and have an awareness of the literary and bardic heritage in Wales, amplifying 
ordinary anxiety associated with learning any language as an adult. 
 Hence, there is an evaluative aspect of Welsh culture that plays a part in regulating good 
language.  For example, schools frequently post on classroom walls examples of bratiaith, 
literally “traitorous language”.  In the didactic mode, “bratiaith” is more conventionally 
translated as “slang” or “sloppy language”, but it also used in a sociopolitical mode that signifies 
the decline of Cymraeg in many parts of Wales and in ways that appear at the phenomenological 
if not at the systematic (i.e., census) level.  Bratiaith is the contrast-class for one of the ordinary 
(if evaluation-laden) things that make up proper Welsh society from the perspectives of members 
of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex. 
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 In any metalinguistic use of “y pethe”, one can recognize a category or type whose 
markedness Davies herself illustrated by using “y pethe” to link Trosset’s analysis to cultural 
commentary in which prototypical cultural features (i.e., y pethe) are objectified.  Moreover, that 
meta-analytical move served Davies’ purposes by objectifying Trosset’s perspective and, in 
doing so, played down aspects of the sociocultural realities of north-west Wales.  My 
understanding is that, beyond Davies’ (1998) article quoted above, which explored cultural 
issues at the 1995 National Eisteddfod in Colwyn Bay, her ethnographic research has not been 
extensive in the north of Wales.  Yet, even if it had been, such experience might not yield a clear 
picture of the shifting and dynamic discursive platforms from which one might position oneself 
as a Welsh person, which explains Davies’ frustration with the idea of such positions.  The 
positions Welsh persons take in discourse are likely to appear to be less discrete if a researcher 
fails to capture the layering of such discursive platforms.  One of these platforms is that of 
everyday life routines such as afterschool activities. 
 There are families in any part of Wales that do not participate in eisteddfodau activities, 
as well as those that do, but there are also those people who defy the first-order generalizations 
that are based on whether (or not) they participate in such activities.  For example, the only 
person of a traditional minority I interviewed (at a “Chinese restaurant”), told me of her 
involvement in eisteddfodau activities at a Catholic school in Bangor.  This might not seem 
surprising to a non-Welsh audience, but it is commonly assumed (but presumably not by the 
teachers who actually teach there) that the Catholic school in Bangor cannot be as “Welsh” as 
other schools.  This is the case even if a person knows that the school participates in 
eisteddfodau, though most people without intimate knowledge of the school would assume that it 
does not.  Several people mentioned to me that the Catholic school is a place at which pupils 
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would have a difficult time being immersed in the cultural and language practices of the 
Cymraeg language complex.  This is due to the legacy of the religious dimension of identity in 
the context of narratives about the history of Wales: Welsh Non-Conformism, in the content of 
the various Protestant religious traditions that Non-conformism comprises, was as opposed to 
Catholicism as it was to Anglicanism. 
 
“Language Nationalism” 
The Cymraeg Structure of Feeling:   Nationalism in north-west Wales is most often identified by 
reference to language practices or attitudes.  Therefore, the most common sort of so-called 
nationalism is language nationalism.  The activist organizations mentioned in the previous 
chapter as nationalist organizations are both central examples of language nationalism.  
Cymdeithas, which was founded in 1962, was involved in the movement to make Cymraeg an 
official language of Wales, which occurred in 1993.  Cymuned is a more recent group, founded 
around 2001 when several politically-active people decided that Plaid Cymru representatives at 
the county level were not doing enough to protect the language against English language 
imperialism.  This allegedly affected community integrity in those villages with smaller numbers 
of people; at greater risk because every English-speaking individual has a greater proportional 
effect.  Both of these groups were involved in a movement in 2007 and 2008 to keep county 
governments from closing or consolidating small village schools in north-west Wales.  Where 
small village schools in Gwynedd county are permanently closed and their students are blended 
into larger schools (with a larger proportion of English-speaking “incidence”), it is widely 
believed that the prevalence of Cymraeg use that was normal prior to such closings could not be 
maintained. 
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 For many in Gwynedd, Cymraeg is part of a “structure of feeling” (Williams 1961:41-
71).  With the term, “structures of feeling,” Raymond Williams meant to point to the set of 
normative impulses that move people to appreciate the same affective and aesthetic sorts of 
things about life in their community and to respond in generally similar ways.  For language 
activists and self-described nationalists, there is a structure of feeling about the sense of loss of 
language identity that they feel is occurring in Gwynedd.  Thus, people who fall into these 
categories, especially those with multi-generational family histories in north-west Wales, think 
English monolingual retirees and vacationers who buy property there are doing injury to Wales.  
In their view, these English people are laying siege to Wales’ distinctiveness, by driving housing 
prices upward and by remaining monolingual English-speakers. 
 In north-west Wales, schools push for youths to maintain their reliance on Welsh as their 
primary language.  However, the disparity in local wages and housing costs impacts Welsh 
language viability: Because local housing is scarce, young adults must leave to the urban and 
populous south or east, where English is more likely to be prevalent at the village and county 
level.  Very few can afford to return to raise families where they were themselves raised.  When 
individuals naturalize Cymraeg as “their own language”, as Wales is their own nation, they 
provide a sense of confidence from which perspectives on changes in Welsh communities can be 
comfortably voiced and articulated in ordinary human-scale terms.  The sense of continuity that 
members of the Cymraeg language community achieve in doing so might be a psychological 
remedy to the cognitive dissonance of demographic change. 
 Due to the specter of a non-benign nationalism, I distinguish the Cymraeg language 
community (anyone who can, but might choose not to participate in Cymraeg-language events) 
from the Cymraeg language complex.  People participate in the latter in a more or less active 
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way to construct a sense of community that privileges Cymraeg and the cultural resources that 
are part of that complex.  The confusion of the language community and language complex is 
common in popular discourse because the activities associated with cultural nationalism 
privilege the use of Cymraeg, which is the defining characteristic of a language community.  
Because a concern for the welfare of Cymraeg is so common among those who use Cymraeg 
regularly, the “nationalist” concern with language bleeds over into “nationalist” concerns 
represented by cultural practices that are associated with a distinctly Welsh sort of identity. 
 This “bleeding-over” tends to happen when these cultural practices begin to seem like the 
locally prevalent and normal kind of practices.  Such putative dominance would go unnoticed if 
it were not marked by the presence of something people are so easily made conscious of, such as 
a specific language code as opposed to another.  Another way of saying the same thing is that 
language nationalism, as a cultural concept, increases in salience on those occasions when one 
objects to a more or less subtle expectation to participate in Cymraeg-centered activities (e.g., 
any of the “traditional” Welsh cultural activities).  Expressions of an expectation to participate in 
Cymraeg-centered activities include potentially unwelcome “encouragement” to teach in 
Cymraeg and requests that the private sector (e.g., grocery stores) make primary use of Cymraeg 
in communicative media (e.g., signage in the parking lot).  This last point about objections to a 
felt expectation to participate is useful to recognize, and it can be generalized as a principle about 
the different scales involved in identity, sometimes simultaneously, which I illustrate with 
attitudes toward the National Eisteddfod. 
 
The National Eisteddfod “Test”:   Structures of feeling, whether anchored in the Cymraeg 
language complex or in the globalist English language complex, are not equivalent in scale to the 
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moments in which people gauge the language attitudes of others.  The latter moments take place 
at the level of interactional stance in conversations and other communicative events.  One 
infrequent example of stance regarding language identity is the inclination of a person to attend 
or avoid the National Eisteddfod, one of the symbols of Cymraeg-speaking Wales. 
 When I asked several people who know Cymraeg, but favor the more liberal contexts of 
global English whether they would attend the National Eisteddfod, my question was met with a 
laugh that marked a self-conscious distancing of themselves from the festival.  Sometimes a 
person was going, but for academic reasons related to research or academic obligations.  
Nevertheless, the laughing indicated somewhat more than critical distance; something like ironic 
distance.  If the person were not going to attend, the laugh generally took on the quality of 
scoffing, expressing the view that the person would not wish to be seen anywhere near the 
National Eisteddfod or that they thought it a waste of their time.  This is one means of resisting 
the felt sense of the imposition of Cymraeg as against individual choice.  The very same people 
can be caught off guard and feel uncomfortably pressured at times when in situations where a 
question about participation in Cymraeg practices is given the tenor of a more or less subtle 
expectation or moral responsibility to participate. 
 
SEGMENTARY SOCIETY AND CHANGE 
 One might see cultural division of the sort discussed in Welsh Studies as two divergent 
demands that define different visions of Welsh society in the context of the locally varying 
subordination and dominance of one or the other language code.  In social relations, they 
manifest as demands for interpersonal activities to be conducted in Cymraeg (or, in much of 
Wales outside north-west Wales, in English) and for the option to distance oneself from 
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Cymraeg (or English) activities.  In north-west Wales, in particular, whenever there is a sense 
that those who locate national identity in Cymraeg might currently hold the upper-hand, there is 
almost always a hint of revolution by those who expressly locate national identity beyond 
Cymraeg. 
 Put more simply, during my fieldwork, I witnessed a “clash of civilizations” within 
Cymraeg-speaking Wales—roughly twenty percent of Wales’ population.  This clash occurred 
and continues between those who support or tolerate Cymraeg-based language nationalism and 
those who have cosmopolitan leanings that are attuned to the issue of choice relatively 
unencumbered by Cymraeg-based institutions.  It is important to recognize that this is a cleavage 
within Cymraeg-competent members of Welsh society, even though it is historically tied to the 
language divide that, in centuries past, was located between English and Welsh ethnic groups.  
So, today, one of the component “civilizations” overlaps with the English monolingual segment. 
 Persons of each category possess different kinds of what Abercrombie (1998) called 
“interculture”, which is “produced through centuries’-long interactions along a cultural frontier 
that has been the site of a great deal of violence, exploitation, resistance, and accommodation” 
(1998:115).  Persons of each (or both) intercultural subjectivity have, at least, a different kind of 
relation to the dominant language in Wales (i.e., English); and possibly a different kind of 
relation to the dominant ethnic other in Wales (i.e., the English).  These different kinds of 
relation ground the sense of two kinds of imaginaries of Welsh society.  Persons I would 
“assign” to each of these categorial constructs inhabit a differently conceived kind of community 
(and could, in principle, inhabit both kinds of community, because they are neither totalizing nor 
mutually exclusive for all occasions). 
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 The opposition between those who see Cymraeg as the substance of community and 
those who privilege personal choice—between those who support or tolerate Cymraeg-based 
language nationalism and those who have cosmopolitan leanings—is homologous to academic 
debates between communitarianism and liberalism (e.g., Kymlicka 1988, Sandel 1982, and 
Walzer 1984), where the former is the claim that people are situated in social relations and local 
values and knowledge, and that these cultural encumbrances are constitutive of self in ways that 
contradict the individualist-liberal claim that each person has a free range of choice.8  This 
division between Cymraeg communitarianism and liberal cosmopolitanism reflects relatively 
recent transformations of Welsh society in the specific context of language politics.  Given that 
the descriptions above present a more or less synchronic picture, some remarks on the diachronic 
transformations, of which former divisions remain in collective memory, are warranted. 
 The classic image of a bifurcated Welsh society into the bonedd, or gentry (largely 
anglicized), and the gwerin, or common people no longer exists as a division of society.  As 
Welsh society became more stratified, the ideology about a simple division of status positions 
became more complex in terms of religious and other cultural domains.  One of these modern 
developments was the bifurcation of society into Non-Conformists and those who supported the 
                                                 
8  That debate, deadlocked and antiquated as it has become, does offer terms that are much more descriptively 
accurate than “nationalist” or “English-centric”.  The terms of the communitarianism debate evokes more precisely 
the sorts of issues that genuinely do appear on occasions and in mediated discourses.  I will hereafter refer to those 
who support or tolerate Cymraeg-based language nationalism as “communitarians” and to those who demand the 
option to distance themselves from Cymraeg activities as “liberal cosmopolitans”.  The latter are people who are 
competent in Cymraeg and who explicitly endorse a “liberalist” ideology about choice in language-use according to 
which there should be no cultural or state constraints on one’s choice to use one language code or the other, or both.  
It is theoretically possible for such people never to feel any compunction toward either language, nor to feel any 
tension about their choice to use one or the other.  Nonetheless, I did not meet nor hear of the existence of any of  
these theoretically possible people. 
     Those who can express themselves in Cymraeg can speak both of Wales’ two official languages.  However, I 
encountered no one who expressed equal affinity toward both official languages.  The singular example might be 
Wales national poet, Gwyneth Lewis, whom I have not met.  She makes it a professional challenge and obligation to 
master the poetic qualities of both languages, often in relation to each other. (See Lewis 1985 and Williams 2002/3).  
The relationship between person and nation is complicated, then, not only because languages, as national symbols, 
are generally polysemic (as are most symbols, national or otherwise), but also because language identity seems, on 
“the ground”, to be so very un-vague. 
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Church of England.  After the Church of England in Wales became disestablished in the early 
Twentieth Century, Non-Conformism carried less national significance.  Eventually, those whose 
national identity and personal values were wedded to the chapel life continued their chapel 
practices, while others became less interested. 
 An analogue to the current social reality captured in my two constructs of language 
communitarians and liberal cosmopolitans can be found in a collection of four projects at four 
sites throughout Wales.9  One of the contributors used the categories of “Buchedd A” and 
“Buchedd B” to represent the empirical division of the community into “chapel people” and “pub 
people” (Jenkins 1960).  The importance of Cymraeg in chapel traditions and of both Cymraeg 
and chapel for local traditional cultural life means that there is a resemblance between Cymraeg 
communitarianism and Buchedd A.  However, whereas my constructs concern ideology largely 
apart from economic circumstances, Jenkins (1960) considered socioeconomic class more 
closely.  Jenkins (1960) associated sixty percent of the village with Buchedd A, while sixty-five 
percent of these were manual laborers.  Of the forty percent associated with Buchedd B, ninety-
six percent were manual laborers. 
 While I did not estimate the proportion of professionals versus working-class persons 
among liberal cosmopolitans, it is obvious to me that the predominance of working class persons 
among those associated with “the people of the tavern” in Jenkins 1960 does not apply to my 
category of liberal cosmopolitans.  Since the end of the Nineteenth Century until at least the third 
                                                 
9  While the contributors to that edited volume researched the traditional quality of rural communities, this was in 
contrast to Ronald Frankenburg’s monograph on a border town.  During the 1950s, Frankenburg accidentally came 
to the borderlands in the northeast of Wales to study the place he called (in Cymraeg), “the village where there is no 
work”.  His original site for research became impossible, so he decided to work somewhere close to the university in 
Birmingham.  He settled on this Welsh village and is widely acclaimed for innovatively representing the lines of 
integration between this village and British society, focusing on the flows of people across the border.  He also 
highlighted the disputes that arose in the village in connection with three organizations: a brass band, a soccer team, 
and production of a carnival.  As he was ultimately blamed for the failure of the soccer team, because his foreign 
status made him a convenient lightning rod, he included those details in his reflective ethnography.  It, thus, 
represented a divergence from the typical focus on traditional rural life. 
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quarter of the Twentieth Century, socialist political work in Wales has been part of a triangle of 
mutual opposition, being in tension with British conservatism and Welsh republicanism—a triad 
of incompatibility (or, more conventionally, an inconsistent triad).10  The non-elitism to be found 
among working-class people, then, can be divided into a distinct sympathy for ordinary folk of 
the traditional sort [gwerin] and Marxian trends in the sociopolitical history of industrial Wales.11  
Many liberal cosmopolitan academics can be described as such precisely because their liberalism 
is oriented toward individuals’ access to public goods as members of society and, therefore, 
occupies a position that is opposed to the political conservatism of the Conservative Party in 
Britain. 
 Interestingly, an anti-establishment attitude, which is easily assimilated to the religious 
history of Non-Conformism in Wales, spans the division between language communitarians and 
liberal cosmopolitans.  Non-Conformism succeeded at ending the imposition of the Church of 
England as the established religion through a majority that imposed its will against the state-level 
policy.  Of course, since Non-Conformism was successful by 1920 in ending the official status, 
in Wales, of the Church of England, it is difficult to state that Non-Conformism is, today, an 
anti-establishment movement.  It has now become a dominant part of the image of traditional 
Welsh society.  Hence, one can make a plausible argument that the general anti-establishment 
attitude toward language dominance involves a nested oppositionality regardless of which “side” 
                                                 
10  Over the course of the Twentieth Century, Cymraeg was a marker of local identity in the north and west, while 
English became more associated with economic well-being and industry in the south and east.  Politics among the 
industrial working-class incorporated a broad sort of cosmopolitanism that connected with the working class ideals 
of other English-speaking societies, while politics centering on the gwerin were concerned with the interests of 
Cymraeg-speaking Wales.  Consequently, due to this imagining of the socioeconomic structure of Wales, there is a 
culturally persuasive myth about two major political parties in Wales.  That is, the Labour Party in Wales represents, 
and is anchored to the support by, people belonging to “industrial Wales”, while Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) is 
anchored in the support of and represents people belonging to Cymraeg-majority communities (found predominantly 
in rural Wales). 
11  Although I cannot confirm it, I heard reported that, when, Margaret Thatcher was asked in 2002 what her greatest 
achievement had been, she quipped: “New Labour”.  This indicated she believed the Labour Party had continued her 
Conservative Party work for her, unintentionally. 
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has primacy in any given context (Gal and Irvine 1995 referred to this sort of phenomenon as 
“fractal recursivity”).  Thus, language communitarians insist on their right to speak Cymraeg in 
private and commercial settings because the broader, dominant society is imposing English on 
them.  Yet, there are settings in Gwynedd in which liberal cosmopolitans feel that the local, 
dominant society is imposing Cymraeg on them.12  Reliance on such nested oppositionality are 
part of the cultural topography—indeed, the interculture (Abercrombie 1998)—throughout 
Wales. 
 To understand a little about the dynamics of the nested oppositionality in north-west 
Wales, recall the observation of the Welsh Studies’ professor that the so-called eisteddfod culture 
“is very, very, very competitive and people are schooled to be competitive”.  The interviewee 
claimed that this leads to exclusion, rather than to the flat, egalitarian society that Wales’ folk are 
supposed to inhabit.  On the other hand, if claims of cultural nationalism coincide with a sense of 
a social expectation or even compulsion to participate—and this suggests inclusiveness, even if it 
is forced inclusion—then this observation about exclusion is at odds with the cosmopolitan’s 
objection to the expectation to participate.  What that particular cosmopolitan professor was 
objecting to, then, was that there should be any expectation to include oneself in the first place.  
This suggests a kind of membership in local communities that is always, ever voluntary, which 
seems to erode the idea of community.  Oppositionality between communities and its correlate of 
national egalitarianism are as much a traditional feature of Welsh society (apart from the former 
society of the gentry) as the activities in which he objects to being expected to participate. 
 This apparent tension in cosmopolitans’ attitudes can be resolved by recognizing how this 
appearance of exclusion relates to a different sort of appearance; that is, the appearance of a 
                                                 
12  This dissertation does not examine the social history of anti-establishmentarianism, but it is worth mentioning 
that such agonistic resistance has a broader societal presence than that pertaining to language politics. 
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ranking aspect in the way community boundaries are marked.  “Invitations” to participate in so-
called eisteddfod culture carry with them an unspoken expectation that one’s performance will be 
evaluated according to the standards of those individuals doing the “judging”.  Hence, it is not 
enough to stress the cosmopolitan leanings that explain their discomfort in Cymraeg-centric 
settings.  One must remember that the liberal cosmopolitan is just as interested in the structural 
setting of choice, as well as the content of the choices. 
 By keeping in mind these two perspectives—communitarianism and cosmopolitanism—
rather than focusing on a mere preference toward Cymraeg or English, one can see that discourse 
is not constructed merely as a duality, but involves a more complicated collection of activities, 
practices, and processes.  Even if this complex set is viewed as a field of action in which there 
are two major identity orientations, both of these orientations can be found among those who are 
bilingual in Cymraeg and English.  Moreover, a communitarianism anchored in the English 
language community and a liberal cosmopolitanism that is very similar to what I have been 
discussing and that can be found among those who speak only English—albeit with differences 
in how English and other languages figures in their practices.  Such a research perspective is 
better able to capture diversity in national identity, but it also better equips a researcher to study 
the social life of language attitudes. 
 The framework composed of language communitarianism and liberal cosmopolitanism is 
especially useful in that it juxtaposes two non-continuous ways of practicing identity in north-
west Wales.  There is, of course, an essential difference between language communitarianism 
and liberal cosmopolitanism—in the former, the identity associated with a language is not a 
personal trait that one can choose not to express, but is an integral part of oneself; in the latter, 
nothing about language is taken to be a substance shared among the community members—i.e., 
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“consubstantial” in Burke’s (1969) terms.  Nevertheless, nothing about the practice of the two 
would necessarily lead to mutual exclusion. 
 To elaborate, one is not “more cosmopolitan” simply because one resists the particularist 
communitarian impulse that is tied narrowly to a language such as Cymraeg.  Conversely, one is 
not a “more communitarian member” of a Cymraeg (or an English) language community if one 
follows the call of that particular language community—what I called a language community 
demesne for short in Chapter Two.  Clearly, it is possible to feel that speaking English, at one 
time, and Cymraeg, on another occasion, are equally valid ways of expressing membership in 
some inhabitable, experiential, and personal part of each of these language communities.  One 
might even feel, oneself, to be equally a member of a demesne of both overlapping language 
communities.  This latter position would be a generalist, rather than a particularist 
communitarian stance on the capacity of language competence to make a group of people and 
their ethos cohesive.  Although a generalist communitarian stance is not a self-contradictory 
position, it just so happens that few people in Wales, particularly in Abergwaith, equivocate in 
this way over cultural identity when language is the salient factor. 
 The following chapter describes some events, settings, and conversations that represent a 
particular stance within language communitarianism.  I call it “decolonization”, which is often 
associated with political territories.  However, the Gikuyu-Kenyan writer, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 
has used the phrase in relation to “the mind” and, in particular, language of choice among artists 
and writers (1986).  It was a visit by Ngugi to north-west Wales that impressed on me the 
importance of one of the analytic frames that both has local currency and cultural-comparative 
value.  My discussion of the decolonization stance begins with Ngugi’s lecture. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
◄ THE DECOLONIZATION CHRONOTOPE ► 
 
Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness.  When change is absolute there 
remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement. . . Those who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. . . [T]he progressive organisation of 
irrational impulses makes a rational life. (George Santayana, The Life of Reason, Vol. 1 
(1906:284, 291)) 
 
The fusion of all the inhabitants of these islands into one homogeneous, English-speaking whole, 
the breaking down of barriers between us, the swallowing up of separate provincial nationalities, is 
a consummation to which the natural course of things irresistibly tends; it is a necessity of what is 
called modern civilisation, and modern civilisation is a real, legitimate force; the change must 
come, and its accomplishment is a mere affair of time.  The sooner the Welsh language disappears 
as an instrument of the practical, political, social life of Wales, the better; the better for England, 
the better for Wales itself.  (Mathew Arnold, On the Study of Celtic Literature (1867:12)) 
 
 
CONVERGENT IDEOLOGIES 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Phatic Conflict in Bangor 
 In June 2007, the Gikuyu-Kenyan writer, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, visited the north-west 
corner of Wales.  He appeared at a 200-person capacity lecture hall on the University of Wales 
campus in Bangor, Gwynedd.  Days previously, Ngugi had appeared in the Welsh border 
market-town of Hay-on-Wye at the Hay Festival of Literature and the Arts, to discuss his 
recently published novel, Wizard of the Crow.1  The event at the University of Wales was 
sponsored by the School of Cymraeg and, as the head of the department told me afterwards, it 
was part of a larger project of encouraging scholars of the School to incorporate modes of 
decolonizing the academy that are drawn from such areas as literary criticism. 
 Ngugi is known for cultural elaboration of the effects of the “international bourgeoisie” 
on the organization of language-cultural institutions, by means of that “bourgeoisie’s” supporting 
                                                 
1  The fact that a Kenyan Hay Festival has taken place in Nairobi, Kenya every year since 2009 (in collaboration 
with the publisher, Storymoja) suggests Ngugi’s presence in Hay-on-Wye in 2007 had a broader purpose that 
overshadowed his visit to Bangor.  However, I have not confirmed any such brokering during his visit to Wales. 
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role in imperialist operations of “consolidated financial capital” in nations that have been 
colonized, particularly by the British.  His Decolonising the Mind concerns the politics of 
English language and literature as it constrains the expressiveness of native African writers, 
artists, and intellectuals.  Given the presence of an international bourgeoisie and the historical 
colonization by an English-language empire, continued commitment to the unassailably supreme 
position of English was devastating for African languages and cultures.  It led to the use of 
colonial forms to express the emerging leadership of African persons in a post-colonial Africa 
and the undervaluing of indigenous languages and cultures.  Decolonising the Mind is his most 
well-known statement on the importance of not conducting intellectual or literary 
communications in English.  Ngugi (1986) wrote, in “A Statement”, in that book that it was to be 
his “farewell to English as a vehicle for any of my writings”. 
 When I walked, a few minutes late, into the lecture hall theater to see and hear the 
Kenyan speak, I noticed headsets near the door.  Familiar with Ngugi’s opinions, I took one with 
me as I looked for a seat—I thought he might speak mostly or entirely in Gikuyu.  To my mild 
surprise, he opened with a few awkwardly-spoken words of Cymraeg: P’n’awn da (“Good 
afternoon”).  He also used another standard phrase, which was inaudible except for the /ch/, 
which was much closer to the sound in Cymraeg than most English monolingual speakers are 
able to perform when learning the language: possibly Diolch yn fawr (“Thank you very much”), 
or Sut dach chi? (“How are you?”).  The headset, as it turned out, was for instantaneous 
translation into English of any Cymraeg that occurred.  The entirety of the talk that followed, a 
talk on the importance of not intellectualizing in English, was in English. 
 There was some surreality to this even, amid such political academic stance-making, 
given that this persona was giving a presentation in English to a school devoted to scholarship in 
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and about Cymraeg.2  Cymraeg is a language that his audience though of as having barely 
survived English’s first trial on the way to (inchoate) global domination.  The event became 
more surreal when Ngugi interrupted his presentation to answer his cell phone.  He carried on a 
conversation for the next five minutes.  However, the real problematic nature of the event in 
Bangor did not fully emerge until near its end, during the question-and-answer session. 
 Ngugi began his discussion of a loosely connected set of topics related to linguistic 
hegemony by saying that, when some religious texts were translated in Britain, the Bible in 
particular, English versions were argued to be more true than other vernaculars (perhaps by later, 
Eighteenth-Century English speakers, but not by Cymraeg speakers and probably not by Queen 
Elizabeth I, who ordered the translation for political-religious reasons).  Ngugi moved on to 
Matthew Arnold’s plea for the elimination of Cymraeg linguistic identity in the Nineteenth 
Century.  Stating that Ireland, like Wales, shares the ignominious claim to be among the first 
colonies of the Anglo-Norman kingdoms, Ngugi discussed the application of colonization 
experiences in Ireland to the colonization of Africa.3  African languages came to be associated 
with negativity, he said, especially at schools, where educators required children who used 
vernacular languages to carry a placard around their neck, and to hand it over to the next 
similarly transgressing student; with corporal punishment being imposed on the last pupil to be 
charged with speaking their mother tongue. 
 This disciplinary practice has a familiar ring to it: Victorian Welsh persons—whose 
minds Ngugi would have said had been colonized—carried out this practice in schools in Wales, 
                                                 
2  One of his responses on this point is that he has never said that he was “above” or had “found solutions to” “the 
contradictions which bedevil our society” (Ngugi 1981:11, quoted in Cancel 1985:28).  Similarly, Gikandi 
(1992:134) claimed that “the most important issues raised in Ngugi's discourse on language. . . reside in the splits, 
the ellipses, and the gaps that it opens up”. 
3  The era of colonization he drew from was that of Edmund Spencer, in the seventeenth century, and not the era 
immediately following the early Norman invasion in the twelfth century, during which some of the Normans 
“became” Irish. 
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which has become known as “the Welsh Not”.  It is most widely known because the story of this 
historical practice is reproduced in the very institutional setting that is its narratival setting: the 
school.  Its popular form is called the “Welsh Not”.  Pupils who violated the prohibition were 
compelled to wear a heavy placard made of slate (or other material) around their neck until 
another pupil could be caught speaking the “Welsh” language.  The child still carrying the 
“Welsh Not” at the end of the day was caned.4 
 The “African Not” was one of the less brutal forms of colonizing minds since the agents 
of colonizing administrations had gone so far as to cut out tongues to stop a person from 
speaking a language thought to hold him back from his potential.  Ngugi cautioned us with what 
was, under English-medium circumstances, enigmatic advice: by intellectualizing in English, 
French, Portuguese, and so on, we help to produce a fate for subordinate languages in which the 
representative literary texts of vulnerable mother tongues will become archaeological sites for 
seeing what those languages used to be like.5 
 After Ngugi finished and the applause died out, the moderator of the event invited the 
audience of fifty to sixty people to ask Ngugi questions.  Unlike Ngugi and the moderator, the 
voices of members of the audience would not be amplified by means of a microphone.  I thought 
nothing of this.  I was excited to be able to participate in the academic event through my 
competence in Cymraeg, which varies relative to context.  The first two questions, in English, 
                                                 
4  Historical narratives that circulate in Wales depict this era in different ways.  Some versions of this and similar 
narratives adopt a conquest and domination theme, and blame the English for such disciplinary measures.  Others 
note that Welsh persons, not the English, enacted such measures themselves in full complicity with English-
language hegemony.  Those who imagine neutrality to be a condition of historical accuracy might leave out the 
moral condemnation of the English language, omit any sense of language dominance in a material as well as 
ideational sense, and downplay the role of dominant languages in the ideological portrayal of identity as a 
dichotomous sense of belonging and place. 
5  Ngugi finished his talk by reading to us from his newest novel about the bizarre and sycophantic steps that a set of 
ministers took to please the ruler of the Free Republic of Aburiria; which involved surgical modification of their 
sensory and expressive organs, thus allowing them to better serve the state—bigger eyes, bigger ears, bigger 
tongues. 
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were spoken loudly, but the third was uttered in Cymraeg by a soft-spoken woman.  Before she 
began, someone sitting in the audience prompted Ngugi in English that he should put on the 
translation headset.  This was the moderator, a member of the faculty of the School of Welsh, C. 
Thomas Logan.  He obviously knew the female speaker who had indicated she had a question.  
There was a brief moment of confusion until the significance of this advice dawned on the guest 
speaker.  I could not hear any words of the question that followed from where I sat, so I tried to 
turn the headset on for the first time.  The question was short and I waited too long to put the 
headset on.  By the time I had fitted the headphones over my ears, she had finished asking her 
question.  Unlike any other similar context of simultaneous translation in Wales, such as main 
events at the National Eisteddfod, I could not get the headphones to produce sound.  Ngugi’s 
answer, in English, was fairly brief and gave me no better context for guessing what the question 
had been.  No one in the area in which I was sitting had heard the question either. 
 As the event came to a close, the moderator walked up to the podium and announced in 
Cymraeg that there would be a reception afterwards.  Continuing in Cymraeg, Dr. Logan 
mentioned that he first came across the Kenyan writer’s work twenty-five years prior in an 
English Department in another country.  Before C. Thomas Logan could say much more, he 
realized that Ngugi was having trouble with the headset.  I had not been able to figure out how to 
turn my own headset on and, apparently, neither had Ngugi.  After a bit of trouble, it appeared 
that Ngugi had resolved the problem and Thomas continued. 
 A moment later, we learned that Ngugi’s wireless headset was not receiving an adequate 
signal and Thomas paused again.  After another headset was found, Thomas began yet again, but 
clearly the second set of headphones was of no help to Ngugi either, so Thomas said, “I’ll switch 
to English.  It’s alright”.  Ngugi, however, urged him to continue and was receiving assistance 
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with the headset.  Seeming to truncate his speech, Dr. Logan finished by recognizing the 
importance of new ideas, thanked the person who organized the event and thanked Ngugi.  After 
the applause died down, we all exited and proceeded to the foyer. 
 It is worth noting a number of things about this event.  Ngugi did not demand that he be 
addressed in Gikuyu and probably never has in public situations outside Kenya.  Nobody 
demanded that he speak Gikuyu at the Bangor speaking event and no one demanded that he use 
Cymraeg in his lecture.  At least one person insisted on using Cymraeg when she asked her 
question.  Ngugi, also, insisted that Thomas continue in Welsh despite the fact that he could not 
understand Thomas and had no means of translation available to him at the moment. 
 Over the course of an hour, I was enthralled in the imaginational act of listening to the 
Kenyan writer’s discussion of linguistic colonization and his portrayal of the fictional state 
administration of Aburiria that followed.  In the final moments of technological difficulties, I 
found myself cognitively synthesizing the social practices that unfolded on the dais during the 
question period and afterward.  While so engaged, I recognized that part of what I had witnessed 
was a conflict over the kinds of links that can and ought to be made between people.  This issue 
evokes Malinowski’s (1923:315) concept of phatic communion: “a type of speech in which ties 
of union are created by a mere exchange of words”.  Such communion “serves to establish bonds 
of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does 
not serve any purpose of communicating ideas” (Malinowski 1923:315).  Notwithstanding 
Malinowski’s idea that silence is never interpreted as a reassuring factor and is to be regarded as 
alarming and dangerous (cf. Basso 1990), it is true that a failure or an inability to communicate 
can cause problems when there is an expectation for someone to do so.  I call the condition(s) for 
such a failure or inability, “phatic conflict”. 
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 Utterances that (seek to) establish phatic communion can also accomplish other ends.  
Abercrombie (1956:3) established this multiplicity by recounting an instance in which Dorothy 
Parker mocked sociolinguistic conventions.  Parker was asked how she was at a social occasion.  
In cocktail party tones, responded to the standard greeting with, “I’ve just killed my husband 
with an axe, and I feel fine”.  Far from astonishing any of her interlocutors, this utterance 
confirmed her health by conveying an attitude typical of her—signifying that all was well with 
Dorothy Parker.  In the communicative event in Bangor, there were several simultaneous 
communicative features that are noteworthy.  First, there was a directly present phatic conflict in 
which material channels were blocked, partly due to technological problems.  Thus, a very basic 
condition of communion, which would have allowed the communication of interactional bonds 
as well as ideas, was not established. 
 This basic conflict could not be resolved, however, because of a second phatic conflict, 
regarding which language code was acceptable under the particular conditions of technological 
problems.  Key participants, Ngugi and the third person to ask him a question, chose to privilege 
a break in one material channel of communication (i.e., simultaneous translation via headphone) 
by rejecting a language code (i.e., English) that would have re-opened channels of 
communication.  Nevertheless, that present phatic conflict was not about keeping the social 
channels of communication open.  The choices Ngugi and others made during and after the 
question-and-answer session reflected a sensibility to recognize the colonized status of language 
use in Wales and its similarity to Giguyu in Kenya. 
 This commonality partly explains why social intercourse at the lecture Ngugi gave was 
anything but smooth and convenient.  Key participants erected impromptu barriers to 
communication due to the felt injustice of acquiescing to the general conditions of constraint on 
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language use.  Despite one kind of phatic conflict, communication occurred on a broader level 
beyond interaction.  That is, phatic conflict continued because the participants already 
understood what each other was talking about.  The inconvenience of entertaining different code-
proprieties was sufferable because the sub-textual theme of post-colonizers using language to 
dominate others was paramount. 
 Importantly, because there was a general communion on the topic of decolonization, we 
can recognize a third kind of phatic conflict, which is a more figurative case of a generalized 
conflict that was not directly present in the communicative situation in Bangor.  This third kind 
of conflict concerns the issue of what language code was acceptable when material channels of 
communication are opened in the broad societal context of life in Wales.  The positions people 
take in this broad kind of phatic conflict depend on individuals’ specific socio-histories and the 
meanings that different kinds of communicative participation have for different people. 
 This broader phatic conflict lends itself to a broader interpretation of the “situation” that 
Ngugi and several other participants orchestrated in that lecture theater.  I characterize that 
broader interpretation after exhibiting two other instances of this broader figurative conflict that 
also occurred in June 2007.  I present these other cases in light of the fact that the glimpse into 
the Kenyan writer’s imagined world of experience was very similar to the views I had had over 
the previous four months when Welsh-speakers attacked the hegemony of the English language 
and, in fact, on each preliminary field trip since my first visit to north Wales in 1995. 
 
The Thomas Cook Affair 
 Two weeks after Ngugi’s Bangor speaking engagement, another event occurred in this 
same college town that illustrates the broader situation of a figurative phatic conflict.  Cymraeg 
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language activists interpreted it as an exemplar for violations of language civil rights.  I gathered 
a common core of “facts” about the event, which I learned from activists, reporters, and 
acquaintances of those involved.6  A monolingual manager of the office of a travel agency 
company with a UK-wide marketing presence enforced an alleged company policy that business 
communications between employees are to be carried out solely in English.  Two employees 
who were discussing something in Cymraeg were actually in heated disagreement over an issue 
they had been arguing about for some time.  Given her position at the branch, the manager 
thought she would have been able to manage the situation if she had understood the argument 
before it became so heated. 
 The issue was discussed in television news, on the internet in Youtube videos, and in 
private places.  In some of the local discussion, there was confusion about whether the travel 
company, Thomas Cook, was discouraging its patrons (or its employees) from using Cymraeg.7  
Confusion notwithstanding, there was an underlying concern among language activists about 
private sector language practices (e.g., Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg [The Cymraeg Language 
Society] had identified the goal of strengthening the provisions of the Welsh Language Act of 
1993 related to bilingual communication, which applied only to governmental settings.).  The 
activists saw the issue, as stated above, as one that involved a violation of the employees’ civil 
rights.  Within a few days of the event, Wales-level political leaders from all of the major 
political parties contacted Thomas Cook.  The company was required, due to public complaints, 
                                                 
6  See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/6739121.stm; accessed June 21, 2007. 
7  Even Member of the National Assembly, Bethan Jenkins, seemed to be confused on this point about customers’ 
rights, despite an image of the bilingual notice Thomas Cook had posted on their entrance in Bangor, which read, in 
capital letters: “Os ydych eisiau trefnu eich gwyliau yn Gymraeg, fe fyddan yn hapas ich helpu” and, in English, 
“Despite press reports, you are very welcome to do you business here through the medium of Welsh”.  Clearly, there 
are performative dimensions of the initiating communicative event that have motivated the response, which go 
beyond explicit intentions of the Thomas Cook principals.  Ms. Jenkins’ web page on this topic is: 
http://bethanjenkins.blogspot.com/2007/06/gwyliau-yn-gwmraeg-thomas-cook-yn-hapas.html; accessed June 28, 
2007. 
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to meet with the Commission for Racial Equality.  When I left Wales in April 2008, however, the 
company policy had not been deemed unlawful by any formal legal process. 
 Web-logs, or “blogs”, as the modern-day equivalent of the village square, are probably 
the most public (and least restrained) arena for discussion of events like those at the Bangor 
office of Thomas Cook.  One blogger referred to the event as “the Thomas Cook Welsh Not 
fiasco”, which highlights the cultural thematic of colonization and repression.8  The blogger 
tellingly used the pseudonym of Ordovicius, which refers to one of the ancient British ethnic 
groups, the Ordovices, who inhabited Wales when the Romans arrived, and resisted Roman 
settlement until (as Tacitus recounted in his “Agricola”) they were all killed in an invasion in the 
70s of the First Century A.D.  In the comments section of that blog item, published two days 
after the incident, one commentator wrote that, “I don’t see how anyone’s rights have been 
offended” and referred to the social drama as “a storm in a teacup” (Wardman, Matt, posted on 
June 8, 2007 at 22:33). 
 Another “blogger” with opinions similar to those of Ordovicius intervened and wrote: 
 
     “What's being denied, Mr Wardmann [sic], is the the [sic] inalienable right of 
citizens to speak their own language in their own country, whenever and to 
whomever they please. Any suggestion that this [company policy] is either 
‘reasonable’ or ‘sensible’ is dangerous nonsense” (Gwe, posted on June 9, 2007 
at 15:47). 
 
Gwe (a pseudonym) used a commonplace phrase in addressing commenter Wardman’s views on 
the Thomas Cook affair: “their own language in their own country”.  It is not difficult to find this 
sort of phrase appearing in discussions of linguistic hegemony and Cymraeg’s subordinate status.  
The occurrence of tropes like “their own language” presupposes some interesting things.  
Whether a person recognizes a single language as their own language and the question of which 
                                                 
8  “My Day with Thomas Cook”, http://this-is-sparta.blogspot.com; accessed June 12, 2007. 
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languages are appropriate to which countries are highly contingent issues.  Some of these issues 
arose in an interview I conducted with a teacher at the junior school in Brynpiws (YGB). 
 
The Welsh “Not as Passionate as Us” 
 In early June 2007, a day before Ngugi’s talk, I had been interviewing teachers using 
basic questions about their favorite subjects and the importance of Welshness and Welsh history 
to them.  Each of these interviews touched on how much control they had over what was taught, 
what made them want to go into teaching, what their hopes and visions about teaching were, 
what their favorite subjects were, whether their students were more likely to enjoy teachers’ 
favorite subjects, how important teaching Welsh history was to them, and whether there were 
any special qualities that make someone Welsh as opposed to British or European.  The 
responses of one teacher at the school in Brynpiws (YGB), Siân Lewis, were still echoing in my 
thoughts. 
 I focus on my interview with Siân here because her passionate outspokenness brought 
together the elements of increasing cultural stresses that I had been feeling for months, which 
revolved around language politics.  As my competence in Cymraeg improved, but not as quickly 
as I liked, so also did my awareness of both how narrow and how hidden was the line between 
those who belonged to the Cymraeg language-culture complex and those who did not.  I found 
myself in a position in which I had not wanted to find myself: Unable to remain in the country 
long enough to become fully fluent in a diverse set of registers and cultural domains, I felt forced 
to do what I could, in the time I had, in the best available way I could do it. 
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 I was learning, but was not yet conversant enough to conduct the interview with Siân and 
the other teachers yn Gymraeg.9  Siân was not the only first-language Cymraeg-speaking teacher 
to feel comfortable enough with me, even in an English-language context, to speak her mind.  
Indeed, Siân expressed claims and arguments that some Welsh people would find objectionable 
and even offensive—that is, “nationalistic”.  I avoided the temptation to exploit the fact that I 
was learning Cymraeg, to use this fact to garner the favor of those who felt most comfortable 
speaking Cymraeg.  Instead, I encouraged research participants to participate only to the degree 
with which they were comfortable.  In some cases, in fact, I had the impression that the English-
language interview could itself inspire discussion of the interviewee’s own politics of language. 
 Siân and I sat on opposite sides of the small table in the teachers’ lounge at Ysgol 
Brynpiws, having our perfectly abnormal conversation.  The key points in the interview with 
Siân came when she highlighted Cymraeg as a special quality that makes someone Welsh. 
 
“. . . so I think it doesn’t matter where you are in the world, you still will be 
Welsh you know, but if you lost the language. . .” 
 
—Siân hadn’t finished her sentence, so after five to ten seconds I asked, “What would you be 
losing?” 
 
“Well you’d lose something that was very precious to you.  And if you’d lose it, 
you wouldn’t think it’s precious and . . . actually, these football players who play 
for Wales (she grimaces), hmm, gets under my skin ‘cause if you can’t speak 
Welsh, this is my opinion, if you can’t speak Welsh, you’re not a Welsh woman 
or a Welsh man.” 
 
In understanding the surface message here, it is important to know what Siân was alluding to.  
Most of the professional soccer players on Wales’ national team at that time could not speak 
                                                 
9  The transformation of the initial /c/ of Cymraeg to /g/ is called a “mutation” and is a feature of Celtic languages. 
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Cymraeg, which is not a contractual requirement.  This is a commonly known fact that people 
discuss in the context of the pre-game ritual of singing the national anthem, which is in Cymraeg.  
Siân was alluding to the fact that many of the players could not sing the national anthem without 
a translation (or even read the words off a page). 
 The importance of knowing the words to the national anthem had became symbolized in 
1993 by a highly publicized videotaping of then-Secretary of State for Wales, John Redwood at a 
national conference of the Conservative political party.  In the video footage, taken soon after 
Redwood had been appointed to the lead political office in Wales at the time, Redwood seemed 
to be miming—bobbing his head and mouthing shapes that had no correspondence to the words 
of the national anthem.  This cultural knowledge lay in the background while Siân and I spoke.  
These things, and their broader societal significance, grated on Siân.  For others, they might have 
amounted to mild annoyance or amusing facts. 
 While strong sentiments such as Siân’s might guide conversations among participants of 
the Cymraeg language-cultural complex, careful questioning revealed that Siân also employed a 
more articulated, dynamic mode of feeling and thinking about these matters.  Siân continued: 
 
“You can’t be [i.e., Welsh].  Until you try to attempt to learn it.  You might not be 
well-spoken and you might not be an expert at reading or writing it, but you have 
to try. ” 
 
This elaboration of Siân’s views demonstrates that strong statements can be, and often are, 
compromised upon reflection.  Typically, the emphasis on language competence is modulated to 
a concern with whether people make an effort to acquire competence. 
 The impression of an implied ethnic purity frequently gets taken in this direction in 
Welsh contexts.  Rather than the totalizing expression of absolutes, we see a much more ludic 
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conception of life in Wales unfold in this teacher’s articulation of her thoughts.  The terms of 
identity are altered to address degree, rather than kind.  Moreover, while her classification and 
bounding of place on such a basis evokes the symbolic violence of ethnic ontologies, this case of 
classification involved shades, rather than absolutes: 
 
“ ‘Cause these people who come in, they don’t learn the language and expect us to 
talk English to them.  It doesn’t happen not in this area of Wales . . .” 
 
Of course, I saw myself, to some degree, as was one of “these people”, as she put it, who came to 
Wales and “expect” people like her to talk English to me.  We see, however, that such opinions 
are not etched in stone, but are more mutable.  They can be and are modulated in practice.  These 
negotiations over the terms of identity are part of everyday transactions in practices of 
performing identities, but recognition of this fact did not ease my conscience. 
 Nonetheless, given the diversity of language practices in Wales, Siân seemed to be ruling 
a lot of people out of her picture of Welshness, so I inquired about areas known for their lack of 
Cymraeg-speaking communities and virtual lack of Cymraeg speakers: south Wales and south-
east Wales, respectively.  By asking for her opinion of the contrast between these culturally 
recognizable different (whether they are, in fact, objectively different) areas, which carry 
different temporal markings, different centuries in which Cymraeg declined to nearly absent 
levels, I contributed to her confusing answer to my question, “What do you think of people in 
south Wales and south-east Wales?”.  Her response to that question illustrated that, to such an 
inquiry, she would and did modulate the issue of definitive membership into an issue of levels of 
commitment: 
 
“I wouldn’t say that they’re not as Welsh as us.  No, they are Welsh, you know, 
because they have, they talk the language and things like that, but in some areas 
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they’re not as passionate as us or they wouldn’t let the language die, you know?  
They’d never speak English to a Welsh person. I wouldn’t.” 
 
Thus, the first two instances of “they” refers to people in the areas in which Cymraeg is not 
common (“they are Welsh, you know”), while the “they” who “let the language die” refers to 
people in the areas where Cymraeg is virtually absent from everyday life.  The final “they” refers 
to a counter-factual—if the people of south-east Wales, who “let the language die”, were 
passionate about the language, they would not speak English to persons accustomed to Cymraeg. 
 This amended position is a far cry from the original formulation: “If you can’t speak 
Welsh, you’re not a Welsh woman or a Welsh man”.  Nevertheless, it reserves the slot of “Welsh 
person” for those who speak Cymraeg.  In that sense, it is a part of a practice of exhibiting a 
stance toward language politics that is oriented toward whatever position a person (e.g., Siân) 
has chosen to occupy. 
 While the progression of the segment of the interview displayed above reveals a complex 
and nuanced way of thinking, the result is a fairly rigid framework that she projects on the 
society and culture of Wales.  The “value” of Siân’s subject position did not change throughout 
the interview, but she did exhibit various stances that eventually took a particular shape that she 
clarified in terms of such notions as passion and effort.  In just so many words, this social actor 
erected a range of values within a field of discourse.  In Chapter Two, I referred to such a range 
as a language zone. 
 As Siân’s presentation of her phenomenological space might suggest, these zones can 
operate as corridors.  Such “language corridors” operate as the pathways into which social action 
is canalized—by orienting, constraining, or forcing people to articulate a social action in a 
culturally recognizable language code.  It is to construe language codes (English, Welsh, 
 239
Japanese, Quechua) as if they were modes of expression that can be delineated as the aspects of 
the communicative process by which material constraints are placed on how a message can be 
conveyed; in other words, as if they were analogous to communicative channels (inscriptional, 
verbal, gestural, telegraphic, by Aldus lamp, etc.).  To read in modern English a Sixth-Century 
Welsh poem in some way true to the original requires two language corridors.  To take another 
example, one cannot properly protest the prevalence of English monolinguals in a Welsh village 
without conducting some part of the protest in English.   
 
The Public and the Pendulum 
 Given the preceding chapters, cultural practices can be and are divided into various 
segments of the discursive space of the public sphere—a segmentation that prompts the use of 
the plural notion of publics.  The abstract public space is divided in everyday practices within 
such zones of discourse operate in such a way as to organize language-canalizing processes; thus 
invoking language corridors applicable to the occasion, and positioning participants in a specific 
language corridor.  By contrast, the concept of “position” seems inadequate in this context in that 
it fails to connote a sufficiently broad and dynamic process. 
 What my discussion of Siân’s progression of thought leaves out, however, is motivation 
for her perspective of phatic conflict at the broad, societal level—a figurative conflict that I have 
not yet defined.  A typical analytic tack regarding such motivation (in Welsh Studies and without 
(e.g., Handler 1988)) would be to evaluate or simply frame such motivation in terms of 
nationalism.  Yet, there is a tendency among intellectuals looking in from the outside at “Welsh 
nationalism” to portray self-described Welsh nationalists as if they were cabalists or Rosicrucian 
fanatics like those found in Umberto Eco’s Foucault’s Pendulum.  What is compelling in that 
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second-order, analytic image of “nationalism” is the (double-edged) clarity of the ethnographic 
perspective according to which nationalists select and shape the content of a narrative—the 
plot—using a schema either as guide or goal.  As a guide, it aids “nationalists” by conveying 
felicitous ways in which the details fit together.  As a goal, it is the posited and imaginary kernel 
inside the shell of details that (allegedly) resonates with a person’s “nationalist” ideologies. 
 In the “native” Welsh historical imagination, there is a schema of resistance against 
diminishing odds.  This image is fleshed out with tales in which the people of Wales or their 
princes figure as beleaguered defenders who are encroached upon by the Anglo-Normans and 
forced into the mountains.  People like Matthew Arnold, an Oxford don of the Victorian era, 
long advocated that Welsh be made a relic of the past, as if it could be swept into a pit. 
 When the conspiratorial perspective is brought into play, the schema of resistance against 
diminishing odds and its narrative details not only evoke, in my mind, Foucault’s Pendulum, but 
they also have an abstract similarity to Edgar Allan Poe’s story, “The Pit and the Pendulum”.  
The protagonist finds himself in a dark room after being released from interrogation and 
narrowly avoids a pit, which causes him to trip in his surprise, hit his head, and lose 
consciousness.  His accidental and unforeseen discovery of the pit leads his prisoners to tie him 
down while he is unconscious and to try another form of disposal.  A pendulum made of a 
sharpened blade slowly descends from the ceiling and is intended to slice through the prisoner.  
He manages to escape and, as a last resort, the Inquisitors somehow bring the iron walls that 
enclose his space of confinement closer and closer toward the pit in the center; the iron walls that 
now glow with great heat urge him ever on into the center.  Inevitably, he loses all possible 
footholds and falls into the pit. 
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 Within this image, the difficulties for the reproduction of Cymraeg use are considerable.  
If the pendulum could sway only in one direction, in favor of Cymraeg, they would prosper, it 
would seem, and escape the bite that is felt to accompany English-language dominance.  The 
pendulum swings from one side to the other, however; hence, the broad societal phatic conflict.  
The result is the ongoing battle to find some way of avoiding the sense that one’s Welshness is 
being attacked whenever English is or seems to be favored.  Even when communities maintain 
some sense of stability in terms of Cymraeg identity, however, something like the Thomas Cook 
affair surfaces.  For people like Siân, Ordovicious, and Gwe, these occurrences seem but the 
latest step in a long protracted move to bring the walls closer together and to cast those Welsh-
speaking communities into the pit of the past.  Somehow, Cymraeg continues to be used to this 
day and has managed to escape that fate.  This life of resistance even has an unofficial theme 
song in Cymraeg, made popular by former folksinger Dafydd Iwan, the president of Plaid Cymru 
(“Party for Wales”) from 2003 to 2010.  The song and refrain are: “Yma o hyd” [[We are] still 
here]. 
 
BAKHTIN’S PENDULUM AND THE DECOLONIZATION CHRONOTOPE 
 Given the clarity in such images of a culture resisting invaders, what I have in mind as a 
figurative, societal-phatic conflict over which of the official languages is most acceptable in the 
national context could best be described in terms of chronotopes.  I refer to Bakhtin’s concept of 
chronotope, but attempts to apply a concept of literary critique to cultural analysis have moved 
the concept beyond Bakhtin.  A literary chronotope is a construct denoting a crystallized moment 
in time and space, which an author creates through a patterned and consistent use of language 
styles: “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
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expressed in literature” (Bakhtin 1981:84).  If my recounting of Ngugi’s speaking engagement in 
north Wales in June 2007 gave any sense of the occurrence of an academic lecture, then the 
“voices” and “tastes” of meaning expressed by that description have produced a literary 
chronotope. 
 In collaboration with the concept of social imaginaries (Taylor 2004; see also Castoriadis 
1987), Bakhtin’s literary chronotopes provide a methodological bootstrap for describing these 
“place-worlds”.  A cultural chronotope is the extension of both of these (or something like each 
of them combined).  Emerging from the material-social milieu in which people carry out daily 
tasks, a cultural chronotope is the synthetic representation of:  
 
. . . points in the geography of a community where time and space intersect and 
fuse.  Time takes on flesh and becomes visible for human contemplation; 
likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time and 
history and the enduring character of a people. . .  Chronotopes thus stand as 
monuments to the community itself, as symbols  
of it, as forces operating to shape its members’ images of themselves. (Basso 
1996:62)10 
 
A literary chronotope occurs in the universe of literature, while a cultural chronotope happens 
within a community of people who may or may not be involved in writing and reading in the 
same context as the focal cultural chronotope. 
                                                 
10  In several texts, Basso appears to attribute this block quotation to Bakhtin 1981 (page 7 and pages 84-5).  It 
seems more likely that this block quotation was a type-setting mistake that merged quoted phrases found in 
translations of Bakhtin with commentary.  That is, it appears to be Basso’s development of a larger idea that used a 
material (de re) mode of speaking (in articulating a cultural type of chronotopes), where Baktin used a discursive (de 
dicto) mode of speaking about literary chronotopes.  Repeated uses of the same block quote, by Basso and his 
followers, have made this a canonical idea of Bakhtin(ian thought), but I stress the distinction between literary and 
cultural types of chronotopes.  Bakhtin (1981:84) did write: 
In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully 
thought-out, concrete whole.  Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically 
visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and 
history.  The intersection of axes and fusion of indicators characterizes the artistic chronotope. 
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 In the discursive regimes of north-west Wales, it is customary to describe certain 
communicative participatory roles, such as that of Ordovicius, Gwe, or Siân, as expressions of 
nationalism—as previous chapters showed.  However, in adopting some aspects of the 
methodological lens of place-making, I believe the attitudes they each express are more tractable 
through, and amenable to, a description of the cultural chronotopes they inhabit.  The discussion 
after the talk Ngugi gave, offered me a window with a view onto the cultural chronotope from 
which emerged his principled refusal to write novels in English, as well as a window to the more 
relevant cultural chronotope that circulates in north Wales.  I could perceive only the barest 
traces of Ngugi’s own cultural chronotope.  Nonetheless, each of the two cultural chronotopes 
was easily recognizable in the operations of mythopraxis.  That is, each possesses a convenient 
clarity by its association with a narratival schema with mythological ambitions; one traced with 
lines some conspiracy-minded creative writers would interpret as intimations of a Rosacrucian-
style plot (to allude to Eco’s fictional story). 
 The traces of Ngugi’s experiences were present in his comparison of colonial experiences 
in Ireland and in Africa, as well as my background knowledge of his imprisonment in Kenya and 
his book, Decolonising the Mind.  The clarity of the decolonizing context of Ngugi’s implicit 
plot were intersubjectively real and possessed similar clarity—to the extent that Ngugi’s talk 
painted, in strokes that his audience would assimilate to the history of Wales, the comparative 
dimensions in Kenya and British colonial Africa, in general.  Likewise, in the Welsh plot, the 
joining of Wales to England was a forced union.  Now, with Britain’s standing in the world 
maintained through the existence of an informal but official network of former colonies (i.e., the 
Commonwealth), it is a marriage of convenience as well as historical domination, where one 
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partner (the English language-social-political complex) clearly holds the upper hand, while the 
other partner (primordial Wales) resists its own seemingly inevitable extinction. 
 By witnessing the two cultural chronotopes of resistance in this setting, I was able to 
recognize a superordinate, “master” chronotope in the University of Wales, Bangor auditorium; 
and by witnessing the unfolding of the latter, was able to recognize the two subordinate cultural 
chronotopes as coordinate to each other.  Indeed, what I perceived in the lecture hall in Bangor 
was the joining of at least two cultural chronotopes into one, which might be called the 
Decolonization Chronotope.  As a master chronotope, which synthesizes points from other 
cultural chronotopes and fuses them together—an image of a place that connotes specific 
moments, of a time that speaks to specific places—the Decolonization Chronotope bears the 
image of confinement and struggle through histories of imperialism. 
 As comparative methods in anthropology acknowledge, communities privilege different 
values of belonging, and specific values of history depending on where people come from.  In 
this case, different communities converged on similar values of confinement.  The fact that the 
similarities in these differences become recognizable is what is salient here.  The similarities 
between the two component chronotopes brought Ngugi and his audience together into a single 
place, even while representing different national histories.  This moment brought him and his 
audience together in simultaneity, despite different languages, different sites of struggle, and 
different styles of living.  Within this moment of shared understanding, those present gained a 
sense of communitas; but not from sharing a collective sense of an experience.  Rather, in 
sharing diverse experiences of a single type, which carried presuppositions of underlying, 
compatible schemata, the participants came to have a collective sense of purpose. 
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 The Decolonization Chronotope is a fusing of space and time and the commonalities in 
the perspectives of those who felt dominated by the continuation of colonial processes into the 
post-colonial phases of each of their nations’ present.  Each of the separate cultural chronotopes 
that constituted the Decolonization Chronotope was a form of resistance against the not-so-subtle 
domination of subordinate vernaculars by the hegemonic use of the languages of those identified 
with colonizers in the present day.  This linguistic hegemony played an essential part in 
producing the chronotopes that make up the focal Chronotope; for, in gouging out channels for 
the enactment of one set of colonially-selected cultural practices, this hegemony supplied the 
raison d’etre for resistance to the domination of the sub-altern languages. 
 The performative genre in which the Welsh component of the Decolonization 
Chronotope, and its accompanying narrative of resistance, manifest, can be loosely described as 
nationalism—and is so described in colloquial communicative practices.  However, this is an 
inadequate descriptive label.  It is a performative genre within the orientation of Cymraeg 
communitarianism that communitarians and cosmopolitans alike recognize as a genre about 
instrumental interests related to competing versions of Welsh identity.  It, along with the 
discursive register of “getting on one’s soapbox” discussed in Chapter Three, is recognized as 
political because of the dominant politics regarding politics in Wales—which makes it a register 
they cannot perform in the classroom. 
 In turn, due to these politics of politics, it is difficult to uncover the substantive features 
that go beyond the controversy to what the communitarians really think is at stake.  They have 
conceded the constraint of the prohibition against political “brainwashing” at school, and they try 
to pass on Welsh traditional heritage as a form of cultural pedagogy.  In doing so, this limits the 
instrumental claims they can make about their perceived collective interests, about the gradual 
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loss of that traditional heritage.  Does the constraint against teaching politics in the classroom, 
further, imply that some substantive content associated with the Cymraeg language cultural 
complex is barred from the classroom or is it only instrumental claims about the boundaries of 
that community that are barred?  Are there, for example, feelings about traditional Welsh 
heritage that cannot be shared or emoted because part of what makes them feelings about—also a 
substantive content of—a particular kind of Welshness is that they violate the social pact 
regarding civility? 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
◄ NATIONAL POSITIONALITY ► 
 
Taking now the point of view of identification, the reader must remind himself [or herself] as the 
author has constantly to do, of how much is here embraced by the term culture.   . . . the dartboard, 
Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into pieces, beetroot in vinegar, 19th-century Gothic 
churches and the music of Elgar.  The reader can make his [or her] own list. (T. S. Eliot, “Notes 
toward a Definition of Culture” (1948:31)) 
 
The point, of course, is that while “the reader” may make his [or her] own list the serious student 
of society may not.  To decide which activities are characteristic implies some principle of 
selection and some theory of social process. . .  Mr. Wollheim will draw Proust and Mr. Jones will 
draw Seventy Splendid Nudes and Mr. Brown will draw the Book of Revelation and I will draw 
the Niebelungenlied—and what the hell shall we all do with what we draw?  How shall we live?  
Will we be there at all—or some other kind of person with different values and tastes?  And what 
shall we add to the store of our own? (E. P. Thompson, “The Long Revolution [Review]” 
(1961a:32, 1961b:36)) 
 
 
CAPTURING NATIONALISM 
 We might imagine, if a substantive content (of consciousness) associated with the 
Cymraeg language cultural complex is to be found, that the documentation of attitudes of self-
described nationalists, or those analytically identified as communitarians, would reveal it.  
Popular discourse in Wales would instruct those who seek substance in so-called nationalism to 
seek it in expressions about language or the nation.  In a study of a more general sort of Welsh 
identity, Carol Trosset and Douglas Caulkins (2001, 2002) used exploratory statistical techniques 
in their study of Welshness.  They examined “the degree to which the behaviour and attitudes 
[presented in items used in interviews] seemed Welsh to [the participants]” and participants’ 
rating of “the degree to which they personally valued each behaviour (how ‘good’ it seemed)” 
(Trosset and Caulkins 2002:243).1  The items that they used to elicit responses were descriptions 
                                                 
1  My instrument materials included a response format in which the range and structure of responses were 
constructed prior to participants’ responses.  Such a “direct response format” is an information capture protocol or 
device that indicates a range of (dis)agreement with scenarios by means of a micro-scale with discrete positions: 
strong approval, moderate approval, and mild approval to mild disapproval, moderate disapproval, and strong 
disapproval.  The even number of positions of this six-point micro-scale ruled out a neutral position. 
 248
of everyday Welsh life, or “scenarios” that speak to issues of Welsh culture that were suggested 
by Trosset’s ethnographic research in Wales.  The following example illustrates the use of such a 
description of an everyday situation: “A university professor has tea with the workers who are 
repairing his garden wall”.  In the implied cultural context, tea is any substantial snack/meal in 
the afternoon, such as lunch or supper, and the scenario exemplifies the absence of boundaries 
between academics and laborers. 
 Trosset and Caulkins’ (2001, 2002) particular method of analysis of responses is known 
as consensus analysis.  In conventional use of this method, elicitation items are supposed to 
address what is imagined to be shared knowledge (Boster 1985, 1986; Garro 1986; Romney et 
al. 1987; Weller 1984).  The received view is that questions should not address individual 
preferences.2  With respect to Welshness or any other domain of “knowledge”, aggregates of 
more or less competent people should converge more quickly on the “answers” as a result of 
“increasing either the number of informants or the agreement among the informants” (Weller 
2007:343).3 
                                                 
2  This interpretation of statistical results exhibits an emphasis on explicit beliefs, rather than emotion—and, 
consequently, implies that preferences are not epistemic; and, conversely, that knowledge is not affect-laden.  The 
distinction between shared knowledge and individual preferences presupposes a theory of knowledge that I take to 
be problematic, where the categorization and motivation for particular knowledge claims is taken to be given, not 
produced by social actors, nor under construction at the time of measurement (see, however, Caulkins and Hyatt 
1999, and Gatewood and Lowe 2009, which address this issue). 
3  In the formal model of cultural consensus, it is assumed that: 1) the cultural reality is equivalent or the same for all 
members of the population such that it is possible to construct a valid “answer key” (whatever that might be); 2) 
each participant’s response is given independently of the other participants’ responses; and 3) the set of questions is 
homogenous.  To some extent, these assumptions establish guidelines for gauging construct validity for the 
questions (e.g., if one is concerned with construction techniques and astronomy is not recognized by experts to be a 
relevant field, the questions should not also be about astronomy), but they also are intended as criteria for cultural 
consensus itself.  If the questions are validly constructed, an outcome yielding negative correlations between 
responses reflects a lack of satisfaction of one of these assumptions. 
     Note, further, that the homogeneity assumption is construed functionally: each participant’s knowledge level is 
consistent across all of the questions.  This functional homogeneity is usually taken in a way that suggests there is 
some purely formal basis for rating the “difficulty” of the questions; if true, this would support a claim that each 
participant will answer virtually all of the questions with an equal level of (in)competence.  However, homogeneity 
need not relate to “difficulty” of the question—and difficulty is a dynamic cognitive property and not a property of a 
textual entity like a question-item.  Thus, while the third assumption is independent of the first assumption about a 
common social reality, both are concerned with how people interpret reality.  Thus, there is potential for mismatch 
 249
 I conducted a sub-study within my larger dissertation research project that expanded the 
work of Trosset and Caulkins.  Specifically, I extended their work to the domain of national 
identity as it concerns language and governance; namely, by means of scenarios that reflected 
issues of language and governance (or civic principles).  I developed new scenarios and modified 
slightly the data-collection technique Trosset and Caulkins used.4  Here, I draw out only a few 
details of that project as it relates to the issue of national identity and the objective of gaining a 
coherent image of the personally-variable content of so-called nationalism. 
 
Participants 
 This sub-study involved two site-specific groups of people found at two state elementary 
schools and ten self-described “nationalists” from three organizations, plus one non-affiliated 
independent “nationalist”.  The nine individuals who were affiliated with a “nationalist” 
organization included five members of the political party, Plaid Cymru; two members of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the experiential realm of individuals and the candidate set of questions that meets some test for functional 
homogeneity. 
     Homogeneity might also be construed, alternatively, as monotonic in politico-practical terms; that is, anyone 
whose experiences have led them to a position in the sociocultural web of relations, a result of which is that they can 
provide a generally acceptable answer to any one of the questions, will have led them to know the answer to each of 
the others.  Otherwise, there might me more than one justifiably competent response to each question.  The first and 
third assumptions, then, raise the issue of positionality, which I take to be an implicit fourth assumption—and, 
therefore, its contrast: positional non-monotonicity, which is a potential feature of a participant’s responses even 
when the responses do not conflict with the assumption of functional homogeneity. 
4  In their study of features of Welshness, Trosset and Caulkins (2001, 2002) evaluated agreement in participants’ 
ordinal responses to question items (i.e., responses that are relative ranks, as opposed to categories that items are 
sorted into and in contrast to standardized, discrete numerical positions on an arbitrary scale). Their primary use of 
elicitation materials was to test the possibility that their sampling of the population in Wales would yield consensus 
on both 1) how Welsh these scenarios appeared to the respondents and 2) agreement/approval with the scenarios.  In 
relation to these scenario-items, they recorded judgments of two concepts: WELSHNESS (“. . . how Welsh is the 
behavior in this scenario?”) and DESIRABILITY (“. . . how good or desirable is the behavior in this scenario?”).  They 
scaled these responses according to a five-point ordinal scale, from “1”, meaning, for example, not very Welsh at all, 
to “5”, meaning extremely Welsh, usually called a Likert-type scale where the number of points on the scale can 
vary from research project to research project. 
     Trosset and Caulkins interviewed residents of two towns, one in the north and one in the western part of south 
Wales, where there are more Cymraeg speakers than other parts of the south.  Trosset interviewed the residents of 
the northern village in Cymraeg, while Caulkins and other members of the team working in the south interviewed in 
English.  They made a strong case for consensus on items related to general Welsh culture, both in terms of approval 
and normative-descriptive Welshness. 
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language activist group, Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (Cymraeg Language Society); and two 
members of the activist group, Cymuned (Community).  The two site-specific groups were 
composed of teachers at two of my main school sites, Ysgol Brynpiws Gynradd (YGB) and 
Ysgol Glain y Sir (YSA).  So as to maximize variation, I strove for “100 percent” quota 
samples—all of the teachers at the two schools.  In actuality, I obtained responses from eleven 
members of the twelve full-time members of the teaching staff at YSA, and nine of the eleven 
full-time members of the teaching staff at YGB, including the headteachers of both schools. 
 
Pre-Analysis 
 Assuming the questions are on the sort of topic of which one can be knowledgeable and 
assuming that the non-random patterns in answers represents knowledge,5 one can locate the 
individuals who are most knowledgeable—that is, who are most “competent”.  Here, 
“competence” is a technical term that is measured by examining who has been among the 
majority for the most questions.  I see this variable as having less relevance to the colloquial 
meaning of “competence” and, rather, as an index that combines an individual’s stake in a 
particular game and their subjective relations to the body of supposed knowledge (i.e., 
“interest”).  If the items used are genuinely cohesive, then anyone whose experiences have led 
them to a particular position in the sociocultural web of relations from which they can give the 
most acceptable answer to a given question, will also find articulated answers among the other 
questions. 
                                                 
5  The second assumption is tested using a standard criterion of consensus by means of informal consensus analysis. 
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 Comparing different sets of questions, the same individuals were consistently represented 
among the respondents with the thirteen highest “competence” scores.6  These individuals 
included eight out of the ten self-described nationalists that I interviewed.  They also included a 
handful of teachers from both the Cymraeg-prevalent school and the English-prevalent school 
(three from YGB and two from YSA).  In addition, by identifying those scenarios that these 
“experts” have agreed on more consistently than have the non-experts, I discovered a relatively 
small number of key scenarios that, together, index the meta-discourse of nationalism.  One 
might predict that the most likely scenarios to function as key indices would be related to the 
emblematic role of Cymraeg and the associated traditional activities.  The result was a set of ten 
scenarios that spoke to certain cultural interests. 
 
The Scenario Items 
Two Primary Analytic Categories:   Situations like those discussed under the rubric of the 
Decolonization Chronotope were the inspiration for the scenarios I developed.  The broad 
categories of social life that I saw applicable to (and that were used to generate) the scenarios 
                                                 
6  I used a statistical package (Systat 13) for exploratory analysis of responses to the scenario materials.  I made use 
of two kinds of exploratory analysis—cultural consensus analysis (CA), following Trosset and Caulkins (2001, 
2002) and non-metrical multidimensional scaling (NMDS).  Informal consensus analysis was carried out on a set of 
data by way of the method of iterated principal axis (IPA) factor analysis, which evaluates the data for agreement, or 
correlations.  All three of these techniques use a common family of algebraic algorithms, with slight differences in 
how the algorithms are implemented. 
 When we arrange data tables with cases as rows and the surface variables as columns, the techniques of both 
CA and IPA involve extraction of a factor (or principal component) that accounts for the most amount of variance in 
the data.  The process then extracts another factor-component that accounts for the most amount of variation in the 
remaining variables and cases, until all of the variance in the data has been accounted for.  Eigenvalue is a German-
English language term for a unit reflecting a factor’s own (eigen) value, taken to be the standard value for each 
factor if every factor made an equal contribution.  If there are ten variables, we can expect ten units of equivalent 
variability, or ten eigenvalues.  Each object being analyzed will contribute to the eigenvalue of each factor, which is 
its factor loading.  The benchmark for determining which factors to focus on is based on the potential share of the 
variability that can be accounted for by each principal component (Shennan 1988:288-90).  Any factors over a single 
eigenvalue should be taken seriously (known as the Kaiser-criterion).  However, in informal consensus analysis, it is 
to be hoped that the first principal component will capture the bulk of variability, leaving little variance to be 
accounted for by many factors of single eigenvalue factor loadings. 
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were LANGUAGE and GOVERNANCE (which might alternatively be called “CIVIC RELATIONS”).  It 
should be noted that these two topical categories are methodological or ideal types.  These 
“pure” topical categories were further divided into the following (also ideal) sub-categories as a 
means to imagine new scenarios: 
 
L1) Cymraeg as Welshness—The Cymraeg language code signifies a strong 
criterion of Welshness; 
L2) Langua-culture Vitality—Welsh language use is an ordinary and common 
practice; 
G1) Dissent and Sacrifice—Everyone has an obligation to participate in social 
life in specific ways that reflect principles or beliefs they hold that are 
deemed unimpeachable, particularly if it involves sacrifice; and 
G2) Welsh Self-government—As a nation, Wales should govern affairs that go 
on within its territory. 
 
Using these four categories, I generated around ten scenarios for each of these sub-categories.  
These scenario items were evaluated by a focus group of five social researchers at the University 
of Wales, Bangor.  After modifying and eliminating some scenarios, I had a set of forty-one 
scenarios, which I pilot-tested at the National Eisteddfod in August 2007 (N=10).  These 
scenarios included, in addition to scenarios generated from the LANGUAGE and GOVERNANCE 
sub-categories, scenarios belonging to two sub-sets of a “CULTURAL” category.7  The CULTURAL 
scenarios consisted mostly of scenarios developed by Carol Trosset in her collaboration with 
Doug Caulkins (see 2001, 2002). 
 The scenario items listed below are scenes of ideology.  Some represent a more concrete 
representation of identity in performance and practice, while some represent a more abstract and 
explicit statement of a feature of ideology.  Even in the latter cases, however, respondents 
                                                 
7  Level Society (C1)—Welsh society is egalitarian and represented by folk (gwerin), rather than hierarchy; and 
Community Orientation (C2)—Members of Welsh society place greatest value on community, rather than on 
oneself.  See above for more details. 
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seemed able to recall an incident that matched a relatively thin description of ideology in 
practice.8 
 
Cymraeg as Welshness (L1):   The first LANGUAGE sub-category consists of eight scenarios.  
They are: 
 Overhearing a teenager discussing S4C, a man complains to his friend about the production of programmes 
in Britain that need British (i.e., English) subtitles 
 A female manager frowns at an employee who is speaking Welsh because she does not understand what 
he’s saying 
 A headteacher, who has an advanced degree in education from Aberystwyth, modifies her speech while 
shopping because she believes the shop employees will be put off by the way she normally speaks. 
(originally, used in Trosset and Caulkins’ study) 
 A first-language Welsh speaker interrupts her conversation in Welsh to greet a passerby in English 
 When Robert speaks to his friend, whose only language is English, he uses Welsh names like ‘Caerfyrddin’ 
for places in Wales 
 A shop-owner apologises for her English when she cannot remember the word for something she would 
normally say in Welsh 
 A woman from mid-Wales argues that people ought to use the Welsh language spoken in south Wales 
when in the south, and the kind of Welsh native to north Wales when in the north 
 Outside of his business, a middle-aged man refuses to speak in English to Welsh people who know Welsh 
 
Langua-culture Vitality (L2):   The second LANGUAGE sub-category consists of seven scenarios.  
They are: 
 A shop owner begins greeting people in English because there are now many more people in the village 
who speak only English 
 A young mother goes to her first eisteddfod-related event when her oldest daughter performs at school 
 A farmer delays in collecting his sheep that have wandered into the pasture of a new English couple who 
speak no Welsh, thinking to teach them something about rural Wales 
 A first-language Welsh speaker gently chides her friend for speaking Welsh to an English person 
 A gardener says he has gone to the National Eisteddfod at least every other year since he was a boy 
 A retired man makes and provides materials for expecting families to help them to use Welsh with their 
future child, in the hope that everyone raised in Wales in 20 years time will be Welsh-speaking 
 A Welsh speaker realizes that he hasn’t spoken English for at least two days 
 
                                                 
8  Prior to analysis, I thought of each sub-category as a useful grouping of items that survived pilot testing and as a 
coherent construct.  As valid as the classification of items into their sub-categories or even into their language or 
governance categories might appear, the sought-after clustering of attitudes need not conform to these pre-conceived 
categories.  These sub-categories and categories do speak to attitudes that might speak to culturally recognizable 
fields in which disagreement would be likely.  However, the cohesiveness of items within these units is indicative of 
an intellectualist approach (which was useful to generating scenarios).  As such, the units are not necessarily a 
model (in a formalist sense) of, nor bear any resemblance to, the cultural organization of ideologies “on the ground”. 
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Dissent and Sacrifice (G1):   The first GOVERNANCE sub-category consists of nine scenarios.  
They are: 
 A farmer tells his neighbor that there are no principles or beliefs worth supporting if it means the family or 
community is going to suffer somehow for that commitment 
 Gareth makes fun of his friend who supports Wales’ football side when they play against England, calling 
the outcome an inevitable slaughter 
 A former chapel-goer argues that non-Conformism might have been un-Christian since it had the effect of 
dividing people in Wales and Britain 
 A father tells his children to turn off The Weakest Link because it is well known that Anne Robinson made 
some anti-Welsh remarks 
 A published letter from a newspaper reader asserts that one should argue economic policy on the basis of 
the needs of the community and not primarily for the benefit of individuals (originally, used in Trosset and 
Caulkins’ study) 
 Two women fight bitterly because of their opposing political views 
 A father agrees to help out at the chapel’s charity sale largely because he feels guilty that he no longer 
attends chapel 
 A woman regularly buys petrol at the higher of two available local prices because the owner of that shop is 
a member of the same political party 
 Upon learning that Prince Charles will visit his town, a man begins making plans to leave town with his 
family that weekend out of protest 
 
Welsh Self-government (G2):  The second GOVERNANCE sub-category consists of nine scenarios.  
They are: 
 During the S4C program, Pawb a’I Farn, a teenager argues that devolution has been worse for Wales than 
anything else Labour has done and that Wales is better off staying united with Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
and even England 
 A council worker complains about how much Plaid Cymru talks about Welsh identity and wishes the 
Assembly would just get on with the job of running the country 
 A college student from Aberystwyth describes his nation's sense of confidence and self-sufficiency in a 
conversation with a Canadian visitor 
 A nurse argues that Wales healthcare system would be much improved if it were controlled entirely by 
Welsh people and not joined to the NHS across the border 
 A bus driver votes according to what candidates think about Wales’ place in the Union, rather than 
according to their views on economics and government programs. 
 
 While I had pilot-tested a set of forty-one scenarios, only thirty-two had been answered 
by all three sample-groups I used.  I evaluated the responses to these thirty-two scenarios for the 
thirty-one individuals for whom I had responses.  However, I understood that there was nothing 
about any individual scenario to make it essential to a set of thirty-two, or even of thirty-one 
scenarios.  The procedure of cultural consensus analysis, which Trosset and Caulkins (2001, 
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2002) used, requires a minimum of twenty items; therefore, it seemed fairly straightforward in 
that vein to locate the smallest number of scenarios between twenty and thirty-two, if any, that 
would yield consensus among the responses. 
 
Images of Consensus:   Several sets of scenario items, in relation to the total set of respondents, 
were subjected to consensus analysis.9  However, consensus analysis could not be conducted on 
Q19, since the number of items fell below the minimum of twenty.  However, the rankings and 
competence scores for participants using Q32, Q21, and Q20 are presented in Table 7.1.  This 
allows one to see the consistency in how individuals are ranked according to “competence” as 
the scenarios included in each set changes. 
 As can be seen, the same group of individuals is represented among the thirteen with the 
highest “competence” score using each of these sets (shown in bold, with PC3 as an exception).  
These include virtually all of the self-described nationalists, PC1, PC2, PC5, and PC4 (members 
of Plaid Cymru); CI2 and CI1 (members of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg); CD1 and CD2 
(members of Cymuned), but neither PC3 nor IN1 (the non- affiliated nationalist). They also 
include first-language Cymraeg-speaking teachers from both the Cymraeg-dominant school 
(YGB) and the English-dominant school (YSA): B4, B2, and B1; and S12 and S6. 
 
Narrowing the Focus:   Given a coherent image or cohesive set of values, then consensus 
analysis is likely to confirm such coherence or cohesion.  This is the case even if the field being 
investigated using consensus analysis contains variation that is impenetrable to consensus 
                                                 
9  These included the core set of thirty-two scenarios (Q32), a core set of LANGUAGE and GOVERNANCE scenarios 
(Q21), which was reduced to the sets, Q20 and Q19, in response to a couple of scenarios that did not load very well 
in analyses using IPA.  I took this to mean that the variation in responses to these scenarios was not shared to the 
same degree or in the same way as the other scenarios.   
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analysis.  That is, if an investigator supposes that the field in which the coherence or cohesion is 
recognized has scalar properties that are typically amenable to the Likert-type response format, 
then consensus analysis will indicate the coherence or cohesion, but will not interpret the scalar 
properties.  However, use of consensus analysis and creative evaluation of scores was sufficient 
to reach some very interesting conclusions. 
 
Q32 
Respondents 
Q32 
“Competence” 
Q21 
Respondents
Q21 
“Competence”
Q20 
Respondents
Q20 
“Competence” 
PC1 0.659 PC2 0.765 PC1 0.781 
B4 0.642 PC1 0.745 PC2 0.773 
PC2 0.615 CI2 0.716 B4 0.736 
PC5 0.613 B4 0.701 CI2 0.711 
CD1 0.606 PC5 0.696 CI1 0.689 
B2 0.600 CI1 0.660 CD1 0.676 
CI2 0.584 CD1 0.646 PC5 0.671 
S12 0.562 PC4 0.574 B2 0.556 
CI1 0.540 B2 0.570 CD2 0.553 
S6 0.524 CD2 0.517 PC4 0.542 
PC4 0.515 B1 0.458 S6 0.484 
PC3 0.484 S6 0.446 S12 0.459 
CD2 0.480 S12 0.442 B1 0.421 
B1 0.478 B7 0.438 B7 0.407 
S4 0.477 PC3 0.373 IN1 0.404 
IN1 0.470 B6 0.367 PC3 0.390 
S1 0.464 IN1 0.357 B6 0.368 
B5 0.453 B3 0.290 S1 0.312 
B3 0.448 S1 0.273 B3 0.279 
B6 0.439 S4 0.223 S4 0.249 
B7 0.438 S9 0.199 B5 0.206 
S9 0.402 B5 0.179 S9 0.183 
S2 0.394 S2 0.140 S2 0.145 
S3 0.384 S10 0.109 S10 0.141 
S10 0.363 S11 0.093 S11 0.109 
B8 0.355 B8 0.043 B8 0.103 
S11 0.350 S3 0.001 S7 0.034 
B9 0.342 S7 -0.011 B9 0.030 
S7 0.339 B9 -0.013 S3 0.028 
S5 0.325 S5 -0.057 S5 -0.009 
S8 0.238 S8 -0.101 S8 -0.060 
 
Table 7.1: “Cultural interest” competence values and rankings for individuals, by set (Plaid Cymru nationalists = 
PC1 – PC5; Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg nationalists = CI1 and CI2; CYmuned nationalists = CD1 and CD2; YGB 
teachers = B1 – B9; YGS teachers = S1 – S12. 
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 It is possible, as Table 7.1, shows, to identify a group with a high “cultural interest 
quotient”, which are those participants with a competence higher than 0.500.  Reassuringly, this 
group happened to include eight of the ten self-described nationalists.  This group, and the 
scenarios in which their cultural interest quotient is anchored, provides a rational basis for 
narrowing the scenario list beyond the degree to which cultural consensus analysis could be 
validly applied. 
 Thus, Q21 contained five scenarios—q1, q15, q21, q23, and q30—whose response-
averages were under 3.9 when considering the ten most “competent” respondents.  Here, strong 
approval of the underlying variable is represented by a “6”.  These scenarios (and only these 
scenarios in Q21) had lower response-averages for these “experts” than the competence scores 
for all the respondents—respectively, the expert versus collective averages for these scenarios 
were: 3.5/3.7, 3.3/3.8, 3.7/4.4, 3.4/3.5, and 3.8/4.4.  These lower averages were good reasons for 
eliminating those scenarios.  Once I had achieved that goal for a set of twenty scenarios, I 
realized there was nothing intrinsically special about consensus analysis, particularly given a 
limitation that required a minimum of twenty items.  An even smaller set might be located for 
which the self-described nationalists exhibited an expert kind of “competence” (i.e., very strong 
inter-item correlations).  Further, there was nothing of intrinsic value to any of these individual 
scenarios alone.  Indeed, statisticians on psychology department faculties would say that isolated, 
individual scenarios are meaningless, and must be taken as only a part of a whole.  The 
attitudinal scale as a totality is what yields the measurements of attitudes.  The relative value of 
these scenarios is that, after testing a large number of such scenarios, these in particular avoided 
problems in the response-context (confusion of meaning, bad phrasing, etc.) and validly 
addressed the “construct” investigated. 
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 Among the twenty scenarios, then, I discovered a set of ten scenarios that provided a 
candidate attitudinal scale for evaluating so-called nationalists in the future.  I designated this set 
“Q10” on the basis of how many scenarios each set comprised.  Q10 consists of the following 
scenarios (the right column indicates the topical category I assigned to each scenario): 
 
Scenario Items in Q10 Type of Scenario  
A young mother goes to her first eisteddfod-related event when Language/ 
her oldest daughter performs at school. (q2) Culture 
 
During the S4C program, Pawb a’I Farn, a teenager argues that Governance 
devolution has been worse for Wales than anything else Labour 
has done and that Wales is better off staying united with Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and even England. (q7) 
 
A gardener says he has gone to the National Eisteddfod at least Language/ 
every other year since he was a boy. (q9) Culture 
 
A retired man makes and provides materials for expecting Language 
families to help them to use Welsh with their future child, or 
in the hope that everyone raised in Wales in 20 years time Language/ 
will be Welsh-speaking. (q13) Culture 
 
Overhearing a teenager discussing S4C, a man complains to his Language 
friend about the production of programmes in Britain that need 
British (i.e., English) subtitles. (q17) 
 
A shop owner begins greeting people in English because there are Language 
now many more people in the village who speak only English. (q19) 
 
A former chapel-goer argues that non-Conformism might have been General 
un-Christian since it had the effect of dividing people in Wales Culture 
and Britain. (q22) 
 
A female manager frowns at an employee who is speaking Welsh Language 
because she does not understand what he’s saying. (q25) 
 
A published letter from a newspaper reader asserts that one should Governance/ 
argue economic policy on the basis of the needs of the community Culture 
and not primarily for the benefit of individuals [NB: This scenario 
was originally used in Trosset and Caulkins’ (2001, 2002) study.]. 
(q29) 
 
Outside of his business, a middle-aged man refuses to speak in Language 
English to Welsh people who know Welsh. (q31) 
 
Table 7.2: Listing of scenario items and their category types for Q10.
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The (Relevant) Results 
 The results for each sample group and for the aggregate sample are shown below as 
Figure 7.1-7.4—showing the set of ten scenarios-items designated “Q10”.  These figures are the 
two-dimensional plotting of variation in each sample with scenario items disaggregated.  Thus, 
the individual respondents are not distinguishable because each object plotted represents the 
responses from all individuals in that sample for a particular scenario item.  The plots resemble a 
geographic map insofar as distance in the sense of Cartesian orthogonal axes also represents 
difference among the different objects plotted (according to the aggregate set of responses). 
 The main result is that the scenario objects for self-described nationalists are far less 
differentiated than for the other samples (see Figure 7.3).  This means that aggregate responses to 
each of these scenario items were much more similar for this group than for the other groups.  It 
does not say anything about how varied the individuals were, but it does mean that these ten 
scenarios constitute a more cohesive group of items in the context of self-described nationalists, 
than for the site-specific groups of teachers.  Indeed, the responses by this group to these 
scenario items (with the exception of q22) are so similar as to be indistinguishable (see Figure 
7.3).  In creating such an empirically valid and statistically reliable attitudinal scale for 
“measuring” agreement in attitudes (Thurstone 1931, Likert 1932, and Guttman 1944)—a scale 
for attitudes about nationalism—standard practice would be to eliminate the exceptional 
scenario, which reads: “A former chapel-goer argues that non-Conformism might have been un-
Christian since it had the effect of dividing people in Wales and Britain”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7.1: Q10, Ysgol Glain y Sir, YGS (N=12) Figure 7.2: Q10, All samples (N=31) 
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Figure 7.3: Q10, Self-described Nationalists (N=10) Figure 7.4: Q10, Ysgol Gynradd Brynpiws, YGB (N=9) 
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 The reasonable conclusion is that this set of scenarios contains nine scenarios that honed 
in on the content of some non-random cultural interest(s) related to nationalism.  Further, the 
particular content of this collection of nine scenarios expresses a primarily language-based 
variety of nationalism—only two of the nine lacked an immediate connection to language 
issues.10  With the caveat that the sample size was too small to allow much generalization, the 
outcome of my scenario sub-study was a textbook demonstration of scaling so-called nationalist 
attitudes.  Based on the results, the set of ten scenarios, Q10, constitutes a standardized battery of 
items that, once further tested, could be repeated all over Wales to indicate variation with respect 
to the attitude represented by this set of scenarios. 
 
Naturalistic Ethnography 
 The previous three chapters detailed some contexts in which one can find symbolic 
expressions that evoke or produce a social substance related to language or the nation.  The 
scenarios I developed in my sub-study capitalize on this supposed relation between symbolic 
examples and attitudes about language or governance represented in popular discourse.  The 
result was as successful as I could have hoped.  The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from 
these results is the following statement: 
 
It is possible to identify empirically and substantiate statistically a set of common 
features for a specific unidimensional perspective on social life that is typically called 
“nationalism”. 
 
                                                 
10  It is interesting, but not especially pertinent, that my classification of scenario items into three categories—
language, general culture, and governance—fairly closely matches the arrangement of distances and similarities 
among the objects in the plotting of responses by scenario item for YGB (Fig. 7.4).  That figure shows, perhaps, 
three stances one might take toward language issues ({q17, q25}, {q2, q9, q13}, and {q19, q31}). 
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 The scenarios that represent the features of this unidimensional perspective operate as a 
high-resolution projection of the sort of thing Welsh people seem to have in mind when they talk 
about Welsh nationalism, and about language nationalism in particular.  In ordinary 
conversations about nationalism, people will recall and tell a story or two.  However they tend to 
rely on background tacit knowledge about what they mean and might not be able to articulate 
these understandings on demand.  In my sub-study, I made use of specific scenarios that speak to 
the features that make up the unidimensional perspective—resulting in richer recollections and 
better “resolution” in choosing a position on a scale.  Thus, the scenarios used here are more 
precise means for articulation.  The scenarios can be said to establish a Welsh nationalist scale, 
where this nationalism is anchored in the Cymraeg language community. 
 The result of scaling was identification of a small core of content that puts in concrete 
terms what certain people—those who answer to the interpellative call of “nationalist”—think 
and feel.  Still, what this tells us is the following: Nationalists are those for whom these three 
domains of life and identity in Wales—language, governance/civics, and general culture—merge 
into one.  These Welsh nationalists, far from being essentialists in seizing on a singular aspect of 
identity, synthesize different aspects of life into a singular image; and are essentialized, in doing 
so, by non-nationalists in a correspondingly confusing manner. 
 On the one hand, in the interests of scaling attitudes, one might downplay the differences 
among the three domains, in which case language stands out as the salient domain, symbolic of 
all items.  On the other hand, the holistic mandate for anthropologists entails that everyday 
experience involves linkages among language, civic principles, and ordinary practices.  Even if it 
might make good analytic sense to distinguish among the domains of cultural, language, and 
political nationalism, enactment of the surface position of being a nationalist in Abergwaith 
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involves stances within all three domains.  Despite this convergence of empiricist methodology 
and cultural holism, each has the same outcome.  That is, each runs roughshod over the 
differences.  This is hardly the desirable outcome of an exercise in isolating an analytic object, 
such as social psychologists strive to construct. 
 While the one-sentence conclusion in block quotes above might be accurate in some 
sense, I do not take the results to confirm the reality of such a perspective.11  I take the results to 
show two different, but complementary things.  First, the phenomenal description of the identity 
game is false.  Secondly, self-described nationalists do position themselves within a social reality 
that corresponds to the phenomenal description of the identity game.  The attitudes a nationalism 
scale would purport to represent are themselves products of a game played at a particular point 
and from a particular perspective on the game.  Social life, as a set of “realities” that encompass 
(rather than being identical to) the attitudes such a scale is intended to “measure”, is the game in 
which one makes moves to adopt or express certain attitudes.  I developed and executed a 
rigorous method that can reliably produce precise results in a valid and reliable way—results that 
represent a category of identity.  However, while it purports to offer something like a chemical 
formula, the nature of the set of scenarios (Q10) is more accurately compared to a mixed drink 
the ingredients for which one can no longer recall.  Further, although the scenarios of the so-
called nationalist scale point in different directions, lacking cohesion, it is clear that they emerge 
from the particular conditions and experiences of life in north-west Wales. 
 The consequence is that, to acquire the sort of validity I achieved, the method itself must 
become so refined that the results are incompatible with the much less precise range of purposes  
                                                 
11  My success in capturing nationalism in north-west Wales carries with it a great deal of irony, some of which 
guided the writing of this chapter—a fact that might be easily missed due to my use of the otherwise appropriate 
scientific formalities; not to mention my production of a nationalism scale in the social psychological tradition. 
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to which the meta-discourse and trope of NATIONALISM are put; the purposes to which is put the 
category of identity that is a surface position at the phenomenal level.  The standardized content 
of the nationalist attitudinal scale I developed is so peculiarly narrow, even in drawing from all 
three topical domains, that it would quickly become useless for understanding ongoing 
interactions and disagreements within the so-called nationalist camp, which is surely not a 
monolithic group. 
 By “honing” in on a certain content of a Cymraeg-based chronotope, this method reveals 
that the perspective it instantiates—one that engages with surface positions on the phenomenal 
level of Welsh society as socially real—is flawed.  This phenomenal description differs from a 
comprehensive explicative account, one this dissertation provides by means of engagement with 
those concerns with difference and cross-cultural comparison that are native to contemporary 
strands of anthropology practiced today.  In this sense, my use of scaling techniques operates in a 
way akin to a reductio ad absurdum argument.  It should, perhaps, be called a “reductio ad 
abusum” since the thrust of my argument suggests that the phenomenal description leads, of 
necessity, to a consequence that does injury or abuse to the cultural processes in north-west 
Wales. 
 My use of scaling techniques reproduces the injury or abuse in both its phenomenal and 
its analytical aspects.  That is, the surface positions of phenomenal national-positionality and 
scholarly productions about national positionality reproduce the simplified model of the dialectic 
between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, but reduce that dialectic to a dualism.  Even as 
my sub-study samples and exhibits the discourses current in the field, my nationalist scale 
reproduces the qualities shared by both discourses—communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.  
This quality is that of possessing the “air of the factual, of describing, after all, the genuinely  
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reasonable way to live” (Geertz 1957:425).  The nationalism meta-discourse informs a manifest 
reality, thereby becoming a ubiquitous and obvious part of social life in north-west Wales.  This 
discourse context is such an immediate part of social life that it might be said to have—once one 
analytically separates it from the phenomena to which it is tied—an independent, cognitive 
“existence” beyond the utterances made on any given occasion. 
 Yet, if this blending of the moral, aesthetic, and evaluative elements of a given culture, 
and of worldview is necessary to ethnography, to getting us “into” a cultural milieu, it is not 
enough to get us back out.  It creates a rhetorical model, but not an ethnographic model.  It 
reveals the rhetorical aspects of life in a given (or multiple) setting(s), but either does not provide 
a full sense of the dynamism of such rhetorical life (because it delivers only a cultural logic) or 
does not convey the rules of the game (because the theoretical elaboration of its thick description 
is not adequate to this task).  Alternatively, the rhetorical model merely stitches a cultural logic 
to a theoretical rationalization.  Blending ethos and worldview together is enough to draw us into 
a problematic field of culture, but it leaves us “there”. 
 Unlike in moral philosophy, the “naturalistic fallacy” that creates this problem is not that 
of mistaking propositions about morality to be about the “natural” order and, thereby, reducing a 
moral proposition (an “ought”) to a non-moral proposition (an “is”).12  The result of this 
naturalistic attitude is scholarly practice that reproduces ontologies of human kinds found in the 
field, rather than being the result of an epistemology of human practices. 
                                                 
12  Some background is useful here.  Half a century before Geertz (1957) interpreted the distinction between ethos 
and ideology/eidos in light of the history of western philosophy, G. E. Moore made arguments for distinguishing 
ought-claims from is-claims.  Following Hume ([1740]2007:302-306), G. E. Moore (1903) argued for a distinction 
in statements between those about what is (facts) and those about what ought to be (values), the conflation of which 
Moore called “the naturalistic fallacy”. The fallacy might better be termed “the fallacy of moral reductionism” since 
the problem is that, by mistaking propositions about morality to be about objects, whether sensible or not, one 
reduces a moral proposition (about an ought) to a proposition about objectual properties (about that which is, 
whether natural or supernatural). 
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THE NORMATIVE-INFERENTIALIST ALTERNATIVE TO NATURALISM 
 The moral (and aesthetic) aspects of a given culture have commonly been summed up in 
the term “ethos”, while the cognitive, existential aspects have been designated by the term 
“world-view” (see Geertz 1957:421, 424).  Geertz (1957) pointed out that the duality of ethos 
and worldview is a reproduction of the philosophical distinction in general cultural circulation 
between what is and what ought to be.  While philosophical traditions block their conflation (i.e., 
even naming it “the naturalistic fallacy”), Geertz argued that, in everyday cultural practices, the 
difference between “is” and “ought” is constantly conflated according to local purposes:13 
 
Morality has thus the air of simple realism, of practical wisdom; religion supports 
proper conduct by picturing a world in which such conduct is only common sense 
. . . [T]he tendency to desire some sort of factual basis for one’s commitments 
seems practically universal; mere conventionalism satisfies few people in any 
culture. . . [P]robably the overwhelming majority of mankind is continually 
drawing normative conclusions from factual premises (and factual conclusions 
from normative premises, for the relation between ethos and world-view is 
circular) despite refined, and in their own terms impeccable, reflections by 
professional philosophers on the “naturalistic fallacy”. (Geertz 1957:424, 426, 
437) 
 
In opposition to the habit of “continually drawing normative conclusions”—and with interesting 
differences to the critical tone Gal and Irvine (1995) used to discuss naturalizing essentialisms—
Geertz clearly disagreed with the philosophers and their reflections “in their own terms”.  The 
gap between natural pattern and moral reality is exactly what is at issue in the calling of attention 
                                                 
13  Given social constructivism, both the natural and moral orders are distinct, but for reasons different from those to 
which Moore (1903) was committed: they are both constituted in sociocentric processes, but determined by 
cognition that is distributed, individual, and rooted in objective reality, all at the same time.  The formal constitution 
of meaning-systems in a sociocentric process consists in what can be taken to be rules, even if they are not of some 
immutable metaphysical kind of being (à la “natural law”).  The failure to conceive of a sociocentric constitution of 
rules that emerge even in what appears to be individually isolated use, has often led to the illusion of a dilemma 
between the rejection of and commitment to formalism in meaning.  Geertz clearly did not state this as I have done, 
but I think he was on a similar course. 
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 Geertz (1957) was suggesting (or, at least, I am) that the continual drawing of normative 
conclusions from factual premises is a necessary part of meaning-making.  The creation of the 
inhabitable world as we know it through language is, simply put, what “is” (i.e., what someone 
or another believes is the case), where what “ought to be” (i.e., what someone or another believes 
ought to be the case) is derived from what “is”; often, within a given perspective (for there is no 
experience of reality without perspective), common-sense makes up the difference between what 
is and what ought to be.  Note, also, that Geertz was using “normative” in the philosophical sense 
of not merely a social expectation, but of being governed by a systemic force or potential outside 
the causal order; this concept, by its lack of specification, abstractness, and anti-naturalism gives 
rise to much philosophical debate.  This philosophical sense contrasts with the statistical and 
anthropological sense of “normative” as average or typical, whereby a particular typicality 
comes to be recognized as a felt or humanly-enforced expectation. 
 Rather than adopting a distinct combinatory notion, Geertz preferred the tension between 
the two ideal types of the affective-moral (ethos) and the cognitive-representational (worldview, 
eidos, doxa).  Thus, Geertz (1957) expressed a commitment to both ethos and worldview.14  
Ortner (1984) seems to have followed Geertz in this: 
 
All of these routines and scenarios are predicated upon, and embody within 
themselves, the fundamental notions of temporal, spatial, and social ordering that 
underlie and organize the system as a whole.  In enacting these routines, actors 
not only continue to be shaped by the underlying organizational principles 
involved, but continually re-endorse those principles in the world of public 
observation and discourse. (1984:154, my emphasis) 
  
                                                 
14  It might deserve a different, and positive name—perhaps “ethodoxy”, to contrast slightly with the connotation of 
conventionalism found in “orthodoxy”—given that people do “continually draw[ing] normative conclusions from 
factual premises” and vice versa in everyday practice to construct cultural realities. 
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For Ortner, principles of practice serve as the ethnographer’s entrée into constructed cultural 
realities relative to any agent’s confrontation with structure.  These principles surface as analytic 
concepts in Ortner’s emphasis on the ordinary—“the little routines people enact, again and again, 
in working, eating, sleeping, and relaxing, as well as the little scenarios of etiquette they play out 
again and again in social interaction” (1984:154).15 
 It is the relation of principles of practice to power, in particular, that most concerned 
Ortner (1984, 1999), rather than tacit principles sui generis.  As Ortner put it herself: “the study 
of practice is after all the study of all forms of human action, but from a particular—political—
angle” (1984:149).  Hence, this concern suggests that principles of practice need to be 
understood in relation to such concepts as Bourdieu’s (1977) habitus, and a trio of Foucault’s 
concepts: discipline (1977), governmentality (1978), and practice of the self (1988).  Ortner’s 
principles of practice, however, do not enable analysts to explain how agents’ actions and 
principles express the “intentional or unintentional political implications” of “the most 
significant forms of practice” (1984:149), nor how political implications obtain sufficient 
coherence to be expressed and to influence practices.  Ortner’s uptake of Geertz’s theoretical 
conjunction of ethos and worldview does imply (and underscore the importance of) an 
explanation of this issue: “[A]ction is constrained most deeply and systematically by the ways in 
which culture controls the definitions of the world for actors, limits their conceptual tools, and  
restricts their emotional repertoire” (my emphasis).16  Unfortunately, the terms of this implied  
  
                                                 
15  Note the resemblance these principles of practice have to Burke’s consubstantial “general body of identifications 
that owe their convincingness much more to trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcements than to exceptional 
rhetorical skill” (1969:26). 
16  The germ of this core concept of constraint, as Ortner presented is, can be found in Ortner’s principles of practice 
and in her (1984:156) agreement with the empirical variability of openness expressed in Yengoyan’s (1979) theory 
of constraints. 
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explanation of the systematic sociocultural constraints on action beg the very question about 
political import that practice theory was supposed to answer, as an improvement over symbolic 
anthropology, political economy, structural Marxism, and transactionalism.  How do they 
control, limit, or restrict ? 
 The task of providing an account of Ortner’s principles of practice is tantamount to 
explaining what might be called the “endorsement” of cultural concepts, or of particular 
metapragmatic discourses—and Ortner uses this idiom (i.e., ENDORSEMENT) in her discussion, as 
well.  In the sense I propose (following Sellars 1956 and Brandom 1988, 2000), endorsements 
“in the public world of observation and discourse” are attitudes and acts (in communication and 
other forms of interaction) that conform to or maintain systematicity in human judgments and 
that regiment the semiotic (re)cognition of systemic relations and practices.  The transformation 
of what appears to be “content” into what appears to be abstract “form” is neither empirical—in 
the ordinary sense that the image of an actual, purple sunset is—nor something individuals can 
volunteer to do.  Yet, individuals are actively involved in such processes insofar as they endorse 
certain intersubjective conceptual relations in taking up positions vis à vis a universe created 
through language use—by uttering certain utterances in given contexts and not others. 
 The notion of systematic sociocultural constraints on action presupposes there is a sheer 
potential to convey meaning in some sense—to signify at all—in the context of (non-deductive) 
inferences.  I would suggest that, hypothetically, this potential is what is manipulated to obtain  
the power to control, limit, or restrict  what we and others do.  If we call this potential by the 
shorthand, “meaning-formalism”, we can recognize meaning-formalism as the epistemological 
hypothesis “that the language we use has a much more intimate connection with conduct than we 
have yet suggested, and that this connection is intrinsic to its structure as language, rather than a 
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‘use’ to which it ‘happens’ to be put” (Sellars 1954:213).  Similarly, the same hypothesis of a 
meaning-formalism is expressed in the view that “epistemology. . . is the theory of what it is to 
be a language that is about a world in which it is used” (Sellars 1967:646). 
 Given the interrelationship of meaning-formalism and endorsement in an account of 
principles of practice, it would be worthwhile to examine each of these to a greater extent.  
Meaning-formalism clearly bears a resemblance to Kant’s synthetic a priori.  It is not surprising, 
then, that Durkheim (1995:238, 239) recognized the possibility of meaning-formalism when he 
wrote the following in his commentary on Kant’s critique of pure reason: 
 
. . . From the standpoint of observation through the senses, everything is disparate 
and discontinuous.  Nowhere in reality do we observe beings that merge their 
natures and change into one another. . . it is religious beliefs that replaced the 
world as the senses perceive it with a different one.  This, the case of totemism 
shows very well.  What is fundamental to totemism is that the people of the clan 
and the various beings whose form the totemic emblem represents, are held to be 
made of the same essence. . . 
. . . Of course the mental habits it implies prevented [hu]man[s] from seeing 
reality as his senses show it to him; but as the senses show it to him, reality has 
the grave disadvantage of being resistant to all explanation.  For to explain is to 
connect things to other things; it is to establish relationships between things that 
make them appear to us as functions of one another and as vibrating 
sympathetically in accordance with an internal law that is rooted in nature.  Sense 
perception, which sees only from the outside, could not possibly cause us to 
discover such relationships and internal ties; only the intellect can create the 
notion of them. 
 
Durkheim was making the Kantian point that reality, as pure sensory impingements, is 
unintelligible and is only made intelligible by the contribution of the intellect.  His 
anthropological point about totemism, as a corollary, can clearly be applied to the nationalism 
meta-discourse and its social effects.  The intellectual replacement for the world—the world that 
the senses conceivably would otherwise show—becomes reality.  That replacement makes 
underlying cultural processes counter-empirical and, for Durkheim, resistant to all explanation. 
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 To explain the underlying intersubjective relations beneath phenomena like totemism 
requires an assumed network of understandings about concepts and things.  There has been, in 
fact, a multi-millennia-running dialogue on the very subject I called meaning-formalism—the 
defining property of any system that is instrumental in the expression or production of meaning, 
but a property that is not functional in expressing particular meanings.17  The principals in the 
quest to articulate some such regimenting and productive system have included Aristotle, Duns 
Scotus, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, John S. Mill, Charles S. Peirce, and many others.18  
There are two major perspectives on concepts and things that can be characterized in terms of 
whichever of two key ideas are privileged.  Logicians and medieval grammarians have used the 
terms “denotation” and “extension” to signify the referential relation of words and sentences to 
things and situations that people interact with, in a spatiotemporal sense.19  This relation is 
distinguishable from the conceptual content intrinsic to and “internal” to particular minds— 
“connotation”, “intension”, “sense”, “comprehension”.  These two orienting concepts emerged  
  
                                                 
17  It does not function by marking an instance of a form (as do tokens of a syntactico-semantic constituent-form), 
nor by being the systemic form for conveying, say, the truth-functionality of a deductive system. 
18  Umberto Eco (1987) outlined the relations of extensional versus intensional treatments of meaning as they bear 
on explicit commentary by Peirce, J. S. Mill, and Saussurean semiotics.  In that commentary, he goes on to trace the 
history of the relevant terms in the medieval tradition, relating these to J. S. Mill’s usage. 
19  Notwithstanding my idealized, consensus-oriented narrative of continuity in the stable senses of 
“denotation”/“extension” versus “comprehension”/“intension”, it is obvious that this tradition was not the only one 
available for linguistic anthropologists like Silverstein to draw on in adopting the concept of denotation.  Upon 
Hjelmslev’s (1943) reconstruction of de Saussure’s distinction of signifier and signified into the planes of expression 
and content, a particular concept of denotation and connotation emerged into the canon of structuralist linguistics.  
Thereafter, Hjelmslev, Benveniste, and Barthes developed the pair of concepts further than had de Saussure. 
     Since the thing-object referred to is not intrinsic to any structural analysis of a particular language code, those 
working in the Saussurean tradition disregarded the Scholastics’ and logicians’ concept of extension.  With 
Hjelmslev’s (1943) assimilation of the Saussurean framework to traditional terms, denotation became an ideal, 
rather than an objectual relation, while connotation remained ideal.  Once denotation was made ideal, it became less 
clear how to distinguish the two.  Even today, for many linguists, the concepts stand as far apart and as close 
together as the literal, dictionary definition of a term (which is one description of denotation) and the necessary and 
sufficient conditions to be satisfied for a term to denote something (which is one description of intension).  
“Connotation” is sometimes taken to be the subjective or, at other times, intersubjective associations of words, and 
has been dismissed from some theories of semantics that emphasize reference. 
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from the medieval European grammatical and logical traditions, extending through the German 
enlightenment, through the English and Scottish renaissances, and up to recent schools.  
 Extensionalists and intensionalists experience the same general world, with ordinary 
differences in experience, but when they begin to describe the conceptual apparatus involved in 
experience, complications multiply.  Extensionalist philosophers tried to theorize language in a 
way that excluded consciousness, much as Chomsky theorized language in a way that excluded 
performance.  This occurred during an empiricism-dominated period in the history of philosophy 
in which most philosophers in the US not only placed more confidence in the formal 
concreteness of language over “ideas” (“the linguistic turn”), but also turned away from the 
general concepts that organize social actors’ particular and far-from-abstract experiences.20 
 Intensional perspectives on how to understand the concept of meaning (whether 
subjective, intersubjective, objective) are those for which categories might or might not exist 
independently of particular minds (i.e., meaning need not be determined internally to minds), but 
meaning is unequivocally constituted by minds (whether individual or communal minds).  Thus, 
it is an essential fact of intensionalism that someone might not know that Robert Allen  
Zimmerman is Bob Dylan and, therefore, understand different things based on the two names.   
 
 
                                                 
20  Often, anything that falls outside of the principles of logic that assume an extensionalist interpretation is called 
“intensional”, even though “non-extensional” would be more accurate.  That is, intensionalism is often constructed 
on the basis of the absence of standard (i.e., extensionalist) conditions.  Some conditions that cause difficulties under 
an extensionalist interpretation include making reference to things that do not exist and opaque contexts in general, 
which occur in different ways—when mentioning objects of other people’s beliefs (de dicto attitudes), when making 
reference to things that have several names of which people have varying knowledge, and when using referring 
terms that denote more than one class of things (referential ambiguity/polysemy).  When sentences fall under one or 
more of these conditions, they have been reformulated in more explicit terms, involving stipulated conditions, so as 
to render them no longer “intensional” (i.e., unacceptable) contexts.  Conditions involving layers of beliefs cause the 
most problems and most readily inspire traditional logicians to construct models that reduce meaning to reference so 
as not to address “intensional” contexts.  The extensionalists’ antagonism toward predicates (as generals) lives on in 
Silverstein’s (1985a, 1993) placing of both reference and predication into a single category, which he would never 
do for the parallel concepts of metasemantics and metapragmatics. 
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While extensional perspectives recognize that meaning requires minds in order to occur (whether 
individual or communal minds), meaning is unequivocably determined by means external to 
minds.  Thus, given the fact that Robert Allen Zimmerman is also Bob Dylan, both names have 
the same connotation and there is no possible universe in which either of these names might not 
be the designation for the named individual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. The compass rose of the space of imagining.  The horizontal orientation represents a simplification of 
sociological, psychological, and linguistic factors related to the agency of meaning—who is distributing, 
maintaining, consuming meanings and how.  The vertical orientation represents a simplification of epistemological, 
general-semiotic, and linguistic factors related to the origin/nature of meaningful contents—the necessary conditions 
for meaning.  Together, these “dimensions” are the minimal number of orientations required to make sense of 
relations among actors, language-codes, communicative situations, and cultural communities. 
     This two-dimensional figure is meant to block the conflation of a variety of considerations into a single 
dimension of meaning where signifiers have their meanings projected in signifieds.  However, I would argue that not 
even the vertical orientation can be represented unidimensionally.  The relations between world and individual that 
the vertical line in this synchronic representation represents, are themselves constituted (the horizontal line) in what 
is, minimally, a process with linguistic, cognitive, and social factors.  As a diachronic process by which the relation 
between world and individual varies according to different emergent purposes, the determining orientation defies 
synchronic representation.  
Phen) Phenomenalism 
Prg) Neo-pragmatism 
EE) Extensionalist Externalism 
Nat) Naturalism/Empiricism 
egocentric 
constitution 
objectual 
determination
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 The potential for confusion about meaning warrants introduction of two terms (see Fig. 
7.5).  Determination of a meaning has to do with the origin or locus of that which enables us to 
say there is (or is not) a meaning; and some theorists have recognized that locus as being in the 
causal-objectual order, and others in the intentional order.  Constitution of a meaning is the 
setting of use in which meaning manifests and is maintained; and it can be said to occur 
primarily either through communicative contact in a social network, or individualistically/ 
egocentrically.  It is important to see the difference between the distinct issues of the 
determination and the constitution of meanings.  Many anthropologists see the latter, but rarely 
recognize the former.  For this reason, perhaps, prominent theorists in linguistic anthropology 
(Agha 2007; Silverstein 2010; and, differently, Hanks 1996a) have articulated their models on 
the basis of a naturalistic, extensionalist philosophy of language (drawing on the work of Hilary 
Putnam).21  I would argue (as Durkheim implied) that any extensionalist perspective is 
                                                 
21  Hilary Putnam’s extensionalist externalism has been cited by linguistic anthropologists because Putnam locates 
meaning in the social realm of language communities, rather than in any individual’s head.  He expressed this view 
by stating that language is a tool that involves a “division of linguistic labor” to operate much like a battleship 
requires a crew to operate it (1974:449).  By this, he meant that individuals depend on others to construct their 
statuses as communicative participants and as users (inhabitants) of one or more languages.  Verification of 
something as being appropriately called “gold” requires jewelers or scientists as well as lay persons (Putnam 
1974:449).  However, the apparent embracing of social interaction in language use by Putnam turns out to be more 
evocative than theoretically revealing. 
     I would agree with Sellars (1974): “[T]he points he is concerned to make have little to do with the contrast 
between individual and group, and concern rather the contrast between different groups, whether they. . . are as 
isolated as the populations of different possible worlds” (1974:460).  Putnam, a content externalist for whom 
meaning has a content that is a direct function of the objectual order, did not claim any more than that society 
manages (in a range from experts to novices) the meaning of expressions such as natural-kind terms like “gold”, 
which is different from saying that society determines those meanings.  In his conception, the semantical values of 
expressions are realized by the objectual order of the “real” world.  Indeed, the physical-structural arrangements of 
the natural world are what determine whether some term successfully refers or not. 
     In applying the framework of the determination-and-constitution-of-meaning to Putnam, we can avoid making 
the mistake of conflating the two dimensions. That is, Putnam did not argue that meaningful contents are determined 
by linguistic labor that is socially organized.  His principle of socially-graduated language use has tended to 
overshadow the fact that Putnam, along with Quine and Kripke, has espoused a double externalism.  Although 
Putnam is an externalist in that meanings are constituted by a graduated distribution of use (with the recognition that 
the sociocentric constitution of meanings is limited to a causal theory of reference in which words are given their 
meanings in christenings or dubbing events), he is also an externalist in the way already mentioned, regarding the 
determination of meanings by the physical-structural arrangements of the natural world. 
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inadequate to the task because its externalist orientation fails to articulate the requisite cohesion 
among cultural concepts. 
 These ancient issues remain vital today because the cases of typification that characterize 
social judgments—such as are involved in conflicts within social interaction described in terms 
of, say, ethnicity, gender, or religion—can only be understood within the context of a theory of 
meaning-formalism and predication.  Linguistic anthropology has a theoretical framework  
regarding the relation of communicative action to context.22  However, the use of this theoretical 
tradition today is propped up on assumptions about whatever it is in which semiotic entailment 
consists (who or what entails something about the context-of-occurrence and how does it do 
so?); and many of these assumptions are fairly vague.  The assumptions involved in any 
discussion of typification or semiotic entailment imply theoretic positions regarding the relation 
of tokens and types.  One cannot address that issue without touching on the rubric of generals, 
predicate-concepts, and essential qualities.  That issue, therefore, depends on what perspective 
one takes toward the problem of predication and representation—central problems that Peirce’s 
semiotic system was meant to illuminate. 
 Only an adequately detailed account of predication can avoid a deep and wide morass of 
confusions in addressing the issues about sociocultural realities that are anthropologically 
relevant.  As suggested above, a number of philosophers (Peirce, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wilfrid  
                                                 
22  This is anchored in the Firth-Malinowski context principle that “the real linguistic fact is the full utterance within 
its context of situation” (Malinowski 1965[1935]:11) and that “[o]nce someone speaks to you, you are in a relatively 
determined context and are not free just to say what you please” (Firth 1957[1935]:28).  Later developments include 
Silverstein’s concept of “indexical entailment” (1976, 1993); Gumperz’s “contextualization cues” (1982); 
discussions of the sequential organization of cotext in conversation analysis (e.g., Schegloff 1988, especially 61-62); 
and the ethnomethodological concept of double contextuality (see Heritage 1984:242).  These form the basis for a 
nascent theory of context in which participants use communication “to constitute the culturally and historically 
organized social worlds that they inhabit”, allowing analysts to “approach[ing] context from the perspective of an 
actor actively operating on the world within which he or she finds him- or herself embedded” (Goodwin and Duranti 
1992:5). 
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Sellars, and Robert Brandom, most notably) have addressed the issue of a kind of normativity 
that fulfills what I call meaning-formalism.  Moreover, they did so in a way that can explain the  
cultural politics with which Geertz and Ortner (among others) were concerned.  Peirce called the 
philosophical perspective in which action is governed by a normativity that emerges from regular 
practice, “pragmatism”.  For want of a shorthand term, the ideological and interactional features 
of belief and perspective according to which sociocultural activities and discourses are 
performed, might be called “pragma”. 
 In the service of developing an anthropological position that does not fall prey to 
naturalism, the concept of pragma should be divided into two types, which correspond to the two 
roles that features of sociocultural practices can play.  These two types are a) an aesthetically-
evaluative, or heuristic orienting role and b) the epistemically-normative, constitutive role that 
elements of a code play.23  The former (a) might be referred to as “psychological pragma” and 
the latter (b) as “epistemological pragma”.  In psychological pragma, the relation of significance 
between two signs and their meaning(s) is arbitrary, but not constitutive of the use of the sign.  
The aesthetic relation of empirical class to member is that of token class to token (as a living 
zebra is a token of a species).  In epistemological pragma, the relation a token has to a type is 
constitutive of the conceptual (mis)taking of that token.  This norm-grounded relation of type to 
token is the relation of an abstract category or object to an instantiation of that abstract 
category/object, much as marks on a page and on a chalkboard can be differently occurring  
  
                                                 
23  This is related, but different from a development in speech act theory.  John Searle (1969) advanced Austin’s 
insight that acts of talking are also performances of social acts even in the act of saying something (where “saying” 
has a prototypically cognitive sense).  He advanced Austin’s theory of speech acts by proposing that speaking a 
language implies the existence of underlying rules that—as opposed to regulating and constraining what could be 
done with or without such rules—provide the basis for specifying behavior that could not be specified without those 
rules. 
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tokens of the same abstract sentence-type.24  The reason why naturalistic approaches reproduce 
ontologies of human kinds found in the field, rather than an epistemology of human practices, is 
that they do not distinguish (re)cognition that is merely aesthetic-evaluative from (re)cognition 
that is epistemically-normative.  The former ignores the cognitive judgments about difference 
and reifies such difference (i.e., locates difference in the metaphysical or physical domain), while 
the latter identifies categorization in the epistemic domain of agent-centered cognitive 
judgments. 
 As suggested by the discussion of extensionalism and intensionalism, the major value of 
making a distinction between aesthetically-evaluative and epistemically-normative principles is 
obscured by the several layers in ways of talking (and thinking) about different conceptual 
schemes for talking about things and concepts.  The issue can be simplified by thinking in terms 
of different worldviews within the human sciences: a naturalistic worldview and a pragmatistic 
worldview.  For some researchers, some of the categories people use, are not culturally 
constructed.  Thus, the distinction I am making manifests (though differently) at the level of 
culturally-constructed categories (e.g., as most people would describe the concept of blue) and 
natural or innate categories (e.g., as some might describe the concept of red).  On the naturalistic 
worldview, there is no distinction between aesthetic-evaluative and epistemic-constitutive 
principles for categories since any category is a matter of innate psychology or social aesthetics.  
For the radical constructivist, there are no non-culturally constructed categories.  If such a radical  
                                                 
24  What Sellars (1948:607) called “the psychologistic blunder” is the error of confusing language understood in 
terms of empirical, psychological functions, with language understood “as an epistemological category for which the 
relation of type to token is not that of empirical class to member” (Sellars 1948:608).  This is similar to the very 
pertinent, even recursively relevant, Boasian pluralist problem in which different cultures might be taken to be 
different cultural species (in the quantitative “blunder”)—that is, as token classes—or as something else.  The 
alternative is not taking the set of cultures as different tokens of a type, but as a class of types each of which is 
represented—“though the imposition of conventional meaning on the flux of experience” (Stocking 1968:159)— 
in token cultural practices.  Notice that each token is only related to a type in virtue of a judgment of recognition. 
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constructivist were a pragmatist of a certain stripe, the distinction I make would be valuable in 
separating the vast realm of thinking about the world from that part that is constitutive of 
different resources for thinking about the world. 
 The different ways in which aesthetically-evaluative principles and epistemically-
normative principles apply to colors is instructive because those two types of principles apply in 
different ways.  My distinction between aesthetically-evaluative and epistemically-normative 
principles cannot help us to understand the difference between the concept of red and the 
concept of blue.  In my opinion, blue is a culturally constructed category, as is red, for whatever 
cultural-perceptual community knows those colors (For those who do not agree with my opinion 
on color classification, they might substitute other debates.).  Thus, the difference between 
concepts of red and blue for any cultural-perceptual community lies in particular histories of 
knowledge regarding the explicit concepts of the community.25  However, the conceptual 
schemes for talking about colors and sounds and things are governed in different ways 
(psychologically versus epistemically) by the different types of principles. 
 If members of a given cultural-perceptual community debate over whether a color in 
their visual field is blue or green, this debate is motivated by a conflict in aesthetically-evaluative 
principles.  If they debate whether they are talking about a sound or a color—whether the tone of 
the bell is as blue as a bellflower—the debate is motivated by a conflict in which epistemically-
normative principles are being endorsed.  It is a part of the meaning of the concept, blue, that  
                                                 
25  Note also that whether members of a given community respond differentially to different values (of hue or 
saturation) corresponding to a color concept (e.g., red or blue) is a different issue.  This response, in my terms, is 
governed by cognitive judgments, but might not involve concepts.  The stable dispositions that manifest as 
categories in psychological experiments, given those cognitive judgments, are what most social scientists mean by 
“construct”.  The experimenter constructs those categories because they are of analytic use.  If they do correspond to 
the research participant’s set of categories, this does not make them any less a construct.  This fact just makes the 
research and its constructs valid.  Many of the constructs used in cultural research do not have such (“face”) validity. 
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blue is a color (and not, for example, a sound).  Similarly, it is part of the concept of snow that its 
instantiations be (ideally) white: 
 
To judge, for example, that snow is white is not just to represent snow and 
represent white; it is to be committed to the idea that the representable snow and 
the representable white belong together regardless of what anyone happens to 
think.  It is, in other words, to be committed to the idea that representings that 
snow is white are (epistemically) correct and representings that snow is not white 
(epistemically) incorrect. . . (Sellars 1967:638, emphasis mine) 
 
Three points suggest themselves.  First, in this example, the link between snow and white is a 
normative one, such that “representings that snow is white are. . . correct”.  Secondly, this 
normativity is of epistemic value, which is to say that it is related to the concepts involved in the 
formation of knowledge about the world.  Other conceptual relations would imply other 
understandings of the world, and vice versa; any of which would involve different language 
worlds.  Thirdly, therefore, this epistemic normativity—and particular, occurrent endorsements 
that instantiate it—is a feature that is part-and-parcel of any network of language use.26 
 
NATIONAL POSITIONALITY 
Some Varieties of Positioning 
 The presentation of a normative-inferentialist alternative to naturalism provides a 
platform for theorizing the way members of a putative community can find grounds for 
positioning others.  In the process, of course, the sociocultural reality—what Durkheim attributed 
to the intellect, but which we can now locate in a space sociocentrically constituted and 
cognitively determined—replaces a reality that is the paragon of objectivity.  Since objective 
                                                 
26  Most logicians would deem an inference such as, “It is raining; therefore, the streets are wet”, to be (formally) 
invalid because it does not explicitly state a generalization about the relevant weather and its effects on the street.  
By contrast, Wilfrid Sellars (1953, 1954a) argued that this inference is valid as a “material” move.  That is, the 
inference is valid—in everyday epistemic contexts—in terms of its conceptual substance. 
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reality cannot be conceived of independently of sociocultural reality, it is clear that the empirical 
reality of an objectivist existence is just as theoretical as the sort of reality that has now come to 
be recognized as being socioculturally constructed.  The positions people in Wales imagine their 
fellows to occupy are constructed through the separate and various endorsements people make in 
everyday life.  Awareness of the fact that these empirical positions are shaped by the inferences 
and judgments people make, but of which few are aware, should allow us to become more 
cognizant of the counter-empirical reality; and to make the counter-empirical, empirical. 
 This progressive alternation from one model of objectivity to the next explains my failure 
(productive as it was) in trying to capture positions of Welsh nationalism.  The static positions I 
did “capture”, reveal the “indexicality” of identity.  That is, the positions are analogous to 
Silverstein’s (1985c, 2004) deictic metricalized (mapping-)relations between texts at his 
denotational plane and interactional texts—but “occur” at the metadiscursive, rather than the 
textual order.  Yet, they do not reflect the “background” cultural dynamics.  Knowing about the 
possibility of the cultural dynamics that lie beyond the empirical reality that enjoys a current 
objective status is helpful here; and, in the previous chapters, we have seen more than a merely 
possible cultural dynamics.  The more ordinary situations in Wales now take on a different light. 
 Just as cultural identity becomes less ambiguous for people in Abergwaith when language 
is the salient factor, their own image of themselves affects how they classify other people into 
non-overlapping categories.  Consider Trosset’s (1993) neutral explanation of a woman who, 
based on what Trosset recounted, seemed to reject Cymraeg-oriented language nationalism.  This 
female guest house owner thought Cymraeg was unnecessary in official settings.  She told 
Trosset “about the rudeness of a young woman guest” who was learning Cymraeg and insisted 
on speaking it and using Cymraeg words even for cities outside the language’s imagined  
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jurisdiction (e.g., using “Caeredin” for Edinburgh in Scotland)—much as I am using “Cymraeg” 
(instead of “Welsh”) for Cymraeg in an English-language context.  Yet, the guesthouse owner 
spoke approvingly of a Canadian man who continually asked her for the Cymraeg word for 
things.  Trosset concluded as follows: 
 
It is likely that her different responses to these two people were related to the 
ways they tried to position her Welshness in relation to their own: the man treated 
her as an authority and sought Welsh knowledge [of Cymraeg, that is] from her, 
whereas the young woman claimed a high degree of Welshness by using words 
the native speaker did not know. (Trosset 1993:39).  
 
 That is a highly plausible explanation.  Moreover, Trosset’s explanation exhibits, 
implicitly, the social space in which the cultural blurs into the political and vice versa.  
Trosset did not highlight that blurring, but she did provide a discursive context: Trosset 
used the term “rudeness” to describe the young woman’s excessive language practice.  
Although it is unclear whether she was indirectly reporting the implied stance or 
conveying an explicit attitude of the guesthouse owner, there is a sense that something 
more is going on than a social slight.  What is crucial is that “trying to position her 
Welshness” can be—in this case was, and often is—interpreted as rude.  It is this act-type 
of positioning that is of broader significance. 
 Despite the fact that the arenas differ in terms of choice and range of action, I believe the 
same category of everyday cultural life is being evoked both when the NSF reviewer objected to 
my studying nationalism in classrooms because it seemed too political (quoted in Chapter Four) 
and when Trosset conveyed the guesthouse owner’s sentiment toward the female guest.  This 
same sort of event occurred, as we saw in Chapter Four, when Tom wanted to know if I was 
Saesneg [English-language] or Cymraeg.  Of course, people will have different ideas about the 
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degree to which something is “rude” or “nationalist”.  Moreover, what one person deems to be 
rude, another might find to be proper and prescribed behavior for the context.  Hence, it is 
important to evaluate both the conventional range and the “directionality” or valence for 
rudeness. 
 If this point is generalized to various social settings, then issues of choice and range of 
action are salient—with respect to this point that the same category of everyday cultural life is 
being evoked by referral to rudeness or nationalist.  Clearly, the guesthouse owner was willing 
to be patronized economically by a chronically rude person, and there are many areas of social 
life in which such associations are voluntary.  In such areas, the guesthouse owner might 
exercise her right to avoid people deemed to be rude.  Settings for social interaction that are 
voluntary might have selective or open membership.  Even in the latter—such as chapel or 
church life, choir groups, women’s groups, activities in the local pub—members cannot choose 
who they will associate with and “rude” social interactions are more likely to occur.  Where a 
committee screens membership applications, there are often surprises (as an extreme example, 
consider confirmations for US Supreme Court justices, who sometimes express opinions at odds 
with their expected ideologies).  In official, non-voluntary social settings, such as schools, public 
policy makers and administrators would require more careful monitoring of a “rudeness” that 
involves positioning other people’s Welshness; specifically, as nationalist. 
 The discourse about nationalism is such an immediate part of social life that it might be 
said—once one analytically separates it from the phenomena to which it is tied—to have an 
independent, cognitive “existence” beyond the utterances made on any given occasion.  Because 
of its fluidity, I find the notion of position implicit in positioning to be limiting in making 
analysis of discourses about nationalism in Wales tractable.  What I am more concerned with is 
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the learned system of resources and constraints that people engage with in taking up—what have 
become, through an analytically distinct process, recognizable as more or less discrete—
positions.  “Positionality”, then, would seem more apt.  For Holland et al. (1998), this term 
“refers to the fact that personal activity (the identified action of a person) always occurs from a 
particular place in a social field of ordered and interrelated points or positions of possible 
activity” (1998: 44).  However, while this conception emphasizes perspective, it locates it in 
transpersonal and determinate “points and positions”, reinforcing the discreteness of positions. 
 Wortham’s concept of interactional positioning, drawing on work by Kenneth Gergen 
(1992 (with Kaye), 1994, 1999) is better at capturing the contextuality of production, and the 
process of recognizing positions.  For Wortham (2001:9), in communicative interactions, people 
“presuppose a certain version of the social world and position the narrator and audience with 
respect to the social world and to each other”.  Thus, positions are generated in context and, 
while they might become recognizable with repetition, they require explanation in the context of 
their use.  Moreover, Wortham makes (re)cognition an explicit part of the concept: 
 
“Something more flexible than rules mediates between the cues in an utterance 
and the interactional positioning that utterance accomplishes. . .  Hearers first 
attend to (sometimes conflicting) cues in utterances, on the basis of which they 
next select aspects of the context as relevant, and they then apply rules (or 
presupposed regularities) to determine what positioning is going on” (2001:36). 
 
On the other hand, where Wortham was concerned with positioning in an interactional setting, I 
am concerned with positioning in an interdiscursive milieu.  While communicative interactions 
impose their own sort of constraints and frames for motivation with respect to how participants 
interact, so do interdiscursive milieux like those in Abergwaith.  One framework for discussion 
of these constraints and contexts for motivation is presented in the remaining part of this chapter.
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Construing “Nationalism” in Terms of “National Positionality” 
 The popular insistence on deploying the frame of nationalism is often jarring, but all the 
more ubiquitous because it seems to fit the realities I experienced in Wales.  Geertz (1973:253-
254) made the rather useful comparison of nationalism to religion, which addresses both the 
controversial key in which nationalism tends to appear and the way it acts as a lens in shaping 
perception. 
Rather like religion, nationalism has a bad name in the modern world, and, rather 
like religion, it more or less deserves it.  Between them (and sometimes in 
combination) religious bigotry and nationalist hatred have probably brought more 
havoc upon humanity than any two forces in history, and doubtless will bring a 
great deal more.  Yet also rather like religion, nationalism has been a driving force 
in some of the most creative changes in history, and doubtless will be so again in 
many yet to come.  It would seem, then, well to spend less time decrying it—
which is a little like cursing the winds—and more in trying to figure out why it 
takes the forms it does. . . 
 
Researchers could make more progress in trying to figure out why so-called nationalism takes 
the forms it does in Wales if the simplistic set of relations called nationalism were recast in terms 
of a complex game I call, “national positionality”.27  This phrase makes it easier to recognize that 
nationalism is a category of colloquial discourse and is not an analytic category. 
 In the context of north-west Wales, the normalizing projection of a consensus-oriented 
conventionality in public discourse has a simplifying effect on the recognition of nationalism—
whether as a discourse or as a diversity of positionings.  This might be expected, given popular  
                                                 
27  The lack of a concept that embraces both extremes of this phenomenon in Wales—nationalism and national 
identity—impeded my progress in this research and, profoundly hampered my ability to recognize something.  This 
something is the cultural and language resources that are used to give shape to it and that people use to express some 
position within its range.  The first step was to recognize the identity orientations that operate independently of 
language preference.  Once these orientations were identified, it became easier to see the ways in which individuals 
and socially constructed realities modulate the expression of national identity in the public sphere under different 
disciplining regimes and through (individual and collective) use of different cultural and linguistic resources. 
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and academic ways of imagining democratic societies, particularly in the image of “the public 
sphere”.  As the irregular typefaces used, suggests, some (e.g., Fraser 1990) have taken the first 
two words of this three-word phrase to be problematic. 
 Habermas’ (1989) notion of the public sphere has been influential to the point that even 
the most critical commentators accept something like a public sphere in their sociological 
imaginings.  Nonetheless, theorists have found much in that normative model, based on a 
historical description of a transformation of bourgeois society in the Eighteenth Century, with 
which to disagree.  One sort of critique (e.g., Fraser 1990) has challenged Habermas’ image of 
public life on three accounts.  First, his description of reasoned debate does not reflect the 
communicative varieties found in strata of general society within a state other than bourgeois 
society.  Second, Habermas’ notion of a singular sphere presumes that an unexamined social 
consensus motivates public deliberation, as is suggested by such anchors of deliberation as “the 
common good”.  Third, the supporting ideal of a bourgeois, liberal-minded, and calmly 
intellectual rationality that informs deliberation is needlessly restricting.28  The different tradition 
of theorizing “publics” has taken a perspective that is less normatively skewed toward an 
unexamined and narrowly construed social consensus (Thompson 1961a:29-33; see also Gal and 
Woolard 1995 and other articles in that issue of Pragmatics).  Instead, the publics approach 
emphasizes contestatory and often highly emotional forms of transacting attitudes toward the 
issues of the day. 
 Recent discussions have raised questions about how social actors are held responsible for 
talk (Hill and Irvine 1992; Irvine 1992) and about what is and what is not of concern to a specific  
                                                 
28  Some (e.g., Polan 1990:260) would even take the particular rationality with which Habermas is concerned, to be 
“a show, a spectacle in which truth is not a content but, á la Russian Formalism, a device, an alibi, to get excitement 
going, to make a scene”.  That is, some emotional content is allowed, but only as a response to a supposed violation 
of a particular norm of rationality in which the idea of truth becomes a stage in a taken-for-granted theater of 
discourse. 
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set of participants in “public” arenas (Fraser 1990).  Language nationalism in Abergwaith is a 
good source of examples of contestatory and highly emotional modes of expressing a political 
will in public arenas, which resonate with the modes Fraser (1990) had in mind.  It is precisely 
these modes that make them “easy targets” for associations with a pejorative kind of nationalism.  
In effect, in response to those modes of expression—seen from the liberal-individualist 
perspective as disorderly (see Urciuoli 1996 and Hill 1998) and as “annoying exceptions” 
(Rosaldo 1993:28)—well-positioned members of the public sphere bundle the variety of attitudes 
carried by language activists together under an appearance of similarity and presume that these 
attitudes belong to some singular form of nationalism.  Consequently, few members of Welsh 
publics have a reason to think deeply about what nationalism amounts to as a set of practices or 
attitudes—even while those who feel Cymraeg to be central to their own identity would have 
much to say about this, but would not thicken the sense of sharply segregated duality.  Indeed, 
those who think the “deepest” about what nationalism amounts to as a set of practices or attitudes 
tend to express views that resemble the reflective (multivalent) nature of the comments of the 
NSF reviewer mentioned in Chapter Four.  However, because these practices and attitudes are 
categorized as nationalistic—as opposed to a more positively valued category, such as 
patriotic—they are deprived in public spaces of some degree of the legitimacy that might be lent 
them as pursuits of active members of the public. 
 This complex field of social action involves a system of relations in which emergent 
positions can be differentiated due to attitudes toward languages and related language ideologies.  
The system of relations includes acts of taking and legitimizing positions regarding the nation 
and the conditions for occupying such positions, which people might believe they occupy as a 
result of acting jointly, or interacting civilly.  It is this broad range of positionality that makes the 
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discourse about nationalism socially efficacious for positioning others; and, therefore, it is 
divisive, and ethnographically problematic.  The symptoms of so-called nationalism can create 
ruptures in the appearances of intersubjectivity (as briefly noted in my critique of hypostatizing 
“the current political situation” in Chapter Four).  Mutual belief that others and oneself are acting 
jointly can be disrupted both when it appears that what an interlocutor is doing is nationalistic 
(or can be so-reconstructed by reanimating an utterance in a more politicized context) and where 
a person would not welcome “nationalistic” performance.  The first condition—the appearance 
that what an interlocutor is doing is nationalistic—can also present itself to those who feel an 
affinity toward Wales, use Cymraeg in their daily life, and seem to bear all the other locally 
recognizable markers of being a nationalist.  However, a social assertion of nationalism has the 
effect of rupturing the appearance of joint action only when people take nationalism to be 
unwelcome. 
 Such ruptures are indicative of problems in constituting phatic communion or 
community.  They are (tacit or explicit) points of conflict over the endorsement or rejection of 
principles—whether these are principles of interaction or community.  Such ruptures equally 
might be points of conflict over whether the principles in question can be decided on the basis of 
social agreement or whether they are rooted in fundamental principles of community.  The 
former involves merely aesthetically-evaluative principles and might apply to sophisticated lay 
persons or to an ethnographer’s sense of proprieties about culturally constructed concepts.  The 
latter involve epistemically-normative principles and might best characterize the essentializing 
and naturalizing treatment of a language by those who speak it and give it pride of place.  In 
taking this multidimensional approach to analysis, one can avoid speaking pejoratively about, 
say, the essentialist beliefs of language activists.  Further, through this multidimensional 
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approach to analysis, one can come to understand how the politics of language can generate 
beliefs that are constitutive of a language demesne or a language corridor out of what appear to 
be merely the boundaries of a (potentially global) language community.  If a social actor treats 
some concept (e.g., the role of Cymraeg as national emblem) as constitutive in some way over 
and above human intervention, then it is inappropriate to treat it as a merely aesthetic notion.  
Such an actor (even lacking any like-minded compatriots) creates a community on the basis of an 
epistemically-normative concept of community—as surely as blue is a color, not a sound. 
 The category of everyday cultural life described in this section—national positionality—
is visible largely in terms of the instrumental claims that constitute what I call “surface 
positions”, and not the substantive content of an ethnolinguistic consciousness.  To be effective, 
national positionality would need to be understood to include substantive claims of a social 
consciousness.  This fact forces one to choose either 1) to accept the surface positions as genuine 
features of the social reality being described and analyzed, or 2) to conceive national 
positionality as an analytic category of a higher conceptual order than the usual concept of 
(surface) positions.  If indigenous Welsh constructs are incompatible with the surface positions 
of everyday (and academic) discourse that are dominated by a discourse about nationalism, as I 
am claiming, then a higher-order concept of national positionality (in option 2) would itself 
“include” the fact of that incompatibility within its scope.  Accordingly, national positionality 
would not take surface positions such as “nationalist” as its empirical matter, but would take, as 
its empirical matter, the complexly dynamic system of politics of language and community that 
produces such incompatibilities.  It is this latter conception I use “national positionality” to 
signify, which is more amenable to the dominant–subordinate binomial structure of official 
languages in Wales. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
◄ LANGUAGE GAMES1 IN WELSH STUDIES IN WALES ► 
 
. . . [A] dominant social character plus a structure of feeling plus the direct intervention of power 
plus market forces and systems of promotion and reward plus institutions can make and constitute 
together a system of ideas and beliefs, a constellation of received ideas and orthodox attitudes, a 
“false consciousness” or a class ideology which is more than the sum of its parts and which has a 
logic of its own. . .  [T]here may be an impression of openness over a wide area and yet still at 
certain critical points quite other factors—of power or of hysteria—come into play. (E. P. 
Thompson, “The Long Revolution [Review]” (1961b:37)) 
 
[F]or each basic factual word in the language there are one or more logically synthetic universal 
sentences which, as exhibiting the rules for the use of these words, have the status of “necessary 
truths” of the language.  These sentences are those into which a user of the language would insert 
the words “must” or “necessary.”  He would say that what they express is necessarily so, as 
opposed to what just happens to be so. (Wilfrid Sellars, “Language, Rules and Behavior”, §35 
([1949]1980:131) 
 
 
 The demographic existence of the two official languages in Wales plays some role or 
another in how people think about language realities there—laypersons and academics alike—no 
matter their ideological or intellectual orientation.  Since the content of these ways of thinking do 
shape the way social actors understand their own membership in local communities, their sense 
of the realities of language and community affects their cultural affinities.  The walls of 
universities are no more of a hindrance to the entry of cultural or language nationalism than they 
are to the coal fumes that waft through village streets and towns.  This makes for an interesting 
meta-theoretic dialectic about the scholarly discussion of identity.  The pursuit of an indigenous 
                                                 
1  The phrase, “language games”, in the chapter title comes from a widely circulated and loosely (mis)interpreted 
concept of the highly original analytic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953).  In part, I use the phrase in ironic 
allusion to the habit of this overgeneralizing use in the social sciences, according to which any contextual use of 
language is thought of as a language game.  More pertinently, I use “language games” to highlight that language 
codes have a serious political role—even if a “stress on the politics of ethnicity. . . reduces cultural identity to a 
utility function” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:44).  That point is taken up in this chapter in terms of the cultural 
significance of state-recognized language-codes as they figure in specific academic discourse in Wales.  Laypersons 
often deem such communications as trivially “academic”—dismissively, as games—but these games on the subject 
of language are anything but trivial.  I also use “language games” because the underlying principle that Wittgenstein 
established through his skeptical, dialectic philosophical investigations provides my way out of a practical problem 
of analysis that this dissertation addresses, though this “solution” is not explicitly presented in this dissertation. 
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modernity is sometimes at odds with scholarly interests, yet is frequently carried bodily into—
embodied by people who enter—the offices and seminar rooms in Welsh universities.2 
 The Welsh logic of heritage (see Chapter Four) has implications for interpretive work in 
Welsh Studies.  This chapter describes its manifestation within the Welsh academy.  I introduce 
the pattern in Welsh Studies here as the most salient instantiation of those issues of historicity 
and language that previous chapters addressed.  Most tellingly, the two major orienting 
perspectives on Welsh identity in Welsh society are found among those in Welsh Studies of the 
academy in Wales. 
 Recall from my introductory statements of my main argument that there is a cultural 
dialectic at work in Wales.  It is constituted by the tensions between those who do not participate 
in the language-cultural complex—and either ignore or reject any focus on the substantive aspect 
of that complex because they think such a focus would be reductivistic—and those who do 
participate in that complex—but who feel they cannot express it to those who do not participate 
in it and, thus, cannot position themselves within it.  These orienting perspectives highlight the 
major issue of contention in this dissertation and its empirical field: the idea at the heart of the 
“strategic use of positivist [sic] essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest” (Spivak 
1988:13), that of asserting the more-than-socially-constructed real existence of socially-
constructed cultural communities.3  Although the orientations correspond loosely to the 
opposition of essentialism and constructivism, the latter categories are transformed in those 
settings of practical-intellectual engagement, as might be expected. 
                                                 
2  I do not suggest that what might be collected together under the umbrella term of “Welsh Studies” is unique in this 
respect.  In fact, I mean the opposite.  I point to an essential rhetorical dimension in scholarship which manifests in 
generally cross-culturally comparable ways with locally particular outcomes. 
3  The preoccupation in anthropology with “positivism”, so misidentified (as I see it), is more aptly referred to as a 
commitment to naturalism, which comes in more or less palatable versions, some of which move under the radar of 
those scholars set on exposing “positivisms”, perhaps even explaining their own preoccupation with a misidentified 
positivism. 
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THE WELSH STUDIES SCHISM 
Crisis of Identity 
 The identity dialectic in Wales with its two orienting perspectives is analogous to the 
tensions in anthropology that Marcus and Fischer (1986) called “the crisis of representation in 
the human sciences”.  In US-based anthropology, there are a diversity of opinions about the 
contexts that give rise to such a crisis and the consequences of it, but practice has led to the 
entrenchment of two options, which can be stated in more or less general terms.  Generally 
speaking, these options involve a search for or a denial of coherence, particularly where cultures 
figure as explicit topics of representations.  It is a welcoming of or suspicion toward “the ability 
of encompassing paradigms to ask the right questions [and] provide answers” (Marcus and 
Fischer 1986:9).  The paradigms of interest are those expected, or assumed to fail, to provide 
some coherent account.  This might be an account of “conditions within American society [and] 
Western societies globally, which seem to be in a state of profound transition” or, more broadly, 
an account of “the variety of local responses to the operation of global systems, which are not 
understood as certainly as they were once thought to be under the regime of ‘grand theory’ 
styles” (Marcus and Fischer 1996). 
 In Wales, not surprisingly, those who participate in the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex have had long experience with the lack of confidence and uncertainty that comes with 
changes in the conditions of life (social, economic, political, linguistic, geographical).4  It is even  
                                                 
4  It is interesting that famous anthropologists bearing “obvious” Welsh names seem to follow a pattern common to 
Welsh émigrés, including Lewis H. Morgan and Evans-Pritchard.  These two anthropologists located their own 
identities in broadly cosmopolitan and even imperial communities of some regional “provenance”—New England 
and southeastern England, respectively—and not in an ancestral Wales.  Barth (2005:32) specifically classified the 
latter as an Englishman, and Leach recognized him as “a very English Englishman despite his [double-barreled] 
Welsh name” (quoted in Tambiah 2002:481n53).  I think there is a common feature between Wales’ national crisis 
of representation and this pattern among Welsh émigrés, whose diasporic historical imagination runs counter to, say, 
“the Irish experience”: Welsh immigrants seem to stop claiming to be Welsh in earlier generations. 
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possible that, much as the methodological objectification of culture in Twentieth-Century 
anthropological discourse became conventionalized among those defending “their own” culture, 
the crisis of representation is similarly becoming convention in the assembly halls, pubs, post 
offices, chapels, and town halls across Wales in the Twenty-First Century.  If true, one should 
expect to see, among laypersons and scholars alike, as part of the Zeit-geist, what Marcus and 
Fischer described as “a loosening of the hold. . . of either specific totalizing visions or a general 
paradigmatic style of organizing research” and cultural recognition (1986:8). 
 It is certainly true that even mundane topics, such as which historical figures belong in a 
Welsh national history or which language the locals usually speak in a particular pub in 
Penrhyndeudrath, are inextricably tied to culturally particular tensions about the privileging of 
ethnic and political identities with apparent continuities (old or recent) in imagining Wales.5   
                                                 
5  It might be that there is such a “loosening” of scholarly authority, but the value of this observation about the 
percolation of the crisis of representation into lay society lies in noting that this appropriation of a discourse by 
laypersons does not unsettle scholarly authority of scholarly collectives.  Indeed, the crisis of note does not even 
need to be real or to mark a real schism within modernist-interpretivist anthropology.  Rather, the crisis of 
representation could be construed (and diminished, in the process) as an application of the Boasian idea—now 
directed at the idea of culture as a cultural feature—that culture is a sociocentric process with an unfolding history 
that actors produce jointly, rather than as something that individuals invent. 
     Marc Goodwin’s (2011:41) depiction of Adorno’s attempt to answer the question of why the new (Modernist) art 
in the 1920s was so difficult to understand, is enlightening.  Adorno argued, according to Goodwin, that it is not due 
to the whim of the individual avant garde artist, but to the socioeconomic context of the production of art—where 
Adorno argued that religious function was no longer the center of art production.  The “new art” emerged just as art 
was being conceived as a domain itself in which art pieces were exchanged and consumed, moving beyond the 
artists themselves.  Artists responded to this cultural context, in which their work was degraded in artistic value 
through popular consumption, with their own language, which defied commoditization. 
     Similarly, culture consumed through analysis is different from culture regarded as generalized human nature, 
producing an analogous “degradation”.  With this change in perspective of the idea of culture, the idea itself then 
begins to change—giving rise to the need to protect disciplinary boundaries in the “marketplace of ideas”.  Analytic 
practitioners of the “new culture”, in the academy or without, develop new languages for analysis.  The latter must 
obtain a level of difficulty that keeps out “the riff-raff”.  In this reading, Marcus and Fisher’s thesis of a crisis of 
representation is an avant garde restatement of the idea of culture after it has been appropriated by academic and lay 
“others”; while more traditional anthropologists feel they have already been addressing the same thing prior to the 
nouveau restatement.  This reading maintains the validity of the original issue.  It can be treated as “epistemological 
hypochondria” (Geertz 1988:71) only on pain of neglecting the sociocentric process and socioeconomic context of 
the production of academic discourse. 
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Some people take up clearly delineated “sides” in the face of such tensions, while others seem to 
despair, believing that these problems are as intractable as they are unavoidable. 
 All scholars carry their interests bodily into academic halls, and scholars are the canaries 
in the coalmine of a crisis like that Marcus and Fischer (1986) described.6  Welsh scholars were 
already in the throes of the implications of the idea that tradition is invented (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983) when the crisis of representation in the human sciences was announced in the US 
in 1986.  As Day (2002:8) wrote, after citing several illustrious texts from the mid-1980s (Curtis 
1986; Smith 1984; Williams 1985): “[I]t has become almost obligatory in recent years to note 
how variously Wales is imagined, represented, and packaged, and to acknowledge the confusion 
that exists about which of these accounts, if any, is closest to reality”. 
 In Wales, situated against the fading glory and inequalities of the British Empire, 
however, the situation has been more complex than that in elite research-focused academic 
institutions in the US.  A crisis of identity and culture already prevailed when something like 
Marcus and Fischer’s crisis of representations “arrived”.  As theorists in Wales (and other parts 
of Britain) tackled the problems of representation, largely through the “invented tradition” school 
(again, see Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983, particularly Morgan 1983), a pattern of reversal 
established itself over the 1990s.  Thus, scholars who felt the cultural crisis of identity as part of 
their daily lives were furnished with the tools to decenter those academic observations that they 
saw as English-centric, in both language and ethnic-cultural terms.  Consequently, they gained 
greater confidence (during a decade of growing confidence among the Cymraeg-speaking 
populace).  Yet, to critique English-centrism effectively requires real targets (regardless of 
                                                 
6  In their personal histories, scholars everywhere consent to or shape their own positionings, in turn by themselves 
and by others.  However, this shaping locates them relatively close to or far from the center of recognizable domains 
within the broad space of belonging, subjectivity, and society.  That is, they do not manufacture their identities out 
of whole cloth.  Ironic detachment is itself a variably scarce resource; and not even scholars can remain in full 
supply of it in every moment. 
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whether they are deserving of the criticisms leveled at them).  At the same time, those 
intellectuals who were confident in “ ‘grand theory’ styles” of social research were, also, inclined 
to deconstruct the grandiose essentializing and “nationalistic” images of a primordial Wales 
whenever a grand narrative rooted in the primordial Welsh past appeared.  Thus, Welsh Studies 
own “cultural wars” (to use a phrase that refers to certain debates in the US academy of the 
1990s) were waged in a setting in which each side took up the critical arguments and 
“postmodern” tools of new modes of analysis. 
 In Welsh Studies in Wales, the conflict about what form (if any) a crisis in representation 
has taken, functions as a social, scholarly, and cultural schism.  This schism cannot be 
represented as a strict contradiction—most so-called “contradictions” should not be so 
represented—because each position cannot be stated in strictly opposite terms.  Rather, the 
schism exists because each opponent does not find the opposing position fully intelligible or 
compelling.  Most simply stated, the schism is made of two “sides”.  One “side” is (pre)occupied 
with the relations of power in representation differentially available to the Cymraeg-speaking 
population, relative to the circulation of English-language representations.  The other “side” is 
(pre)occupied with reliably representing perceptions and groupings of Welsh identity, while 
maintaining, in the formulation of their analytical constructs, the tenuous balance between those 
who are and those who are not part of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex. 
 Indeed, the growing sense of confidence in Cymraeg-speaking Wales seems to make the 
contingent that is not involved in the Cymraeg language-cultural complex less confident about 
making sense of Wales from a sociological perspective.  Although there was no pool of 
confidence that would shrink if either side partook of it, the use of the new ability of one group 
of scholars to de-center the other side’s authorities led to a loss of confidence among those with 
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affinities to the targeted, traditional (English-language sociological) authorities.  This led to the 
creation and consolidation of the side that is not involved in the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex as a reaction to attacks on its authorities. 
 
Schismatic Conversations 
 The setting I have chosen for discussing the schism in Welsh Studies in Wales is a 
symposium conference of Welsh Studies scholars, the comments of which were published in the 
January 2005 issue of the journal, Contemporary Wales.  The subject of the symposium was 
Graham Day’s book, Making Sense of Wales (2002).  A sociologist at the University of Wales in 
Bangor in north-west Wales, Day has shown a concern for the methodological issue of reliability 
in sociological studies, which has the unintended consequence of conservatively favoring the 
status quo.  Unintended conservatism notwithstanding, his concern with accurate representation, 
without showing undue loyalty to the minority segment in Wales, is characteristic of one “side” 
of the Welsh Studies schism. 
 The most stringent and analytic criticism of Day’s book—in the published comments—
came from Charlotte Aull Davies.  Davies was trained in mathematics and anthropology at US 
universities, did her anthropological fieldwork in Wales, and later took up a faculty position at 
Swansea University in Wales.  She has written a very valuable account of historical nationalism 
in Wales and, since the 1990s, she has been directing attention for some time to the importance 
of reflexivity in social research.  The research stance she displayed in her published comments 
for the symposium can be associated with scholarship on the Cymraeg-speaking segment that is 
of a self-consciously progressive stripe.  Davies commented positively on the work of Williams 
and Morris (2000), which she characterized as addressing “the language [Cymraeg] as a force 
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structuring social groups and affecting economic prospects (for example, the over-representation 
of Welsh speakers in rural areas in unskilled and semi-skilled manual employment)” (Davies 
2005:212).  Davies demonstrated concern for the politics of language and community that 
structure research and that result in links between ethnic or cultural differences and economic 
disadvantage. 
 Davies (2005) targeted Day not only because his book was the object of criticism, 
collegial and otherwise, but because she thought he sided with the hegemonic aspects of English-
language, capitalist society—for offering, in her words, an “extremely negative interpretation of 
the Welsh language and Welsh nationalism” (Davies 2005:212-3).  Davies envisioned, in Day’s 
(2002) work, an “implicit portrayal of the indigenous population along with [language activist] 
organizations”, where these appeared as “backward-looking, refusing to accept the inevitability 
of the direction of social change”, with whom “charges of racism rest rather more heavily with 
them than with the incomers” (2005:210, emphasis mine).  She did not call attention to the 
polarized terms that she “borrowed” from Day (at least, I sense no irony in her usage), nor 
suggest there might be alternatives to this binomial condition.  She (2005:208) did, however, 
formulate a dilemma she saw in Day’s work, which she found lamentable:  
 
This suggests the other reason for Day’s continued concern about, and tendency 
continually to interrogate, the existence of Wales as an entity for sociological 
study, namely a concern that a ready acceptance of a socially and culturally 
distinctive Wales may allow too great a prominence for language-based and 
nationalist visions.  He is in fact caught in a dilemma, in that he advocates the 
development of a distinctive sociology of Wales, to which he has been a 
distinguished contributor for decades, while at the same time wanting to resist any 
encouragement this might give either to the position of the Welsh language or to 
the growth of nationalist political fortunes. 
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Davies’ concern with the dilemma she ascribed to Day did not depend so much on resolving the 
two lemmas or the binomial condition on which they are constructed.  The primary concern, 
here, was with a lack of reflexivity that she saw in Day’s and others’ implied perspectives of 
their own subject positions in the role of researcher. 
 Davies identified different kinds of research stances, which, perhaps, supervene on those 
subject positions.  These stances are embodied in those “whose theoretical approach challenges 
dominant political perspectives” and those “whose work reflects more mainstream and hence 
taken-for-granted perspectives” (Davies 2005:211).  The two research stances, combined, are 
characteristic of the Welsh Studies schism and Davies’ practical categorization highlights the 
terms that play into that schism.  As Davies (2005:209) noted, the taken for granted character of 
subject positions rooted in the English-language cultural complex is associated with both the 
strict-representationalist sociologist that Day appears to be and the sort of cosmopolitan attitude 
he expressed, which appears to treat parochial stances pejoratively, as something to avoid.  For 
Day (2002:265), “[g]lobalization and localization go hand in hand”.  Yet, as Davies observed 
(2005:212), in Day’s elaboration of this slogan, “celebrations of diversity” are rhetorically 
encoded in Day’s (2002:265) writing as equivalent to globalization, while “new forms of 
tribalism and exclusivity” and “hunt[ing] out the security of old or newly invented forms of 
identity” are rhetorically encoded as equivalent to localization.  Day’s tacit view of globalization 
and localization do not seem able to fit in the same hand, where localization is treated as sinister, 
and globalization more correct. 
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A Departmental Rift 
 There is a context that forms the background for the intellectual disagreement that 
surfaced at the symposium conference of Welsh Studies scholars mentioned above.  When this 
context is presented, some of the more strident reactions to Day’s book make a little more sense.  
Day, as a pillar of the School for Social Sciences at the then-University of Wales, Bangor has 
been counter-positioned by another pillar: Glyn Williams.  Williams has long taken up discourse 
analysis from the French theoretical perspective and applies it to Wales’ economic and cultural 
conditions in line with Hechter’s critique of British constitutional arrangement and economic 
policy as exemplifying a kind of “internal” colonialism.  The latter, internal colonialism, 
involves at least two conditions: 
 
First, an instrumental relationship existed between the core region and its internal 
colonies in that decisions were made, by the state's ruling elite, to serve the 
interests of the core without regard for detrimental effects on the peripheral 
economy and society. . .  Second, the peripheral region had a separate culture 
from the core, and cultural distinctions provided a basis for socioeconomic 
divisions, with the economic dependency of the periphery being largely attributed 
to its cultural distinctiveness. (Davies 1989: 61) 
 
In contrast, Day’s perspective applies the more empirical and detached strategy of British social 
research and examines the phenomena of social and economic organization, exemplified in such 
features as social closure and exclusion.  Yet, the two Bangor dons differ in more than their 
sociological approaches. 
 The divide in the School of Social Sciences at the then-University of Wales, Bangor, is 
the stuff of academic rumors even if I know less than I would like to know about it.  It extends to 
the early 1990s, when some of the participants in the Welsh Studies schism (on Day’s side) were 
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still at Bangor.7  Beyond the manuscript text, patterns of social avoidance and a normalized 
standard of collegiality make it virtually impossible to document the tensions at the level of 
interaction.  It is only because anthropologists are professionally required to tell tales out of 
school (and because it is not a well-kept secret) that I would discuss the contentiousness.  
Moreover, things have changed at Bangor and one might attribute the recent cooling of a decade 
or more of conflict to the reaching of retirement age by Day and Williams, and the carrying on 
by a younger generation, some of whom themselves have recently retired.  Thus, Day’s 
(2002:247) comment about the future exchange described above involving his own sociology 
colleagues, comes to apply to himself: “In a thoroughly reflexive and ‘postmodern’ fashion, 
these contributions made by sociologists (working at the time within the same academic 
department) form part of the discourse of Welshness and nationhood which they are 
investigating”. 
 The presence of the schism at the symposium intersected with the departmental divide 
because, in his book, Day (2002:247) had criticized Glyn Williams’ critique (1994) of a 
discussion of racism and nationalism in Wales (Denney 1991): 
 
. . . [T]here are quite fundamental differences of theory and method between the 
critic and the criticized, which represents distinct, and probably irreconcilable, 
positions within social analysis. 
     However, there is also a strong vein of polemic running through the attack [by 
Williams (1994)]. . .  The arguments put forward by Denny et al. are said to 
exemplify an ‘aggrieved ethnocentrism’, appropriate to ‘transient voyeurs’ casting  
                                                 
7  Some of the earlier participants—David Denney (Royal Holloway-University of London) and John Borland 
(University of Chester)—have moved on from University of Wales, Bangor to other institutions.  These formed part 
of a cohort based around ideas and not age.  Day’s reference to “Denney et al. 1991” might reveal his personal 
knowledge of the history of a manuscript that ultimately became listed in Contemporary Wales as a single-author 
article.  However, that reference also represents a sharing of ideas among two of the putative co-authors who were 
on staff at the School of Social Sciences at Bangor.  Along with Ralph Fevre, John Borland and David Denney 
published papers about the legitimization of social closure in north-west Wales in 1992 and 1999 (and others, and 
also presentations in between these dates).  Glyn Williams’ image of Day’s cohort has similarly conflated personas 
of his “opposition”, particularly in his attacks of Day 2002. 
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their eyes over a country to which they do not belong (Williams 1994:87, 95).  
Their approach is interpreted as an attempt to ‘pathologize’ minority culture, by 
attributing to it ‘mystical’ and mythical properties, and denying it reason. . . There 
are a number of interesting features of the way in which the argument proceeds, 
which amount to a statement of who can say what about Wales. . . The ability to 
speak Welsh is said to confer an insight into the cited texts that is denied to those 
who have not mastered the language—even though all the texts in question were 
written in English (including those by [the strident nationalist poet] R. S. 
Thomas). 
 
While not explicitly aggressive, Day’s mode of selection and style in this message might signal a 
referral/renvoi to background tensions if they existed (and they did).  Thus, Day used “polemic”, 
which tends to signal a critique that goes beyond ordinary rational discourse.  He used 
“interesting” in characterizing the “features of the way in which the argument proceeds”, where 
this word often highlights a certain discursive key of objectifying interest, bordering on sarcasm: 
The features are of interest not because of how the message (and its principal) informs us about 
those features, but because the features tell us about the author of the original message (i.e., Glyn 
Williams). 
 Also, as Day’s initial, topical sentence of this paragraph indicated, he was documenting 
the polemical style of the original message.  If there were background tensions, and there were, 
then the selections Day made and his evaluative language would be like flags marking various 
battle grounds.  Some of these flags are directly reported—“ ‘aggrieved ethnocentrism’ ”,  
“ ‘transient voyeurs’ ”, “an attempt to ‘pathologize’ ”, “ ‘mystical’ and mythical properties”—
while others involve layered representations of points-of-view: “casting their eyes over a country 
to which they do not belong” and “denying [minority culture] reason”. 
 Tellingly, William’s (2005) contribution to the symposium was entitled, “Blaming the 
Victim”.  Because Williams mentored Davies while the latter conducted structured interviewing 
as the former’s research assistant in 1984 and 1985, and has established more recent 
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collaboration with one of his students on the sociology faculty at Bangor (Dr. Delyth Morris), it 
might be tempting to imagine that Davies was playing the role of defending Glyn Williams’ and 
her own position in a debate that has been too politicized for too long.  Of course, by criticizing 
faculty in his own school, Day opened up old wounds and opened himself up to a counter-
critique.  He wrote of Williams and a current professor in the School of Social Sciences (and one 
of Williams’ former students), Delyth Morris: 
 
. . . [R]ather than pursuing specialist debates about issues such as language change 
and language shifts, code-switching and the various ‘domains’ of language use, 
they prefer to concentrate upon language as an instrument of social action, but 
also as a powerful structuring force which contributes towards the formation of 
social groups and allegiances” (Day 2002:223). 
 
Davies took this as dismissive: 
 
He essentially dismisses in a couple of paragraphs (pp. 223–3[sic]) the extensive 
work of Williams and Morris (2000), which treats the language as a force 
structuring social groups and affecting economic prospects (for example, the 
over-representation of Welsh speakers in rural areas in unskilled and semi-skilled 
manual employment) 
 
 Importantly, the positions Davies and Williams have defended, as with Day, are not 
rooted solely in ways of doing analysis, but in social imaginaries.  The following point of Day’s 
(2002:247) is an apt one, which applies (again) to his own involvement in the previous referrals 
to Williams, and also to Davies’ uptake of Day’s response in his book: “As the editors of the 
journal in which the exchange appeared state, there is clearly far more at stake here than a 
dispute about modes of sociological analysis”. 
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Language Essentialism? 
 The schism in Welsh Studies in Wales becomes most salient upon Day’s examination of 
“the thought that identity can rest only upon language” (2002:253), which is based on a 
suggestion made by Aitchison and Carter (2000).  In characterizing responses to the recent 
history of devolutionary voting results (in 1979 and 1997) as evoking that idea, Day elaborated 
this claim in terms of the protection by Cymraeg-speakers of their collective interests: “The real 
danger appears to be that an alternative conception of Welshness might undermine the claims of 
the Welsh-speaking community within Wales to represent the defining essence of Welsh identity 
and nationhood” (2002:253-4).  In response, Davies rejected the implied corollaries in Day’s 
thinking: that the Cymraeg-speaking segment was actively essentialistic and that it promoted 
exclusivity.  She was disturbed that Day would present “[t]he Welsh-speaking collectivity in 
Wales. . . as elitist and intent on projecting the language as the principal, if not the only, marker 
of Welsh distinctiveness” (Davies 2005:212).  She also attacked him because of the kind of 
attitude that this way of thinking suggested: “. . . his treatment of the Welsh language as 
primarily a divisive and negative force within Welsh society” (Davies 2005:211). 
 In implying that (no parts of) the Cymraeg-speaking collectivity is unafraid for the 
reasons Day suggested, Davies denied that the fear Day ascribed to Cymraeg-speakers is of any 
significance.  By implication, Davies might also have been suggesting that Cymraeg-speakers 
should not be expected to have collective interests; but, of course they do have instrumental 
interests in common as Cymraeg speakers, and, of course, many do feel threatened by the slide 
of Cymraeg toward increasing marginality that, many feel, has been halted in the present 
moment.  One should not deny these facts about Cymraeg-speaking Wales, a diverse segment of 
the population of Wales, simply because they might seem unpalatable or controversial.  They can 
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be unpalatable or controversial only if people refuse to separate these facts from an implied 
consequent.  However, it is the implication, not the facts, that should be seen (by Davies and 
Day) as offensive.  That is, what should offend is the inferential move: 
 
from a) the fact that persons produce and act on collective interests and fears of language 
“extinction” 
to b) the belief that such persons are “primarily a divisive and negative force within Welsh 
society”. 
 
Technically, this is called a non sequitur.  The cultural significance of that inferential move, 
besides the fact that this implication is seldom examined in Wales, lies in the meaning and value 
imputed to the related tacit, middle terms: essentialism, exclusivity, elitism, and the “project[ion] 
of the language [i.e., Cymraeg] as the principal, [or] the only, marker of Welsh distinctiveness” 
(Davies 2005:212). 
 It is the denial of the legitimacy of expression of a full range of responses to Cymraeg 
activists that, I believe, characterizes the “current political situation”.  This was illustrated in the 
NSF reviewer’s comments, which I quoted in Chapter Four.  Also, consider the deployment of 
the term, “byddin” [army], discussed in that same chapter.  I do not believe that the expression of 
a full range of responses, in action, as well as words, should be allowed, of course.  Even if any 
were willing to kill for Wales, Irish history offers many cautionary tales. 
 To clarify, my point is not that any individual is monitoring and blocking the expression 
of extreme ideas about the Welsh nation.  The legitimacy of such acts, however, is undercut 
before anyone thinks to express such ideas.  The implication seems to be that Cymraeg-speakers 
would violate a basic social pact if they appear as divisive or as a negative force, as imposing a 
social hierarchy or ethnic typology, as promoting exclusivity or elitism, as projecting the 
language as the principal or only marker of Welsh distinctiveness.  In making an apology for 
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Cymraeg-speakers, as being none of these things, Davies’ position was perpetuating the stigma 
related to the full expression of civil responses, and reproducing the taboo against a metaphorical 
militancy. 
 
Degrees of Welshness and an Imagined Hierarchy 
 Davies’ target recognized that competence in Cymraeg and its visibility is “widely 
endorsed even among those who do not speak the language” (Day 2002:221).  Yet, Day’s claim 
that the use of Cymraeg as a critical marker of ethnic identity “relegates [those who do not speak 
the language] to a diminished status” (2002:221) gave Davies pause.  Day’s claim of such 
relegation implies, in Davies’ view, a social imaginary consisting of “degree[s] of Welshness 
within some imagined hierarchy” (Davies 2002:211-212).  Of course, Day’s belief does imply 
such a hierarchy; and the claim regarding degrees of Welshness might even be demonstrable (see 
Trosset 1993, which Davies (2005:212) considered “rather questionable”).  For Day, “nationality 
and national identity” have a “multiple nature” “in which they are constructed out of a cluster of 
attributes and characteristics” (2002:253), but that multiple nature does not rule out social 
hierarchies. 
 If one continually crosses the borders of the language divide on a daily basis, even if as a 
cultural tourist, an imaginary hierarchy becomes vaguely tangible.  For whatever reason, Davies 
did not acknowledge such a social imaginary, and my guess is that it is simply more tangible in 
north-west Wales.  My short visits in Swansea and Cardiff (in south Wales), Davies’ stomping-
grounds, did not convince me that the same social imaginary subsisted there as in Bangor and 
Caernarfon (in north Wales).  The constructed “natural” balance of language identity, according 
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to which one or the other language is prevalent and taken for granted, is precisely what differs in 
those two areas of Wales. 
 At the same time, the idea of an imaginary hierarchical scheme of relative degrees of 
Welshness violates the ideology of egalitarianism, which Trosset (1993:164-165) pointed out.  
From the outside, the sense that some are more authentically Welsh because they can participate 
in social activities using Cymraeg (Bowie 1993; Trosset 1993) does seem to imply relative 
degrees of Welshness.  These relative degrees are expressed ordinally, as rankings, as more or 
less Welsh.  They evoke the idea of racial hierarchies, because such rankings do not have a 
natural place in vernacular socio-cultural rankings because of the ideology of egalitarianism.  
Ranking people in terms of human-wide relations of difference does have the familiar rubric of 
race and prejudice.  Charges of racism are frequently leveled at so-called language nationalists 
for that reason, and they are offensive to so-called language nationalists for similar reasons. 
 The language in which Trosset captured her experiences—as a distaste for contamination 
of groups identified as attaining a “purity” (Trosset 1993:59-61)—would heighten the 
discomfort, for those who are committed to a Cymraeg-centered sense of identity, of those 
reading such an account.  Given the positive values many place on Cymraeg-centered sociality, 
this violation of egalitarian sensibilities and the resulting discomfort serve to motivate the 
location of relations of difference in the rubric of ethnicity rather than race.  Such a positioning 
of language-cultural identity, however, does not match well with the sense of Wales as a quasi-
state for those committed to Cymraeg-centered sociality.  That is, for those responding 
emotionally and existentially to the decline (prior to the 2001 census and current low levels) of 
competence in Cymraeg throughout Wales, in tandem with the increasing scope of authority of 
Welsh jurisdictions by people within Wales, ethnicity fails to represent the relation between 
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these two realities of language and politics.  Consequently, neither race nor ethnicity seems an 
appropriate category for language-culture identity. 
 According to Davies, “Day’s assumption that non-[Cymraeg] speakers feel diminished” 
in some Cymraeg-dominant language demesnes “does not sit easily with his acknowledgment of 
the very positive attitudes of the vast majority towards the language. . . or their active 
involvement over decades in establishing Welsh-medium schools, especially throughout the 
former industrial valleys of south Wales” (Davies 2005:212).  This is to draw attention to what 
Davies saw as a contradiction in Day’s sociological analysis—because she thought that his 
analysis was wrong.  However, if that analysis is correct, it draws attention to a condition of life 
in Wales. 
 In my experiences in Wales, I would suggest that the Cymraeg schools movement in 
south Wales is very strong precisely because there is more social inertia for the language in the 
community outside schools; industrialization and mobility led to a decrease in community-use of 
Cymraeg in south Wales long before and more extensively than in the north-west.  Cymraeg 
(unlike, say, Punjabi) is completely “at home” in many villages and towns of Wales.  As a 
minority presence (in most of Wales, but not necessarily in the north and west), its use is 
typically unthreatening today.  If there is a hierarchy of a Cymraeg-based language identity in the 
south of Wales, it amounts to minimal stratification.  While there is no question that the Cymraeg 
schools movement has constituted and continues to constitute a new reality in south Wales, the 
contrasting majority force it represents in north-west Wales operates within a broader hegemony 
of English-language culture.  As a result, one of the many simultaneously ascribed valences of 
that majority Cymraeg presence in north-west Wales is a perception, from a particular subject-
position, that the local Cymraeg-speaking majority is being thuggish or is imposing their will on 
 309
others.  This perception is theoretically possible in south Wales, but the concomitance of factors 
that load the relevant subject-position—from which that perception seems natural—are less 
likely to occur where Cymraeg is not perceived as densely prevalent as it is in north-west Wales.  
This difference, related to the different statuses of Cymraeg in south (minority status) and north-
west (majority status) Wales, respectively, is a strong symptom of the differential politics of 
language in Wales according to area or region.  By rejecting the collective interests and fears of 
some Cymraeg-speakers, one also neglects the area-by-area variation in the dynamics of 
language politics. 
 One of the characteristics of the Welsh Studies schism, as can be seen from the above, is 
that most of the labor in its expression is devoted to regulating the discourse.  This fact is why it 
is a schism and is what provides the substantive quality of polarization.  However, this fact also 
means that much less time is devoted to the collaborative production of novel theories about 
identity and to the production of new contexts and use-relations for discussing Welsh identity 
across schismatic battle-lines.  When such theories do emerge, the ideological trenches militate 
against acceptance or modification. 
 
WHEN ETHNOGRAPHERS BECOME PAWNS . . . 
As Different as Davies and Day: Schismatic Responses to Trosset 
 As mentioned in the early parts of this dissertation, Trosset did not count the assertion of 
a past and present domination by the English among her seven components of a Welsh ideology 
of personhood.  That assertion takes “being English” to be symbolized by the inability to speak 
Cymraeg (Trosset 1993:50).  Such assertions—whether of being dominated, oppressed, or led by 
leveraged consent by the English—are submerged in the first component she discussed, degrees 
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of Welshness.  The omission of the politics of Cymraeg as a component ideology is an important 
lacuna, particularly in light of my points above about the area-by-area variation in the dynamics 
of language politics.  That variation in sociopolitical place-making, differentially constituted by 
the minority/majority status in south and north-west Wales, bears heavily on the concomitance of 
factors on which subject-positions are produced. 
 Trosset (1993) seems to have been aware that laypersons in Wales routinely reproduce a 
dichotomy between Cymraeg-oriented Wales and Cymraeg-independent Wales.  She probably 
assumed that academics were above such “games”—incorrectly, if so.  Perhaps unwisely, I make 
an attempt in this dissertation that is identical to Trosset’s (1993) in certain features.  Trosset 
attempted to describe beliefs and practices that were: 1) endorsed by a portion of the Cymraeg 
language community; 2) prevalent in larger Welsh society not as practiced, but as salient and 
culturally recognized features mentioned in a “dialogue” about identity; 3) countered by a 
dominant segment of Welsh society, including members of the Cymraeg language community; 
and 4) symbolic of a position within a milieu in which their expression is likely to elicit a 
response from the antithetical position.  These four features apply to the phenomena with which I 
am concerned in this dissertation.  Hence, one of the challenges I face is also identical to that 
which Trosset faced: to deflect my readers from misunderstanding my claims about ideologies in 
Wales.  I believe I can see the challenge to this attempt more clearly than Trosset could have at 
the time.  After all, I have the opportunity to benefit from exploiting responses to Trosset’s 
monograph.  However, one consequence of this challenge and the fact that I am writing after 
Trosset and published responses to her monograph, is that I have been obliged to incorporate the 
culture of academics into the scope of my own ethnography. 
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 While I consider Trosset’s monograph on performing Welsh identity to be one of the 
most significant contributions to the literature, its reception in Wales falls prey to the schism in 
Welsh Studies and is interpreted by means of the two sets of schemas that that academic milieu 
affords.  It is in this spirit that I complete the title of this section: When ethnographers become 
pawns . . .  scholars become informants (and the “pawns” become ex post facto or post hoc 
elicitation items). 
 One response that reflects the schismatic conditions described above can be found in 
statements made by another anthropologist mentioned above who is also from the US, but who 
settled in Wales—Charlotte Aull Davies.  Day’s discussion of “Welshness as Production and 
Performance” (2002:249-252) is another response.  It is precisely at the point in Davies’ 
comments on Day’s Making Sense of Wales uptake of the idea of “degrees of Welshness”, where 
she rejects the idea of an implied hierarchy, that one also finds Davies (2005) suggesting that 
Day was guilty by association with Trosset (1993).  She wrote: “Some imagined hierarchy” is 
“an idea he has taken from a rather questionable study of the ‘performance’ of Welshness 
(Trosset 1993; cf. Davies 1998)” (Davies 2005:211-212).  Day (2002:239-257) did draw on 
Trosset’s monograph about the performativity of an ideology of personhood—as a contrast to the 
typologies and classifications of sociologists (e.g., Balsom 1985; Denney 1991; Rawkins 1979) 
and political scientists (e.g., Osmond 1985; Wyn Jones and Trystan 1999).  There, he cited “a 
more detailed insight by an American anthropologist, Carol Trosset” (Day 2002:251). 
 
Day:   In his book, Making Sense of Wales, Day (2002:251) characterized Trosset’s aim and 
ethnographic conclusions as follows: 
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Trosset’s aim was to discover what was fundamental and shared within Welsh 
culture, and why it was that ‘out of all the experiences lived in Wales, only some 
are popularly deemed to have any ethnic significance’ (Trosset, 1993: 54).  For 
those who speak Welsh, she argues, there is a dominant ideology which revolves 
around the centrality of the language, and a cluster of activities and values which 
are associated with it.  These include participation in eisteddfodau, with the 
peripatetic National Eisteddfod as the crowning event; preferences for Welsh-
language over English-language media; and the adherence to certain distinctive 
styles of behavior and conduct. 
 
What is most telling about this summary is that the only specificity in ascription “revolves 
around the centrality of [Cymraeg]” and the “crowning event” of Cymraeg-centered activities 
(eisteddfodau).8  The “adherence to certain distinctive styles of behavior and conduct” is 
decidedly vague.  The former features of Cymraeg and eisteddfodau typify Welsh culture in this 
passage in which Day describes his reading of Trosset 1993.  However, the focus on language in 
Trosset 1993, to the extent that one could be said to exist, lasts for only fifty pages. 
 In the block quotation above, Day described the main focus of the monograph as “a 
cluster of activities and values” and “certain distinctive styles of behavior and conduct”.  Day did 
not articulate whatever is distinctive about these activities and values, in his view; whereas these 
concerns preoccupied Trosset for two-thirds of her monograph.  While Day went on to discuss 
Trosset’s “degrees of Welshness” thesis and the pattern of social organization that Trosset called 
sectarian, these have the opposite relationship to language that they did in Trosset’s monograph.  
Trosset used language-based tensions as a minor theme that introduces her readers to the 
sociocultural milieu of north-west Wales and, partly, frames her topic of the components of 
Welsh personhood.  In contrast, Day treated a certain social closure as being caused by the 
tensions related to Cymraeg and activities and values associated with it; social closure, thus, 
unites the thesis of “degrees of Welshness” and the idea of Wales as a sectarian society.
                                                 
8  The National Eisteddfod, in conjunction with the Gorsedd, involves a chairing event and a crowning event, and it 
should be noted that winning the chair is more prestigious than being singled out in the crowning event. 
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Davies:   The opposing view from Davies (1998) takes a very different tack, but is motivated by, 
interestingly enough, the same excessive attention to Trosset’s claims about language and the 
activities and values associated with Cymraeg as had motivated Day (2002).  In her critique of 
Day (2002), Davies (2005) disagreed strongly with Trosset’s focus (in her substantive 
interpretive strategy).  Davies’ major criticism seems to have been that Trosset carried out her 
research “mainly within the context of eisteddfodau [i.e., artistic competitions within the 
Cymraeg language-cultural complex]” (Davies 2005:212), which are traditionally-conceived 
cultural activities involving competitions of music, poetry, drama, among other forms.  Davies 
(1998) then used explicit attitudes and preferences as cases of evidence that seemed to contradict 
some of Trosset’s (1993) claims.  Davies (1998) drew on her own experiences interacting with 
people who attended the 1995 National Eisteddfod (which also happens to be the first National 
Eisteddfod I attended). 
 Some of her experiences seemed in conflict with the list of features in Trosset’s picture of 
Welsh society.  Thus, in one of Davies’ empirical cases, an “active political nationalist” 
complained about his child’s success in eisteddfodau competitions because it meant waiting for 
several hours for the next competition.  The complaint suggests the political nationalist displayed 
a lack of passion in this emblematic cultural activity.  Another example Davies offered was of an 
eisteddfod enthusiast who, wishing to move into a larger home, sought an English buyer for their 
home in the knowledge that no local person could afford it (1998:150-151).  This case suggests 
an act of betrayal of the Welsh/Cymry people, because English “incomers” are notoriously 
resistant to learning Cymraeg.  Citing these apparent counterexamples, Davies concluded that 
“Trosset’s view of Welshness as emanating from what is even a relatively small segment of 
Welsh-speaking society, let alone Welsh society as a whole, is ultimately unconvincing” 
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(1998:151).9  Davies argued that ethnographers should emphasize “performances not of a single 
homogeneous and hegemonic Welshness, but rather of alternative and often competing 
‘Welshnesses’ ” (1998:151). 
 Davies’ criticism here is not straightforward or of the nature of empirical disagreement.  
She did not quibble with Trosset’s claims about egalitarianism or the performance ethos, for 
example.  She also did not utilize Trosset’s specific terms, such as “self-sacrifice” and 
“martyrdom”, to describe the counterexample of a Welsh eisteddfod-goer selling her house to 
English people.  In fact, the only details of the dominant ideology construct that Davies 
mentioned or alluded to were those that were overtly related to Cymraeg or Cymraeg-oriented 
cultural activities. 
 It is important to recognize that Davies did not make the objection to Trosset’s 
ethnography simply because that monograph presented a skewed representation of Wales as part 
of that Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  Davies’ objections are much more intelligible if 
interpreted as conforming to the schism in Welsh Studies in Wales.  In the glare of that schism, 
Trosset’s monograph, as an actual text, is but a pale shadow of the image her ideological 
opponents beheld.  This is precisely because ideology in that context functions both in an 
analytic role and as constitutive of a social imaginary; and it is much more likely that the social 
imaginary will re-calibrate the analytic perspective than that the analytic perspective will re-
calibrate the social imaginary. 
                                                 
9  In defense of Trosset, it is clear that even people whom anthropologists fit into objectified roles like political 
nationalist have limits on their time and can be impatient after hearing the same song performed 100 times in recent 
months, which is typical in the youth eisteddfodau competitive process.  Also, those who participate in core, 
culturally symbolic activities sometimes put their own desires first, even against the perceived threat of the 
“dilluting” or “polluting” effects of English immigrants.  The counterexamples that Davies cited would contradict 
Trosset’s (1993) claims only if Trosset had argued that people follow the dominant ideology unthinkingly without 
exception.  Trosset argued that the dominant ideology often operates even when people act in some way contrary to 
it—something that is more common than adherence to the components of the ideology. 
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 It is useful to contrast Davies’ view with the surprisingly non-schismatic impression of 
Trosset’s monograph I represented in Chapter Two.  The impression of a scholar in the 
“humanities sector” of Welsh Studies in Wales—someone who is originally from the US, but 
who settled in Wales—commented that Trosset’s monograph seemed only to touch the surface, 
covering only the more obvious parts of Welsh culture and society (I should add that this scholar 
amended their criticism with a comment that early-Twentieth-Century Trobriand Islanders might 
have said the same thing about Malinowski’s work.).  While it is true that humanities scholars 
are not typically required to analyze practices they themselves have documented (e.g., by means 
of field notes), this humanities scholar was as familiar with the milieu as was Trosset, and 
increasingly less of an outsider. 
 Since the force of this humanities scholar’s criticism was that Trosset (1993) neglected to 
address the dynamics of identity in Wales, I suspect that the salience of eisteddfodau culture 
played a role in that impression, along with Trosset’s focus on attitudes and values.  However, it 
was how Trosset explored her topics, more so than which ones she selected, that led to that 
impression.  What is under the surface is a politics of language and identity that was not subject 
to much analysis in Trosset 1993.  Although the humanities scholar’s response was a critical 
response, it was a neutral one, relative to the schism in Welsh Studies. 
 
The Role of the Cymraeg Language Complex 
 In my reading, Trosset’s (1993) overall argument rests on the idea that Welshness is 
performed and not an essence to be possessed.  Yet, Trosset did not fully articulate the 
connection between this concept of “Welshness performed” and the idea that “Welshness is an 
ideological discourse rather than an essence” (Trosset 1993:54).  This might have been due to 
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structural-textual circumstances: No chapter was devoted to this theoretical issue.  Other 
factors—such as that language, as a major (but not counted) part of that ideological discourse, 
dominates the first fifty pages of the monograph and then fades into the background—suggest 
that the theoretical relation between performing Welshness and performing the ideological 
discourse was not fully clear even to Trosset at the time of her writing.  Thus, it is easy to 
misinterpret “performing Welshness” as a grandiose expression that takes Trosset’s argument to 
be that culturally significant presentations of culture—exemplified in music and poetry 
performances—represent Welshness.  It is a tempting conclusion that both Day (2002) and 
Davies (2005) seemed to have reached; but as a reading of Trosset 1993, it is an incorrect one. 
 Locally salient, traditionally Welsh practices (even excluding Cymraeg) are not sufficient 
for a representative picture of life regarding all Welsh people in Wales.  However, they would 
seem to allow for a less (objectionable kind of) essential treatment of Welshness than would a 
focus on Cymraeg, which is salient to all and highly politicized.  My impression of Trosset’s 
strategic approach is that she thought the traditional social activities for which Cymraeg is the 
common medium would be less problematic than Cymraeg practices per se because the locally 
salient traditional practices are more fluid, and even less representative of Welsh people in Wales 
(and less political) than Cymraeg competence.  Trosset’s focus on cultural practices makes it less 
likely (or so it might seem) that any “traditional” activity one includes in an ethnographic project 
will appear to play the role of the essence of Welsh identity (as identified in Trosset’s 
ethnographic account and given how traditional activities appeared to operate in mis-readings of 
Trosset’s ethnography).  Unfortunately, Trosset’s decisions regarding ethnographic 
representation created a problem for readers in Wales that she could not have foreseen.  This 
problem arises because any mention of the generally salient traditional practices (e.g., 
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eisteddfodau) evokes the role of Cymraeg in identity, yet the role of the Cymraeg language 
complex does not emerge in Trosset’s monograph. 
 
Circumstances and Consequences of Semiotic Application 
 What this discussion of Trosset’s role as pawn in the Welsh Studies schism in Wales 
reveals, is that Cymraeg and Cymraeg-centered traditions (not restricted to, but most saliently 
evoking eisteddfodau) act as a lightning-rod or trigger for a discursive context.  This 
phenomenon, furthermore, was shown to manifest outside academia in Mrs. Williams’ 
distinction between cultural brainwashing and political brainwashing (see Chapter Three), a 
distinction cued by this same double-headed lighting rod.  When it appears in any of various 
instantiations, the cultural operation by which such signs facilitate or directly trigger a response 
do not occur naturalistically; for example, in the way that certain proteins trigger genetic 
transcription and replication.  Nonetheless, if it is not random, then such motivated actions or 
reactions will be organized as a system of concepts and practices.  There is an obvious candidate 
for such a system (i.e., the set of discourses of and about nationalism), but I contend that this 
candidate of a meta-discourse lies in the phenomenal level of surface positions, and does not 
offer a way out. 
 The Welsh Studies schism amounts to tension between two principles for regulating the 
proper categorization and practice of sociology.  Each representative of the competing parties 
and the regulative principles associated with them recognizes the cultural category of language 
(in particular, Cymraeg) and eisteddfodau as the salient point(s) in the identity game. These 
points—or rather, acts of recognition of these as occurrences—signal a moment of conflict.  
Each side in the Welsh Studies schism exhibits a tacit, and seemingly accidentally coinciding, 
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commitment to the idea that the cultural category of Cymraeg and eisteddfodau are signs (indices 
or icons) of conflict.  For each side, Cymraeg and eisteddfodau mark a salient point in the 
identity game. 
 The meta-level recognition of this fact could afford the opportunity for those on each side 
(and other people too) to discuss how each perspective would envision the constitutive features 
of the Welsh national community.  However, elements of rhetoric, cognition, and society 
(simplistically labeled “ideology”) intervene by figuring the schismatic conflict in terms of 
Cymraeg and eisteddfodau so as to maintain that conflict on the level of regulative principles. 
 To begin to show the way out of this trap requires that I provide elaboration of two 
aspects of meaning- and community-productive processes.  These two aspects are part of a frame 
that relates semiotic circumstances to the consequences of semiotic application—a frame that I 
borrow from Brandom (1988, 2000, 2002), who borrowed and adapted the basic concepts from 
Dummett (1973).  The former are the conditions under which one is justified in making some 
presentation of signs, the circumstances under which a sign is correctly applied, uttered, or used.  
I have already tacitly employed the concept of circumstances of application, in Chapter Three, 
with respect to the usage of “getting on my soapbox”.  The consequences of application of a sign 
are the conditions that follow from accepting some presentation of signs as appropriate, the 
consequences of some semiotic application, utterance, or use. 
 Brandom (1988:20) provided the following example: “Being classified as AWOL does 
have the consequence that one is liable to be arrested, but the specific circumstances under which 
one acquires that liability are equally essential to the concept”.  One can take a devil-may-care 
attitude about the circumstances and consequences of using and interpreting signs, but members 
of the community will be more discriminating toward some signs and context than others; and 
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there can be consequences to neglecting underlying regimes of normativity.  Which sets of signs 
evoke a tacit or expressed evaluative framework, whether in terms of the appropriate 
circumstances or the acceptable consequences, is a matter of the particular regulatory principles 
at work internal to the community.10 
 Before I return to the Welsh context and Trosset 1993 (in the next chapter), consider the 
following fictional case of ascriptive identity, which uses, as a label: 
 
[the] pejorative term. . . “Boche”.  The conditions for applying the term to 
someone is that he is of German nationality; the consequences of its application 
are that he is barbarous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans.  We 
should envisage the connections in both directions as sufficiently tight as to be 
involved in the very meaning of the word: neither could be severed without 
altering its meaning.  Someone who rejects the word does so because he does not 
want to permit a transition from the grounds for applying the term to the 
consequences of doing so. (Dummett 1973:454) 
 
In many (or most) social realities, people seldom have the opportunity as individuals to alter the 
circumstances of application of such a term (to apply, for instance, to Libyan elites), or the 
consequences of application (to mean, instead, a lover of freedom).  Hence, the options Dummett 
suggested were to accept or reject the term.  This polarized condition of choice is a characteristic 
feature of social realities in which the circumstances or the consequences of semiotic 
applications (or both) are maintained as part of a normative system that lies outside individual 
agency. 
                                                 
10  It follows, as a condition of concepts’ being intersubjective and rule-regulated, that the normativity of concepts is 
derived from their sociocentric constitution.  Such a sociocentric origin for the normativity of concepts should not 
lead anyone to underestimate the “reality” that results.  The resulting normative system imposes rules that are every 
bit as real as the fact that there are natural or supernatural influences on our lives (e.g., gravity is every bit as 
mysterious from the scientific perspective as it is from a supernatural one).  This makes the issue of the constitution 
of meaning one of epistemological formalism, rather than of an individual-oriented empirical psychology. 
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 Explication of just such a normative system is the goal of this dissertation.  The following 
chapter carries that project forward by making sense of a trope that would seem to defy sense.  It 
does so by moving beyond the mapping relations in the nationalism meta-discourse that founder 
on the surface positions, and moving toward the constituting relations of identity to be found in 
the special resources of Cymraeg. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
◄ DROWNING CHILDREN ► 
 
It is imperative, therefore, when analyzing putative “realistic” representations of reality to 
determine the dominant poetic mode in which its discourse is cast.  By identifying the dominant 
mode (or modes) of discourse, one penetrates to that level of consciousness on which a world of 
experience is constituted prior to being analyzed. (Hayden V. White, Metahistory (1973:33n.13)) 
 
The essential rulishness of cognitive conduct is taken in the first instance to be lived in what the 
linguistic community does, rather than starting out represented in what it thinks. (Robert 
Brandom, “Inference, Expression, and Induction” (1988:257)) 
 
 
 In the introductory pages of this dissertation, I observed that participants in the Cymraeg 
language-cultural complex perform a cultural script in which they do not make particular, 
concrete claims to a distinctive Welsh culture.  Rather, they are invested in an ongoing past—
having traditions and a language that, apparently, say all that anyone needs to say.  I noted that, 
in the absence of a generally intelligible language about things like culture, heritage, and 
difference, this is a difficult script to perform.  Somehow, these participants manage to mark out 
cultural space for their sense of continuity in such a way that does not require them to make any 
substantive cultural claims.  This chapter describes an image that people in Abergwaith use to 
accomplish that marking of cultural space. 
 
THE TROPE OF DROWNING 
Linguistic Significance of DROWNING 
 While I was doing preliminary research in 2002 and 2003, a provocative concept 
appeared several times in conversations and interviews with teachers in Gwynedd county.  The 
interview with two lively teachers presented in Chapter Three was my first encounter with the 
idea that children are “drowned”.  The first mention of it in that interview during an eight-week 
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preliminary fieldtrip in 2002 communicated that, although there are a few children each year in 
each school who are unable to speak Cymraeg, they “learn very quickly, because they're 
drowned in Welshness”.  However, the concept did not appear with enough regularity to draw 
any conclusions about it at that time other than that it was a striking figure of speech. 
 With respect to its typical semantic value in the English-language context, the dramatic 
nature of the image of drowning is no less drastic in Cymraeg (using “boddi” in the context of 
“drowning [in Welshness]”).  Translated into English, the entry for “boddi” in a widely used 
Welsh dictionary yields the definition, in my translation: “to die as a result of failure to breathe 
underwater or under any other fluid”.1  Many teachers in north-west Wales use the dramatic 
metaphor of drowning children in Welshness to describe immersion of pupils in their native 
heritage, in reaction to English and US-American language influences and the broader cultural 
implications of these influences.  The notion of DROWNING CHILDREN IN WELSHNESS described 
below symbolizes, for me, the complex relation of language and culture.  Its use reveals how 
difficult it is to identify, analytically and in descriptive terms, which kind of thing is being 
fashioned as identity, genre, topic, or practice out of the whole-cloth of “Welshness”. 
 In the usage I highlight here, DROWNING speaks to the positive formation of a cultural 
community rooted in use of Cymraeg.  One of the tenets of this set of acts of community-
formation involves the rejection of any need to elaborate the target concept.  If this tacit 
knowledge is part of the process of being drowned and part of how Cymraeg can be used 
defensively, then this proposition—paradoxically, but entirely consistently—is never stated.  The 
following example, from YGS in the English-dominant community of Croes Efydd, is one that 
comes as close to explicitness as any I saw.  In it, the teacher, Mrs. Bellamy, speaking mostly 
English, is aware that they are not only focusing on various facets of Wales in their celebration 
                                                 
1  D. Geraint Lewis. Geriadur Gomer i’r Ifanc. (LLandysul: Gomer Press, 1994), p. 51. 
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of the patron saint of Wales, Saint David, but ensuring that the content is presented in “Welsh” 
(i.e., Cymraeg). 
 
Mrs. B: Em.  So. Let me see. Just get familiar with it just in case.  Em.  Just have a quiet 
read um until the end and I’m sure everyone will be fine by Thursday-  Em. The 
rest of your- Just before you start reading- Have a listen.  It’s a special day for 
us in Wales on Friday.  Isn’t it?  Why? 
 
[children are talking] 
 
Mrs. B: Shh.  Put your hands up, please. 
 
[a child volunteers an answer] 
 
Mrs. B: It ‘tis St. David’s Day.  What is “Saint David’s Day” in Welsh? Dewi 
Sant. [Saint David] Dydd Gwyl Dewi. [David’s Holy Day] 
 
 
She turned to me to explain what the children already knew: 
 
 
 Mrs. B: It’s our special saint’s day.  So, the services this week are going to be about 
Wales; really, not just about Dewi Sant, but about Wales.  And what we’ve been 
given to do is, em, about how lucky we are to live in such a beautiful country, 
em, and getting the ch- g- being given the chance to take part in-   
 
 
She turned back to the students. 
 
 
Mrs. B: Are you listening, please? Just for a second or two.  Just for a second or 
two. 
 
 
Turning back to me, she continued: 
 
 
Mrs. B: Em- being given the chance to learn to speak a bit from th’ language and 
to- <pause> take part in things like the Urdd Eisteddfod.  Not everybody 
chooses to do that, but those of you [addressing the students again] I 
think who have, em, have had a lot of enjoyment out it, haven’t you? 
‘specially going out of lessons and practicing, I would say. 
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She was finished explaining for the moment. 
 
 
Mrs B: Okay.  Right, so Donald is going to take Johnny’s part for a little while, 
em, and then I’ve got- Wher- You’re having-  Was that yours, Ian?  Is 
that your prayer?  ‘kay Come get it.  [Muffled] Diolch i ti o yn ddiw 
[Thank you for persevering]  Who’s doing that one? You’ve got your 
own copy, Jake?  Em-  Have you got your own copy of the story? 
 
Pupil: Yeah. 
 
Mrs. B: Okay, off you go.  Just stand by the board so we can have-  Mae’n posib 
[It’s possible] [then inaudible as she alternates her attention to the class 
and me] 
 
Pupil: Can I read Gwilym’s?  Missus- 
 
Mrs. B: Wait a minute, now, Martha.  Shh shhsh.  I don’t know, ‘cause you 
haven’t been with us.  Can you read “Pwy mae. . .” [inaudible] yn 
Gymraeg or would you rather wait for an English one?  Do you 
normally?  Well, let me give it to someone else because I’m pretty 
certain Gwilym will be back 
 
Mrs. B: Right.  The rest of you: if you have finished your reading book, you can listen 
or you can have a quick reading session, okay? 
 
 
Having finished managing and directing the students for a moment, she began explaining again: 
 
 
Mrs. B: We’re having a very Welsh service this week because it’s eh a special 
week for us.  So everything, I think, is in Welsh.  [Turning to student] 
Iawn, Eric [Good, Eric]. (February 25, 2008) 
 
This snapshot of classroom life shows how such programmatic goals of schools are embedded in 
everyday, managerial tasks such as giving and enforcing the following of instructions.  Some of 
these managerial tasks involve finding students to replace others who are absent and cannot 
perform certain roles to which they have been assigned—in pursuit of using Cymraeg for all of 
the children’s contributions at school assemblies during the week of Saint David’s Day.  It also 
illustrates a principle of equivalence between Cymraeg and commemorative events related to 
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Wales.  In addition, it illustrates an ethnolinguistic requirement in which Cymraeg is privileged 
in such contexts.  As a whole, the effort represented in the practice session above makes the day 
and the symbolic relation of the patron saint to Wales into vehicles for immersing the event and 
participants in Cymraeg. 
 This moment in the classroom illustrates the trope of drowning children in Welshness, 
even if Mrs. Bellamy did not use that expression.  Some people (e.g., Mrs. Lloyd, the assistant 
headteacher at YGA, or the assistant headteacher in “the soapbox” interview of Chapter Three) 
would use the expression of “drowning”, but others would not.  Mrs. Bellamy did, on another 
occasion, use a different expression, “trochi” [to dip], for the same concept.  Whatever the 
surface expression, the underlying meaning is that if the children are surrounded completely by 
activities carried out in Cymraeg, they will learn what it is to be Welsh.  There are, of course, 
varying ideas about what it is to be Welsh.  Nevertheless, it is valuable to elaborate fully on the 
linguistic and cultural significance of the trope of DROWNING, even if it suggests a narrow range 
of identity.  This will lead to a brief discussion of the metapragmatics of the discursive space of 
DROWNING. 
 I examine the dominant poetic mode “in which its discourse is cast” because “[b]y 
identifying the dominant mode (or modes) of discourse, one penetrates to that level of 
consciousness on which a world of experience is constituted prior to being analyzed” (White 
1973:33n.13).  I believe this movement—to the level of consciousness on which a world of 
experience is constituted—provides greater resources for analyzing the identification of language 
and nation than are conventional in linguistic anthropology.  Recall, in this connection, that my 
main problem in this dissertation is of producing ethnography of the constituting of the social 
reality of a distinct Welsh identity rooted to Cymraeg language demesnes. 
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 Unless one or the other of the terms, “cymreictod” (having the quality of pertaining to 
Wales) or “Cymraeg”, are used in the phrase containing “drowning”/“boddi ”, ambiguity will 
remain.2  Reference to drowning children occurred during preliminary research as often as not 
without any modifier (e.g., “we drown them, don’t we?”).  The primary problem, then, is the 
nearly ubiquitous ambiguity of context.  As a result, part of my metaphorical journey of 
fieldwork was spent navigating the equivocation of culture and language, even at this microscale 
of phonology and semantics. 
 My thinking of the trope of DROWNING in the early days of principal dissertation research 
went as follows.  Drowning children in Welshness meant that students are to be prevented from 
taking in any “air” that is not Welsh, with the implication that the “non-Welsh” identities of 
students that require such air will die—or, at least, that those “non-Welsh” features of identity 
will not prevent the students from adopting “properly Welsh” ways.  Outside Gwynedd, I 
encountered teachers who use the similar, but milder concept of “dipping” [trochi] children in 
Welshness, as into a fluid like water.  This is also the word used for the symbolic act in Christian 
baptism, as well as a word used for the process of dipping sheep for purposes of cleaning them 
and removing pests.  In accord with the weaker gloss of boddi—as in the use of trochi—I suspect 
the rationale for such usage is less exciting than the provocative impression of a literal drowning 
of children.  That likely rationale is the psychologically “smooth” transition of sequential 
substitution of the following concepts (and the metasemantics of the corresponding words): 
submersion (as an act-instance), immersion (as continuous action), and drowning (as the result of 
a continuous action). 
                                                 
2  Although people communicating in Cymraeg can easily distinguish the set of Welsh language varieties (Cymraeg) 
from properties or things pertaining to Wales (cymreig), the only difference between them is the vowel-value of the 
second syllable.  Natural conversation tends to make it difficult to distinguish between /ae/ and /ei/ in north Wales. 
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 Because the denotation of metaphorical “drowning”—an abstract and implicit term—is 
descriptive of a largely taken-for-granted practice, the term in either language is used only 
irregularly.  When I heard it used, it was virtually always in the context of conversations about 
the language and cultural differences between England and Wales, or in response to my 
questions about how teachers in Wales teach national identity.  Neither of these contexts for 
labeling some abstract, implicit “thing” using the term in question is an everyday occurrence.  At 
schools in communities where use of Cymraeg is common, “drowning” is a label not so much for 
a particular practice, but for a kind of approach to socialization that certain teachers take—
“certain teachers” being those first-language Cymraeg speakers at schools in communities where 
use of Cymraeg is common.  This approach to socialization arises out of the deep love of 
teachers’ own heritage and their professional objective of nurturing children. 
 Many of the student teachers that I interviewed in the early days of my principal 
dissertation fieldwork, both Cymraeg-focused and English-based cohorts of student teachers, 
offered the idea of nurturing as a primary motivation for pursuing a teaching career.  Most of 
these student teachers identified teaching as an occupation that has an essential element of 
influencing students in a positive way that engenders open communication, growth, and trust.  
As a result, the positive sense of “drowning” draws on tacit understandings about how to help 
children learn and mature, making it more difficult to define than to describe this set of practices. 
 Ultimately, I found that this family of contexts—related to drowning in Welshness and 
teaching national identity in classrooms—depended on an understanding of the cultural context 
for these contexts.  That cultural context, however, varied according to the meta-discourse of 
nationalism, which pervades school hallways, classrooms, offices and teachers’ lounges.  In this 
connection, it must be noted that I never heard the phrase as a natural occurrence in Cymraeg 
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settings, but only in conversations in English.  To have a conversation in Cymraeg is, to a great 
extent, to already be drowned in Cymraeg, which would make it unnecessary to mark the 
practice.  It is in English conversations that the gap between the immediate communicative 
context (defined by use of English) and these teachers’ most comfortable communicative settings 
(defined by the use of Cymraeg) that provides an occasion for metapragmatic marking of the 
practice of DROWNING. 
 
(Meta)Semantics of “Drowning” 
 Eventually, I arrived at the following conclusions about the best linguistic analysis.  The 
phrase, “drown them in Welshness”, does not conform to a model in which “drown[ed]” is the 
verb, “them” is the direct object, and “Welshness” is the indirect object or “in Welshness” is a 
prepositional phrase.  In fact, “drown [them] in Welshness” should not be interpreted as a 
construction that involves an indirect object.  In terms of semantic structure, another way of 
saying this is that the verb “drown” takes “in water” to be its unmarked adverbial.  Hence, 
“drowned in Welshness” is a complex transitive verb and the phrase, “in Welshness”, is an 
obligatory adverbial (though, this adverbial is not supplied on every occasion of use).  Thus, the 
similar “immerse in work” employs “work” in an equivalent (functionally) as “Welshness”.  
Both are treated as fluid media. 
 Consider how more distant and simpler verbal forms with similar surface features operate 
in contrast to complex transitive verbs using an obligatory adverbial.  Specifically, consider the 
verb, “to eat”, which presupposes that whatever is taken as its object is at least mechanically  
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edible.3  Just as the normal (meta)semantics of “to eat” presupposes food-like substances, “to 
drown” presupposes a lack of usable air and suggests that some other medium is substituted for 
air with lethal consequences.  However, it is more complicated to use “to drown [something]” 
than “to eat [something]”.  The use of “eat”, as transitive verb, is simple enough so that the 
variety of things that can be ingested does not require a specific category for the direct object 
position when occupied by other than food-like substances, as “drown” [boddi] requires a 
marked adverbial for media that exclude water. 
 This fact of a slotted quality to “drown” explains the visceral reactions to this metaphor 
as a violent one.  This reaction should be surprising.  After all, drowning in water is lethal, but 
drowning in Welshness hardly so—and I never encountered the poetic counterpart of the 
binomial; that is, dying to English, being born to Cymraeg.  This is in contrast to neutral 
reactions to “eating one’s words” (which lacks a visceral quality such as taste, for me anyway), 
but more similar to the reaction to “eating crow” (You don’t really eat a black scavenging bird 
when you eat crow, but some might find the image disgusting.).  Even, when “in Welshness” is 
included in the phrase” drowning children. . .”, cultural outsiders tend to see the phrase as not 
only a dramatic metaphor, but a disturbing one (by contrast, I never found it disturbing—merely 
“colorful”). 
 I think this usage warrants coining a term for such an adverbial: medium adverbials, 
which make use of a mass noun that lacks explicit boundaries.4  Given the base or ground on 
                                                 
3  Eating typically also presupposes that whatever is mechanically edible is also potentially food (i.e., is analogous to 
culturally appropriate foods).  Nonetheless, (meta)semantics tend to extend farther than typical usage; consider “My 
baby sister ate my homework” and “Locked in his own library for two days, Thomas Jefferson ate a copy of the 
New Testament to keep his strength up”.  We even speak of eating one’s words; since words are abstract, eating 
words is not physically possible and the expression “eating one’s words” is, therefore, metaphorical and appropriate 
under just such a reading. 
4  See Hawkins 1984 (specifically, page 94) and Nesset 2004 for a justification of the choice of the term “medium” 
for this adverbial category, which moves spatial relations (e.g., containment) to the background and leaves the 
definition of boundaries implied, but non-specific. 
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which the profile/figure of drowning appears, we might say the (quasi-)obligatory adverbial for 
“drown” (when not merely implied, as when it is used in its unmarked mode) belongs to the 
category of “medium adverbials”.  Since the interest in this complex transitive verb (i.e., 
“drowned in Welshness”) lies at the point of the quasi-obligatory adverbial (i.e., “in 
Welshness”), there is some value to adopting a category of medium adverbials, given the 
indeterminate status of the implied boundaries. 
 The metasemantics of the phrase, “drown in Welshness”, provides only one instance of 
marking, but this single markedness is doubly significant.  In using the phrase, Welsh teachers 
use a lexical form (DROWN) that has an unmarked semantic value (“in water”), but they mark the 
adverbial position so as to indicate a different semantic role: to drown in something other than 
water.  This is one value of the single instance of marking.  In addition, the specific value of the 
explicit medium of drowning indicated in the phrase (i.e., the value of “in Welshness”), which 
might be any other dense fluid that is not breathable, implies that the verb in this phrase connotes 
a metaphorical type of drowning (as does “eating” in “eating one’s words”).  The metaphorical 
connotation is a second value of the single instance of marking. 
 
RE-THEORIZING THE PRAGMATICS OF COMMUNICATION 
Cultural Objectification 
 It is useful to compare this way of thinking about language and cultural identity to the 
discussions of the same range of identity in a different ethnographic study (i.e., Trosset 1993), 
particularly in relation to an influential perspective on nationalism (i.e., Handler 1983).  
Trosset’s primary experiences with ideologies of a Welsh ethnic identity came from her 
participant-observation of traditions that are closely linked to Cymraeg as a language-cultural 
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complex.  Trosset identified recurring features of an ideological discourse about Welshness when 
interacting with people who took Cymraeg to be central to their identity, interactions that took 
place in certain activities in which “the same people did everything”(1993:37).  As a result, the 
model for the ideology that drew her attention emerged from the social networks of people 
involved in certain activities.  In the idiom of the earlier part of this chapter, these are people 
who are drowned in Welshness.  The local activities in which Trosset was interested were 
“groups interested in local history and folklore, the Welsh women’s group” (1993:37), attending 
chapel services, and singing in a local choral group.5 
 Apart from choral singing, it is important to notice, that these traditions are not those that 
figure in the general popular imagination as “cultural traditions” associated with the Cymraeg 
language complex.  The “traditional” activities that Trosset (1993:37) listed (quoted above) are 
better described in terms of specifically social activities—or, even better, in terms of community 
construction: local objectifications of culture, rather than cultural objectification at a social 
                                                 
5  The Welsh women’s group that Trosset referred to is Merched y Wawr.  Literally translated, Merched y Wawr is 
“Daughters of the Dawn” in English.  I would find it even more difficult to research this organization than primary 
schools because of its sex-specific basis.  It is the Cymraeg correlate to the UK-wide Women’s Institute (in 
Cymraeg: Sefydliad Merched; transliterally, “Women’s Foundation”).  The UK-wide WI organization, perhaps 
having received complaints from local women in Wales, objected to the typical use of Cymraeg at Women’s 
Institute groups in Wales and, in 1967, made English the language of conducting business.  Interestingly enough, 
today, the website for the National Federation of Women's Institutes of England, Wales, Jersey, Guernsey and the 
Isle of Man (NFWI) has pages devoted to NFWI-Wales, and on the index of pages, Cymraeg pages are listed first.  
Merched y Wawr is a sociological analog of what linguists refer to by the simple phrase, “back-translation”: the 
translation from Language B to Language A of something that had previously been translated from Language A to 
Language B.  It is more convoluted than “back translation” might suggest, almost of Borgesian proportions 
(referring to Jorge Luis Borges).  That is, the first Women’s Institute meeting in Britain took place in an area in 
which Cymraeg use was prevalent.  After it expanded across Britain, some of the Welsh members reacted to the 
English-language policy of 1967 and created a splinter group, the meetings of which would be conducted in 
Cymraeg. 
     While “[t]he WI movement began at Stoney Creek in Canada in 1897 when Adelaide Hoodless addressed a 
meeting for the wives of members of the Farmers' Institute”, “[t]he first British WI meeting took place on 16 
September 1915 at LLanfairpwll on Anglesey in North Wales” and “[t]he first [WI unit in Britain] to be formed was 
at [this same village] on Anglesey, North Wales”.  By the following year, there were forty local units in various 
villages, presumably, all across Britain; and over 100 local units in 1917.  This information was obtained from the 
official sites at http://www.thewi.org.uk and http://www.merchedywawr.co.uk, particularly the History pages at 
http://www.merchedywawr.co.uk/Hanes.link and at http://www.thewi.org.uk/standard.aspx?id=56 and 
http://www.thewi.org.uk/standard.aspx?id=58; accessed June 15, 2011. 
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distance.  According to Trosset, these “community” activities are important because the people 
involved in them are “contributing to the current existence of certain social practices” (1993:53).  
They do so out of various motives and for different reasons—but all these motives are related to 
creating community.  People do not organize and participate in these activities in order to 
“act[ing] in imitation of something done in a less self-conscious form elsewhere in the society” 
(Trosset 1993:52) or to “re-creat[e] something other sectors of society used to do” (1993:53). 
 In discussing the relation of “cultural traditions” to community-construction, it is 
important to highlight what Handler (1988) called “cultural objectification”.  As a result of this 
process, objectified activities, as “things”, and the “folk” producing cultural objects can be 
presented as authentic representatives of national culture.  Often, such objectified traditions are 
put on national display in imitation of people elsewhere in society who are practicing those 
traditions less self-consciously (Handler 1988).6  The notion of locally salient traditional 
practices—“local objectifications of culture” as differentiated from cultural objectification at a 
                                                 
6  Handler's treatment of cultural objectification raises worries of both a philosophical and an anthropological nature.  
In explaining his omission of an explicit discussion of Québécois history by observing that Québécois nationalism 
and nationalist historiography is predicated on a socially constructed historical reality, he raises questions of 
epistemology.  Given our cognitive capacities, all human knowledge is constructed, but that doesn't mean that there 
is nothing there for our knowledge to be about.  Anthropology of knowledge offers to philosophy confirmation that 
all of our understandings and knowledge are incomplete because perception and conceptualization are not 
independent from culture.  In other words, there is no escape—for nationalists or social scientists writing on 
nationalism—from the sort of objectification Handler resisted; something Handler seemed to suggest himself (1988: 
194-5).  Objectification is a cognitive resource without which we would experience nothing, precisely because 
Westerners are wrong to believe that any “thing, objectively existent in the real or natural world, presents itself 
unambiguously to human subjects who can. . . apprehend the thing as it truly is” (Handler 1988: 14).  From the 
Kantian perspective, which has not outworn its value, the sensible aspects of things are apprehended and the objects 
are constructed as known objects in the process of perception. 
The danger of thinking that movements that objectify their culture have the option of not doing so is that of 
presuming that their actors will, by objectifying their culture, always fail to recognize the constructedness of 
national identity and that they will never apprehend new cultural qualities of their constructed cultural objects.  It 
may seem paradoxical, but if objectification is seen as a natural part of human experience and knowledge, then this 
“pragmatic use” of a construct of objectifying practice “within the context of action” (as Malinowski (1965b) would 
say) becomes less monolithic and less consumed with totality than it is in Handler's discussions.  On the other hand, 
it is far too easy for commentators to interpret ethnographers of Wales as having essentialized and objectified those 
social groups recognized in Wales.  The schism in Welsh Studies might result in an outcome in which my 
perspective is said to objectify Cymraeg and associated traditions.  My pragmatistic perspective can only be 
successful if the consequences of its application and the circumstances of its uptake by other researchers are both 
congruent with my argumentation in this dissertation. 
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social distance—is crucial to understanding the positioning of people relative to Welshness, 
among laypersons and academics alike in Wales. 
 There are many things that might be considered traditionally Welsh, and many that are 
considered saliently traditionally Welsh by those who practice them.  Some of the former or the 
latter are culturally objectified in such a way as to be made the object of possible parody, 
ridicule, or even contempt by members of the larger national community in Wales.  The 
simulated, parodic, and pejorative aspects of cultural objectification are not central to how I use 
the concept of cultural objectification in this dissertation.  Nevertheless, the pattern seems to be 
that when the community of people who hold some practice to be saliently traditional is very 
broad, the more likely “it” is to be objectified—in mental, communicative, and re-enacted 
representations—in ways that are at odds with those who practice it “with feeling”.  Many 
traditions that are recognized as saliently Welsh by only a relative handful of people are not 
candidates for pejorative objectification for that reason (i.e., their low visibility). 
 To reiterate, only some of the social activities that are part of local community 
construction and associated with the Cymraeg language complex are popularly recognized to 
play such a role.  Thus, beyond local communities and outside the Cymraeg language 
community, few of these activities could be recognized as special symbols that could anchor a 
Welsh identity in relation to Cymraeg.  It is important, then, to identify the people involved in 
any case of cultural objectification as having occupied one or another of two positions.  These 
two positions divide: 1) those who participate in a more or less ingenuous way as part of 
community construction and 2) those who participate in distancing themselves from these 
activities (e.g., through stereotyping).  The former can be said to endorse the traditions, while the 
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latter merely engage with them, sometimes without being fully aware of it, sometimes in a 
pejorative or parodic way. 
 Any activity that anyone might claim to be traditional might be culturally objectified in 
different ways by different people.  Some of those who participate relatively sincerely (“with 
feeling”) in a widely recognized (and perhaps ridiculed) tradition also participate in other social 
activities that are not nationally recognized as a distinctly Welsh activity, but might be distinctly 
Welsh to the participants.  People who emphasize Cymraeg in their sense of identity would 
readily recognize local history groups as a “very Welsh” cultural tradition, but a discussion of 
local history at an arranged meeting is not something that mass media have culturally objectified 
as being stereotypically Welsh.  Thus, there are those who identify traditional Welsh activities as 
stereotypic customs that reflect an imagined past, while others live that imagined past in their 
daily lives as they reproduce and produce the Cymraeg language complex. 
 Drawing the line between the two perspectives on social activities is a critical move.  The 
implication that these perspectives construct two different types of social activities—which some 
might find indistinguishable when witnessed—is equally important to analysis.  The popularly 
recognized traditions, which are represented repeatedly and stereotypically as signifying ethnic 
Welshness, figure in the general popular imagination as “cultural traditions” associated with the 
Cymraeg language complex.  Such culturally objectified traditions in Wales include Welsh 
music and poetry competitions, traditional Welsh folk song form (e.g., cerdd dant, which 
involves musical counterpoint), and noson lawen (traditional evening entertainment 
characterized by humor and musical performances that were once held in farmhouses at evening 
time around a fire).  It is possible that some people would slide back and forth between these 
positions, exemplifying an ambivalence about their own participation and significance.  I did not 
 335
meet any who expressed ambiguity about the two positions.  Typically, people in north-west 
Wales are “rooted” to one or the other, although many feel tensions between the two in meeting 
everyday objectives and obligations.  If a line is to be drawn between locally objectified social 
activities and stereotyped cultural traditions, it must be a fine line that takes into consideration 
the processes of cultural objectification and popular stereotyping.7 
 The fact that certain traditional practices are not well-known or culturally objectified 
beyond those who engage in them for purposes of constructing their communities means these 
activities can avoid being politicized.  Use of Cymraeg is the most symbolic and recognizable 
practice that is culturally objectified by those who do not strive to maintain the Cymraeg 
language complex and language community.  The symbolic tyranny of language attitudes in the 
sociopolitical life of Wales also means that Cymraeg can operate by association with traditional 
activities, even where language practices, as a theme, are preemptively redacted from discourse 
by elimination of explicit denotings of Cymraeg.  The consequent of these points is that the 
imaginary object of the Cymraeg language complex—taking various shapes according to 
different national identity positions—plays a very significant role in processes of cultural 
objectification in Wales. 
 
Iconization and the Limits of Analysis 
 The language activists I encountered in north-west Wales, among others, understood 
language (in the particular shape of Cymraeg) to be the central emblem—one might say the 
essence—of the nation.  Hence, they took it to be a matter of necessity that language stand in 
some kind of signifying role relative to an imagined community of people.  In using the term, 
                                                 
7  By contrast, the line between overtly political, on one side, and social activities or cultural traditions is much more 
contrastive.  Volunteer work on campaigns of the political party, Plaid Cymru, which many in Wales still refer to as 
“the Welsh nationalist party”, would involve overtly political activity. 
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“necessity”, I am deploying it as an analytic term that expresses something of the force that 
sociocultural actors attribute to Cymraeg.  Like the term, “identity”, “necessity” is vague and 
requires ethnographic content.  At the center of vexing questions about the cultural necessity of 
particular languages (in north-west Wales and elsewhere) is what Gal and Irvine (1995) called 
“iconization”.8  Various predecessors and contemporaries of current-day anthropology have 
endorsed (e.g., Herder) and critiqued (e.g., Boas) the idea of a seemingly “necessary” link 
between a group and a set of language practices (i.e., a language).  As mentioned in Chapter 
Two, Susan Gal and Judith Irvine have made this principle a canonical one in linguistic 
anthropology. 
 
Iconicity involves a transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic 
practices, features, or varieties and the social images with which they are linked. 
Linguistic practices that index social groups or activities appear to be iconic 
representations of them—as if a linguistic feature somehow depicted or displayed 
a social group's inherent nature or essence (Irvine, 1989).  This process entails the 
attribution of necessity to a connection (between linguistic features and social 
groups) that may be only historical, contingent, or conventional.  The implication 
of necessity is reinforced by the iconicity of the ideological representation.  By 
picking out qualities supposedly shared by the social image and the linguistic 
image, the ideological representation (itself a sign) binds them together in a 
linkage that appears to be inherent. (Gal and Irvine 1995:973)9 
 
                                                 
8  The class of phenomena that was initially called “iconization” (in Gal and Irvine 1995 and Irvine and Gal 2000), 
was later changed to “rhematization” (Gal 2005).  However, in the case of each label for iconization/rhematization, 
Gal employed a term that signified a strength of correspondence between signs and their objects that was less than 
that of index and, in changing the name, employed a term that signified even less about interpretive significance 
(indeed, as little as is possible in a Peircean context).  The formulations that Gal and Irvine have used, suggest a 
desire to capture two different kinds of semiotic factors: a sign-object factor (a relation between a social group and a 
language, or signs of them) and a significance factor (in fact, an image of a “necessary” link between the two).  Gal 
and Irvine probably focused on icons in naming iconization because they (seem to have) understood the putative 
resemblance of iconic relations (real or not) to have the same status—in the perception of any beholder—as any 
indexical relations.  Regarding the latter, they might have understood indexes as having only the significance of 
whatever is being pointed at, rather than the indication of the real effect of a causal relation of, say, moving air on a 
weathervane. 
9  Many of the linguistic anthropology terms whose use is accompanied by a citation of the semiotic theory of 
Charles S. Peirce tend to deviate significantly from how Peirce used them.  In fact, the linguistic anthropological use 
of Peircean terminology is almost entirely due to Silverstein’s (1976, 1979) importing of those terms in his project to 
address problems in traditional semantics. 
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 Iconization/rhematization can be seen as a principle comparable to the law of averages in 
that it speaks to an ideological conviction that is supposed to emerge more-or-less “naturally” 
according to the appearances of experience and an underlying reality (whether social, cultural, or 
physical reality).  The shared ideological commitment is a tacit or explicit belief that connections 
among the appearances of the universe are not accidental.  In unpacking this notion, we begin to 
notice that such connections emerge (at least, in part) from the expectation that signs have, and 
even must have, a meaningful content.  In the domain of experience of connections between 
social groups and practices, this notion suggests that the functionality of expression is a rule of 
cognition or language use.  Thus, the knowledge that I am a US-American citizen might (or 
must) carry the content that I speak English.  To take a famous example: to speak English with 
centralized /ay/, in a certain presupposed vicinity, can be said to express (or did when Labov was 
doing research) the meaning that one’s family has lived on Martha’s Vineyard for generations. 
 The most important aspect of the iconicity concept is that the link between group and 
practice is claimed or taken to be necessary, which is to be other than “historical, contingent, or 
conventional” (Gal and Irvine 1995, Irvine and Gal 2000).  When I read Gal (2005) defining the 
concept “as an indexical sign that its interpretant takes to be an icon” (2005:35n5, emphasis 
mine), my reading is that the grammatical referent of “its” is “rheme” and that this as a semiotic 
explanation of what it means to take the conjunction of social image and language image as a 
putatively necessary conjunction.10  Thus, iconization is the two-part process by which people 1) 
                                                 
10  My reading of this passage is that the grammatical referent of “its” is the relation Gal (2005) had in mind, which 
she called “rheme” when she renamed iconization, “rhematization” (in Gal 2005).  In the Peircean context, in which 
the recent semiotic work in linguistic anthropology purports to be anchored, the change in stress from icon to rheme 
indicates a broad, multidimensional, and non-coordinate change, rather than a unidimensional one—as the authors 
might have understood it .  Gal (2005) specified the Peircean category of Firstness when she called the class of 
phenomena “rhematization”, just as Gal and Irvine (1995) did when they called it “iconization”.  That is, both 
rhemes and icons are relations of Firstness, which is a category characterized by possibility/quality, rather than 
actuality (as with Secondness) or law-like regularity (as with Thirdness).  However, in moving from icons to 
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link categories under which falls a social group (or images of that social group) to categories 
under which falls a language or stylistic practice (or images of that language/stylistic practice); 
and 2) infer/assume (for whatever reasons) that this link is a metaphysical necessity.11 
 As Keane (2003:417) noted, “[t]he social power of naturalization” comes from this 
application of the principle involved in such “necessary” conjunctions of group and language 
practice.  Such conjunctions are not simply the “false readings” that make associations seem to 
have “some prior essential character” inherent to them.  They are the “misconstruing[s]” of those 
socioculturally entailing sign tokens that have effects on the future situation or institution, 
misconstruing them not as the creative or inventive moves in communication that linguistic 
anthropologists can see them to be, but “as if they were merely expressing something that 
already exists” that is part of objective reality (Keane 2003:417)—as if they were something on 
the known landscape. 
 Irvine and Gal describe iconization as involving “an attribution of cause and immediate 
necessity” (2000:37, emphasis mine—the phrase “cause and” is an addition since the 1995 
article).  While being philosophically insightful (or allusive) in doing so, Irvine and Gal are not 
expansive about the folk-ascription of cause and necessity to the situated perception of a 
group/practice link.  Thankfully, there is an older, if narrower literature on perception and belief 
from which to draw.  Those familiar with the US-American academy’s canonical history of 
                                                                                                                                                             
rhemes, Gal (2005) shifted from a stress on sign–object relations (icon/index/symbol) to sign–significance relations 
(rheme/dicent/argument).  That is not a difference in degree, but of kind. 
11  The awkward-sounding sign-relation relation of argument is what Gal and Irvine might have used to indicate a 
binding (i.e., a compelling) perception of relations between a sign’s appearance (such as some language practice), its 
significance, and (social or geographic) object.  It seems safe to say that what Gal and Irvine have had in mind in the 
various presentations of the concept of iconization/rhematization—that is, what is common to both their analytic 
perspective and the practical perspectives of their research participants—is what Peirce called rhematic symbols or, 
even more likely, arguments, rather than rhemes sui generis.  It is the sign relations of symbols and arguments that 
convey the regularity and compulsion, respectively, of conjunctions between things like social/language image and 
the language or social group.  However, there are two other possible sign-object relations that are relevant: a 
rhematic index ["any object of direct experience so far as it directs attention to an Object by which its presence is 
caused” and a rhematic icon, which would also direct attention to an object (present, absent, or non-existent), but 
only to the idea or possible qualities of an object (Peirce [1933]1974, CP 2.256, c.1903)]. 
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philosophy in will recognize the similarity between Irvine and Gal’s (2000) formulation of this 
process of group/practice identification and David Hume’s Eighteenth-Century critique of the 
appearances of causation.12  In that critique, Hume suggested that appearances of causation are 
better described as “constant and regular conjunction”.  I draw loosely on that picture of 
causation to further expand Gal and Irvine’s model.13 
 Given their original statement of iconization, we can see that a perception of a link 
between group and practice, as something observed at least once, is likely to be followed by 
consistently coincidental appearances of one group and one language/stylistic practice.  
Eventually, this might lead to an attribution of a conjunction by necessity, which (if true) would 
explain the constancy expressed in there being a series of these conjunctions.14  Given some 
mention or appearance of a practice or group, the pair (of group or practice) is typically already 
                                                 
12  To provide textual context for this quoted phrase, Hume wrote in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
published in 1737 (section IV, part II):  
[T]here is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers [like physical 
inertia or the nutritional value of foods]; and consequently. . . the mind is not led to form such a 
conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction [of sensible qualities and “causal” 
powers], by anything which it knows of their nature.  As to past Experience, it can be allowed to 
give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, 
which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to 
other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main 
question on which I would insist. 
13  David Hume represents a transition from Cartesian concerns with certainty to later concerns with necessity in 
nature and knowledge.  However, philosophy progressed in the Nineteenth and Twentienth Centuries.  The concern 
with necessity was followed by concerns with contingent, probable combinations, which were the notable concerns 
of thinkers like the naturalist, Charles Darwin, and the mathematician, C. S. Peirce.  The replacement of necessity by 
probabilistic contingency is useful for anthropologists who draw on the history of philosophy because—in a view 
that is unlikely to be intuitive to anthropologists who still find Boas’ nomothetic model of natural science 
compelling—the apparently less (or, for Hume, un-)intelligible natural world became more intelligible through 
recognition of its more contingent, merely probable nature. 
14  Another account of this imputation of necessity is the attribution of design.  I would call this “the Clouseau 
Fallacy”, to recall the way the Blake Edward character, Inspector Jacques Clouseau, would generalize from a single 
case to a principle in a way that suggests a misuse of cognition.  Thus, in one scene, he mistakes a closet for the exit 
as he takes his leave.  When he runs into the wall inside the closet, Clouseau suggests his host is “up to the old closet 
ploy”, despite the fact that there is no nefarious purpose behind something that is easily explained by Clouseau’s 
own error of judgment. 
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“known” and, therefore, presupposed when sociocultural actors say the constant conjunction of 
the paired elements is necessary.15 
 Linguistic anthropologists have become interested in Peircean semiotics in the same span 
of time in which ideologies and broad, cultural discourses have nudged interests in traditional 
field linguistics to the periphery.  Thus, it is important to note that, while citation practices link 
indexicality and iconicity to the mathematician-logician-philosopher Peirce, the fidelity to 
Peircean semiotics wavers in linguistic anthropological usage.  Peirce was no discourse analyst 
and, if he is not to be so portrayed, it is important to be clear on how Peircean semiotics relates to 
the kind of mapping relations Gal and Irvine (1995) discussed. 
 Gal and Irvine are concerned with cases in which a social actor takes linguistic practices 
to index social groups or activities and, thereby, takes those practices to be iconic representations 
of the groups/activities.  In giving theoretical description to such cases, Gal and Irvine 
(1995:973) claim that, when a social actor takes a linguistic feature to be “somehow depicted or 
displayed a social group's inherent nature or essence”, which (they say) “entails the [actor’s 
attribution of necessity to a connection (between linguistic features and social groups) that may 
be only historical, contingent, or conventional”.  The Bourdieusian concern with misconstrual 
                                                 
15  It seems useful, also, to consider the idea that iconization could also (indeed, it does) occur in the opposite order 
from one that presupposes a given pair.  That is, it could also occur as an instantiating application of the basic 
principle of necessity.  That is, people might assume that every language/stylistic practice (or a social group) must 
necessarily be linked to some particular (but currently) unidentified social group (or language/stylistic practice, 
respectively).  People who assume this might then look for the relevant group or practice that is currently missing.  
By locating some practice or group—a candidate for pairing—the sociocultural reality of necessary conjunction 
comes to bear on a newly exemplifying pair.  The result of applying in practice a cosmological principle of 
necessary conjunction is the creation of a (more) concrete, privileged association that had not existed previously. 
     In certain (but not all) settings when links between group and practice are discussed by “folk” (e.g., many Welsh 
or English persons in the border zones of Cymraeg and English language-based identities), the two kinds of serial 
group/practice conjunction are intertwined in a loop of cultural logic.  That is, the appearance that a presupposed 
pair is necessarily linked is sometimes explained by the “obviousness” that any group or language has a twin-
correlate, and vice versa.  It is possible that the assumption of a principle of a necessary conjunction without a 
presupposed pairing—as a habit of rule-following that represents a deeper normativity than that of a presupposing 
application of observed correlations—is the motivating force behind iconization in many national contexts.  Bauman 
and Briggs (2003) suggested something like this to be the case in Europe after Lockean modernization. 
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and misrecognition is clear in their writing.  When ethnographers of communication who focus 
on semiotic processes like iconization write of misconstrual in the field, they write in the 
language of irrealis moods (e.g., subjunctive), discounted views of cultural essence, and 
epistemic hedges—“as if”, “somehow”, “inherent nature or essence”, “supposedly”, “appears to 
be” (Gal and Irvine 1995: 973, see the block quote above), “appears [to be inherent] from the 
perspective of the ideology” (Gal 2005:26), and “. . .as if they were merely [expressing 
something that already exists]” (Keane 2003:617). 
 Moreover, such ethnographic treatment tends to conflate processes of sign interaction and 
representation (i.e., semiosis) with broader discursive processes.  This treatment of signs is in 
stark contrast to how signs operate in Peircean semiotics.  Linguistic anthropology is concerned 
with recognizing the creative entailments of signs (effects on a situational context that are 
signaled in a communicative event).  The kind of entailment that is central to Peirce’s semiotics 
has to do with how any given sign token becomes a sign.  That sort of entailment is key to 
understanding a number of key features of what motivate Gal and Irvine’s notion of iconization: 
the conventionality of symbols, the necessity of what Peirce called “arguments”, and (more 
generally) the law-like force of his “universal category”, “Thirdness”.16  It is an interest in such 
realist normativity—which structures meaning/representation itself—that makes Peircean 
semiotics “pragmatistic”. 
 At a less philosophical level, it is important to see that Peircean semiotics is a framework 
for analysis of appearances.  An “indexical sign” that someone takes to be an icon is, by that very 
                                                 
16  Peirce shares with the philosopher David Hume (see footnotes 12 and 13, this chapter) an interest in principles of 
governed regularity (e.g., successful inductive inferences).  However, Peirce inverted the Humean finding about 
reasoning and reality, contrasting also with Durkheim and Mauss finding about forms of classification (1963).  He 
did not conclude that reasoning imputes a law-likeness to reality that does not exist (or is unfounded), nor that 
people impute systems of classification to objective reality that they find in their own societies.  Rather, Peirce’s 
monistic realism held that the success of human “laws” of reasoning (like causality) is due to the fact that nature’s 
substance is representational, a substance that human reasoning shares (Peirce 1974, CP 6.476-7, 1908; CP 5.93-
5.106, 1903). 
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fact, an icon; similarly, if taken as a symbol, then it is a symbol; if taken as an argument, then an 
argument; and so on.  Someone else might see the same object as a sign in its index aspect—for 
example, as something that indicates to them the presence of a ghost—where the first person saw 
an icon—for example, something the latter thought was reminiscent of a ghostly presence.  The 
analysis of signs cannot reveal delusions or illusions, but only what is perceived because Peirce 
located significance in a specific element of his analysis of sign structures—the interpretant (or 
interpretation, akin to message).  The element of significance—as a part of a sign structure—is a 
distinct element from that of the sign-object and the sign-vehicle.  Peirce’s analysis of signs 
allows for demonstration of variation in the interpretations of any given sign token (i.e., variation 
in sign significance), but not demonstration that a sign significance is a misconstrual.  There are 
no discourses in Peircean semiotics, only signs. 
 Peirce’s interest in the concomitance of signs was a logical and evidentiary interest.  The 
processes by which signs represent not only objects, but other significances did not imply 
sociological or cultural forces.  Signs, for Peirce, were appearances and progressions of 
significance.  While they might implicate habits of thinking, these habits were far removed from 
such “phenomena” as, say, sexual repression, gender alignment, and institutional racism.  
Because Peircean semiotics is phenomenological (in the precise sense of empirical 
appearances)—and neither psychoanalytical, nor ideological, nor cultural—surface meaning is 
all important.  Although the superficiality of Peircean signs might seem a detriment to discourse 
analysis, as with any tool of analysis, Peirce’s semiotic system actually simplifies research on 
cultural discourses.  It allows for attention on complex dynamics to be applied to discourse and 
society.  To gain that view, significance must be analytically located in agents and not in 
multiple layers of a sociocultural milieu. 
 343
 In recognizing the limits of analysis, it is important to see, then, that sign relations subsist 
at one level of analysis, while the dynamics of cultural discourse subsist at another (or others).  
The productive use of Peircean concepts in linguistic anthropology is hindered by a conflation of 
the two levels (or, worse, a reduction of one level to the other): the phenomenological, on one 
hand, and the socio-discursive, ideological dimension of (cultural) inference, on the other.17  The 
difficulty of separating the two levels in linguistic anthropology might be the fact that both are 
equally agent-oriented.  However, it is critical to separate the two levels if one is to address the 
counter-empirical, underlying norms of consciousness and action (as stated in Chapter Two). 
 The mapping relations that fit Gal’s and Irvine’s descriptions of iconicity seem to be 
commonplace—at the discursive level.  As a contrasting cultural practice, the dominant poetic 
mode in which the trope of DROWNING manifests is worthy of note.  Indeed, it suggests a more 
broadly pragmatic analytic strategy than that of iconicity.  Recall, in this connection, my 
distinction between aesthetically-evaluative and epistemically-normative principles.  We need 
not restrict our analysis to the merely aesthetic and heuristic level.  Instead, we can adopt an 
orientation that focuses on the normative constitution of community in terms of the relations of 
cultural discourse, rather than in terms of misconstruals of signs of such cultural relations (by 
“the native” or the ethnographer).  By doing so, we come to how the trope of DROWNING 
transcends the simple mapping relations of iconicity (and indexicality). 
 
Variation in the Use of “Drowning” and Its Cultural Significance 
 There is a more common usage of “boddi” in the same circles that I found it being used in 
the way this chapter discusses.  This more common usage connotes the destructive elimination of 
                                                 
17  Notice that, in my view, this gives rise to the identification of another area of research; that of socioloinguistic 
scale (e.g., micro versus macro).  See the June 2012 special issue of Anthropology & Education Quarterly. 
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a village to make way for a reservoir that would provide water resources for English cities.  
While there were several instances of this intra-state, inter-nation exploitation of water resources 
in Wales, the most commemorated village so affected is that of Capel Celyn in north-central 
Wales, whose “drowning” benefitted the denizens of Liverpool.  Despite the fact that Liverpool, 
in England, is often called the capital of north Wales, due to the numbers of Welsh persons who 
have lived there, many activists saw this case of state-required compulsory exchange of property 
around Capel Celyn as a culturally symbolic case of “drowning”.  For them, Liverpool’s “taking” 
of the territory in which the village of Capel Celyn rested, signified a double threat to 
nationhood: the literal submerging of local life around Capel Celyn and the exporting of natural 
“Welsh” resources. 
 One of the signs of the depths of the trope of “drowning” (boddi) children is that the 
spectrum of language politics in north-west Wales is captured in that trope and in the variety of 
local accounts people give of it.  For teachers at schools in Cymraeg-majority villages in 
Gwynedd, the drama of this metaphor transforms a vague, county-mandated approach to Welsh-
language immersion into something of national importance.  They will explain that boddi is 
something done to children who come from backgrounds where Cymraeg is seldom or never 
used. 
 Use of the metaphor and practice varies according to the language-policy principle that a 
language should be the medium of instruction during the majority of classroom time if it is 
spoken by the majority within the school’s community.  Where this principle implies that 
Cymraeg is the dominant medium of instruction, children are said to be drowned in Welshness; 
and where not, they are not.  Nevertheless, among Gwynedd teachers for whom Cymraeg is of 
fundamental importance, boddi is a national-cultural obligation, not only a professional one: 
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They “drown” children in the “welshness” of Cymraeg in order to combat the prevalence of the 
English language in mass media and most of Wales.  That is, they drown all children, even the 
ones who might learn it in their home, because they are “in danger of losing it” as they get older. 
 Alternatively, many who feel greater affinity toward the English language—who would 
rarely, if ever, hear the “drowning” metaphor—take it to be a perfect example of “Welsh 
nationalism”.  For these people, the idea of “drowning” children highlights the exclusionism of 
those whom they portray as separatists from the UK.  The range of emotional significance of the 
metaphor is not limited to ethnolinguistic attitudes, but also interacts with the image of nurturing 
that is emblematic of primary school teachers.  DROWNING, while enacting this nurturing value 
for first-language Cymraeg teachers at schools where most of the community members regularly 
use Cymraeg, clearly can convey the opposite to those whose idea about what constitutes 
personhood was not formed in the Cymraeg language world.  An anthropologist at Manchester 
University found the metaphor—the image of teachers drowning children—“disturbing”. 
 The Manchester University anthropologist had no connection to Cymraeg communities.  
Someone who did have such a connection, but now lived and worked in communities with 
English-majorities also had a strong negative reaction to my inquiries about whether the practice, 
and I used the term “drowning”, occurred at her school.  This Cymraeg-speaking primary school 
teacher at YGS, which lay midway between the Welsh western coast and the English border—
outside the Cymraeg-majority Gwynedd county—told me that my use of “boddi” was mistaken.  
I had never heard the metaphor used at that school, in either English or Cymraeg, during the 
several months I was observing lessons and activities there.  She denied that teachers would ever 
use it, the idea of drowning, in reference to children.  They would, however, use the word, 
“trochi” (to immerse or to dip), she said.  When I asked her what “trochi” meant, she replied: 
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It’s where children, usually it’s children, you know, they’re right in, you know, in 
a school where they just hear Welsh from an early age.  And you usually hear that 
term, if it’s referred to with children that have come from another area, typically 
an English area. . . totally immerse yourself in work, isn’t it?  You say that, don’t 
you? (March 6, 2008) 
 
 A researcher of school language practices at a university in Gwynedd, himself a first-
language Cymraeg-speaker, had a similar view on the general concept.  However, he located the 
metaphor in a setting different from that of any present-day cultural milieu.  Born and raised in 
the school district of one of my Cymraeg-centered school sites, he offered an account of this 
usage of “boddi” that gave it a temporal connotation.  He told me teachers had once used 
“boddi”, but it probably stopped being used in the 1980s.  At that time, according to that 
researcher, teachers did not apply it to all children in reference to a native Welshness maintained 
by Welsh culture or language.  He told me teachers only used it for language immersion 
practices related to children who came from England or other places. 
 The implication was that, since the communicative medium in which teaching took place 
in that now-finished era was the medium of the ordinary lives of pupils who were “really 
Welsh”, it was not necessary to apply the term to them.  There was also an institutional 
connection: From his perspective, the practice has since become confined to the three small 
language centers that are dispersed across Gwynedd and devoted to immersion teaching for 
children with little or no Cymraeg competence.  Nevertheless, when I did preliminary research in 
north-west Wales in 2005, and during the fourteen months I conducted principal dissertation 
research in north-west Wales in 2007 and 2008, the metaphor of drowning children in Welshness 
was clearly “still” in use. 
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 Despite the enormous disparity in knowledge of local practices between this researcher 
and I, his lack of awareness on this one point is due to his long occupation as an instructor at a 
teaching college (i.e., not as a schoolteacher “on the ground”) and his research and recruiting 
methods.  Representing a locally-based research project and university, he demonstrated a formal 
regard for official distinctions between private and public spaces, where schools are semi-private 
territories.  He also spent a mere day, two, or three at each school, to which teachers were 
accustomed in the form of school inspections and university research. 
 Despite my more intensive (not to say intrusive) presence, it was difficult for me to get a 
definitive sense of the concept of drowning [boddi], and the causes were many, as I later 
discovered.  The reasons have to do with the wide variation in usage, as well as variation in how 
teachers approach national identity.  When I was first encountering the cultural concept, I 
understood the semantic potential of the “drowning” phrase, as used in various contexts, to be as 
follows.  “Welshness” seemed to denote an imaginary kind of substance, and seemed to connote 
a cultural sort of national identity, but this is not the best interpretation—not even given the 
orientation of this dissertation, with my focus on language identity.  Unfortunately, when those 
who use the phrase attempt explication, their attempt often involves an ambiguous reference to 
traditional Welsh practices.  These practices might be particularly Welsh because they are 
traditional or they might be particularly Welsh because Cymraeg is a constitutive part of their 
performance. 
 When the phrase of “drowning children in Welshness” is used, the notion of a Welsh 
ethos is often used as well.  Again, the same problem occurs, since the project of creating a 
Welsh ethos involves creating the same kind of environment in which children would be 
drowned in Welshness.  To anticipate, the implicit significance of such discursive practice is to 
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keep Welshness implicit.  The circularity is itself functional because it restricts knowledge to 
those already accepted as part of the community.  In the case of adults, if they are not community 
members, they are made explicitly liminal.  In a positive sense, this liminality allows the 
outsiders to be welcomed.  From the obverse perspective, the liminal position allows candidate 
community members to be monitored. 
 
THE METAPRAGMATIC SPACE OF “DROWNING”/DROWNING 
 As noted above and evidenced by the context of application of terms like 
“drowning/”boddi”, those who feel Cymraeg to be an intrinsic part of their personality and 
cultural identity often have Cymraeg implicitly in mind when Welshness is the explicit topic.  
Unfortunately, during most of the time researching Welsh identity, I failed to find any 
representational content in identity beyond a tie to Cymraeg (or English for their English 
counterparts).  Still, while I found (and continue to find) the search to have been useful in and of 
itself, cosmopolitan-minded people with liberal views about the politics of language do not look 
further into the role of language in such contexts.  Allegiance to a language, for the latter, seems 
to be superficial.  They do not expect to find anything below the surface. 
 As long as the contours and regimentation of the domain of the political are not made 
visible, it is difficult to see how such a powerful and dramatic trope would have emerged for 
imagining immersion in a language.  In the context of north-west Wales, clearly “immersion” or 
“dipping” (trochi) do not capture the affective and moral depths that are meant because there is a 
reservoir of cultural knowledge and collective experience (of the Cymraeg languaege complex) 
to which “drowning” refers. 
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 The pragmatic significance of the DROWNING trope can be articulated as its power to 
mark two kinds of transition.  First, there is the transition from polite conversation to 
conversation that, given the mainstream dominance of the English language, is almost 
inappropriately political.  Second, there is the transition from the putative inclusiveness of the 
general Welsh-national community (including even “traditional culture”) to the more bounded 
Cymraeg language community.  In each of these two kinds of interface, the latter part of the 
distinction is the denser and less fluid of the two substances that are interfacing. 
 The denser fluid, into which teachers drown or dip children, acts to obscure the vision of 
any outsider who intrudes on the Cymraeg language community—though one could also say that 
it is equally welcoming of any who want to participate fully.  While use of the phrase is very 
infrequent, the fact that I encountered it in English-language contexts is symbolic of the 
connotation of Cymraeg being the denser fluid.  There would be less of a need to mark the 
interface in the two transitions if the communicative context were already the Cymraeg one, the 
native language context for those who see DROWNING as a positively-valued process.  The 
process would be especially deserving of mention in English-language communicative contexts 
given that the English code-medium of performance itself evokes the very interface that 
DROWNING serves to mark. 
 Following Taussig (1987), I would suggest that the greater “density” I associate with 
Cymraeg contexts is the product of the conquest and colonization of Wales.  At many points in 
Taussig’s study of the Putamayo rubber boom, he draws on the literary work of Robert Conrad.  
Like the stories of Conrad’s character, Marlow, the Putamaya rubber boom was full of horror.  
Such tales cannot convey the sense of horror by a straightforward description. 
 350
 The indescribable horrors with which Conrad and Taussig were so involved contrast with 
the simple yarns of seaman.  The meanings of the latter stories could be revealed simply in the 
telling, like the kernel inside the shell of a cracked nut.  The pervasiveness of horror in 
Putamayo, for Taussig, was captured in a different way of telling tales.  Told by a master like 
Marlow, the simple yarn is reversed, so that meaning is not revealed in the telling, but the 
meaning of a tale and the knowledge associated with it might be shown to influence the telling.  
Conrad’s fictional Marlow had a reputation that lent his pronouncements a special significance: 
Looking on a twilight scene characterized by a “lurid glare” of “a brooding gloom in sunshine”, 
Marlow noted that, by contrast, “this has been one of the darker places on the earth”.  From 
Marlow’s lips, such a pregnant remark was not surprising, but “was accepted in silence” and was 
cause for wonder and reflection. 
 In this Marlovian theory of knowledge, description brings out the meaning of an event 
“only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these misty halos that sometimes are 
made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine” (Conrad 1999:50).  We might wish for 
more clarity and try to articulate illuminating details, but the essence of the phenomenon itself is 
obscurity.  In presenting this theory of knowledge, Taussig used the phrase, “epistemic murk”—a 
diffusely gray area of knowledge.  It signifies that “the haziness brought out by the glow [of 
telling the tale] could be as powerful a force for terror as it could be for resistance” (1987:127).  I 
reverse this relation, choosing to emphasize counter-hegemony. 
 The space of “drowning” is no carnival of horrors like that Taussig analyzes using his 
concept of space of death.  Rather, the space of drowning offers a haven from the prying eyes of 
holiday-goers and English patriots who do not value Welsh cultural features as highly as do 
those who take pride in the Cymraeg language complex.  The murkiness of Welshness, in 
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connection to Cymraeg, might lend itself to acting as a platform for resistance, or simply for 
avoidance of social tensions brought on by contentious identity issues.  Whether intended or not, 
the reticence of or difficulty for Welsh people to spell out the meanings of Welshness within the 
Cymraeg language complex ensures that a person has to live those meanings to know them. 
 The implied ethnographic risk should be evident: If ethnographers treat cultural concepts 
as having a clarity to them—a more precise definition—that they do not have in practice, then an 
ethnographer risks treating culture simplistically.  As stated, this is likely no different than for 
any number of cultural concepts in other cultural contexts.  However, such a compulsive 
intellectualism would be highly problematic where the cultural concepts are related to Cymraeg 
use in Wales—because Cymraeg use there is neither constantly political, nor constantly neutral; 
it is often, but not always, politicized.  The degree to which it is problematic depends on the 
appropriateness of framing cultural practices or settings in terms of potential controversy.  Thus, 
it is important to observe that, where the question arises as to whether the cultural concepts 
related to any practice are subject to being treated variably as potentially controversial, the 
question about proprieties of a practice (and not only the practice itself) can be potentially 
inappropriate and controversial—and, therefore, political. 
 To bring too much clarity to a description of any actual sociocultural event at the level at 
which structural power is enacted—to hand out meanings like kernels from the shell of a cracked 
nut—would be to reductively treat meanings as so many atomic features, features which the 
meanings do not have when they are put into practice.  Even if these atomic features are treated 
as analytic or heuristic constructs, the danger remains that they will be treated as merely 
phenomenal features of practice—but phenomenal features that are more than appearances. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
SURFACE AND DEPTHS 
 This dissertation tracks several kinds of ethnographic sites in an investigation of the 
normative construction of a politics of language and community in north-west Wales.  It finds 
spaces of sociocultural interest in the classrooms of three primary schools, academic offices and 
hallways, teachers’ lounges, the comments of a proposal reviewer, a lecture by a famous Kenyan 
writer, and even structured interview response formats for scaling attitudes.   
 Cultural identity in north-west Wales, as a popularly (not officially) recognized kind of 
belonging and citizenship, has a binomial character.  Omitting the categories of learners and 
incomers/immigrants, which are characterized by change, there are two well-recognized types, or 
“species”: Cymraeg and Saesneg; that is, Cymraeg-Welsh and English-Welsh.  That there might 
be a large number of such identity role-types—far exceeding the empirical, imagined, set of two 
“species”—is seldom recognized in Wales.  That possibility is so often neglected because the 
very few role-types that are recognizable, are chained to a specific game of identity the playing 
of which depends on “tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game as practical mastery 
of its rules” (Bourdieu 1992:117).  The game of identity involves surface positions, and these 
surface positions are assimilated in daily practice to a (simplified) taxonomy, or a synecdochal 
rhetoric.  People only recognize a few such roles in the game of national positionality, and this 
limited game is the one people in Abergwaith (and Wales in general) have mastered. 
 NATIONALIST is the emblematic role that epitomizes the game at the phenomenal level, 
the nature of the game, and what is at stake.  It operates rhetorically for all to see, while the 
epistemic operations in which it is involved are less apparent.  Tthe game of identity in 
Abergwaith is conducted not by players’ manipulation of game piecess, but by means of players’ 
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performance of their own roles and those of their interlocutors, which are part of the game’s 
constitution —a game in which there are only two sides.  There simply are not enough roles in 
this phenomenal picture to play the game of identity that is played in actuality. 
 The consequence of perceiving Cymraeg-language activists as nationalists is a failure to 
cognize society’s diversity—failure to recognize either certain kinds of participants or their issues 
at all, or failure to distinguish between those participants and attitudes ascribed to them.  Such 
failure can lead to a group’s or individuals’ exclusion from—or a limitation on group-members’ 
participation in—the public sphere.  By failing to recognize Cymraeg-language activists except 
insofar as they make unreasonable demands on others in society, liberal cosmopolitans exclude 
certain kinds of participation by the former from the public sphere. 
 Some Welsh people construe the sentiments that other Welsh people express, through 
cultural and language resources, as excessively and problematically nationalistic in a Welsh 
context—particularly as they relate to what teachers might do in classrooms.  Teachers in Wales 
actively manage their performances to construct particular presentations of self in schooling 
contexts that are not determined solely (or at all) by their attitudes toward national culture, 
language, and governance.  What is hidden within schooling settings, then, is not a “hidden 
curriculum” (Apple 1971; Jackson 1968).  That is, it is not a habitus or other component of 
teachers’ personality grounded in their autobiographical experience that, unknown to them, 
influences their evaluation of students’ performance in non-academic terms.  Rather, what is 
hidden is the explicit statement of teachers’ somewhat stable opinions and convictions about the 
nation. 
 By contrast, the implicit references, on the other hand, are there “for all to see”, and some 
parents do complain about instances of “nationalism”: certain implicit, but marked and culturally 
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salient references that are made in classrooms.  It is far from clear, however, how children 
understand such implicit references, which are organized by cultural concepts, places, and 
historical figures of the Cymraeg language complex.  Young children likely do not understand 
them according to any particular political orientation of the nationalist meta-discourse, 
communitarian or otherwise.  However, children are well-aware of the “teams” on this field. 
 Once one understands that the hiding of national positionality at schools is deliberate, it is 
important to see that the operation by which such cultural submergence occurs is only partly 
deliberate.  This is the case in two different senses.  First, teachers make a practical distinction 
between politically motivated and politically framed allegiance to the nation, on one hand, and a 
national pride that is based in everyday activities and cultural distinctiveness.  As Mrs. Williams 
put it (see Chapter Three), “We are not supposed to brainwash children politically, but we can 
brainwash them culturally”.  This is the basic schema by which nationalism is adjudicated in 
those zones of the public sphere that bleed off into the private, such as schools.  Teachers use the 
distinction between culture and politics to enact moral economies that can determine whether 
some expression of self is appropriate or inappropriate in schooling settings.  As a result, some 
things are deliberately hidden from children’s view, while some things need not be concealed. 
 Secondly, teachers—and most people in Wales, even academics in the area of Welsh 
Studies—do not have a convenient way of effectively evaluating, as a unity, a phenomenon that 
ranges over both national identity and controversial nationalism, and across everyday culture, 
language practices, and political stances.  This lack, I believe, is the reason so many people—
including academics, whose livelihood involves evaluation of stances within this space—rely on 
the simple label, “nationalism”.  The reliance on a problematic concept of nationalism has a 
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further result: Educators in primary and secondary schooling often evaluate their professional 
field in terms of concepts like “brainwashing”. 
 The use of political and cultural varieties of brainwashing actually represents a 
sophisticated attempt to map the topography of this phenomenon in the absence of an “aerial” 
view of the cultural landscape.  However, the concept of brainwashing reinforces the use and 
ambiguity of the concept of nationalism.  This is because, if there is an issue of political 
brainwashing, it clearly would fall under nationalism, while if the issue is one of cultural 
brainwashing, then this recognition makes the label of nationalism irrelevant because cultural 
nationalism is seldom controversial on its own.  The result of teachers’ fairly sophisticated 
attempt to map national positionality is an evasion of discussion of the normative and aesthetic 
expectations that surround claims of nationalism.  Also, by immersing children in Cymraeg 
activities and practices—that is, by drowning children in Welshness—teachers reinforce the 
relative lack of cultural visibility of the Cymraeg language-cultural complex compared to claims 
about Welsh national identity. 
 At a general level, Cymraeg has two functional aspects with respect to national visibility 
and cultural visibility.  With regard to national visibility, Cymraeg operates as the foremost 
emblem of the bilingual nation of Wales.  Thus, Cymraeg is frequently referred to as "the Welsh 
language”, though only roughly one-fifth of the population are competent in it.  At the same 
time, Cymraeg operates as an anti-emblem with respect to “the culture”; that is, with respect to 
the Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  One has to know and appreciate Cymraeg—that is, to 
belong to the language community—in order to belong to that cultural community.  These 
circumstances create specific challenges for ethnographers of (the nation of) Wales. 
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 In Chapter Three, I recounted the suggestion of the assistant head teacher in responding 
to my requests for an interview: “If you tell me what it is that you would like to know, perhaps I 
could then find a way to get the information to you”.  That suggestion is an instance of the 
descriptivist perspective—the European attention to objects/reference/facts; what Silverstein has 
called the “denotational plane”.  The picture revealed in this dissertation presents a surface field 
of culture that resembles the descriptive functions of language.  Mrs. Williams’ suggestion 
corresponds both to her cultural expectations for participation in the interview, as well as to a 
“theoretical list” consisting of items of interest about the Cymraeg language-cultural complex.  
The direction of research that I adopted and that this dissertation represents, can be explained in 
relation to the role of the culturally-emergent (but theoretical) list, and in relation to the relative 
lack of cultural visibility of Cymraeg-centered identity.  That is, I focused on such descriptivist 
features as historical landmarks and figures—because these were part of the metapragmatic 
discourse of the Cymraeg language community—while simultaneously pursuing the constitutive 
principles of a social reality that bears both on Welsh cultural and national belonging and on the 
claim to special, particular resources of identity. 
 That dual-mode “research design” mirrors the theoretical framework I adopted, in 
gradually more explicit ways, during fieldwork and writing.  The recognizability of subject 
positions of national identity conforms to the descriptivist/“denonational” aspect of sociocultural 
life in Wales.  This aspect characterizes both national visibility in Wales and the metapragmatic 
discourse of the Cymraeg language community in Wales.  Notably, the scenario sub-study 
detailed in Chapter Seven defined the surface position of nationalism as it manifests in north-
west Wales.  That chapter demonstrated that the surface position of nationalism is an ordered 
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field that has the factual character of such value-poor knowledge as knowing where cereal is 
shelved at the local grocery store. 
 Also, Chapter Seven argued that a phenomenal description differs from a comprehensive 
explicative account.  The relative lack of cultural visibility of the Cymraeg language-cultural 
complex in a context where characterizing certain identity practices as political is itself a 
political move, fraught with potential controversy.  The lack of cultural visibility symbolizes 
some of the covert conditions of sociocultural life in north-west Wales that demand explication 
beyond the phenomenal description.  In particular, the polarized condition of choice in identity 
politics in north-west Wales is a characteristic feature of social realities in which the 
circumstances or the consequences of semiotic applications (or both) are maintained as part of a 
normative system that lies outside individual agency.  As I came to understand deeper layers, 
these conditions and the polarizing normativity in north-west Wales became part of my research 
topic. 
 
COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS 
 For laypersons and scholars, there are generally two images of cultural identity in 
Wales—either identity is conceived as a simple diversity or as a duality.  The image of duality 
implies the sort of (more-or-less strategic) essentializing game played by language activists and 
less politically conscious people in north-west Wales.  The image of diversity implies the sort of 
game played by impartial observers such as those ethnographers who, explicitly or implicitly 
endorse a constructivist vision of the empirical field.  Ultimately, the constructivist vision 
produces an objectivist vision of the ethnographer’s role in knowledge production (and which, on 
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some level, I am also producing).1  Deconstruction of the tension between activist-belief and 
researcher-belief depends on recognizing that some such game of identity is being played, either 
the one involving duality or the one involving diversity, or both (or neither).  Yet, that 
deconstructive project also implies the possibility (at least) of deconstructing not only those 
naturalizing discourses “on the ground” in the field, but those at the ethnographer’s home, too.  
In fact, I can see no justification for not doing so.  
 Importantly, the problem for linguistic anthropology that I raised in Chicago (see Chapter 
Two) is remarkably similar to a problem that exercised Durkheim (1995) many decades ago, 
which Karen Fields highlighted so insightfully in her introduction).  In fact, Gal and Irvine’s 
(1995) formulation of what they called “iconicity”, and Gal (2005:35n5) renamed “rhematicity”, 
is another view of Durkheim’s concern with totemism and religion.  Although Gal and Irvine 
defined their problem in terms of ideologies about language, both problems concern collective 
representations more generally.  Before discussing the abstruse, but crucial question Durkheim 
raised about collective representations (and how it bears on iconization), it is worth mentioning 
several approaches to the counter-empirical domain that I called “the politics of ‘politics’ ”. 
 In the anthropological literature on ethnicity, one might identify four basic positions on 
the politics of ‘politics’: primordialist-essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism, and 
pragmatism.  Essentialism is a metaphysical commitment to some core (primordial) features of a 
community. Instrumentalism conceives of claims about community as means of mobilization for 
achieving instrumental ends, rather than as intrinsic bonds of belonging. It “stresses the 
mutability of [community] attachments”, but only in terms of “the roles of interests and context 
                                                 
1  Put differently, the idea of diversity amounts to an increase in the number of categories (qualitative quantity), but 
not an expansion of the qualitative “space” of culture.  I believe it is this lack of expansion that Ortner (1984) had in 
mind when writing her famous introduction of practice theory within the Geertzian legacy in which she worked.  
However, she was so far from certain about how to characterize the concept that she used scare-quotes when she 
described this concept as “openness” (Ortner 1984:156). 
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in the process of [community] conflict”; that is, it stresses “competition between groups over 
scarce material and symbolic resources” “in a particular socioeconomic and political context” 
(Schmidt 1993:82).  Constructivism also stresses the mutability of attachments as constructs, but 
as constructs of belonging.  That is, the attachments are not determined by interests and a 
particular context of political and economic factors, but by the analyst’s own metaphysical 
commitments—either by dismissing the community attachments as subjective constructs, or as a 
more generous appreciation for the purposes and plans of subjects. 
 Comaroff and Comaroff (2009:39) suggested that synthesis of primordialist-essentialism 
and constructivism leads only to banal bromides about ethnicity (but one can challenge this view 
on the grounds that they conflated instrumentalism and constructivism, though I do not take this 
route).  They argued that “a theoretical synthesis that seeks the ontology of ethnic identity in a 
fusion of the primordial and the instrumental” does not explain, but “merely re-describes, at a 
higher level of abstraction, the phenomenon as it is lived and experienced”, which “is precisely 
what needs to be explained” (2009:162n.29).  If every synthesis of primordialism and 
constructivism leads only to banal bromides about ethnicity, in the general form Comaroff 
(1996:164) called “Neo-primordialism”, then one must be committed either to the view that such 
objects or forms are real, or that they are vernacular tropes (or some other sort of construct).2 
 In their account, the contrasting features of “native” primordialism and of constructivism 
cannot be dissolved into one another, except on pain of failure to explain (since it is not enough 
to describe) “the phenomenon as it is lived and experienced” (2009:162n.29).  The conclusion is 
an impression that the explanatory task of relating the features of “native” primordialism and of 
                                                 
2  Kant thought he had solved the similar problem of empiricism and rationalism by generating the first viable 
constructivist strategy; but he was followed by the neo-Kantians who popularized approaches that repeated errors 
Kant had corrected; then came US-American pragmatists like Peirce, whose complex theory of semiotics is an 
outgrowth of a radically different conception of Kant’s project of critiquing the idea of pure reason; and then Wilfrid 
Sellars, who peeled the gold finish off several philosophical altars to fashion his own project. 
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constructivism to its complementary kind of feature makes for intractable problems.  Neither 
option allows for an explanation of the constructing, the constituting of primordial consciousness 
except in terms that do not explicate the relation between material and ideal aspects of society.3 
 It is highly significant that Comaroff and Comaroff (2009:45) characterized the issue of 
the clash between primordialism and constructivism as one of metaphysics; that is, “the 
ontological [observation] that contemporary cultural identity is experienced as the product, at 
once, of shared essence and self-fashioning”.  This is significant because to understand 
constructivism as ontological in more than a nominal sense is to fail to understand the 
explanatory force of constructivism (and I would be confident that the Comaroffs would agree, if 
they had not called this a general “ontological” observation).4  Constructivism is, essentially, an 
“epistemological” strategy that happens to have ontological challenges to its validity.  That is, in 
an ontological discourse, constructivism cannot be a complete theoretical stance regarding 
cultural identities without explaining how sociocultural realities are real (Of course, the short 
answer is that they are constructed!).  The status of such sociocultural realities is metaphysical 
for an ethnographer concerned with cultural practices of some member of a culture (but probably 
                                                 
3  Unfortunately, the Comaroffs (2009) did not present criteria for adequacy of an explanation of ethnic 
consciousness (as if these could be available in a priori conditions).  Of course, anthropologists use a priori 
considerations all the time, as professional convention intervenes in empirical research.  Yet, even these are 
deployed in a more or less justificatory fashion; for example, in a discussion of the literature and the findings of 
other researchers.  Thus, in an earlier version of the Comaroffs’ chapter on totemism and ethnicity in Ethnography 
and the Historical Imagination (1992), John L. Comaroff (1987) dissected five propositions (and relevant 
alternatives) to provide a heuristic understanding of his proposal for explanations of ethnic consciousness and social 
activity.  Because of the interest in primordial claims and primordial markings of ethnic-classificatory relations, J. L. 
Comaroff’s text is preoccupied with the opening act in the play of ethnicity: ethnogenesis.  However, most of his 
suggestions would seem to apply to ongoing practices, beliefs, and change. 
4  Constructivism might seem to be an ontological/metaphysical strategy if one takes up the idea, say, that facts are 
invented not discovered, since facts are putatively bits of reality or reliable propositions about reality.  Nonetheless, 
by characterizing the issue as ontological/metaphysical, the Comaroffs can only mean that the question contains a 
statement about the nature of things and their existence (in fact, they do mean something like this, in presenting a 
thesis about the unequal arrangement of material means of production).  Nonetheless, the real nature of things and 
their existence is irrelevant to constructivism: The ultimate nature of things does not bear on how we should address 
the empirical dimensions of problems related to cultural consciousness.  Hence, the problem at hand is not 
intrinsically about the real nature of things and their existence and, therefore, is not ontological. 
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not for that focal person), but it is epistemological for an ethnographer concerned with the 
methods she is using. 
 In construing constructivism as instrumentalism and as ontological, the Comaroffs 
highlight the issues of motive—nativist (for essentialism) versus utility (for instrumentalism)—
and of determining the proper branch of philosophy—metaphysics or epistemology.  While they 
enlightened me on the first issue of motive, allowing me to recognize a useful distinction, they 
seemed to err in taking constructivism to be equivalent to instrumentalism and to be an 
ontological account.  The Comaroffs (2009:40) made a distinction between “an explanation for 
ethnic consciousness” and “phenomenological representation of how that consciousness, once 
constructed, is experienced” and the fact they did so must be evaluated in light of two aspects of 
their argument.  These are: 1) that the Comaroffs worry about the fact that constructivism cannot 
seem to explain how sociocultural realities emerge, and 2) that essentialism cannot seem to 
explain how invented traditions could be primordial.  Because the Comaroffs have worried about 
these two conjoined problems, they include constructivism in the duplex problem they 
characterize as ontological (i.e., primordial-essentialism versus constructivism). 
 However, constructivism is a perspective in theories of knowledge—of knowledge of 
whatever objects one likes (one’s social status, the assumed and socially confirmed reality of 
one’s social status, the boundaries of one’s community, cosmology, etc.).  Explanation is an 
epistemological process, even if it pertains to metaphysical or scientistic details.  Constructivism, 
by definition, dissolves the “ontology” of primordialism into an “epistemology”; such that this 
assimilated epistemology of primordialism (what is given) appears to compete with the 
epistemology of constructivism (what is made).  This dissolving is the point, I think, to which the 
Comaroffs objected by reference to bromides—because it seems to transpose the primordialism 
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to a different key without improving on our knowledge.  When properly directed, however, 
constructivism addresses the semiotic recognizability of social realities, rather than their 
metaphysical nature.  The ontological worry related to either constructivism or essentialism, or 
both, is properly located in the commitments of the researcher—and is independent of the 
realities in the field.  It is to be found in the domain of explanation and it is also what makes the 
explanatory-analytic dimension domain distinct from the representational-phenomenal 
dimension. 
 The issue of an incompatibility between essentialism and constructivism coincides in the 
linguistic anthropology literature with the use of semiotics as a toolbox for analyzing cultural 
dynamics.  That use raises the problem that, because (Peircean) semiotics is not revelatory for 
cultural dynamics, it is not obvious what provides the appearances for turning cultural dynamics 
into an empirical problem when theory is so underdetermined by facts.  Fields (in Durkheim 
1995) carefully unpacked this very problem, but did so drawing on a social theorist who has less 
than broad appeal in cultural and linguistic anthropology: Emile Durkheim. 
 In her introduction to her translation of Durkeim’s The Elementary Forms of Religion, 
Fields (1995:xxxvii) described Durkheim’s concern in the following way: 
 
If the faithful are thought of as rationally constituted human beings, what would 
cause them to fly in the face of what they can observe from moment to moment 
and year after year.  And is our understanding advanced if we assume the 
religious faithful of all ages merely to be people who can be sold the Brooklyn 
Bridge, not just once but over and over again?  Ultimately, then, to leave belief 
unexamined is to gain a mentally incompetent human. 
 
 Durkheim’s and Fields’ point, much like mine, places the onus on the analyst, rather than 
on those people ethnographers study.  Academics would see the idea that languages are natural 
kinds as an obviously false notion, while missing the fact that essentialism and constructivism 
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cannot occupy the same space simultaneously.  Ethnographic analyses cannot treat the 
naturalizing (of religion or) of language as rational and simultaneously argue that such 
naturalizing is a false reality.  I have described this conceptual conflict, as did Durkheim and 
Fields, and argued that ethnographers must address it explicitly, and must not rest on the 
privilege that divides their authoritative perspective from members of the subject communities. 
 There is obvious value in understanding inferences about social group and language 
identities in the terms of a misconstruing of future effects and possible meanings of sign tokens 
“as if they were merely expressing something” that is part of objective reality (Keane 2003:417, 
emphasis added).  However, to analyze “the social power of naturalization” as emerging from 
misconstrual means linguistic anthropologists must reject naturalization as a locally efficacious 
mode of action and subjectivity in its own right, as local truth.5  To treat naturalization as a 
misconstrual of a sign token’s significance—to misconstrue its pragmatic effect of changing a 
communicative situation or social institutions, as if it were merely descriptive—is to substitute 
Silverstein’s interest in creative entailments of sign tokens for the Peircean interest in the 
normativity that structures meaning/representation itself. 
 This tendency alone should signal a problem in theory.  However, it is not the only 
problem.  It is also far from clear that, as far as the cultural particularities of any case of 
naturalization are concerned, the analytic interest in creatively entailing signs (i.e., sign use that 
produces changes in the communicative situation or broader cultural field) can reveal or do more 
than re-describe them at a higher level of abstraction.  I tend to think that now-common analytic 
strategies that extend the terms of Peircean semiotic terms do not do justice to the cultural 
                                                 
5  It is crucial not to take Peircean realism as a kind of materialism, as Keane seems to have done.  That is, the law-
like normativity (i.e., Thirdness) of concern to Peirce (leaving aside his opulent, if monistic metaphysics) was not a 
law-likeness of first-order object-level processes like causality, but representations in intelligent beings of such 
material processes.  Such intelligent representations of material processes are likely (eventually) to converge on the 
truth about those processes because, in Peirce’s worldview, such intelligence is of the same fundamental substance. 
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particularities that lend the character of necessity to commitments about social groups and 
language practices (i.e., about the necessary connection of language to social group). 
 The Comaroffs attempted to address such cultural particularities and argued that, initially, 
primordial consciousness is constituted by its reification in systems of structured inequality and 
then, on an ongoing basis, as an ideological motive for altering material reality (Comaroff 1987; 
see also Genovese 1968).  Yet, the Comaroffs have not articulated what it is about typification in 
ethic formation (or its consequences) that would distinguish it, as persuasive (i.e., as imagined to 
be capable of altering material reality), from other typifications; or what would prevent such 
typification from being the original determining force in ethnic formations relative to economic 
structures and the social organization of status.6  Moreover, the sense of necessity natively 
imputed to iconicizing/rhematicizing ideologies in linguistic anthropology is not itself an 
explanation, as it is exactly what needs to be explained (and theorized).  
 
EMERGENT POSSIBILITIES: EPISTEMIC MATERIALISM 
 Rather than focus on mapping relations, I used the trope of GAMES because it can apply to 
an activity of complex dynamism—the process of which rules are inadequate for explanation—
as easily as to an activity of simple dynamism (e.g., such as is involved in looking up the English 
equivalent of a Cymraeg word in a dictionary).  Indeed, it is because the trope of cultural logic 
does not do justice to the situation of identity in Wales that I employ the trope of games.  At the 
phenomenal level, identity dynamics can certainly be subsumed under the notion of a cultural 
logic or narrative.  However, the surface positions that are visible as phenomenal aspects of 
                                                 
6  These lacunae serve as a wedge from which to challenge their emphasis on systems of structured inequality, but it 
is their conceptual analysis and the related questions about primordialism and constructivism that I find more 
productive in the context of an explication of the pragmatics of language community in Wales.  In particular, their 
analysis helps us to recognize areas in a theoretical domain that must be developed to make sense of the 
interrelations of language and community in Wales. 
 365
identity games in Wales are the material of which confusions, silences, erasures, and dominance 
are formed.  Identity games are not the elements of a storyline, but the stuff of history in which 
plots are appropriated by parties, altered, represented under different guises; all the while, this 
subplot has become subverted by another party and made insignificant or re-figured as a cause 
for claims of treason.  In the abstract, cultural logics amount to simple games, whereas one way 
of describing the games of identity in Wales is as a game that consists of the nesting (and a 
shuffling and reorganizing) of cultural logics within other cultural logics, involving a process in 
which each cultural logic jockeys for position. 
 What might be treated simplistically as naturalization in the case of Wales can now be 
seen to involve a covert cultural institution of positioning practices as controversial or not, as 
unacceptably political or not.  Similarly, the practice of drowning children in Welshness serves 
the social function, in a history of colonization, of keeping prying eyes away from the 
substantive content and values of the culture of Cymraeg.  Neither of these—either controlling 
the boundaries of what can be considered politics, or the metapragmatic space of DROWNING—
can be subsumed under the modality of certainty or necessity. 
 While I do not position this research as a project in constructivism, that third variety of 
the politics of ‘politics’—or, to use my leading phrase, of “the pragmatics of community”—
bleeds into pragmatism, thereby suggesting a fourth possibility.  The fourth possibility, epistemic 
materialism, is a pragmatist orientation toward the politics of ‘politics’.  Epistemic materialism 
takes the relation of type to token to be grounded in a system of conceptual norms, as a relation 
predicated on the idea that conceptual or perceptual matter is not given in conception/perception, 
but made through acts of cognitive judgments.  This orientation stresses the normative principles 
involved in the organization of practices—where this organization is governed by forms of 
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conceiving and perceiving.  This systemic normativity speaks to a “force”, not of any causal 
order, but of the conceptual (or epistemic) order. 
 To speak of epistemically-normative principles does not suggest the conviction in stable, 
unchanging meanings that characterized traditional semantics.  The line that linguistic theorists 
use to demarcate metasemantics, as a subset of metapragmatics, emerges from the relation of text 
to discourse, whereas a focus on epistemic structures concerns the relation between discourse 
and consciousness.  Because it renders impossible any account of a substantive rhetoric and 
consciousness of belonging, I criticized the conflation of reference and predication in 
Silverstein’s work (one layer of which occurs in the body, and another is left to the footnotes of 
Chapters Two and Nine).  To attend to predication (but without committing the errors of 
traditional semanticists) is to recognize that human experience involves the appearance of 
structured connections subsisting among generals/predicates.  Human experience consists in this 
at least as much, and perhaps more so, than it does in the “objective” relations among objects.7 
 The organization of these systems of concepts is not determined by, but constituted in 
social relationships and interactions.  Systems of concepts are enacted by individuals who, in 
their personal development, have gradually gotten the knack of salient typifications and their 
exemplification.  Conceptual typifications and their exemplification represent (for those people) 
the proper way of engaging in a community.  Early in the last century, Malinowski spoke to the 
pragmatic force of such systemic normativity: 
 
“The effective force of such. . . acts [of conception and perception] lies in directly 
reproducing their consequences; and it is because there is a. . . tradition, 
                                                 
7  Dominant perspectives in the philosophy of logic resolved this demarcation issue in a way that pragmatics 
remained a small subset of semantics—one might call it the garbage bin of non-logical concerns.  On other 
philosophical perspectives (e.g., Sellars 1969), however, the scope of pragmatics came to overshadow that of 
semantics.  In this, the latter, pragmatistic philosophers share a view on the distinction with linguistic 
anthropologists who make their conceptions on the subject explicit (e.g., Silverstein 1987a, 1993). 
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sanctioned by various beliefs, institutions and explicit rules, that a certain 
challenge cannot be ignored, that a certain request must be fulfilled.  The 
pragmatism of such. . . acts is based on the same complicated mechanism as that 
on which the pragmatism, i.e. the effective force, of all rules of conduct, customs 
and [societal] laws is founded” ([1935]1965:49). 
 
 However, in situations characterized by issues of who gets to decide how to label other 
people, it might not be clear whether the “typifications” are merely aesthetic or the foundations 
for constituting and distinguishing communities.  To group Neanderthals among the Great Apes, 
exclusive of modern humans is a (debatable) matter of scientific propriety that carries an 
aesthetic kind of taxonomic “necessity”, but lacks the properly epistemic sense of normativity—
unless you belong to a society constituted on that basis! 
 The question much of this dissertation revolves around is whether cultural claims about 
Welshness amount to psychological or epistemological pragma.  Do the features of Welshness 
that people in north-west Wales use to identify Welshness have the coherence of meaning-
constituting necessity or merely of taxonomic convention?  The staging ground for the 
pragmatics and politics of claims about language and community can now be conceived of as a 
field of tensions between aesthetic-evaluative and the epistemological-normative principles.  
That is, rules that are not rules can become rules when (and only when) the claims they represent 
become endorsed as part of local cultural and social realities. 
 In the play of human politics, the characters on the stage-of-the-world act in ways that are 
more or less “appropriate expressions of the thematic structure which ought to determine them” 
(Culler 1980:32).8  Each of the components of political acts, then, can be seen as moments in 
which the actors endorse the circumstances and/or consequences of a component of a political 
                                                 
8  The normative term Culler chose, implies that thematic structures do not merely or necessarily influence actors, 
but inhabitants act as if they ought to determine actions in a narrative.  For that reason, the fact that he recognizes 
that normativity is at issue is crucial.  Here, the suggestion of determinism should not detract from the point about 
the normative influence of thematic structures on action. 
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act.  This is the micro-scale at which political action is constructed, apart from the broader 
ideological consciousness and tacit practices.  By looking at the ways in which such 
endorsements are material—have real force in human life and on other humans—we can move 
beyond the empty rhetoric of explicit ideology to the substantive rhetoric and consciousness of 
belonging.9 
 Currently, there are available resources for application in anthropology of this position on 
epistemic materialism and, more importantly for developing an explicit theory related to it.  
However, some of these resources are not well recognized and part of the goal of this dissertation 
has been to bring them to light.  Now that I have applied theoretical concepts to empirical 
situations in Wales, only a little more effort is to bridge the concerns with ethnicity, essentialism, 
and constructivism to current methodologies in linguistic anthropology.  While the mid- to late-
Twentieth Century study of presupposition (e.g., Sellars 1954a; Grice 1975; Katz and 
Langendoen 1976; Morgan 1973; Stalnaker 1973, 1974) has influenced current-day 
sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology (e.g., Agha 2006; Duranti 1997; Rosaldo 1980; 
Schegloff 1991; Silverstein 1985c), the latter work has suggested that pragmatic functionality 
operates in two directions—connecting the present to the past, by means of presupposition, and 
creating the future, by means of creatively entailing signals.  This conception of the relation of 
talk to context does not address the central problem of how social actors can do either. 
 The position I have taken, inferentialism, implies that what we think of in terms of 
contents, concepts, values, and structures of practices are all connected.  Because “conceptual 
                                                 
9  This is to allude to Wilfrid Sellars’ (1953, 1954a) critique of assumptions common in analytic philosophy, which 
would take, “It is raining; therefore, the streets are wet”, to be an invalid inference.  By contrast to the emphasis on 
formal, truth-functional relations in inferences, Sellars highlighted the more ordinary truth: Learning of the concepts 
associated with the terms in the statements—“raining”, “street”, and “wet”—allows one to connect those concepts in 
a useful way that leads one validly from the premise to the conclusion on the basis of such knowledge of the world.  
Background knowledge about weather effects that are part of the concepts that these particular utterances are in 
virtue of what persons infer from them—both presupposing and understanding what other people want and need.  Of 
course, the street is going to be wet if it rains!  How is it logical to think that this is not a valid inference? 
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contents are conferred by being caught up in a social practical structure of inferentially 
articulated commitments and entitlements” (Brandom 1988:279), we are not left with the 
dilemma of culture versus language, matters of fact versus semantical meaning, and talk versus 
language ideologies.  We have other options, such as a commitment to an “ongoing elucidative 
process”, as a process of discovering, deploying, and examining appropriate concepts, and “of 
discovering and repairing discordant concepts” (Brandom 1988:279).  This inferentialist 
perspective allows me to frame the pragmatics and politics of language and community in north-
west Wales by means of an alternative to indexes or icons that are bound by a sense of necessity.  
It envisions an empirical field organized not only by principles of Welsh belonging that are 
fundamentally constitutive (i.e., necessary), but a field that is held in tension by different types of 
principles. 
 
ADVANCING THEORY: CULTURAL MODALITIES 
 To see the importance of epistemic materialism, it is necessary also to see that it is only 
half of the truth to say that cultural categories are objectified or typified—as in the Comaroffs’ 
discussions of the motivations for ethnicity, Handler’s (1988) discussion of cultural 
objectification, and in Gal and Irvine’s (1995, and other works) concept of iconization.  The 
fuller truth is that ordinary people (including academics) use a combination of resources—
concepts they see as constructed and concepts they see as completely natural and universal—and 
they use them with, as well as in tension against each other.  This systemic practice also 
conditions academics’ use of the concept of constructed realities.  Even if all realities are 
culturally and socially constructed—at the least, as a prerequisite for a reality to be recognized as 
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reality—scholars have to feel that some are more real than others if scholars are to claim any 
authority at all in the realm of knowledge.10 
 While I am somewhat inclined to see the forms of naturalization and objectification as 
largely unanalyzable into component elements—as in the case of metaphors and myths—I find 
ethnographic interest in the variation in forms of expressing naturalization.  It is not just a sense 
of necessity that is important, which would lead to the impression that we are content with 
mapping relations alone.  My numerous discussions of the shifting line between what is political, 
and what is not, reveal the ongoing processes of constitution of a cultural community centered in 
Cymraeg use, which I describe as the pragmatics of language community.  Within such a cultural 
system, the rhetorical and cognitive acts of individuals come to have real force in the world.  The 
various settings for “waging” the pragmatics of language community, the various linguistic and 
discursive stances people deploy in asserting associated ideologies (and systematic organization 
of this variety), and how people discipline their own practices in maintaining positions within the 
surface-level nationalism metadiscourse—discussion of all of these inform an account of the sort 
of essentialism in north-west Wales that sustains, for example, Cymraeg language activists. 
 As structured, epistemic, connections among apparent generals, systemic conceptual 
connections are represented in everyday experience and political action by means of various 
expressions; that is, by means of repeatable, explicit lexical forms, as well as more implicit 
stances.  The analytic language for describing grammatical resources for producing the boundary 
between the real and the constructed is well-developed.  Typically, this analytic language 
consists of tense, aspect, and mood (see for, example, Palmer 1986 and Sweetser 1990), which in 
its general shape is often referred to as “modality”.  In one of its primary senses, “modality” 
                                                 
10  I think this practical-moral hierarchy of concepts is what makes the denotational or descriptive mode of meaning 
so indispensable. 
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signifies a grammatical resource for coding agents’ ontological, epistemological, and moral 
commitments either to act or to believe (also called, with various senses, attitudes, stances, and 
positions).  These commitments to act or to believe stand in relation to what can be treated as 
three classes of “things”: physical objects; events, processes, and states of affairs, and 
propositions (Lyons 1977; Perkins 1982).  The grammatical coding of modality occurs in terms 
of various dimensions of human contexts, such as moral responsibility, personal evaluation, what 
is (un)known/(un)knowable, truth/alethic, time/tense, causation, probability (Perkins 1982; 
Rescher 1967).  In everyday usage, POSSIBLY, BELIEVABLE, ACTUAL, YESTERDAY, ALWAYS, 
MUST, PROHIBITED, WONDERFUL, WILL HAPPEN, IS NOT LIKELY, would all be instances of 
language uses in which the expression of modality is coded by lexico-grammatical means. 
 Signs that are reproducible, having a (meta)semantic (i.e., conventionally meaningful) 
status, and that express those constraining aspects of situations can be conceived in explicit terms 
as a modal category or in a modal figure of discourse (cf. Brandom 2000:89-96).  Whenever such 
modal devices are used, some epistemically material proprieties are at least tacit.  Thus, even the 
indicative mood is “modal” in that it presupposes an actual world and a complex status quo 
within it.  Some kinds of modalities (e.g., alethic) involve normative formulae that relate to 
propositions (as opposed to physical things and to events, processes, and states of affairs (Lyons 
1977; Perkins 1982)).  Normative formulae that express propositional kinds of modalities would 
provide the resources for metalanguage discourse in the context of elucidative processes. 
 Modal devices, defined functionally, are motivated with respect to dialogic and 
interactional interests.  Also, on this account, they are part of a system of use (meaning-
formalism) and a set of public (i.e., not in the head), culturally recognizable non-deductive 
games.  Normative formulae render relatively explicit (which is contingent on the beholder) the 
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endorsement of the material proprieties that motivates the use of modal devices (This is a 
paraphrase of Brandom’s (2000:89) that reveals a more relativistic attitude toward explicitness 
than Brandom displayed.). 
 The analytic languages for the grammatical and lexical kinds of resources do not have a 
counterpart in the conceptual language for application to non-linguistic forms of social action 
(beyond the abstract social theoretic frameworks of Foucault, Gramsci, Bourdieu, and the like).  
However, there is a broader, discursive kind of communication that can be classified according 
to those forms of talk that have become central in linguistic anthropology in the last forty years, 
such as narratives, performance genres, communicative styles, or participant frameworks.  
Within this communicative order(s), there are linguistic resources for modulating the (assumed) 
modality of describing reality.11 
 There, we can surely find such resources for managing the transparently “constructed” 
concepts and topics, and for differentiating them from the “real” concepts and topics.  They are 
persistent ways of thinking and ways of constructing social realities that are implicated in 
institutions and identities (and identities implicated in institutional practices), and these have 
been the empirical focus of this dissertation. More specifically, features of talk in this order(s) 
bear interrelationships through resources typically identified by means of evaluation and 
assessment (e.g., Biber and Finegan 1989; Englebretson 2007; Goodwin and Goodwin 1992; 
Jaffe 2009; Kockelman 2010; Labov 1997; Labov and Waletzky 1967; Palmer 1986; Thompson 
and Hunston 2000; Wortham and Locher 1999).  Lexico-grammatical and discursive kinds of 
modality—“We can’t do that”, “That’s not feasible”, “If only we had alien technology”—can be 
                                                 
11  Thus, a narrative about non-existing creatures or abilities might be recognizable as belonging to a purely 
imaginary state-of-affairs and, therefore, to a fantasy genre of expression.  This is a modal category of broader scope 
than grammatical modality, even though what appears in the broad scope is suggested in the “narrow” scope.  That 
is, alethic/dynamic modal forms can be expressed by non-structurally means—for example, a lexical item like 
DREAM—or by grammatical means—for example, by the auxiliary verb, “cannot be [true]”. 
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taken as expressions of the normativity of the conceptual relations by which agents construct 
their social worlds.  It is because the same lexical item can be used for different conceptual 
framings, such as epistemic and moral perspectives, that the grammatical and lexical forms of 
modalities can address both structural concerns in language analysis and the broader “getting 
about” in the worlds we inhabit by means of learning, interpreting, and producing signs. 
 While developing a framework for the analytic concepts of status, role, and attitude, 
Kockelman (2010:8, 9) seemed to have those considerations in mind.  Besides amplifying the 
writing of anthropologists like Ralph Linton, he also drew (implicitly in the following block 
quotation) on the work of Wilfrid Sellars’ champions—Robert Brandom and Ruth Millikan (Paul 
Kockelman, February 10, 2011, personal communication): 
 
For present purposes, the modes of permission and obligation that make up a 
status may be regimented by any number of means: while typically grounded in 
norms (as commitments and entitlements), they may also be grounded in rules (as 
articulated norms) or laws (as legally-promulgated and politically-enforced rules) 
. . . In short, a status should be defined as a collection of commitments and 
entitlements to signify and interpret in particular ways; a role should be defined as 
any mode of signification or interpretation that enacts these commitments and 
entitlements; and an attitude should be defined as any interpretant of a status 
through a role—usually itself another status.  Here, then, is where modality 
(entitlement and commitment) is most intimately tied to meaning (signification 
and interpretation).  
 
 The multiplistic dynamic space comprising the implicit and the expressive dimensions of 
social and interpretive constraint constitutes a domain of modality at the discursive and cultural 
level—“cultural modalization”.12  Thus, two prominent cultural modalities are the prevalence of 
                                                 
12  Inferentialism can be argued to be an obstacle to understanding cultural modality.  As part of a philosophical 
approach grounded in a sharp divide between the descriptive (“is”) from the prescriptive (“ought”), inferentialism 
emphasizes analysis at the cost of practical understanding.  However, just as one sees in material modes of talk the 
confused blurring of the use–mention distinction, one also sees in ordinary cognition and language-use a blurring of 
the is–ought distinction.  The result is the merging of the semantics/notional/worldview side of meaning with the 
pragmatics/performative/practice side of meaning: a hallmark of philosophical (“American”) pragmatism. 
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the nationalism meta-discourse and the drowning of compatriots in Welshness.  What I have 
described as cultural submergence is the clashing of these two modalities at the surface of 
cultural processes.  The fact that the surface of national positionality is dominated, first, by 
English media, and second, by the prevalent meta-discourse of and about nationalism in the 
English media is that communitarians who center their identity in Cymraeg move toward the 
cultural depths and richness of the Cymraeg community. 
 My approach in this dissertation engages directly with the conflicting strategies of 
essentialist-primordalism and constructivism without denaturing the essentializing claims of, for 
example, language activists.  The product of this perspective of pragmatic action as being in 
tension among different modal types of principles is an account that transcends iconic mapping 
relations.  The account presented in this dissertation suggests strategies for identifying, and has 
portrayed, a variety of particular ways of conceiving and enacting belonging within language 
communities. 
 Further investigation would examine commitments to a language community or language 
demesne—the accompanying entitlements, and related attributions, undertakings, and 
endorsements of those commitments and entitlements.  Such an interrogation would allow me to 
make coherent claims about individuals, peoples, and practices without presupposing or 
conveying an underlying cohesion that might not exist.  By investigating the construction of 
language communities in terms of areas of cohesion that do not necessarily overlap—and might 
be in mutual conflict—I would more likely arrive at a complex dynamic picture of sociocultural 
interaction.  Consequently, such a project allows researchers to develop language for empirical 
description of how language functions productively relative to constituting of language demesnes 
and language corridors. 
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APPENDIX A 
◄ THE CYMRAEG LANGUAGE WORLD ► 
 
 “Hiraeth” is an emblematic word in the contact between Cymraeg and English-language 
contexts.  This word is often described by Cymraeg-speaking Welsh persons as untranslatable.  
In English-language contexts (e.g., National Geographic, June 2001), “hiraeth” is often 
translated as “homesickness” and “nostalgia” (see Drakakis-Smith et al. 2007:9).  If “hiraeth” 
really is untranslatable, then “nostalgia” is, at best, a gloss—in the sense of a tentative, but 
inadequate translation.  “Nostalgia” is etymologically accurate insofar as “nostalgia” can signify 
an illness related to homesickness, which was medically recognized in the eighteenth century, 
leading even to the burying alive of soldiers who succumbed to the illness (see Lowenthal 
1985:3-12).  However, in the contemporary context of social research, particularly anthropology, 
translating “hiraeth” as “nostalgia” is problematic because nostalgia itself has become an object 
of analysis.  Translating “hiraeth” as “nostalgia” is particularly problematic because post-
colonial studies has yielded a variety of the concept of nostalgia that takes on the connotation of 
a particular sort of historicity, à la imperial nostalgia (see Rosaldo 1989b).  Hence, today, 
researchers can be nostalgic for a time when they were able to experience nostalgia happily and 
innocently. 
 “Nostalgia” is also inadequate because hiraeth speaks to longing for home and being 
situated in a cultural milieu that is part of oneself, but also speaks to the macro-locale of Welsh 
traditions, recursively encompassing the Cymraeg contexts (e.g., famous poetry and hymns) in 
which allusions to hiraeth figure.  “Hiraeth”, thus, has an historical dimension (as Lowenthal 
1985 noted of “nostalgia”), as well as the sense of having connections to a place—Wales and 
particular parts of Wales.  Consequently, it makes sense to think of the concept of hiraeth, from 
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an academic perspective, as a particular kind of historicity.  This chapter presents a 
representation of that practical hiraeth sort of historicity. 
 
The Cymraeg Social Imaginary 
     Once upon a time, the Welsh knew when their history began.  It began about 
1170 BC.  That was when the Ark of the Covenant was captured by the Philistines 
and when Brutus, a descendant of the Trojans, landed on the shores of Britain.  
Apart from a few giants, the island had no inhabitants.  Brutus and his 
companions were the first of the Britons and the ancestors of the Welsh.  This was 
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s account of the early history of Britain, written in AD 
1136, an account which would be central to the consciousness of the Welsh for 
many centuries. 
    Such precision about the beginning of Wales and the Welsh has long ceased to 
be tenable.  (John Davies 1993:1) 
 
These are the words that open the English translation of academic historian, John Davies’, Hanes 
Cymru [A History of Wales].  It is telling that he begins with the gambit of “once upon a time” 
and follows with his brief, tongue-in-cheek, quasi-historical account—one that nevertheless has 
been and might still be, for some, “central to the consciousness of the Welsh”.  It is especially 
telling that he replaces this fairy tale frame with an evaluative comment about the difficulties of 
producing consensus about the Welsh origins.  The evaluative comment, a rhetorical expression 
of aporia, marks an historiographic ambiguity and sociological sense of uncertainty. 
 Wales has served as a site of such struggles for so long that this history evoked the 
challenging question by Gwyn Alf Williams (1985): When was Wales?  One answer, contained 
in the asking of that ambiguous question, is that Welsh identity can be found only in its struggle 
for something akin to state status, even if this struggle is unsuccessful from the perspective of 
any historical point in time.  However, this idea of national struggle should not be construed as a 
simple conflict between thesis and antithesis.  Struggle involves dynamic situations in which 
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people simultaneously propose various propositions and interact socially in these political and 
other spheres.  The very idea of struggle holds within it the possibility of rejection of the idea of 
conflict itself; and not only by those who are the target of resistance, but also by those who 
merely dislike struggle.  Struggle implies tension, rather than a state of peace and comfort that 
many seek.  Thus, not every Welsh person, perhaps not even most, would endorse Williams’ 
principle of political-sociological struggle as a national ideal.1  The corollary to the question of 
“What is the nation?”, which Williams addressed via the question “When was Wales?”, would 
seem to be, “Whose history?”. 
 Williams’ emphasis of the processual nature of a Welsh historicity and the idea of Wales 
he advanced are instructive in situating the problem of the submergence of culture.  Crucially, 
Williams begged the question insofar as he did not explain how the historicity of a nation is to be 
identified.  To put it another way: If, as Santayana (1906) cautioned, a nation of people is 
condemned to repeat the past because the people cannot remember how it (i.e., the past) 
constitutes the core nature of the nation, what is the “it” they are condemned to repeat?  What or 
who makes the past into an “it”?  Moreover, how can “it” be repeated by a people who lack the 
identity to make themselves continuous with those who lived such a past on previous occasions?  
Williams, like Santayana, left unspecified the particulars of the presupposed link between 
embodied personal experience and some kind of historicity (where either of these might take on 
the value of substance or essence, with the former subsuming individual bodies or economic 
                                                 
1  There is even less reason to hope for consensus in light of Williams’ amicable clashes on this very subject with 
another famous Welsh historian, Wynford Vaughan Thomas, on a television history program in the late 1970s with 
the telling title, The Dragon with Two Tongues. [The dragon is one of the national symbols of Wales and it has had 
multiple appearances throughout British history that some see as continuous.  Many link it to Roman use of a dragon 
figure as a device of auxiliary cavalry troops.  It has been associated with the legendary king, Arthur.  Henry VII 
used as a dragon device on his standard at the Battle of Bosworth.  The two “tongues” are English and Cymraeg.] 
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production processes, and the latter narratival frames of experience or perspectives on the sweep 
of history).  Thus, Williams poured new paradoxes into old antinomies.2 
 While there might be no consensus about when the history of Wales should begin, Wales 
has served as a site of struggles to anchor identity to an inchoate and futurist imaginary state for 
many centuries.  If one adopted the view that one cannot locate nationalism in Wales prior to the 
industrial era, this neglects the long millennium preceding industrialization (to extend phrasings 
of the “long century” for spans of times that do not match up as conventional centuries, which 
would be inaptly designated using ordinals, such as “the Eighteenth”).  If it is untenable to speak 
of Brutus and giants in an historiographic register, it is much more tenable to address the time in 
Wales’ history after Rome’s troops left or assimilated into societies in Britain.  The historicity of 
Welsh identity might find its clearest evidentiary basis in the period when Anglo-Saxon settlement 
and Irish raiding established boundary lines between the three peoples—the Teutons, the Gaels, and 
the Britons.  If there is a “consciousness of the Welsh” associated with the Cymraeg language-
cultural complex, the first millennium of this post-Roman Welsh history, extending from the 
400s to the 1200s, is central to it.  It includes periods, each arguably a “golden age” for Wales, 
that are in contrast to the “Dark Ages” of Europe that was signaled by the “fall” of Rome. 
 The most recognizable contrasting age of “radiance” (400-600) is marked by the 
development of monastic communities—think of the patron saints, Patrick and David, of Ireland 
and Wales, respectively—and a periodic literary tradition that is known through later written 
documents of much earlier oral poems.  Also, between the years 400 and 900, Welsh societies 
underwent a transition from the figuring of corporate identity in terms of conquered tribes to that 
of Welsh quasi-feudal dynasties and their associated territories.  One might even imagine this era 
                                                 
2  The mentioning of antinomies is an allusion to Kant’s use of certain intellectual dilemmas in which each lemma 
leads to contradiction.  He claimed that such a result indicates a problem with the formulation of the dilemma. 
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as the assimilation by native Britons in Wales of what Davies (1993:44) called the ethos of 
Athens (e.g., literature and fine arts) and Rome (e.g., social economic stability and political 
administration).  Since the legionaries and auxiliaries “were more likely to hail from the valleys 
of the Rhine and the Danube than from the valley of the Tiber” (Davies 1993:32), this image 
draws on an elite administrative class and a Roman-culture hegemony. 
 Professional historians of Wales and those attempting to express “properly academic” 
voices might be more confident in locating a national identity centuries later in the post-Conquest 
part of the medieval era.  Wales, emerging from a group of small kingdoms occasionally unified 
between the ninth and thirteenth centuries, lost its autonomy well before the other two major 
non-English areas.  Until the late thirteenth century, when the successful conquest of Wales 
occurred, Wales had been divided into multiple territories.  At several points in history, certain 
rulers could unite these “micro-states” into a principality encompassing most or all of the 
territory of modern Wales for several decades.  The last native leader of Wales was defeated in 
1282 by the forces of a Norman-English king, Edward I.  Conquest symbolized the end of a 
dynasty of these various native rulers, with only a short, but important rebellion begun (by 
Owain Glyndŵr) in 1400 to interrupt briefly the longue durée of Norman-English hegemony 
from the thirteenth to the twentieth century. 
 Losing independence long before the Industrial Revolution, Wales was never in a 
position to develop indigenously the industrial and economic systems that Scotland did by the 
eighteenth century.  It also lacked, in more recent centuries, the networks to enable, and 
willingness to employ outright violence in resistance to the English state as Irish republicans  
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did.3  Moreover, although Welsh nationalism was tied to a religious movement that was opposed 
to the Church of England, it managed to avoid the internal, religious divisiveness exhibited in 
Northern Ireland.  Nationalism in north-west Wales—often deemed the most extreme of Welsh 
nationalism, in conjunction with the view from south Wales that villages and social networks in the 
north of Wales can be less welcoming and more closed than in the south—appears to be idealist.  
That is, it normalizes a more idealist, expression-oriented sort of cultural identity, rather than a more 
materialist view of identity that would emphasize political acts or attitudes (see Khleif 1980, 
Rawkins 1984, and Davies 1989). 
 Wales is most easily distinguished from the rest of the other nations of the UK by its 
remarkable maintenance of a thriving, if minority, “native-language” complex.  There has been a 
great deal of resistance to the acceptance in British modernity of that indigenous language 
community.  It was only in 1993 that Cymraeg became Wales’ second official language 
alongside English, and this followed the centuries of struggle that make up the nationalist’s view 
of the history of the indigenous language of Wales. 
 During the second half of the long millennium before industrialization, the occasional 
stability among fractious political units in present-day regions of Wales provides several bases 
for claims about national unity.  That scope of interest ranges over local-area princes’ irregular 
attempts to unite Wales since at least the eight century and the codification of Welsh national 
laws in the tenth century.  How broad a perspective can be given to the telling of so-called 
                                                 
3  By an odd set of unconnected coincidences, hundreds of these Irish republicans, including Michael Collins, were 
detained at a former-whiskey distillery-turned-prison-camp in then-remote north Wales after their involvement in 
the 1916 Easter Rising.  By interring the “worst” of the Irish revolutionaries together in one place, the British 
government facilitated the detainees’ founding of the Irish Republic Army, since the prisoners organized the covert 
teaching of guerrilla tactics—and, interestingly, facilitated the detainees’ exposure to the non-English language (i.e., 
Cymraeg) prevalent in the countryside around the prison camp (Whitmore 1917).  Another camp for these detainees 
was located a mile or so away, near Capel Celyn, on the land of what would become one of the symbols for modern 
Welsh nationalism: the Tryweryn Reservoir. 
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nationalistic history is often a matter of how closely it is tied to the history of ethnic conflict and 
tension between the people of Wales and England. 
 The latter history of conflict begins with the early history of confrontation with English 
settlers and rulers (combining, from a Welsh perspective: Angles, Saxons, Jutes, and the 
Normans).  That the late medieval English kings saw the Welsh as a separate people is clear, 
given that legal entitlements yielded to the Welsh are mentioned in the Runnymede Charter of 
1215, the most famous of the charters referred to under the abbreviated name of “the Magna 
Carta”.  The history of Wales and England over this particularly contentious era, during which 
the futures of the two peoples were joined, is generally told from a doubly insular perspective 
(islanded from English Britain, which is islanded from Continental Europe), rather than 
addressing interaction between ethnic groups.  Although the historiography of language contact 
across the Welsh borders is one I have not explored and this scholarship appears to me generally 
neglected, language was probably a symbol for cultural identity even before the conquest. 
 Even after conquest by the Norman-English in 1282, the native language complex 
continued for over seven centuries.  This complex includes a literate tradition that was 
standardized by the sixteenth century according to the native concerns and interests of Wales’ 
artistic and religious communities (see Jones 1994).  However, by the eighteenth century, 
societal conditions had changed so that the literate tradition could no longer support itself.  
Although some degree of standardization might have lent validity to Cymraeg in an objectified 
form, material and ideological forces in Welsh society directly and indirectly impacted public 
Cymraeg practices during the Victorian era.  As with other indigenous and colonized language 
communities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the British state and civil society 
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applied various methods to persuade the Welsh to recognize Cymraeg as pre-modern, relative to 
the “modern” language of English. 
 The method most widely recognized in Wales is the prohibition of the use of Cymraeg in 
school settings.  It is most widely known because the story of this historical practice is 
reproduced in the very institutional setting that is its narratival setting: the school.  Its popular 
form is called the “Welsh Not”.  Pupils who violated the prohibition were compelled to wear a 
heavy placard made of slate (or other material) around their neck until another pupil could be 
caught speaking the “Welsh” language.  The child still carrying the “Welsh Not” at the end of the 
day was caned.  Historical narratives that circulate in Wales depict this era in different ways.  
Some versions of this and similar narratives adopt a conquest and domination theme, and blame 
the English for such disciplinary measures.  Others note that Welsh persons, not the English, 
enacted such measures themselves in full complicity with English-language hegemony.  Those 
who imagine neutrality to be a condition of historical accuracy might leave out the moral 
condemnation of the English language, omit any sense of language dominance in a material as 
well as ideational sense, and downplay the role of dominant languages in the ideological 
portrayal of identity as a dichotomous sense of belonging and place. 
 Whatever might have been the specific role of Cymraeg in ethnic identity, from the 
medieval era to the Victorian period, the conspicuous replacement of that language by the 
English language in many settings in Wales by the twentieth century brought language politics 
into national consciousness.  Teachers in north-west Wales often compare mid-twentieth-century 
protests, which complained about policies and practices that favored the English over Cymraeg, 
to the civil rights movement in the United States.  One teacher I spoke with in 2002 claimed: 
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The great hero of course in Wales was Martin Luther King. . . and he certainly 
had an impact on Welsh politics in the 60s. . . There are a lot of Welsh poets in 
the 60s who wrote about the Montgomery bus protests and that sort of thing. . . If 
you look back to the language movement in the 60s, a lot of leaders were 
ministers in religion and they obviously identified with Martin Luther King. . . 
And they were pacifists.  That is why Welsh nationalism has gone down a 
different path, for example, to Irish nationalism.  There’s a strong tradition of 
pacifism.  Gandhi was very influential, as well. (Interview D2#2R, July 3, 2002) 
 
Because of the non-violent strictures of the movement associated with him, Martin Luther King, 
Jr. is frequently cited as an important figure for Welsh people who participated in Wales’ 
language rights movements in the 1970s and 1980s, and were influenced by those who 
participated in language activism in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Some key landmarks in this “protest era” of Wales will help to provide a sense of how 
this time in Welsh history is often conceived of from a popular and educational perspective.  In 
1938, demands were made of the British government by petition for Cymraeg to be granted an 
official status equal to that of English.  Three decades later, in 1967, an Act of Parliament was 
enacted that required government forms to be printed in both English and Cymraeg, and bilingual 
services to be provided in courts of law.  In 1977, campaigns to establish a Cymraeg radio station 
succeeded.  In 1982, language activists badgered then-Prime Minister Thatcher into keeping her 
promise of establishing a Cymraeg television service.  The UK Parliament gave Cymraeg a status 
in courts and the public sector (in Wales) equal to that of English in 1993.4 
 This series of events and dates might suggest a concession to a more positive outlook of 
the language’s survival.  On the other hand, it might be the influence of a motivated segment of 
the Welsh population on parliamentary regimes, whose members came to see imperial attitudes 
                                                 
4  While never officially tied to governmental institutions prior to 1998 (with the exception, perhaps, of the 
nationalist political party), these landmarks in the history of civil protest—as developments in the cultural restoration of 
mass media and civic spaces—paralleled developments in the cultural restoration of educational institutions positioned 
within the state governmental framework. 
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as old-fashioned and counterproductive to British exploitation of global capitalism.  The 
unambiguous consequence is a range of choice.  While that range of choice is most visible in the 
commercial sector, it corresponds to a wider liberal attitude in Britain, where the “choice” of 
Cymraeg has only recently become visible in the governmental, not the commercial sector.  
Thus, many people in Wales have recently been able to choose to have their utility bills printed in 
Cymraeg, and to enjoy the bilingual services of public institutions (e.g., libraries and post offices) 
which are required by law to employ staff persons who can communicate in Cymraeg.  The ability to 
tune in to S4C—Sianel Pedwar Cymraeg [Channel 4, Cymraeg], which was in 2007 and 2008, and 
has been for some time, the only antenna-received, television channel featuring Cymraeg 
programming—is another context of choice. 
 I give this account because it reflects a history of protest in Wales that is centered on felt 
abuses to the state of Cymraeg.  Of course, protest can take and has taken different forms and can 
be differently evaluated, both violent and non-violent.  People I interviewed at several stages of 
dissertation field research generally considered political action that involves damage to physical 
structures like electrical transformers and buildings, but not people, to be non-violent.  A strong 
constraining principle is exemplified by the measured use of symbolic, though physically 
destructive violence performed by two sorts of groups: One of these consists of the paramilitary 
organizations of the 1960s and 1970s, whose members blasted pipelines and dam construction  
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sites.  The other sort includes the Welsh arsonists (Meibion Glyndŵr [Sons of Glyndŵr]) who, in 
the 1980s, set fire to English holiday-homes located in Wales.5 
 The way the Welsh have dealt with ethnic conflict for a century and a half has been 
outside the realm of full-fledged violence.  Rather, their actions and practices fall within a range 
that neither excludes peaceful settlement of conflicts, nor declines into outright ethnic violence.6  
Not surprisingly, music, literature, and other expressive forms of culture appear in a favorable 
light to all and sundry in Wales.  I believe the explanation (which I do not provide) can be found 
in conditions like those Comaroff (1987:305) formulated, if slightly stronger than the Welsh 
case: “But even where they have had a social identity contrived for them, subordinate  
groupings. . . may begin to assert a shared commitment to an order of symbols and meanings 
and, sometimes, a moral code (Moerman 1967)”.  Expressive culture might have been the 
primary way of expressing a Welsh sense of culture because it is free from any of the social 
recriminations ranging from accusations of social backwardness or of personal contrariness, to 
being anti-English (and therefore anti-British).  While many, perhaps the mainstream of, Welsh 
                                                 
5  I believe the model for this mode of reprisal, involving the burning of second homes owned by English residents 
and of property of government (UK) agencies in Wales, is suggested by tenth-century, codified indigenous Welsh 
law.  The more contemporary reference is probably the 1936 incident when three nationalists set a shed on fire at the 
Royal Air Force installation at Penyberth on the LLŷn peninsula.  Yet, the Tenth-Century, codified indigenous Welsh 
law might lie in the background of that incident.  My suggestion is that this cultural knowledge lies in the 
background among some Cymraeg speakers or texts, but I have found no confirmation of the idea that anyone is 
aware of such a source as a motivating inspiration.  In the version of Cyfraith Hywel (The Law of Hywel DDa) called 
LL yfr y Damweiniau, this legal codex states: “If it happens that a person does violence or harm against another for 
land or earth, let him do it on the land or earth for which his claim is. . . This is violence: burning houses and 
breaking ploughs” (Jenkins 2000:111).  Another version, the Cynferth Redaction, further states: “Whosoever holds 
land for three men’s lifetimes in the same country as those entitled. . . without claim and without surclaim, without 
burning houses and without breaking ploughs, they will never be answered for that land, since law closed between 
them” (Jenkins 2000:111-112). 
6  This kind of action, while labeled nationalism in Wales, could be alternatively labeled “ethnic affrontery”.  The 
etymological derivation of “affrontery” is that of an Old French expression meaning a literal slap to the forehead, 
where the import would be more social than physical.  The Welsh use of ethnic affrontery exemplifies gradations 
among kinds of political and social action.  These gradations subsist whether political action involves an attempt to 
inflict damage on the physical implements of hegemonic institutions, or those expressive means of social and/or 
political action in which political violence is often sheathed (for example, protest songs). 
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persons tend to respond negatively to forms of violent or criminal political action, everybody 
loves a good Welsh male-voice choir. 
 The result might be variously described in awkward connotations, as repressed, as a 
simmering anger, as cultural frustration.  Tellingly, the way I heard it most commonly expressed 
by Welsh persons is that the Welsh have a lack of confidence.  Thus, the confident stance that is 
frequently maligned as “nationalistic” sometimes appears unexpectedly in contexts thought to be 
pacific in nature and free of political tensions.  In the 2003 national culture festival, the National 
Eisteddfod, the highest award in the competitions at that festival was received by a poet wearing 
a t-shirt bearing the Cymraeg word, “cymuned”.  The typesetting styling of the word [Cymraeg 
for “community”] was that of an activist organization that is generally perceived to represent a 
“nationalist” point of view about maintaining the “Welsh” character of villages in Wales, 
particularly rural Wales.  Cymuned is generally taken to be extreme, but only within the range of 
civil action; and would only rarely (if ever) be confused with paramilitary groups or arsonists.  
Knowing that he would be receiving the award that day, the winning poet chose to wear a t-shirt 
of a political group best known for its campaign to control English immigration into Wales.  
Moreover, the winning poet is and was announced at the ceremony to be an active member of 
that organization. 
 It is easy to imagine, and I do, that this history of protest has led to changes in the 
political prospects of Cymraeg.  Cymraeg language identity has also been (and is being) shaped 
into a more positive object of perception by changing social attitudes.  Up until the 1980s, the 
broad public considered Cymraeg to be a lower status language than English (Khleif 1980).  
Consequently, the former language was linked by social values to Welsh culture and heritage, 
while English was linked to economic well-being and modern civilization.  Conservatives and 
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centrists of the UK believed that the language was going to “die out” in the near future—and this 
“extinction” was encouraged at least since the nineteenth century (see Jones 1950; Jones 1998).  
The situation is different today, as many economic opportunities now exist for bilingual persons.  
It is noteworthy that use of Cymraeg was thought to be disadvantageous in pre-war Wales, 
motivating parents to emphasize English in the home.  Today, competence in Cymraeg is sought 
in many jobs, from post office clerk to university instructor. 
 
Language, Ethnicity, and Modernity 
 While Cymraeg has made a slight recovery from the long slide to its plateau of relative 
marginality during the Victorian and Edwardian eras and the twentieth century, its future in the 
linguistic reality of Britain remains in doubt.  Certainly, it now has a more positive image and 
status in discourses in Wales than it had in the Victorian era, coming to be seen as less alien to an 
imaginary Wales in the modern age.  Nonetheless, the label of “Welsh” (originally meaning 
“foreign”) remains. 
 The central descriptive topics that this dissertation addresses are the role that languages 
play as emblems of nation, their cultural persuasiveness in this role, and—for many, but not all, 
or even most—Cymraeg’s primacy over any other image of native identity in north-west Wales.  
It is not only careless, but problematic to refer to the mutually intelligible varieties of Cymraeg 
as the Welsh language.  This is not simply because of the plurality hiding behind the singular 
term, “Cymraeg”, or even “the Welsh language”, but because English is also a Welsh 
language—albeit one that has failed to obtain legitimacy as an indigenous language, both 
because of and despite its dominance.  
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 As do people around many parts of the world with language, Welsh persons talk of the 
salient language categories of English and Cymraeg in ways that suggest the categories are 
monolithic, even if each label encompasses a large range of linguistic forms.  It is somewhat 
well-known that the set of language varieties conveniently called “English” is highly diverse in 
the United Kingdom, and this is also true within Wales.  While laypersons in Wales recognize 
two major kinds of Cymraeg (south Walian and north Walian), the number of the Cymraeg 
language varieties associated with regions in Wales is not fully charted, with the exception of 
broad varieties (as studied under the rubric of “Welsh dialectology” by Thomas 1973, for 
example).  Given modern forms of media (e.g., television), the presence of any of the regional 
dialects of English overshadows that of the Cymraeg regional dialects, much as the presence of 
the former does in most of the urban areas of Wales.  This “fact of life” accentuates the sense of  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Percentage of those able to speak, read, and write Cymraeg by age ranges. (ONS 2004b) 
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unity across region-based Cymraeg varieties, producing an image of a dominant monolith of 
English language and a subordinate monolith of Cymraeg.7 
 One recent sociolinguistic study by researchers based at the University of Wales, Bangor 
(Jones and Morris 2008) described Cymraeg in Wales in terms of its national-level features.  The 
authors (2008:128) located Cymraeg in Wales under their “Cluster B”, which they characterized 
as follows: “Some young families speak their [sic] language with offspring, but mainly the older 
generation [speak their language with offspring]; a few minority language speakers in mixed 
families also use minority language”.  Such a description opens the cracks to allow more 
nuanced studies of differences among generations and communicative contexts, as well as area 
and regional variation—even in the context of a typology of the status of languages in states.8 
 By contrast, most academics and well-informed laypersons typically describe Cymraeg in 
Wales in terms of official census figures.  The 2001 census showed a trend reversal in the 
proportion of people in Wales who can speak Cymraeg: After a century-long drop from fifty 
percent in 1901 to eighteen percent in the 1980s (ONS 2004b), this proportion rose to just over 
                                                 
7  If the language takes on the nature of geological orders of time, this is poetically apt.  Several terms for geological 
periods come from Welsh heritage, whose rocky countryside held Paleozoic-Era remnants on which early geologists 
labored: Cambrian (Latin for “Cymru/Cymry”, Wales), Ordovician (from the name of an ancient British tribe), 
Silurian (from the name of an ancient British tribe), and Breconian (a now-defunct label for a stage of the Devonian 
period that comes from the name for an area of Wales). 
8  The other categories and characterizations that Jones and Morris (2008:129-130) include for comparison are: 
Cluster A—“Virtually all young families speak their language with offspring as do most minority language speakers 
in mixed families”; Cluster C—“Only about half of families speak minority language with offspring, mainly the 
older generation”; Cluster D—“Only a minority of families speak minority language with offspring, mainly older 
people; people have heard grandparents speak the language”; and Cluster E—“Virtually no families, except for the 
very old, use the minority language in the family”. 
     Examples of these different categories include: Cluster A—“Swedish in Finland, Catalan in Catalonia, German in 
Belgium, German in Italy, Luxembourgish, and Turkish in Greece”; Cluster B—“Basque AC, Catalan in Majorca, 
Galician in Galicia, Ladin, Slovene in Italy, Slovene in Austria, Basque in Navarre, Danish in Germany, Occitan in 
Spain, Friulian, Catalan in Aragon, Albanian in Italy, Occitan in Italy, Mirandese”; Cluster C—“German in 
Denmark, Catalan in Valencia, Irish, Asturian, Gaelic, German in France, Frisian, Croatian in Austria, Basque in 
France, Catalan in France, Corsican, Franco Provencal, Slovak in Austria, Catalan in Italy, Slavo Macedonian, 
Bulgarian, Aroumanian, Albanian in Greece”; Cluster D—“Sorbian, Saami in Finland, Tornedalen, Hungarian in 
Austria, Irish in Northern Ireland, Saami in Sweden, Breton, North Frisian, Dutch in France, Occitan in France, 
Sardinian, East Frisian, Portuguese in Spain”; and Cluster E—“Grico, Cornish”.  The table in which Jones and 
Morris (2008) present this classification was adapted from Glyn Williams’ Sustaining Language Diversity in Europe: 
Evidence from the Euromosaic Project (published in 2005 by Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke). 
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twenty percent by 2001(ONS 2004a:7).  There is great variety concealed by these national-level 
official figures, however.  At the scale of neighborhoods and villages, there is dramatic variation.  
Moreover, different regions of Wales have historically had different trends and patterns of 
decline in Cymraeg usage, with some areas maintaining very high levels of usage. 
 Nonetheless, the national census figures do express an image of Cymraeg’s minority 
status that is born out even at the scale of counties, with which local governmental bodies tend to 
be associated.  Only four of Wales’ 22 unitary authorities (counties, boroughs, and three cities) 
have a percentage greater than fifty percent of their respective residents (age three and older) in 
possession of some kind of competence in Cymraeg (ONS 2004a:7).  The unitary authority with 
the next largest proportion of people competent in Cymraeg possesses a population with less than 
30 percent competent in Cymraeg (ONS 2004a:7).  With a total of 417,736 residents, age three 
and older, the collective populations of these four Cymraeg-majority counties make up only 14.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: The slope of the changing percentage of people aged 3 and over who are able to speak Cymraeg over 
time—which was in decline until the mid-1980s. (ONS 2004b) 
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percent of Wales’ total population.  In terms of physical territory, these four counties are among 
the ten largest unitary authorities in Wales, covering over thirty-five percent of the total area of 
Wales.  These are relatively rural counties, which tends to make them marginal in terms of 
production markets for mass media like television. 
 It is possible that the association between rural areas and Cymraeg dominance offers 
hints about different trends and patterns of decline in Cymraeg usage in different regions of 
Wales.  Before 1800, there were many villages and towns in which Welsh people would have 
experienced Cymraeg in monolingual settings.  In the eighteenth century, the English language 
increasingly came to be conceived of as a sign of civilization, as the only means of 
communication for civilized people, a goal with which Cymraeg.  The expansion of the Anglican 
Church into Wales, the development of a state church-run network of schools, the “Whig 
interpretation of history”, Matthew Arnold's social Darwinian excoriation of the use of Cymraeg, 
the royal commission report that criticized Welsh education and morality in 1847—all these 
presented a contrast between the supposedly progressive and upstanding English and the 
purportedly backward and inferior Welsh.  That is, not only were human labor and natural 
resources (e.g., coal) of Wales being exploited by the British Empire, but various more or less 
good-intentioned Britons had developed an elaborate system of institutional “trenches” (Gramsci 
1971:243) throughout Welsh society that placed elements of English culture strategically within 
Welsh life. 
 Of course, the Welsh responded with their own system of institutional trenches in this 
war of position; even if some were “concerned to answer the criticisms [of the 1847 report on 
Welsh education] by becoming more like the English” (Morgan 1983: 93).  Members of Welsh 
civil society continued to create Cymraeg language and literary societies, but these became more 
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markedly and pointedly Welsh cultural institutions.  In addition, revivals of Welsh culture, 
exemplified by the National Eisteddfod and the Order of Bards, were characteristic of Britain 
between the Eighteenth and Twentienth Centuries (Morgan 1983) and their persistence over 
time, until today, appears to have been due largely to cultural confrontation with the foreign, 
English culture. 
 Presumably areas affected most by the industrial revolution would also be most 
influenced by those messages about a “civilized” modernity.  Despite the concurrent circulation 
of multiculturalist messages in mass media, I have heard people say that Cymraeg is obsolete in 
today’s world.  A cultural evolutionary ideology, then, re-assembles in the present into mutual 
exclusive human spaces.  Whatever motivated people to produce verbal or written expressions of 
that perspective on language and progress, the outcome is that many in Wales conceive of 
domestic and public spaces as being open to one or the other exclusive means of communication 
(i.e., language codes). 
 Today, as in the Eighteenth Century, messages that seek to exclude Cymraeg from the 
spaces of modernity often are animated by people who cannot participate in Cymraeg 
conversations.  While use of Cymraeg over much of Wales was seen as natural and to be 
expected before 1800, the present situation is one of bilingualism for a mere twenty to twenty-
five percent of the national population.  The majority of the Welsh population can only speak 
English.  Unfortunately, the idea of language exclusion is also reproduced by bilingual activists.  
In meeting the challenges faced by those in Cymraeg-centered communities who feel threatened 
by language decline, Cymraeg activists perpetuate the politicization of the language.  This theme 
is elaborated later in Chapter Four, in terms of a “Welsh logic of heritage”. 
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APPENDIX B 
◄ THE SOAPBOX TALK INTERVIEW ► 
 
  
 
Hughes: ‘s my second language. 1 
Williams: It’s our second language, yes. 2 
Hughes: Yes. 3 
Williams: So- 4 
Hughes: Um, well, this term in our in year 3 and 4, our theme is um, sea, the sea 5 
life and the sea shore and in history we’re doing Tudor Times and we try 6 
to look at the Welsh aspect you know not- we do talk about things like 7 
you know who was the King and Queen of England at the time you 8 
know- 9 
Maas: Mm hm: 10 
H: But that’s just by the way we really try to think of what pla- what sort of 11 
place it was in Wales at th~s- at the same time and what’s the most 12 
important thing.  There is the um, translation of the Bible. .  13 
M: Uh huh. 14 
H: Which happened in 1588, you know? 15 
M: Uh huh. 16 
H: -By request of Elizabeth, who was Queen at the time, you know? 17 
M: Oh, so she actually requested that?  I didn’t- 18 
H: Yes, yes. 19 
M: …know that. 20 
H: Because she wanted to change, because before th- it was a Catholic 21 
country, wasn’t it, and then she wanted to change it really, um, to 22 
Protestant so she thought the best thing is to give the people of Wales the 23 
chance to read and learn about the Bible 24 
M: Hm. 25 
H: And of course there weren’t any schools. . . 26 
M: Right. 27 
H: …so they- they didn’t have books either. So she started with the Bible, 28 
really, and that was translated fours hundred- in 1588  And then um each 29 
village was given or each town was given a bible in the chapel of the 30 
church, chained, because there was only one and they were so rare, you 31 
know. 32 
M: Right. 33 
H: So people then started having schools in chapels and in churches you 34 
know where they started to read. 35 
M: Huh. 36 
H: Um, so that’s quite interesting, you know th-. 37 
M: How do the students respond to... I guess by that time they know who L- 38 
Elizabeth is. 39 
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H: Yeah’m. They also know about the Spanish Armada, as well, which 40 
happened in 1588, you know, y- uh- so we relate it with that, as well, you 41 
know, talk a little about what’s happened, you know, during that time. 42 
Em, and every four years we go: to where William Morgan was born, the 43 
chapel d- wooded—the translation—we go there on a pererindod- 44 
W: Right, it’s on a pilgrimage. 45 
H: “Pilgrimage”.  No, we walk there, which is nice you know through 46 
forestry and uh- 47 
W: Mmm. 48 
M: W- You walk from where to? 49 
H: We walk from em- the- the- village where he lived was near Penmachno, 50 
Betws... 51 
M: Uh huh- 52 
H: …-y-coed.  53 
M: …Okay.  Right. 54 
H: ...So, we eh walk from Dolwyddelan... 55 
M: Uh huh. 56 
H: ...across you know and that... 57 
M: Mm. 58 
H: ...which is a nice walk, it’s not very long, it’s- 59 
M: It’s about te:n:: miles isn’t it? 60 
H: It’s two, three... 61 
M: …Or six- 62 
H: ... miles you know, but it’s... 63 
M: -Oh, okay. 64 
H: ...it’s, it’s countryside and you know, it’s- it gives them a feeling of what 65 
sort of age it’s very very narrow road, you know... 66 
M: Uh huh. 67 
W: Oh. 68 
H: ...um and then when you do arrive I don’t know if you’ve been there, but 69 
it’s a wonderful place. 70 
M: I walked from um:: Capel Curig... 71 
W: Mm: 72 
H: Yeah. 73 
M: ...to Betws-y-coed. 74 
H: Oh there we are. 75 
M: Which was more- 76 
H: But you’ve haven’t been to /y/ [the]1 Ty Mawr Wybernant where 77 
William Morgan lived? 78 
M: No:, no. 79 
H: That’s very interesting.  It’s- 80 
W: Mm, it’s a lovely- it’s being... 81 
H: ’s museum there 82 
W: ...renovated. 83 
H: you know. Yes. 84 
                                                     
1  Both teachers occasionally used “y” [the] as a definite article in English-language streams of talk. 
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W: Yes. 85 
H: And there’s a museum there you know, showing uh, you know... 86 
M: Hm. 87 
H: ...what’s sorts of, uh, and it’s a wonderful place for the children to go and 88 
see... 89 
W: Mmm. 90 
H: ...as well what sorts of houses they lived you know... 91 
M: Uh huh. 92 
H: ....because there’s no glass on the windows you know, shutters and, very, 93 
very old-fashioned. 94 
M: Mm. 95 
H: So that’s just you know what we do this term that is, you know.  We also 96 
look at, um, [school bell/alarm sounds] in history, I mean in the Year 4, 97 
we look at the Cel-, you know, at the Celtic Time... 98 
M: Mmhm: 99 
H: ...where we learn really from where we’ve come from as a nation you 100 
know or as a people. 101 
M: How far back do you start?  Is it Iron A- Age or...? 102 
H: No, we d-, um, when the Celts really came to places in Wales, you know.  103 
Um, we don’t really give a date. 104 
M: Uh huh. 105 
H: And also there, we talk about Dewi Sant, you know... 106 
M: Uh huh. 107 
R2 ...the patron saint of Wales... 108 
M: Yeah. 109 
H: ...Saints come into that category as well and that time you know. 110 
M: Uh huh. 111 
H: So you’re able to talk about Dewi S:ant David, but also about Deiniol. 112 
M: Uh huh. 113 
W: Uh. 114 
H: ...who in:cidentally, who um- 115 
W: Founded. 116 
H: Established, yes, 117 
W: Founded? Mm. 118 
H: Established the Church [redacted] in you know in Bangor, you know 119 
we... 120 
M: Uh huh. 121 
H: ...try to do it as a local thing, more or less.  And of course in Anglesey, as 122 
well, we’ve got, eh, Celtic places where we can go to, which are very, 123 
very… 124 
W: Yes, the… 125 
H: …interesting. 126 
W: …burial grounds. 127 
H: Yes, burial… 128 
W: In Pen Celli Du 129 
H: …grounds.  Pen Celli Du… 130 
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M: Oh right. 131 
W: .. and um Pen LLywydd(?), which is a very interesting place.  It’s over, 132 
see, you know that, on top of the hill. 133 
M: Huh. 134 
W: Em. Pen LLywydd(?) that’s great if you’ll get the chance to go there you 135 
know… 136 
M: Okay. 137 
H: …because you can see where the- the houses- the round houses were, 138 
you know… 139 
M: Uh huh. 140 
H: …you can still see the, eh, bases at Solfach- Solfach(?).  Um, what else.. 141 
W: And- you- you also… 142 
H: We do… 143 
W: …take them down to Celtica… 144 
H: Yes. 145 
W: In- 146 
H: When we… 147 
W: …in… 148 
H: Yes. 149 
W: …Machynlleth, don’t you? 150 
H: Yes, when we do- eh, when we do study the Celtic times, that’s in the 151 
Spring term, we take the children to Glanllyn.  I don’t know if you’ve 152 
heard about Glanllyn.  It’s a Welsh, em, it’s a camp 153 
W: League of… 154 
H: Welsh… 155 
W: …Youth 156 
H: League of Youth. 157 
W: On LLyn Tegid… 158 
M: Uh okay. 159 
W: …in Bala.  It’s between Bala and LLanuwchllyn. 160 
H: Yeah.  So that gives us a chance to go to Celtica in Machnylleth and, eh, 161 
we looked at Celtic places around Bala as well, em. What else do we do?  162 
We do Victoria Time, but, em, what we do is we, you know, movement, 163 
people moving from Wales to Patagonia… 164 
W: Oh yeah. 165 
H: …and places… 166 
W: Uhh. 167 
H: …like that, you know. 168 
M: Uh huh. 169 
H: So it’s a chance for me to talk to them about Michael D. Jones and other 170 
people who did leave country, you know. 171 
M: When do you- How do you split up the- the year?  There’s a Summer, a 172 
Spring, and a Fall term? 173 
H: Yeah.  We have six themes. 174 
W: Six themes. 175 
H: Yes. 176 
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W: Over two years.  Three a year. 177 
H: And then, what we do really is Victorian Times, th- we take two terms to 178 
do that, you know, two terms to do the Celtic thing… 179 
M: Okay. 180 
H: …and two terms-  Yes.  That’s more or less how we do it.  So we split it 181 
over two- two terms, you know… 182 
M: Mm hmm. 183 
H: …and look at different things like maybe one term we look at the fashion 184 
of Victorian Age, you know, and, em, you’ll look at the houses maybe or 185 
how people lived. 186 
M: Hm. 187 
H: So, that’s more or less, you know. 188 
M: You get a feel of how the people 189 
H: Yeah. 190 
M: …lived. 191 
W: We try to make it a local thing… 192 
M: Uh huh. 193 
W: You know, bringing history to their own experiences and life around 194 
here… more than you know learn the hist’ry’f England, sort of thing, you 195 
know. 196 
M: Mm hmm. 197 
W: Yes, and dates and things… 198 
H: Yeah. 199 
W: …really, you know.  Children aren’t really interested- children of this age 200 
aren’t interested in remembering a list of dates…. 201 
M: Uh huh. 202 
W: …because, we in Year Five and Six this term, we’ve been working about 203 
the- talking about- learning about the World War Two, period… 204 
M: Mm hmm. 205 
W: …but what’it is, it’s all how that affected… 206 
H: Yeah. 207 
W: …[area of north-west Wales] itself. 208 
M: Mm. 209 
W: And… 210 
H: And- 211 
W: …what life was like here, you know rather than what life was like 212 
throughout Britain, and the battles... 213 
M: Mm hmm. 214 
W: em, and we had someone from the Red Cross coming in to speak to me 215 
the other day and so we’ve learned about the history of the Red Cross 216 
and when it was founded, and things like that, em, but mainly ,again, as 217 
you say, local… 218 
H: Yeah. 219 
M: Hm. 220 
W: …and get the children to find out… 221 
H: -I think the main- 222 
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W: …who’re related to them… 223 
H: Yeah. 224 
W: …who were in the war, what they were doing and they come up some- 225 
with some, you know, really interesting facts. 226 
H: Yes. 227 
W: …You know, one grandmother has written out three A4 sides about her 228 
memories of being evacuated to Wales… 229 
M: Wow- 230 
W: …and she’s moved back, of course, to live in- i- to- to London, eh, to, 231 
em, England, but what she didn’t realize at the time, after, she’d have a 232 
granddaughter living permanently in Wales… 233 
M: Hm. 234 
W: …and learning and- and being a bilingual child. 235 
M: [Laughing] Huh huh. 236 
W: Like [Name]… 237 
H: Yes. 238 
W: …you know because her mother has learned Welsh after moving here… 239 
H: Yes. 240 
M: Uh huh. 241 
W: …and she (Clapping) she’s really to… be admired, 242 
H: Very, very c- 243 
W: …isn’t she?  You 244 
H: Yes… 245 
W: …know? 246 
M: Hm. 247 
H: … but… 248 
W: Sorry- 249 
H: …history, I think the word is empathy, you know that the children… 250 
M: Uh huh 251 
H: …you know, can feel… 252 
W: Yes 253 
H: …what sort of times it was… 254 
M: Uh huh- 255 
H: …um, you know ‘s just trying to give them the exper-… 256 
M: Mm hmm- 257 
H: …ience of being there, which is very, very 258 
W: It’tis difficult- 259 
H: …difficult, really, you.. 260 
M: (Laughs) 261 
H: …know, you try- we try to do it by videos, we’ve got good videos… 262 
W: Yes- 263 
H: …em. 264 
W: Oh! S’ Years One and Two take the children dow’ to, er, places… 265 
H: Lloyt- lik- Lloyd- 266 
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W: …to the Lloyd… 267 
H: George- 268 
W: …George Centre… 269 
H: Centre.  Yes- 270 
W: …Yes… 271 
H: -they took them down- 272 
W: …where they ‘re able to dress up in the period... 273 
M: Hm- 274 
W: …Em, they have an experience last week- I was talking to one of the 275 
tutors an’ he said that, em, they have to preten- they had to- pretend were 276 
going into a school- an-n’ he told them before-hand: “I’m going to be 277 
acting now.  And I’m going to be like an old teacher was” and slapping 278 
the cane and he… 279 
M: (Laughs) 280 
W: …said, even though he told them, he was acting… 281 
H: They were all afraid, you know- 282 
W: …One child was crying. 283 
M: Wow. (Laughs) 284 
H: Yeah… 285 
W: You know? 286 
H: We -aw- We’ve taken children there… 287 
M: Mm 288 
H: before when the other gentleman… 289 
M: Mm 290 
H: …was down. 291 
M: -Mm- 292 
H: …I think he was worse than the one that is . . . 293 
M: (Laughs) 294 
W: (Laughs) 295 
H: …They were like this!… 296 
W: -Yeas- 297 
H: …Even I was like this… 298 
W: Right 299 
H: …you know… 300 
W: Yeah 301 
H: …You were really a… 302 
W: Yeah 303 
H: …part of that school… 304 
W: Yeah 305 
H: …at that time.  We’ve also- when we were doing Victorian Times, we- 306 
we’ve been taking them to Castell Penrhyn… 307 
W: Mm 308 
M: Uh huh. 309 
H: …you… 310 
M: Uh huh 311 
H: …know, Penrhyn Castle… 312 
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M: Uh huh 313 
H: …They- they have the same sort of thing there, like looking in the… 314 
kitchen… 315 
W: Kitchen- 316 
H: …is made, you know?… 317 
M: Uohhh 318 
H: or being at school and… 319 
M: Mm 320 
H: …using the slates… 321 
I Mm 322 
H: …you know and the-… so it’s a matter of giving them experience… 323 
W: -Yes- 324 
H: …trying to take them to places where- 325 
W: We- when we ‘re talking about the quarries… 326 
M: Mmhm 327 
W: …Right?  We have, em, a- a- a- a project on homes, so we take them to 328 
LLanberis Slate Museum… 329 
M: Uh 330 
W: …because they’ve renovated a row of houses.  They’ve brought the 331 
houses down- the old mine-, em, slater’s houses… 332 
M: -Mm hmm- 333 
W: …and renovated and th- you know, and one is in, say, Nineteen-Twenty 334 
another ‘s Nineteen-… 335 
H: Forty- 336 
W: …Forty… 337 
H: Yeah 338 
W: …et cetera, et cetera… 339 
M: Wow. 340 
W: …and em- 341 
H: You’ve been to Saint Fagan in eh…?  You haven’t been to St. Fagan? 342 
M: No. 343 
W: Oh… 344 
H: Oh that’s- 345 
W: …Folk-… 346 
H: …really- 347 
H: Welsh Folk Museum… 348 
W: Welsh Folk Museum- 349 
H: They’ve got that sort of thing there… 350 
W: They’ve 351 
H: …you know. 352 
W: taken buildings… 353 
H: Yes. 354 
W: …from different parts of Wales- 355 
M: -In LLanberis? 356 
H: Yes. 357 
W: No! No.  Down in Cardiff, eh- 358 
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H: Plas- 359 
M: Ahh. 360 
W: …This one i’Slate Museum- they have a row of houses… 361 
H: In LLanberis. 362 
W: …but down in the- in the-, em, in the-  363 
H: -eh, Saint Fagan, the one- 364 
W: …Saint Fagan… 365 
H: F- 366 
W: …down… 367 
H: Yeah. 368 
W: …in- in Car-… 369 
H: -Car- 370 
W: …-diff- 371 
M: Ao:: 372 
H: They’ve built that same sort of thing, but it’s… 373 
W: But it’s on a very large… 374 
H: …large 375 
W: …scale… 376 
H: -scale- 377 
W: …you know… 378 
H: -Yes- 379 
W: …a house here and then you walk and you come to a different house or a 380 
building- 381 
H: Yeah. 382 
W: …you get- 383 
H: -But they’ve got their own houses as well… 384 
W: -Yes!- 385 
H: -which is very interest… 386 
W: -Yes- 387 
H: …ing, but... 388 
W: -That i- yes- 389 
H: ..you know. 390 
W: -But there- there’s quite a strong feeling here, em… 391 
H: -Mm- 392 
W: …about learning about Kenni-… 393 
H: -Mm- 394 
W: …eh, Penrhyn Castle… 395 
H: -Yeah- 396 
W: …There’s a s- still a bitterness… 397 
H: -Mm- 398 
W: …between the landlord and the people… 399 
H: -Mm- 400 
W: …of Bethesda. 401 
H: -Yeah- 402 
M: -Hm- 403 
R1…because they… 404 
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H: -Still- 405 
W: …were locked out… 406 
M: -Uwow- 407 
W: …Was it?… 408 
H: -Yes, uh huh- 409 
W: …How long, eh?  Nineteen-Ten- Nineteen Oh One. 410 
H: Yes.  I- I’m not sure-re how long it was… 411 
W: -No- 412 
H: …but they were on strike, you know, for quite a long… 413 
W: -Mm- 414 
H: …time 415 
W: -and they suffered great hard… 416 
H: -Yes- 417 
W: …ship- so the lord… 418 
H: -and they still- 419 
W: …was in his… 420 
H: -feel, you know- 421 
W: …castle and, you know ‘cause-  I remember one parent [Name]… 422 
H: -(Repeats) [Name]- 423 
W: …the Welsh actor.  He came in to speak to- to the children about, em, 424 
life in the times, you know, as told by his grandfather and he has never 425 
set foot within the grounds of Penrhyn Castle… 426 
M: -Hm- 427 
W: …and he will never set foot… 428 
H: No, and he wo’ let… 429 
M: -Hm- 430 
H: …his children even though- 431 
W: -No- 432 
H: you- you know, his- that feeling… 433 
M: -Hm- 434 
H: …to them… 435 
W: -Mm- 436 
H: …as well… 437 
W: -Yes- 438 
H: And… 439 
W: -So, you know- 440 
H: …it’s still true where I live in [village name], which is, you know… 441 
M: -Mm hmm- 442 
H: …a quarry village.  It’s… 443 
M: -Righ’- 444 
W: Ah. 445 
H: …the same there… 446 
W: -Yes- 447 
H: …with the older people, you know… 448 
M: -Hm.  So there’s- 449 
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H: …They don’t talk about Castell Penrhyn, you know.  They don’t talk 450 
about it. 451 
M: Are there any, uh, descendants of the, uh, of… 452 
H: -Of the- of the family? 453 
M: …Of the landlords, yeah? 454 
H: -Well, yes, there are… 455 
W: -Yes, but they don’t live in- the National Trust… 456 
H: -Has taken the place- 457 
W: …has taken… 458 
H: -over now, you know. 459 
W: …over the Castle now. 460 
M: Uh huh. 461 
W: But the Queen had, eh, eh, em, supper there recently… 462 
H: -Yes- 463 
W: …didn’t she?… 464 
H: -Two weeks ago- 465 
W: …on her travels… 466 
H: -she was here, you know… 467 
M: -Hm- 468 
W: …The Jubilee… 469 
H: -That’s where she dined- 470 
W: …Yes. 471 
H: -Dinner time- 472 
W: But they had the Welsh flag, eh… 473 
H: -(Laughs) Yes.  It’s a- 474 
W: They didn’t have the E-… 475 
H: -The English 476 
W: …Th- No, they didn’t- 477 
H: -Didn’t they?- 478 
W: …have- ‘cause I was going to LLandudno after school… 479 
H: -(Laughs) And y- 480 
W: And I noticed on the way home, they only had the Welsh… 481 
H: -The Red- 482 
W: …flag… 483 
H: -Dragon- 484 
W: …up on the tower while she was there and I thought, “Well that’s 485 
something”… 486 
M: (Laughs) 487 
H: -Yes, yes.- 488 
W: …You know. 489 
M: -They took- 490 
W: …A good thing- 491 
M: …it down after she left?  492 
W: Oh yes.  Well, yes.  I think so. 493 
M: The Welsh flag? 494 
W: …Em… 495 
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M: -Not the, eh - 496 
W: …The Welsh flag.  No, there’s nothing now, ‘cause I was passing today.  497 
There wasn’t a flag… 498 
M: -Huh- 499 
W: …there, em- 500 
H: But things have changed a lot, you know… 501 
M: -Mm- 502 
H: …that Lady Douglas Pennant, who was last Lady.  She died about three 503 
years ago and she had a very, very sad death ‘cause she was in the same 504 
home as my mother-in-law, you know… 505 
M: -Mm- 506 
H: …a’ it was… 507 
M: -Mm hmm- 508 
H: …so sad, you know.  She had all this money and yet… 509 
W: -And there was no- 510 
H: …Oh… 511 
W: -difference between her and the poor peo- 512 
H: ..Yes… 513 
W: -you know- 514 
H: …and- Oh yes, s’was- it was very… 515 
W: -Mm- 516 
H: …very sad… 517 
M: -Mm- 518 
W: -Hm- 519 
H: …You know… 520 
W: Lot’s… 521 
H: -Yes- 522 
W: …a- g- is- is done, em, by Le-, eh, education authorities, I think, in 523 
Wales by now… to make sure that history is brought to life… 524 
H: -Yeah- 525 
W: …and the children, you know we’re talking about LLanstumdwy, em… 526 
H: -Yeah- 527 
W: …Castell Penrhyn and, eh… 528 
H: There are places to take them here- 529 
W: …Yes… 530 
H: aren’t they?- 531 
W: …lots… 532 
H: We’re lucky- 533 
W: lots…And the- e- even Caer-, em, Caernarfon Castle.  They will have, 534 
em, role-playing going on there… 535 
M: Uh huh. 536 
H: Yeah. 537 
W: …And children are invited… 538 
H: Yeah. 539 
W: …to go along, you know, for different occasions.. 540 
H: Yeah. 541 
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W: …em… 542 
H: And 543 
W: …So they ca~ do~ 544 
H: They’ve given the Welsh aspect, as well- 545 
W: ...That’s it… 546 
H: You know – 547 
W: …Yes. 548 
H: Even though it’s… 549 
M: Mm. 550 
H: …you know, Caernarfon is an English castle… 551 
W: Mm. 552 
H: …D’y’know’t I mean?  They’ve changed, you know, and they’re ready 553 
to say, “Well, what- what were the people who lived outside castle”? 554 
W: Yeah. 555 
H: …What sort of life they had?… 556 
M: Hm. 557 
H: …You know. They’re ready to- They’ve changed th’r’attitude really. 558 
M: -Hm- 559 
W: And… 560 
H: So it’s- 561 
W: …then we study the history of Bangor itself, eh, with the ten year old, 562 
em, next term now we’ll be going revisiting, you know, going back 563 
(th)ith /y/ [the] theme of Bangor and again developing on what you’ve 564 
done about Deiniol, em, the settlement, em, that he founded and the 565 
growth of Bangor… 566 
H: Mm. 567 
W: …from that little… 568 
H: from the cathedral- 569 
W: …em, from the cathedral… 570 
H: -to the church, really, yes- 571 
W: …because, em, I don’t know.  Do you know the- what the meaning of 572 
“Bangor” is? 573 
H: No, actually. 574 
W: …Right.  Well, it’s- it’s /y/ [the] Welsh word for a- for a wattle-and-daub 575 
fence. 576 
H: -Mm- 577 
M: -Hm- 578 
H: -Yeah- 579 
W: …And that was what’e… 580 
H: -Sacramented(?) 581 
M: -Ahh- 582 
W: …you know, built around… 583 
H: -Around his little church- 584 
W: …his little wooden church… 585 
H: -there, yeah- 586 
M: -Huh- 587 
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W: …the wattle-and-daub and the Welsh word for that is “Bangor” and 588 
that’s why it’s called… 589 
M: (Laughs) 590 
W: …Bangor. 591 
H: Yeah.  You’ve got a Bangor as well in, eh, America, haven’t you? 592 
W: Bangor, Maine. 593 
M: Yeah, yeah. 594 
H: Bangor, Maine. 595 
M: Right. 596 
H: Yes, I think there are two Bangors- 597 
M: I think they call it “Bayng-er”.  I think they call it “Bayng-er” out there. 598 
H: Yeah. 599 
W: Bayng-er. 600 
H: Bangor. 601 
M: Bayng-er. 602 
W: (Laughs) 603 
H: That’s the- 604 
W: Bayng-er.  Bayng-er. 605 
H: That’s the… 606 
M: (Laughs) 607 
H: …eh, reason for the name, isn’t it? 608 
W: Yes… 609 
H: It’s- 610 
W: …Yes… 611 
H: Welsh people in ~ 612 
W: …Emm… 613 
M: ‘S very interesting- 614 
W: Wasn’t that interesting 615 
H: …Yes and… 616 
W: Yeah- 617 
H: Yeah- 618 
W: …you know, we talk a lot about, em, important personalities over Welsh 619 
history.  We’re talking about Dewi Sant she was saying… 620 
H: Yeah- 621 
W: …William Morgan you was saying, Gruffydd Jones, who in fact… 622 
H: LLanddowror, eh, Welsh schools- 623 
W: …one of the, er, one of the founders in Welsh schools and then you have 624 
stories, interesting little stories of- em, connected with the Bible, em.  625 
And you’ll notice it if you’re in Bala.  Walk along the street and they’ll 626 
say: “Thomas Charles… 627 
H: Mm- 628 
W: …”lived here”... 629 
H: -Mm- 630 
W: …Now Thomas Charles, em… 631 
H: Mm- 632 
W: …was involved… 633 
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H: Bible- 634 
W: …with… 635 
H: -Society- 636 
W: …he- he-… 637 
H: Yes- 638 
W: …Yes, the Bible Society… 639 
H: He started the Bible- 640 
W: …Yes… 641 
H: Society, didn’t he? 642 
W: And, em, little girl, there’s a story about a little girl… 643 
M: Mari Jones. 644 
W: …who collected… 645 
H: Mari Jones!- 646 
W: …Mari Jones.  Yes… 647 
H: We’re doing that now- 648 
W: …An’ they lo::ve that story… 649 
H: you know- 650 
W: …you know… 651 
H: Coming from- after we’ve done William Morgan and the Bible… 652 
W: Mm- 653 
H: …We go, then, to Mari Jones, you know, and they… 654 
M: Hm- 655 
W: Mm- 656 
H: …they- the children they experience that themselves, y’know’t’ I mean? 657 
they… 658 
M: Uh huh. 659 
H: …So that’s quite interesting as well… 660 
M: -They don’t- 661 
H: …She went to Thomas Charles in Bala for a Bible… 662 
M: Ahh. 663 
W: Mm. 664 
H: Yes. 665 
M: And d- 666 
W: So there’s lots, you know, the Urdd movement itself, an- f- the Child- (y) 667 
Children of the- Youth of Wales, we talk about O. M. Edwards- We 668 
teach th’m’bout- about O. M. Edwards, the founder, who again ‘s a 669 
statue… 670 
M: Uh huh. 671 
W: …in LL-LLan:… 672 
H: LLanuwchllyn- 673 
W: …LLanuwchlyn… 674 
H: Mm. 675 
W: …em, cemetery and, em, we also teach th’m’bout, eh, modern day, eh, 676 
heroes, if you like… 677 
M: Uh huh. 678 
W: …Like Bryn Terfel, you know and… 679 
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M: Uh huh- 680 
W: …Ryan Giggs and these that they-  We- we make sure they know that 681 
they are Welsh, even if some of them can’t speak the language… 682 
H: Yeah- 683 
W: Right- 684 
H: Tom Jones… 685 
M:  (Laughs) 686 
H: …and Sion Dafydd and Olwen ‘n’t they?  I think it’s… 687 
W: Yes, they- 688 
H: …important, yes. 689 
W: ‘re ours… 690 
H: Yes- 691 
W: …They are ours… 692 
H: Yes. 693 
M: (Laughs) 694 
W: …I told him I’d go on my soapbox.  I was telling him… 695 
H: (Laughs loudly) 696 
W: you know, how- how my children- how we s- older teachers, I was 697 
saying, or more mature teachers, feel strongly about… 698 
H: Mm. 699 
W: …our country… 700 
H: Yes, of course- 701 
W: …because we had to fight, because we didn’t have anything in-, you 702 
know… 703 
H: Yes. 704 
W: …and we had our- our education through the medium of English… 705 
H: Yes. 706 
W: …as children… 707 
H: Mm. 708 
M: Secondary… 709 
H: Yes!- 710 
M: …and primary or…? 711 
W: Ehh… 712 
H: Yes!  More or less- 713 
M: …just secondary? 714 
H: secondary as well.  I might be ~ - 715 
W: …Secondary more than the junior, I would say… 716 
H: Yeah.  Yeah- 717 
M: Uh huh- 718 
W: …Em, I think a few… 719 
H: I think I did the- I’s did scripture through the medium of- 720 
W: …That’s it… 721 
H: Welsh- 722 
W: …I did scripture in Welsh… 723 
H: and it’s part of my history- 724 
W: …Mm… 725 
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H: …do you see? 726 
W: ..Th- that’s… 727 
H: Yeah- 728 
W: …what I did… 729 
H: Anything else- 730 
W: …All the others and I remember my mother saying, when she was at 731 
school, she didn’t realize until years afterwards, em… 732 
H: Some of the teachers- 733 
W: …Meeting people… 734 
H: Yea- 735 
W: …out on the streets-  Yeah: “That person speaks Welsh!”… 736 
H: ‘Cause she- 737 
M: Huh- 738 
H: you know- 739 
W: …because they’ve never spoken a word of Welsh… 740 
H: A school in Bala, [name of school] 741 
W: …in the school… 742 
H: Yeah- 743 
W: …It’s- this is in Bala, where… 744 
H: Mm- 745 
W: …I was brought up… 746 
M: Huh- 747 
W: …and my mother went to school, you know. 748 
M: Ohh- 749 
H: Well, my grandfather taught in Bala in… 750 
W: Yes- 751 
H: …a boy school there and- some people there, you know, they didn’t want 752 
to say that they were Welshmen, really, you know… 753 
M: Uh huh. 754 
H: …It was awful… 755 
W: Mmm- 756 
H: …And he was a member of Plaid Cymru, one of the earliest ones… 757 
W: Yeah. 758 
H: …you know… 759 
W: one of the earliest members, yeah- 760 
H: …But yet he talked a mete(?) of English… 761 
W: Mm- 762 
H: …you know in Bala… 763 
W: Huh- 764 
H: ...’s very funny… 765 
W: Well, that’s- 766 
H: Yeah- 767 
W: …that’s how it was, isn’t it?  I’m sure… 768 
H: Yes, in the Thirties, yeah- 769 
W: …Mister- Mister [Name], eh, [Full name]… 770 
H: Yeah, [Full name]- 771 
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W: …Eh… 772 
H: would be the same, yes- 773 
W: …One of our old, eh… 774 
H: Ba- 775 
W: … Be’dy “Archbeirwydd”? [What is “Archbeirwydd”?] They’re the 776 
Eistedd- 777 
H: Archdruid.- 778 
W: …-fod- The Archdruids in the Eisteddfod…. 779 
M: Uh huh- 780 
W: …Have you heard… 781 
M: Yes- 782 
W: …of our Eisteddfod…? 783 
M: Yes, I went- 784 
W: …He’s a… 785 
M: in 1995- 786 
W: …grandfather… 787 
H: Here- 788 
W: …He’s a grandfather here and- that’s why I was hoping that the ce- the 789 
chairing ceremony would be on… 790 
H: It would’ve been- 791 
M: Uh huh. 792 
W: …today… 793 
H: today, so you- 794 
W: …because we, you know because he- because being, em, a grandfather, 795 
he’s agreed to be… 796 
H: to be Archdruid- 797 
W: …you know, Archdruid for our ceremony, but it’ll be next Friday now.  798 
Emm, and that’s something else we do a lot of in the school is to make 799 
sure tha’ they know… 800 
H: Mm- 801 
W: …of our culture… 802 
M: Mmhm: 803 
W: …you know, the Eisteddfodau, the, eh, noson lawen, which are, em… 804 
H: Yes. 805 
W: …like evening concerts… 806 
M: -Uh huh- 807 
W: …only formal, where they… 808 
H: Mm. 809 
W: …They started when they were held at- in farmhouses, around the fire, 810 
when people… 811 
M: Mmhm: 812 
W: …from neighboring farms came together in the winter to entertain… 813 
H: Mm. 814 
W: …you know, to pass /y/ [the] long hours 815 
H: That they know about the- 816 
W: …of ~ 817 
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H: tradition, really- 818 
W: …Mm. 819 
H: you know- 820 
M: Uh huh. 821 
H: What has happened and th- that things change, you know as- 822 
W: …Yes… 823 
H: history has changed- 824 
W: …And that they’ve got to carry on. 825 
H: Yes 826 
M: Do they experience these things happening in the present, um? 827 
H: Oh yes. 828 
W: Cer- You know the- the- what we have to do, we- we have children here- 829 
To be honest, we have abou- ha- over half of them who are from non-830 
Welsh speaking backgrounds.  We are not supposed to brainwash 831 
children politically… 832 
H: (Laughs) 833 
W: …but we can brainwash them culturally… 834 
M: Uh huh- 835 
W: Hoping that- 836 
M: What would be difference between those two? 837 
H: (Laughs) 838 
W: …Well, that they will realize that there is a place for them and, eh- onus 839 
on them to carry on… 840 
H: Mm- 841 
W: …Em… 842 
H: tradition- 843 
W: …to- to carry on traditions and hopefully, em,… 844 
H: Hmm, love of country, you know- 845 
W: …Yes… 846 
M: Mm hmm 847 
H: Every- 848 
W: …’T is… 849 
H: Everybody has- 850 
W: …Love of… 851 
H: it, I suppose- 852 
W: …country, love of /y/ [the] language… 853 
H: Yes, and how important it is- 854 
W: …Yeah… 855 
H: You know- 856 
M: So… 857 
H: If no one- 858 
M: …if it were politically, would- that’d be political parties… 859 
H: Well- 860 
M: …or-r would it be…? 861 
W: Oh yes… 862 
H: Well- 863 
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W: …we have the Welsh Nationalist Party… 864 
M: Right- 865 
W: …yes, so we bo-, yes, we both vote for the Welsh… 866 
H: Yes- 867 
W: …~ of the, you know 868 
H: yeah- 869 
W: …but you… 870 
H: I don’t- 871 
W: …don’t talk about things… 872 
H: We don’t- 873 
W: …like that, for ~~… 874 
H: bring that into school- 875 
W: …Oh no… 876 
H: No, no- 877 
W: …We don’t… 878 
H: No- 879 
W: …No… 880 
H: No- 881 
W: …But you have children like the- the- the World Cup last-… 882 
M: Uh huh. 883 
W: …last week.  The children were allowed to watch the games, you 884 
know… 885 
H: Yeah. 886 
W: …Up to a point, until the bell rang or lunch-time and, eh, the day bef- 887 
well, when- when England went out… 888 
M: Uh huh. 889 
W: …em, who- who beat them, ehh?… 890 
M: Brazil- 891 
H: Brazil!- 892 
W: …Brazil… 893 
H: -Yes- 894 
W: …And we had the children in- in the theatre.  One or two children had 895 
asked to stay at home to watch because if/that they won… 896 
H: -Yeah- 897 
W: …his mother was English… 898 
H: Yeah. 899 
W: …and, you know, and he was very, very upset when he got in… 900 
M: (Laughs) 901 
H: Tsk. 902 
W: …but I- I went from the theatre to my car- ‘ll I thought I might as well 903 
make use of the time, eh, at the- I heard a great roar: “Yeahhh”, you 904 
know… 905 
H: [Williams] will just will act it out (Laughs) 906 
M: (Laughing) 907 
W: …and… 908 
H: -Really funny- 909 
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M: (Still laughing) 910 
W: …Yes, I thought: “Oh, England has scored” and the children came 911 
running, he did: “Brazil beat them, Miss!”… 912 
M: (Laughs) 913 
H: -Yes, they wanted to- you know- 914 
W: …You know, and- and it’s- noth- it was nothing, we didn’t… 915 
H: -No- 916 
W: …I mean, we daren’t, you know… 917 
H: -Mrs. ~, you wouldn’t- 918 
W: …you can’t… 919 
H: -would you?- 920 
W: …You’re not… 921 
H: -You know- 922 
W: …You can say something, Oh [Headteacher] used to say, (In a deep 923 
voice) “Oh, I hope th- I hope- I hope the Brazilians beat them”, like that, 924 
but you know, em, no, we’re not allowed to really, but I- I think, lots of 925 
the children… 926 
H: (Laughing, presumably about the other’s performance) 927 
W: (Almost laughing too) They- they have got a strong W-… 928 
H: -Yes- 929 
W: …feeling of Welshness… 930 
H: -Yeah- 931 
W: …haven’t they? 932 
H: Well, it’s a matter of, you know, loving an old, old language, isn’t it… 933 
W: -Mm- 934 
H: …and you want that to carry on, you know.  This is it, isn’t it?… 935 
W: -Right- 936 
H: …And it’s all part of ~~~ well… 937 
W: (Laughs self-consciously, presumably realizing the hilarity of her 938 
performance) 939 
H: …(Laughing a little) Eh doesn’t it. Y’know’t’ I mean?  It’s all… 940 
M: (Laughs) 941 
W: Yes, but we have… 942 
H: -If we don’t do it… 943 
W: -No, who will? 944 
H: Em, there’s not another school in Bangor will do it… 945 
W: -No, ~- 946 
H: …feel like us ~… 947 
W: -’cause this is the Welsh school of Bangor, you see. 948 
M: -Uh huh- 949 
H: …You know, you want it to… 950 
M: -What d- Does that mean that… Welsh is a core… subject as- as opposed 951 
to a found-… 952 
W: -Well, in Eng- 953 
M: …ational subject or…? 954 
H: -Hm- 955 
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W: …in Wales, there are four core subjects: English, Welsh, En- 956 
H: -Maths- 957 
W: …eh, Maths, and Science.  Em, but lots of schools- Gwynedd, eh, 958 
County policy is that Wales- Welsh is the first language… 959 
H: -Mm hmm- 960 
W: …You know, they do the test of the Welsh first language, em, but you’ve 961 
got Anglicized areas in Gwynedd where I live and where Mrs. Hughes- 962 
where you live, very… 963 
H: -Yes- 964 
W: …near to Bangor, but it’s… 965 
H: -Yes- 966 
W: …it’s… 967 
H: -Very- 968 
W: …very Welsh… 969 
H: -Yes- 970 
W: …It’s-… 971 
H: -Oh yes- 972 
W: …it’s very Welsh and I live the other side of Caernarfon, which is very 973 
Welsh, em, but here, and the schools where we are they are Welsh… 974 
H: -Yes, yes 975 
W: …schools, you know… 976 
H: -Mmm- 977 
W: …You- you rarely have children who don’t speak Welsh… 978 
M: -Hm- 979 
W: ..coming to the school- er you have the maybe two or three and they, you 980 
know, they learn very quickly, because they’re drowned… 981 
H: -Yeah- 982 
W: …in Welshness. 983 
M: -Right, right- 984 
W: ..Whereas here, the parents-  This is a W- a specifically Welsh school, 985 
where you have another four or five junior schools in the city, em, where, 986 
okay, they do teach Welsh, but’s not’s- a- they- they don’t do the’s- the 987 
tests, do they? 988 
H: -No, so they don’t work- 989 
W: …Em, so really, they’re teaching more through the medium ~ of English, 990 
and learning the language, okay? 991 
H: -Mm- 992 
W: …Whereas we- we start here by learning through the medium of 993 
Welsh… 994 
M: -Ahh- 995 
H: -Em- 996 
W: …but as they go up to school, em, what we aim for is to get them 997 
bilingual… 998 
H: -Fifty percent- 999 
W: …by the time they’re eleven… 1000 
M: -Right- 1001 
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W: …and by the time they reach us, they do 50% of the work through 1002 
English and 50% through Welsh… 1003 
M: -Hm- 1004 
H: -Mm- 1005 
W: …and- but some people in th- in this city are under the misconception 1006 
that we only teach through the medium of Welsh… 1007 
H: -No, it’s not true really- 1008 
W: …You know… 1009 
H: Well, it- 1010 
W: …No… 1011 
H: - T’isn’t true. 1012 
W: No, it t’sn’t true. 1013 
H: No, but I think they dr- they’re really drowned in the Welshness at the 1014 
beginning… 1015 
W: -Mm- 1016 
H: …you know, so that’s- eh, eh, you know, their Welsh is good when they 1017 
reach Year Six… 1018 
W: -Mm- 1019 
H: …you know… 1020 
M: -Uh huh- 1021 
H: …because they’ve been… 1022 
W: -Mm- 1023 
M: They’ve been doing everything, or… 1024 
H: -Mm- 1025 
M: …well,… 1026 
W: -Yes- 1027 
H: -Yes- 1028 
M: …at least half… 1029 
W: -Yes- 1030 
M: …of… 1031 
H: -Yes- 1032 
M: …everything. 1033 
W: -Yes- 1034 
H: -Yes, we do science, maths, everything through the medium of Welsh, 1035 
but also, you know, we bring it- the English in… 1036 
W: -Yeah- 1037 
H: …as well by- 1038 
W: They do their, eh, you know their leaving, their- their SATs tests, when 1039 
they leave, they do them through the medium- they’re doing their science 1040 
and their maths… 1041 
H: -Through the medium of Welsh- 1042 
W: …through the medium of Welsh… 1043 
H: -Mm- 1044 
M: -Huh- 1045 
W: …They do their English paper… 1046 
H: -English, Welsh- 1047 
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W: …and they do the Welsh paper, but when we do history and geography… 1048 
H: -Mm- 1049 
W: …we may do this aspect… 1050 
H: -This aspect, yes- 1051 
W: …of history through the medium of English… 1052 
M: -Hm- 1053 
W: …we might do another bit through the medium of 1054 
H: -Yeah- 1055 
W: ..Welsh, because what we- the hope is that we bring our history and 1056 
geography into our- that… 1057 
H: -Into our language work- 1058 
W: …Into our language work or our language work into the other, em- 1059 
H: When we were doing the Tudor times, for instance, we’ve been looking 1060 
at pirates, as well, you know… 1061 
M: -Yeah huh- 1062 
H: …and doing some of ‘em through the medium of English, you know, like 1063 
some famous pirates, but they ‘re are very, very Welsh, very famous 1064 
Welsh pirates as well… 1065 
W: -Mm- 1066 
M: -Right- 1067 
H: …So we do that in Welsh… 1068 
W: -Mm- 1069 
H: …you know, so we’re combining both, really, so that they have the 1070 
skills… 1071 
W: -And you learn songs, eh, you know… 1072 
H: -Yeah- 1073 
W: …when you're doing the-… 1074 
H: -Yeah- 1075 
W: …eh, about the sailors, you learn lots… 1076 
H: -Wel- 1077 
W: …of… 1078 
H: -Welsh songs- 1079 
W: …Welsh, or Welsh sea shanties- 1080 
H: -Sea shanties, yes. 1081 
M: Huh. 1082 
H: …You know, and folk songs… 1083 
M: -Wow- 1084 
W:  you teach a lot… 1085 
H: -Yes- 1086 
W: …of in Years Three and Four don't you… 1087 
H: -Yeah- 1088 
W: …Mrs. [Name]? 1089 
H: Yes. 1090 
M: So you might even do som-me- some songs or, well, you probably 1091 
wouldn't be doing English sea shanties, would you? 1092 
R1 No, we- 1093 
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H: -We haven't 1094 
W: -We have our own. 1095 
M: Yeah. Right. 1096 
H: Yes. 1097 
M: So you might teach the- about the English pirate, say, Blackbeard. 1098 
H: Yeah. 1099 
M: I think he's- 1100 
W: -Mm- 1101 
H: Blackbeard, yeah. 1102 
M: …English and you might teach that in English, but then you would do 1103 
Captain Morgan… 1104 
H: -There we are- 1105 
M: …Say… 1106 
H: Harri Morgan. 1107 
M: …in Welsh? 1108 
W: Harri Morgan is- 1109 
M: -Ahh- 1110 
H: Yes, so it's, you know- 1111 
W: Y be'ty d' yr(?) 1112 
H: You bring the Welsh and the English language into it, you know… 1113 
M: -I see- 1114 
H: …so they get 1115 
W: And poetry, poets? 1116 
H: Yeah. 1117 
W: Eh, lots of famous… 1118 
M: -Mm hmm- 1119 
W: …Welsh poets and… 1120 
M: -Definitely- 1121 
H: Yes. 1122 
W: We have people coming in, we have authors and Welsh poets… 1123 
H: -Mm- 1124 
W: …coming in, you know and we have English authors as well… 1125 
H: -Yes- 1126 
W: …haven't we? 1127 
H: -Oh yes- 1128 
W: …Children's authors? We… 1129 
H: -Yes- 1130 
W: ...We do- we're not s- so narrow-minded as we appear. 1131 
H: -No- 1132 
M: (Laughs) 1133 
W: …or as we sound. 1134 
H: No, we have, eh, and who was here, Eric, em…? 1135 
W: Tony Brackman. 1136 
H: …Tony Brackman… 1137 
W: -Yes- 1138 
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H: …I'm trying to get a friend of mine now who is a famous English author, 1139 
Phillip Pullman… 1140 
W: -Pullman- 1141 
H: …who was, went to school with me… 1142 
M: -Hm- 1143 
H: …eh, to come.  He- he's the next one to visit us, I think… 1144 
W: -Yes- 1145 
H: …When he's in this area. 1146 
W: He writes through the medium of English. 1147 
H: Yes. 1148 
W: Books… 1149 
M: -Huh- 1150 
W: …for the children… 1151 
M: -Hm- 1152 
W: …and adults. 1153 
H: -He won the- 1154 
M: -And he's from Bala as well. 1155 
H: -No, he's- 1156 
W: -Harlech- 1157 
H: …from Harlech… 1158 
M: -Oh- 1159 
H: …My- my home was in Harlech… 1160 
M: -I see- 1161 
H: …em, he's- even though he's- he never taught Welsh, you know he never 1162 
spoke Welsh… 1163 
W: -Mm- 1164 
H: …but he's just won the Whitsbrid Book Prize… 1165 
M: -Hm- 1166 
H: …now, for… 1167 
W: -Mm- 1168 
H: …a children's book, first one to w-win a prize for the… 1169 
W: -Mm hm- 1170 
H: …for a children's book… 1171 
M: -children's book- 1172 
H: …you know? 1173 
W: -Yeah- 1174 
H: It's quite interesting. . . I'm supposed to be on the yard, Mrs. [Name], but 1175 
em.. 1176 
W: Yes, and I'm- the lollipop isn't here today and he's not coming up.  So 1177 
I've got to go to the- 1178 
H: …to the… 1179 
W: …to the 1180 
H: I hope you've had some information out of us. 1181 
W: lollipop QT. 1182 
M: Yes, it's been wonderful. 1183 
H: [Laughing, as she watches me pick up my recorder] 1184 
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Is that thing still on, is it? 1185 
W: I don't know if that's what you wanted to know? 1186 
M: Yeah, uh- 1187 
W: You'll be laughing when you go home… 1188 
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APPENDIX C 
◄ PLAID CYMRU’S FIGHT AGAINST INDEPENDENCE ► 
 
“Political Nationalism” 
 A self-conscious Welsh nationalism emerged in the nineteenth century, consisting 
primarily of locally-based ministers and deacons of Non-conformist (in reaction to the 
Anglican Church) congregations and London-based prominent Welshmen (Davies 1989).  
The central issue of Welsh nationalism in this historical period was that of the 
encroachment of the state into the everyday individual concerns of the Welsh.  For most 
Welsh elites, the agent of encroachment was the Church of England.  Although Welsh 
Non-conformism was well developed throughout Wales and symbolized interests that 
were antithetical to English interests, its localism prevented a national Welsh identity 
from forming (Davies 1989).  This was a significant point of contrast to the other sort of 
elite that constituted Victorian-Era Welsh nationalism. 
 The Welsh identity of the relevant London-based Welsh gentry was highly salient 
while that gentry lived in English society.  In connection with the opportunities they took 
to travel around Wales, that locally salient ethnic identity caused a national Welsh 
identity to congeal among them (Davies 1989).  This brings to mind and confirms 
Anderson's creole-journey model of national identity-formation, in which creole 
functionaries travel between administrative units maintaining patronage and acquiring a 
consciousness of connectedness with travelling-companions and colleagues (Anderson 
1991: 54-56). 
 The emergence of Welsh nationalist organizations began when Cymru Fydd 
[Wales To Be], which formed in London and Liverpool in the mid-1880s as a cultural 
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and literary organization, came to act as an umbrella organization for groups of Welsh 
socioeconomic and cultural elites who had developed a national Welsh identity.  
Although a segment of Cymru Fydd was working for change from within the British 
Liberal Party, the umbrella organization was not well-organized for integration with the 
greater Welsh society (Davies 1989).  Rather than having a Welsh constituency, the 
primary audience of this movement was English society, which they attempted to 
convince that the Wales of Celtic romance and magic “had contributed to England's 
cultural eminence and imperial greatness” and that Welsh persons were overcoming the 
“handicap” of their native language (Davies 1989: 15).  Its work mostly focused on 
legislative initiatives with cultural and religious aims.  Those initiatives established a 
Welsh university, a national library, a national museum, and closed pubs in Wales on 
Sundays, but neglected to address the lack of any bureaucratic and economic institutions 
with the mission of improving living conditions in Wales (Davies 1989). 
 By contrast, Plaid Cymru, started from humbler beginnings than did Cymru Fydd.  
It was grounded in industrialized Wales and its members were well aware of the 
condition of Wales as an internal colony of the UK.  While economic conditions were not 
the impetus for twentieth century nationalism, the image of Wales as an internal colony 
was an influence on nationalists’ attempts to revalorize (in the sense of establishing a new 
value of) Welsh culture, to invigorate the Welsh economy by exploiting bureaucratic 
agencies established after World War II so as to introduce regional development 
programs, and to address problems of class inequities by adopting socialist ideology 
(Davies 1989). 
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 In regards to education, Plaid Cymru has advocated changing those approaches 
that are “completely alien to Welsh values”, such as using the competitive market as a 
model for school administration.1  Plaid Cymru has opposed the idea of schools as 
competitive markets to the idea of schools as resources for the community.  Strangely, the 
diminished ability of Welsh colleges and universities to compete against those in England 
is used by Plaid Cymru as a reason to have the Assembly oversee higher education in 
Wales.  With respect to culture and communications, Plaid Cymru has supported funding 
of a foundation for cultural policy, an increase in the budget of the Cymraeg BBC 
channel (S4C), and review of the legislative framework for Cymraeg. 
 In regards to issues of governance, Plaid Cymru has emphasized “the need for 
Wales to have the powers to act effectively for its own benefit”, to “have powers similar 
to those of Scotland”, which can make laws governing Scotland.2  While arguing for 
more legislative power to be vested in Wales' National Assembly, the Manifesto 
advocates solidarity among stateless national regions in Europe.  In addition, Plaid 
Cymru has advocated that, on one end of the spectrum, local governments should be 
given more power and that, on the other end of the spectrum, regions and nation-regions 
that have their own parliaments or assemblies should be allowed representation in a 
bicameral European Parliament (which currently only has one house).  In the past, Plaid 
Cymru urged application for “full member-state status” in the European Union for 
Wales.3  Today, Plaid Cymru international vision includes commitment “to an 
independent Wales as a full member of the European Union”.4 
                                                 
1  http://www.plaidcymru.org/manifestosection2.html; accessed April 21, 2003. 
2  http://www.plaidcymru.org/manifestosectionb.html; accessed April 21, 2003. 
3  http://www.plaidcymru.org/manifestosectionb.html; accessed April 21, 2003. 
4  http://www.english.plaidcymru.org/international-affairs/; accessed March 1, 2011. 
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Fighting Independence Within 
 On April 9, 1999, BBC News reported that nonspecific “opponents” were 
“warning” that “Plaid is a separatist party which will only be happy when Wales has 
gained total independence from the rest of the UK”.  In the same article, entitled 
“Nationalists ‘don't want independence’ ”, then-leader, Dafydd Wigley was given a 
chance to defend Plaid Cymru:  
 
We haven’t used the term full independence or independence at all in any 
stage in our history.  We have used the term self-government and self-
government within the European context as we believe that is the relevant 
term.  We don’t believe that any country is independent in the 21st century 
in the way that it was interpreted in the 19th century.  There is 
interdependence between countries and particularly between the countries 
in Europe. . .  We are part of a united Europe. The separatists we have 
within these islands are the little Englanders who want to separate England 
away from the continent we are part of. 
 
 The article was treated as if it were merely an opportunity for the leader of Plaid 
Cymru to give a presentation of the party's position on various constitutional questions 
(e.g., devolution) and to speculate on the outcome of the election.  No other individual 
was represented explicitly in the article.  It was likely also an opportunity for BBC News 
to create a bit of controversy. 
 Ten days later, on April 19, BBC News reported that “Welsh independence claim 
[has been] scorned”.  In an article with that headline, BBC News reported that “Plaid 
Cymru is coming under attack over its claims that it has never sought independence for 
Wales” and paraphrased Mr. Wigley’s position.  The BBC News stick seemed to have 
stirred up a hornets nest, for leader of the Liberal Democrats in Wales, Mike German, 
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was portrayed as countering with references to Plaid Cymru documents in which the 
latter party advocated independence: 
 
The Liberal Democrats have produced quotations from past Plaid Cymru 
documents which they say prove that Welsh nationalist leaders, including 
Mr Wigley, have repeatedly used the word "independence" over the years.  
Welsh Lib Dem leader, Mike German, said Mr Wigley could not escape 
the fact that Plaid Cymru was born out of a desire to break away from 
England.  ‘But the people of Wales know that wriggly Wigley and his 
cohorts live in never never land. A breakaway Wales is not practical, 
economic or desirable. It would not work’, he said. 
 
The article continued, reporting that the Labour Party had entered the fray: 
 
Labour took the same tack, accusing Plaid of trying to trick voters over 
hidden ambitions to separate Wales from the rest of Britain.  Peter Hain, 
the Welsh Office minister spearheading Labour’s drive, claimed Plaid 
Cymru had even wiped out references to independence from its Website.  
‘We have proof that Website pages have been removed, previous general 
election manifestos hidden from view and a new membership card 
airbrushed of its references to separatism.  ‘There is hard evidence of a 
clumsy campaign by Plaid to censor its own beliefs for public 
consumption’, he said. 
 
Plaid Cymru spokesman Ieuan Wyn Jones spun the issue as the use of “smear tactics” 
and Mr. Wigley was quoted as accusing the Labour Party of “deliberately using every 
ploy to keep away from the economic agenda”. 
 Nowhere in the literature the party produced prior to the 2001 election of 
Members of (the UK) Parliament, Plaid Cymru’s “Manifesto”, is there a suggestion that 
the party would advocate secession, since even application for member-state status would 
occur only after receiving popular approval in a referendum.  Clearly, Plaid Cymru’s 
agenda is comprehensive, with many of the specifically Welsh-oriented initiatives being 
inapparent without background knowledge of Wales.  The party's agenda—which 
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addresses agricultural issues, the water resources that originate in Wales, bilingualism, 
Welsh-medium television, poverty and health issues that are proportionately higher than 
for England, and the coal mining history – combines issues specific to Wales. 
 The next day, BBC News again featured Plaid Cymru (though more explicitly this 
time, since it featured other parties as well) by providing a kind of summary of the party's 
positions on the issues of “Health”, “Education”, “Nationalism”, “Europe”, “Economy”, 
“Environment”, “Transport”, and “Agriculture”.  This material was taken from the party 
“Manifesto”, while the sections on nationalism and Europe were also taken from those 
statements that were printed on April 9, 1999 and attributed to Mr. Wigley, as quoted 
above.  However, the BBC News story on April 20, 1999 that featured Plaid Cymru did 
not mark the end of the political exchange.  That public exchange resumed two weeks 
later, on the eve of the election. 
 Two days before the Assembly elections, on May 4, 1999, BBC News published a 
story with the bizarre headline, “Lib Dems rule out Welsh separatism”.  It is bizarre 
because it is unlikely the Liberal Democrats ever seriously considered advocating that 
Wales should become a separate state.  The news agency was covering what was, of 
course, a nearly last minute effort to portray Plaid Cymru as a separatist party: 
 
Paddy Ashdown has made it clear the Liberal Democrats will ‘not be 
party’ to any attempts by Plaid Cymru to make Wales independent from 
the UK.  The Lib Dems could hold the balance of power in the Welsh 
Assembly if both Labour and Plaid fail to win an overall majority in the 
elections on Thursday.  But the Lib Dem leader dismissed any talk of a 
political alliance with Plaid Cymru until the nationalists made a clean 
break from separatism.  ‘The Lib Dems will not be party to any move that 
leads to the break up of the UK—forget it’, said Mr Ashdown. 
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The article implicitly represented Plaid Cymru, restating the responses already quoted 
above by party leader Mr. Wigley and party spokesman Mr. Jones: separatism and 
independence were not issues of any current debate.  Interestingly, no Plaid 
representatives were quoted, but their position on separatism was nonetheless fairly 
represented. 
 One more attempt by the Liberal Democrats to confuse voters was made on the 
day of the election, May 6, 1999, via BBC News.  In an article entitled “Divorce is 
costly—Lib Dems”, the specter of separatism comes again to haunt the nationalist party.  
Once again, the news agency represents the Plaid Cymru position that that there was no 
secessionist agenda.  However, the article ends with explicit reference made to Plaid 
Cymru documents that supposedly advocated Welsh secession.  According to this 
election day article, the Labour Party had (apparently in the late April stage of the 
controversy) revealed a statement from Plaid Cymru's 1983 election manifesto, which 
said the party “supports the right of every nation to enjoy independence”. 
 
